

HISTORY OF AURANGZIB

MAINLY BASED ON PERSIAN SOURCES

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PREFACE

3rd edition, (July, 1928.)

The new materials that have come into my hands between the publication of the second and third editions of this volume are (1) an old Assamese *Buranji*, edited by H. C. Gosvami, (Gauhati, 1922), (2) two MSS. (both incomplete and only partly overlapping) of the letters of Hamid-ud-din, who was originally a servant of the household of Aurangzib's father-in-law, Shah Nawaz Khan, and latterly became a Mughal faujdar in Malwa, (3) the Rajasthani poem *Raj-vilas* by Man, printed by the Nagari Pracharini Sabha, (4) a summary in Hindi of the unpublished Rajput bardic chronicles and traditions relating to the birth and early years of Ajit Singh, prepared for me by Rao Gopal Singh Rathor (the Chief of Kharwa), (5) all the daily bulletins of Aurangzib's Court still preserved at Jaipur, i.e., the residue of what Col. James Tod sent to the Royal Asiatic Society of London, and (6) the Persian letters included in Kaviraj Shyamal Das's Hindi History of Mewar, entitled *Vira-vinod*, 4 vols.

But the additional information supplied by these sources to the present volume has been disappointingly small. The Assamese *Buranji* is much less full and authentic than the Ahom chronicles previously used by me. The letters of Hamid-ud-din tell us only of petty raids and minor alarms. The *Raj-vilas* has been already abstracted by Tod, and it is after all a Court-poet's exaggerated eulogy and not a sober history. The mass of *Akhbarat* discovered at Jaipur unfortunately commences just where this volume ends and throws no light on the war in Rajputana before Aurangzib's departure for the Deccan. The current Rajput account summarized by Rao Gopal Singh cannot be always reconciled with the contemporary Persian sources ; the local bards' poems

are marked by rhetoric and hyperbole, their sources are unknown, and their authors mostly belonged to times later than the events described and wrote in a credulous eulogistic vein, giving a loose rein to their imagination or feeding local and family pride. In short, they embody uncritical popular tradition and not authentic facts. In the broad outlines and the general result, however, they agree with the narrative I have constructed from the contemporary Persian records. The *Vira-utnod* alone is of value, but only with reference to Mewar affairs.

The war in Marwar forms only a small portion of the subject matter of this volume, which embraces the events of Northern India during 23 years, and therefore the sense of proportion and the lack of space have prevented me from including many interesting but minute details (which are evidently true) from the narrative supplied by Rao Gopal Singh. My theme is the history of the Delhi empire and not that of a provincial tribe.

Subject to these remarks, minute corrections and additions have been made in this edition. A new appendix (X) has been added, giving the current Rathor narrative of the war, necessarily in an abridged form. The second Bibliography which appeared in the first two editions has been now omitted, as I intend to give one consolidated list in the proposed sixth volume of this work, which will also contain the index.

First edition, 1916.

Second edition (1921.) Many minute corrections have been made and two and a half pages of additional matter inserted. Appendix VIII of the first edition (Prince Akbar's letters chronologically arranged) has been here omitted to save space.

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THE HISTORY OF AURANGZIB

CHAPTER XXVI

THE FIRST HALF OF THE REIGN : A GENERAL SKETCH,
1658—1682

§1. *The contrast between the two halves of
Aurangzib's reign.*

The reign of Aurangzib is naturally divided into two equal parts of about 25 years each, the first of which he passed in Northern India and the second in the Deccan. During the earlier of these two periods the centre of interest lies unmistakably in the North, not because the Emperor lived there, but because the most important developments, civil and military, concerned this region, while the South figured as a far-off and negligible factor. In the second half of the reign the situation is reversed : all the resources of the empire are concentrated in the Deccan ; the Emperor, his Court and family, the bulk of the army, and all his best officers live there for a quarter century, and Hindustan sinks back to a place of secondary importance. True, the administration goes on in the North as before, but the empire's centre of life is now in the South ; Delhi, Agra and Lahor

lose their proud position as the abode of royalty, the throbbing heart of the State, and the centre of the wit and wisdom of the land; they become mere provincial cities, the seats of viceroys; their palaces still stand but are untenanted; the imperial furniture and upholstery are packed and kept under lock and key, and a curious visitor has difficulty in viewing them even with an imperial permit.

The generals and soldiers in their enforced exile in the Deccan sigh for a return to their northern homes; one homesick noble offers the Emperor a lakh of Rupees for leave to spend only one year at Delhi; the Rajput soldiery complain that their breed is dying out by reason of their lifelong stay in the Deccan away from home and family; even the Prime Minister diplomatically suggests that the imperial arms in the South have been crowned with success and therefore the Court may now go back to Delhi without loss of prestige. But nothing can shake Aurangzib's obstinate resolve to "root out" the Marathas.*

During this period, practically extending over one human generation, the administration in Northern India naturally falls into decay at the withdrawal of the master's eye and the ablest officers; the people

* Imperial furniture packed up in Delhi, *M. A.* 383. Homesick noble, *M. U.* i. 457. Prime Minister's advice, *Anecdotes* § 46.

grow poorer; the upper classes decline in morals, intelligence and useful activity; finally, lawlessness breaks out in most parts, and we notice the first rudimentary beginnings of that political economic and cultural breakdown which has rightly given the name of "the Great Anarchy" to the 18th century in Northern India. In the closing years of Aurangzib's life, Hindustan merely meant a place where the much-needed money for the Deccan wars was to be raised and from which disturbances were reported with annoying frequency.

During the first half of the reign the centre of interest in Northern India shifts with startling rapidity and range. The imperial banners march from Kabul in the extreme west to the Namrup hills in the extreme east of India, from Tibet beyond our northern limits to Bijapur across the southern boundary of the empire. We see wars with the Mongoloid Ahoms of Assam and Burmese of Arracan, with the aboriginal Cheros of Palamau in South Bihar and the hillmen of Morang and Kumaun northward of North Bihar, with Marathas and Bijapuris, Rajputs and Afghans, besides many operations on a smaller scale against lawless peasants and chiefs in several widely separated districts. We see the Emperor's religious intolerance fully unmasked, and we also see the first signs of the Hindu

revival which was the natural response of a living creed to the stimulus of persecution by Government.

This frequent change of scene and subject is apt to bewilder the reader by its variety and suddenness, and give him the impression of a set of detached political acts, unless he keeps his eyes fixed on the centre of the entire political machinery, the Emperor, whose will guided the whole administration and whose policy gave the only possible unity to seemingly unconnected acts in various provinces.

But the affairs of the Deccan during these 25 years are excluded from the present volume, because they did not affect the administration in Northern India nor influence the fate of the empire in general, as they did in the second quarter century of the reign. Moreover, there was such intricate action and reaction between the four Powers in the Deccan,—namely, Bijapur, Golkonda, Shivaji and the Mughals,—that the history of the Peninsula can be studied only as a whole. It is impossible to get a proper historical perspective and to trace events to their real causes if we follow the Mughals only—their wars and alliances with any of the Deccani kingdoms, without taking note of what was happening in the other two kingdoms at the same time. The internal history of each of these three States as well as their foreign relations must be studied if we wish to understand the true

course of affairs in the Deccan from the rise of Shivaji to the fall of Shambhuji. There is an organic unity in the theme and it will form the subject matter of a volume by itself.

§2. *Aurangzib's personal history and movements, 1657—1681.*

A survey of the first half of the reign may well begin with the personal history of the Emperor. After his grand coronation at the commencement of the second year of his reign (13 May, 1659), Aurangzib lived at Delhi, guiding the State from the capital. News continued to reach him of the success of his armies and the removal of his domestic enemies one by one. Dara was put to death on 30th August, 1659, and Shuja driven out of India in May next, while Murad Bakhsh and Sipihr Shukoh were safe in prison. There remained only Sulaiman Shukoh, the eldest son of Dara: but he, too, was given up by his protector and brought to Delhi in chains, (27th December, 1660). A year afterwards Murad was done to death (4 Dec., 1661) and in the following May Sulaiman Shukoh also. The Emperor's eldest son, Muhammad Sultan deserted to the enemy, but soon came back (8 Feb., 1660) and was confined in a fortress for the rest of his life.

At Prince Muhammad's going over to Shuja and the recovery of Rajmahal, the capital of Bengal,

by the two, there was much alarm and slackness among the imperialists. Aurangzib advanced from Delhi to Garh Mukteshwar on the Ganges (13-24 Nov., 1659), in order to be nearer at hand to march to Bengal in case of need. But the danger was not really serious, and the Emperor spent most of his time in hunting. Early next January he left Garh Mukteshwar for Allahabad by way of Soron, again hunting on the way. But as the situation in the eastern theatre of war improved under Mir Jumla's able control, the Emperor found his own presence there unnecessary and turned aside from the way, reaching Delhi on 13th February, 1660. (*A. N.* 444—464).

Thereafter he dwelt at the capital and received grand embassies sent from all parts of the outer Muslim world to wish him well on his accession. For the benefit of these foreign guests he made that lavish display of his wealth and power which "dazzled even eyes which were accustomed to the pomp of Versailles." From February 1661, when the first of these missions arrived, to October 1667, in the space of less than seven years, the Emperor spent over twenty-one lakhs of Rupees in receiving and sending out embassies, besides eleven lakhs given to the ex-king of Kashghar, who took refuge in India in 1668.

In the 5th year of his reign, Aurangzib made a

trip to Kashmir, leaving Delhi on 8th Dec. 1662 and returning to that city on 18th Jan. 1664. In February 1666 his father's death took him to Agra. So long as Shah Jahan lived in captivity, Aurangzib had naturally avoided Agra and held his Court at Delhi. But the death of the deposed Emperor removed this embarrassment, and his next enthronement (that of the 9th year) was held in Agra palace (March, 1666) with the utmost display and magnificence. In November 1662, on the eve of starting for Kashmir, he had removed the imperial treasures and precious articles of Agra fort—the hoardings of three long reigns,—to Delhi for safer keeping. They were now (May 1666) brought back to Agra in 1,400 carts and lodged in the fort for good. In October of the same year the Court returned to Delhi and stayed there for the next $7\frac{1}{2}$ years, with the exception of two years (Dec. 1669—October 1671) spent at Agra again. (*A. N.* 759, 962.)

In 1674 the seriousness of the Afridi rising forced the Emperor to go to Hasan Abdal, to be near enough to Peshawar to direct the operations of his armies. Here he lived from 26th June, 1674 to 23rd December, 1675, returning to Delhi on 27th March, 1676. Early in 1679, the death of Maharajah Jaswant Singh and the opportunity it presented of annexing the Jodhpur State drew him to Ajmir. His first stay in the latter city was short (19 Feb.—10

March), as there was none to oppose his policy. But the Rathor nobles successfully conveyed Jaswant's heir, Ajit Singh, to Marwar and raised the flag of national independence which all the resources of the Mughal empire after a generation of struggle failed to defeat. So, Aurangzib had to leave Delhi again (3 Sep. 1679), never to return to his capital in life or death. In Rajputana he spent the next two years and then, early in the 25th year of his reign, he started for the Deccan where he finally exhausted his life and empire after 25 years of strenuous but un-availing toil. With this southward march from Ajmir (8 September, 1681), the first half of his reign ends, and a new scene, marked by complete dramatic unity, opens, which will be described in the Fourth and Fifth Volumes.

§ 3. *Correct dates of his regnal years and coronation celebrations.*

Some European writers have made the mistake of asserting that confusion was introduced into the dating of events and the keeping of accounts in consequence of Aurangzib's frequently changing the time of the official *commencement* of his regnal years. (Duff, i. 160 n.) But the truth is that every year of his reign began on exactly the same lunar month and day, *viz.*, the first of Ramzan; and official documents and letters dated in the years of the reign, therefore,

present no uncertainty at all as to the exact time meant. What Aurangzib did was to change, but only once, the date when the coronation *festivities* were to begin and he repeatedly curtailed their duration as his puritanical moroseness or financial distress increased. A clear statement of the case here will, I hope, set the matter at rest for ever.

Aurangzib first *sat on the throne* on 1st Ziqada, year 1068 of the Hijera era (21 July, 1658); but his second or grand coronation took place on 24th Ramzan, 1069 (5 June, 1659), and only the next year's act of sitting on the throne on the same day of Ramzan. But, in the second year it was ordered that in official documents *every year of the reign* should be *calculated from 1st Ramzan*, both because it was the commencement of a holy month and also because on that day in 1068 he had crossed the Chambal to fight Dara. The actual *enthronement* took place on the 24th Ramzan of his second year, because the astrologers considered it a most lucky day.

As for the coronation rejoicings,* they were kept in abeyance in the 1st year, but in the 2nd year they extended from 24th Ramzan (the day of enthronement) to 10th Zihijja (the day of the Id-uz-zuha), a

* A N 155 (1st year), 388 390 (2nd year), 481 (3rd year), 613 (4th year), 816 (6th year), M A 162 (21st year).

period of $2\frac{1}{2}$ months. In the 3rd year the Court festivities were reduced to eight days only, *i.e.*, from the day of actual enthronement to the 1st of Shawwal (the Id-ul-fitr). But it was found inconvenient to feast and rejoice in a season of religious fasting and prayer, and so, from the 4th year onwards the Emperor sat on the throne immediately at the end of the month of Ramzan, *i.e.*, on the day of the Id-ul-fitr, (sometimes a day later), and the celebrations ran for 10 days from that date. This rule was followed throughout the remainder of the reign. Only in his 6th year there was no rejoicing, as the Court was then in mourning for the death of Mir Jumla. In the 21st year (1677) he abolished the celebrations, the making of presents to him by the nobles, and all kinds of display at Court on the occasion of the coronation anniversary.

§4. *Aurangzib's illness, 1662.*

Early in the 5th year of his reign, Aurangzib had a severe illness,* which was aggravated by his obstinate devotion to work and religious austerities. The days of Ramzan (10 April—9 May, 1662) were extremely hot and long, and this being the month of the fast, the Emperor could not quench his thirst or repose in bed during the day-time, but transacted

* *A. N.* 745—753; *Bernier*, 123—126; *Storia*, ii. 54—61.

business, tried cases, and performed his prayers as regularly as in other seasons. It used to be midnight before he finished his prayers and other duties and found time to take his meals which were scanty and simple like a hermit's, so as to be in keeping with the character of the holy month. Even his nights were devoted to prayer, and if sleep stole on his eyelids and he reclined in bed, he would start up at the first consciousness of it and then begin to count his beads again ! Thus, overwork and lack of sleep and proper nourishment during an entire month in the frightful heat of a Delhi summer, greatly weakened him and his body became full of pain. Even when the period of fasting ended, he gave himself no greater repose, but insisted on holding Court twice daily and doing regular work in spite of ill health.

* At last in the afternoon of 12th May, a fever seized him ; he went to the Private Audience as usual, but was forced in a few minutes to retire to the harem. Next day his temperature rose ; the doctors who bled him let so much blood out that he became extremely weak ; his agony was frightful ; the fever-heat "scorched him like the rays of the sun" ; at times he fell into fits of insensibility and a deadly pallor spread over his face. Weeping women surrounded his couch, expecting the end at any moment. The greatest anxiety and distraction reigned in the palace and the capital, and the evil was aggravated by the rival

movements of his sons to gain adherents and secure their own succession. His sister Raushanara, who ruled the harem in reward of having supported him during the War of Succession, is said to have usurped the charge of the sick man and excluded all save her own friends from his bedside. Even Aurangzib's queen Nawab Bai, the mother of his second son, was dragged away by the hair from her husband's chamber by Raushanara during the crisis of the disease. The people of Delhi were in wild terror at the prospect of war and rapine as soon as the supreme authority would close his eyes. One man rule is not an unmixed blessing.

The public anxiety was prolonged through the 5th day, when his fever and weakness continued without abatement. But such was Aurangzib's strength of mind that he showed his face in the Audience Hall for a moment that evening and the next, leaning on a mace and receiving the presentation of the royal standards. The courtiers were reassured by the sight of His Majesty, and the rumours of his death in the bazars were stilled. On the 7th day the four highest grandees of the State were granted audience at his bedside. The illness continued for a month more, but there was no longer any cause for public alarm or disorder. On 22nd May he sat for a time on the marble throne in front of his bedroom in Delhi fort, and on Friday the 23rd

and 30th he went to the Jama Mosque in a litter to pray in public. During this period he also showed himself daily to the outside public at the balcony of morning salute (*jharokha-i-darshan*), and attended the presentation of the standards in the Audience Hall in the evening, though still weak and ailing.

Indeed, he could have recovered much sooner if he had spared himself such exertions. But his spirit was unconquerable by the weakness of the flesh. Not only did he insist on appearing in public with the fever on him, as we have described above, but he also transacted much business during this time. At last on 17th June his malady took a decided turn for the better, and a week afterwards he performed the customary bath of complete recovery.

There were rejoicings all over the country. Raushanara, in particular, gave a grand feast on her beloved brother's escape from death. The absolute peace that was maintained throughout the empire during this critical month and a half is the highest tribute to the strength of Aurangzib's character* and the stability of the rule he had founded. The Indian world seemed to have been laid under a spell by that

* Bernier's *Agha* (Danishmand Khan) on hearing of Aurangzib's fortitude during illness, exclaimed, "What strength of mind! What invincible courage! Heaven preserve thee, Aurangzib, for greater achievements! Thou art not yet destined to die!" (p. 125).

masterful will and durst not stir a finger until he was known to be dead beyond hope of revival.

On his recovery, Aurangzib was advised to regain strength and refresh his spirits by a visit to the pleasant valley of Kashmir, then known as the "Earthly Paradise." He left Delhi on 8th December, 1662, reaching Lahor on 8th February next, where three months were spent in supervising the administration. Then, early in May 1663 he started for Kashmir,* entering the valley through the Pir Panjal Pass at Bhimbar. The Court passed 2½ months most happily at Srinagar, and then moved from one delightful spot to another enjoying the beauty of the prospect, and setting out on return before winter. Lahor was reached on 29th Sep. 1663 and Delhi on 18th January next.

* *A N* 819—840, Bernier, 391—428 (entirely wrong about the year, see *Storia*, II 66) According to *M A* (46) and *K K* (II 176) a terrible accident during the outward journey depressed Aurangzib's mind and made him resolve to give up the idea of visiting Kashmir in future "While crossing the terrible Pir Panjal Pass, a frightened elephant turned back from the front and ran towards Bhimbar like a sudden calamity or a whirlwind A terrible confusion fell on the men and animals in that narrow pass Some female elephants and porters fell into the pit of destruction at the attack of this moving mountain and were so thoroughly destroyed that not a bone (of them) could be seen On hearing of this accident the heart of the gracious Emperor was greatly moved and from that very time he resolved never again to visit Kashmir" It is surprising that the detailed official history, *A. N.*, is silent about the incident, which Bernier, an eyewitness, also gives (407) though in a different form.

§5. *Imperial hunt.*

During these early years passed at Delhi, when there was no cloud on the horizon of the frontiers, Aurangzib often devoted himself to the pleasures of the chase in the neighbourhood of the capital or in the Doab, though in old age he condemned *shikar* as the business of the idle (*beḡar*). The Court chronicles have preserved full descriptions of the imperial hunt.* Thus we read that in January 1660 he shot five tigers in one day near Garh Mukteshwar; in December 1661 he killed two fighting *nūlgaus* with two successive shots, near Palam and set up three stone monuments (*taḡhtgah*) on the scenes of this feat of marksmanship; and in September 1663 he bagged two tigresses in one day on the bank of the Chinab at the foot of the Jammu hills. In hawking, too, he was equally successful: in 1660 in about a month the falcons slipped by him killed 258 small bustards besides waterfowl on the Ganges, while in the season 1662 they struck down 150 herons (*ḡulang*). Another favourite game was the *qamurgha* hunting of the Turks. A large circle of beaters drove the game into the centre, where 355 deer were crowded together (1662). The Emperor himself shot down eight of them (six with matchlocks and two

* A N 459—464, 645—6, 673—5, 839 Also bare mentions in *Aḡhbarat*

with the bow) and his companions forty others; 31 were captured alive and the rest were set free. At first nearly a thousand more had been enclosed, but even the deer can fight when driven at bay; they fell in a body on the beaters, gored five of the men (two fatally) and, breaking the cordon, escaped.

§6. *Minor conquests on the outskirts of the empire.*

The early years of Aurangzib's reign saw the expansion of the empire in many directions. First, Daud Khan, the governor of Bihar, annexed Palamau (1662). Next came the conquest of ASSAM. After the flight of Shuja from Dacca, Mir Jumla, the governor of Bengal, was ordered to punish the Rajahs of Kuch Bihar and Assam, who had raided and seized Mughal territory in North Bengal during the late civil war. He started from Dacca on 1st November, 1661, with a very large army and fleet, and entered the Kuch and Ahom capitals on 19th December and 17th March respectively. But from May to November 1662 he was besieged by floods and the enemy, and his communication with the outer world and the fleet on the Brahmaputra was cut off. The Mughals suffered terrible hardship and loss from famine and pestilence and the night attacks of the enemy. But, when the ground became dry again, he resumed the offensive, early in November, and pursued the Ahom king up to Tipam at the mouth of the Namrup hills.

At the beginning of January 1663 a treaty was signed by the king's agents, securing the retirement of the invaders in return for a large piece of territory and a vast tribute in gold and elephants. Mir Jumla, stricken with a mortal illness in the pestiferous swamps of Assam, died just before reaching Dacca (31st March, 1663). But in November 1667 the Assamese recovered Gauhati and pushed the Mughal frontier back to Dhubri (Rangamati). The Emperor sent Rajah Ram Singh with a large Rajput contingent to recover the province, but after seven years of desultory and futile warfare (1669—1676), Ram Singh was recalled. In February 1679 Gauhati was sold to the Mughals by an Ahom noble, only to be recovered by their Rajah two years later.

Shaista Khan, the successor of Mir Jumla in the viceroyalty of Bengal, restored security to the great water-ways and rich riverside districts of East Bengal by capturing CHATGAON. He first bought over the Portuguese half-caste mariners (*Firingis*) settled at Chatgaon, whose trade was piracy under the protection of the Rajah of Arracan. Then he wrested the island of Sondip, a halfway house in the Bay of Bengal, from its rebel zamindar (18 Nov. 1665). Lastly the combined Mughal and Firingi fleets defeated the Arracanese navy in two engagements and captured the city of Chatgaon, the nest of the pirates (26 January, 1666). It was annexed to Bengal again.

Another success of this period was the acknowledgment of Mughal suzerainty by TIBET.* In 1665 the Mughal governor of Kashmir sent to the ruler of Tibet a mission with a letter from Aurangzib threatening invasion unless he agreed to introduce "the marks of Islam" into his country and publicly profess obedience to the empire. The chief submitted in fear, advanced six miles from his capital to honour the imperial letter on the way, and promised obedience to it. The two demands were carried out; the first by the building of a mosque and the chanting of the call to prayer in a land where they had been unknown before, and the second by the public proclamation of the Emperor's titles and the minting of gold and silver coins bearing his name at the Tibetan capital. The embassy was honourably sent back with a loyal reply, a golden key emblematic of the surrender of the whole country, and a thousand *muhars* and two thousand Rupees stamped with Aurangzib's name, as well as some rare products of the country, for presentation to the Emperor.

Tibet in those times is described rather vaguely as a country more than six months' journey in length

* A. N. 921—923. Bernier (422—426) describes the reception of a Tibetan embassy by Aurangzib in Kashmir (1663). *M. A.* 236. *Tarikh-i-Kashmiri Azami*, 124 b and 131 b. K. K. ii 185 (useless). The ruler of Tibet is named in the Persian works as *Daldan Namjal*, sometimes as *Daldal Muhamal*. The first word may be *Dalai*.

and one to two months' journey in breadth. Its armed strength is said to have been more than 12,000 cavalry and infantry, and the State officials were mostly of the Black Qalmaq clan of Tartars.

This clan invaded Tibet in 1683 and the overlordship which Aurangzib had so easily placed on the land was invoked for its protection. An imperial force was sent under Fidai Khan, the son of Ibrahim Khan (viceroy of Kashmir), who returned after expelling the Qalmaq invaders and bringing away a vast booty with him. The official history, however, says that the imperialists conquered Tibet from its native ruler and annexed it to the Mughal dominions. This was unlikely to have been the case.

§7. *Lawless risings in the provinces.*

The disturbances of internal peace in Aurangzib's reign were of three classes: (a) The outbreaks inevitable during a succession dispute among the princes, when the collapse of civil authority tempts plunderers and ambitious chiefs to enrich themselves by lawless acts without fear of punishment. (b) Hindu risings against the policy of temple destruction which began to be enforced throughout the empire in the 12th year. (c) Revolts of vassal princes. We have also a few sporadic cases of defiance of imperial authority by petty chieftains in out-of-the-way or jungly places, which had not yet been reduced

to the orderly condition of the longer settled and more civilized districts of the empire.

In order to understand the real cause of many of the village disorders in Mughal times, we must bear in mind that the population was dynamic, not static. Internal movements of the people were constantly going on. In different generations different tribes were migrating to new districts and trying to push away the older settlers and make a home for themselves. * Or, as it oftener happened, a clan that had entered a district as servants and tenants, in a few generations grew strong enough to overthrow their masters and become the dominant tribe and owner of the land. Thus, the Tenwa Jats first entered Mathura and Aligarh about 1600, but sixty years later they had multiplied so greatly as to make themselves lords of the Joar pargana. Their chief Nandram withheld revenue during the War of Succession, but had to submit to Aurangzib about 1660. (*N. W. P. Gaz.*, ii. 428).

The first year of Aurangzib's reign was spent in campaigning against his brothers, and the second and third in teaching the enemies of law and order that they had got a master again and that the authority of Government could no longer be safely defied.

The district of Mathura had been the *jagir* of Dara Shukoh. He was a popular ruler, and, as he had patronized pandits and even coquetted with

Hinduism by making gifts to temples, his fall was resented by his tenants. After Samugarh, when Dara's troops and officials fled from the district, the villagers took advantage of the absence of administrators, and there was much plundering. On 6th June, 1658, Aurangzib sent a new *faujdar* with a strong force to chastise these lawless men, but it took time to re-establish order in that region. In June 1662, the district of Koil (Aligarh) was so much disturbed that troops had to be sent from the capital to suppress the disorders.*

The Hindu revolts provoked by Aurangzib's bigotry, as well as his dealings with the Sikhs, will be treated in detail in a subsequent chapter. The minor risings may be dismissed with brief notices here. In November 1659 large numbers of Rajputs of the Bais and other clans under a leader named Bahadur Panchkoti rebelled and plundered the highways and villages in Baiswara. Indeed, defiance of

* Mathura disturbances, *A. N.* 115; Koil, 752 (text has *Kul*). Minor risings:--Baiswara, *A. N.* 450 451 and *Insha-i-Raushan Kalam* (for last decade of reign); Chakra-sen Bhil, *Pad.* i. 449, *A. N.* 474, 615, and *Akh.* 2⁰/₃; Bhupal Singh Gond, *Akh.* year 12, sheets 15, 24, 26, 27, year 13, sh. 9, 15; Mina, *Akh.* 1⁰/₂; Uchhrain, *Akh.* 1⁸/₈; Kishtawar, *Akh.* 1³/₈; Allahabad zamindars, *Akh.* 1¹/₂; Bir Singh Gaur, *M. A.* 137, probably same as Nar Singh Gaur of Ishwardas 73a; Alam &c., *M. A.* 146; Hamir-sen, *Akh.* 3⁰/₁₇; Zamindar of Jammu, *ibid.* 1⁰/₉; Orissa zamindars *Muraqat-i-Hasan*, 52, 58 (Keonjhar), 116, 130, 181 (Hijli), 127 (all).

civil authority was the normal condition of the Baiswara peasantry, and the public revenue could be rarely gathered without the employment of an armed force. In the closing years of the reign fights between the local officers and the peasantry led by their tribal zamindars were very frequent here. The Sambal Afghans belonging to the *Niazai* clan crossed from Bannu to the eastern bank of the Indus river in May 1663 and plundered many Mughal outposts; but a large expedition with artillery defeated them, drove them back across the river, and seized booty valued at two lakhs of Rupees.*

Early in 1660, Chakra-sen, the Bhil zamindar of Ghatakheri near Bhilsa in Malwa, rose against the Government, gave up waiting upon the local *subahdar* and paying his customary tribute, and seized the neighbouring villages. Bhagwant Singh Hada, an imperial officer whose home was near by, was despatched to punish him, and captured the Bhil's stronghold in May. We next hear of Chakra-

* The Niazai Afghans were pushed out of Bannu by the Marwals in the 16th century. They then "spread across the Khattak-Niazai hills and colonized the plains upon both banks of the Indus." (*Imp. Gaz.* iv. 394). *A. N.* 828 says that they were removed by the Mughal Government from Dhankot (which Aurangzib had renamed Musazzamnagar) to the west bank of the Indus. The *Ain-i-Akbari*, ii. 401, (Jarrett), gives Dhankot ferry as "the place where the Indus is crossed for reaching the Bangash country." Erskine locates it near Khushalgarh "or perhaps Kalabagh", which latter is less likely.

sen as joining another rebel, Durjan Singh Hada, in Mau Maidanah (?) early in 1677, when forces had to be sent against both. In the same province Bhupal Singh, the son of Alam Singh, a Gond zamindar, rebelled in January 1669, but was expelled by the local officers from near Bhilsa. By October he had assembled 8,000 fighters under his banner, defeated the imperial faujdar of Chaukigarh,* and seized a number of outposts, and his power had grown so strong that the Emperor had to send four high generals against him. In January next Bhupal Singh wrote humbly making his submission and begging pardon. His brother, Murardas, was offered by Aurangzib the zamindari of Chaukigarh on condition of embracing Islam. But Bhupal Singh remained in arms for some time longer and had to be placed under the ban of the empire. Hamir-sen (probably a Bhil) rebelled in Shahabad, in December 1665, and the Rajah of Jammu in April 1667. In October 1669 there was a rising of the Mina tribe near Ajmir, which Ram Singh Gaur put down; but the village of Jandauli in pargana Alipur was ravaged by a Rajput chief.

The Rathor State of Idar, on the Rajput border of Gujrat, remained in perpetual turmoil during the

* Chaukigarh, in Bhupal territory, 47 miles south-east of Bhupal city and 16 miles north of the Narmada river; 23° 6 N. 78° 7 E.

reign. Taking advantage of internal discord, Prince Murad Bakhsh had occupied the chief town and stationed a Musalman faujdar there. But during the War of Succession, Punja, the son of the late Rao, had recovered Idar and he held it till his death. Then Mughal rule was restored for some time, though members of the dispossessed family continued to harass the imperialists and raid the villages of the province of Gujrat. In January 1670, one of these Rathor princes* surprised the Mughal outpost of Idar, slew 200 men and carried off much booty. Gopinath Rao expelled Sayyid Kamal, the Mughal faujdar, about 1675, and recovered Idar, where he reigned for 5 years. But the imperialists drove him out to a miserable death in 1680 and held Idar thereafter.

The irruption of the Uchhrain clan into Sebwān (west of Sindh) early in 1670, the withholding of tribute by the Rajah of Kishtawar south of the Kashmir hills in May, the rising of Hardi and other landowners in the province of Allahabad in the following January (1671), the rebellion of Bir Singh Gaur the grandson of Rajah Bithaldas, (? in Ajmir)

* The *Akhbarat*, 1³, calls him *Punja*. But according to the bardic chronicles relied on by Forbes (*Ras-mala*, i 446-448), Punja died in 1658, and his brother Arjundas and then his uncle Gopinath continued to resist the Mughals. Even after 1680 the local Rathors were not pacified.

in September 1674, and the disturbances caused by Alam, Ismail, and some other Afghan zamindars in Bihar,* next year, were all of a purely local nature and were evidently punished by the provincial officers. The zamindars of Keonjhar and Hijli in Orissa rebelled and withheld tribute at Aurangzib's accession, and there was a general remissness among the vassals here at that time.

Besides the natural anarchy of the War of Succession and the revolts against Aurangzib's anti-Hindu measures, some local disturbances were caused by pretenders setting up for his dead brothers or nephews. A false Dara Shukoh appeared in Gujrat in August 1663, a false Shuja in the Morang hills (west of Kuch Bihar) in May 1669, a second in the Yusufzai country in 1674, and a third in Kamraj (Kashmir) as late as 1704; a bogus Buland Akhtar (second son of Shuja) in the Allahabad province in July 1699, and a counterfeit of the rebel prince Akbar in the Deccan in March of the same year.†

* They are said to have risen in *Shahjahanpur* and *Kantgola*. There is a place of the former name 15 miles s. of Patna, and a place called Athman-gola, 28 m. e. of Patna. Rennell (sheets 4 and 9) gives a *Katganj* on the north bank of the Ganges opposite Athman-gola.

† False Dara (*A. N.* 837). Shuja (*M. A.* 84, *Storia*, ii. 193, *Tarikh-i-Azami*, third vicerealty of Ibrahim Khan), Buland Akhtar (*M. A.* 405), Akbar (*M. A.* 404, Ishwardas, 119 b).

§8. *Campaigns against Rajah of Bikanir and Champat Bundela.*

We now turn to rebels of a higher rank, namely vassal princes who had thrown off their allegiance to the crown. The first of them was Rao Karan of the Bhurtiya clan,* the chieftain of Bikanir, who had served in the Mughal army of the Deccan in the last year of Shah Jahan's reign, but had come back to Northern India at Dara's instigation without taking Aurangzib's leave. Afterwards he had put off paying the customary visit of respect to the new Emperor, and sent evasive replies to the royal letters summoning him to the Court. So, in August, 1660 an army, 9,000 strong, was sent under Anir Khan to bring him to reason. Rao Karan was cowed into submission, waited on the Emperor (27 Nov.) and received his pardon. Next January he was created a Commander of Three Thousand nominal rank (with 2,000 troopers) and sent to serve in the Deccan wars.

The next lawless Rajah to feel Aurangzib's heavy hand was Champat Rai Bundela.† The province of Bundelkhand, immediately south of

* Rao Karan of Bikanir, *A. N.* 570—572, 599—600, 603, 606.

† Champat Rai, *Chhatra-prakash*, cantos 5-8, (inaccurate trans. in Pogson's *Boondelas*, pp. 20-43); *A. N.* 78 (joins Aurangzib at Ujjain), 92, 163, 217 (sent to Lahor), 301, 630-633; *M. U.* ii. 510 (life); Abd. Hamid, ii. 221, 303 (campaign against him in Shah Jahan's time), 304 (enters Dara's service). For full details, Irvine's *Later Mughals*, ii. 219-227. *Mahewa* is 59 miles west of *Mahoba*.

Allahabad and east of Malwa, continued to be a centre of disorder throughout the 17th century. We have seen (Ch. I §3) how after the war of 1635 the family of Bir Singh Dev was dispossessed and the throne of Urchha given to Devi Singh, a descendant of his eldest brother. The new Rajah could not keep his turbulent clansmen in order and his authority never spread to Eastern Bundelkhand, where a family sprung from a younger brother of Bir Singh's father ruled as the lords of Mahewa. Their leader was Champat Rai who exercised great local influence by reason of his having been an old and important servant of Bir Singh and his successor. In 1636 he crowned Bir Singh's infant grandson Prithwiraj and tried to rule the country as regent for his puppet. His depredations led to a fresh Mughal invasion, at the end of which (June, 1642) he submitted and some years later entered Dara's service. When Aurangzib reached Ujjain after his victory over Jaswant, Champat Rai joined him (April, 1658) and according to three contemporary authors it was this Bundela chief who guided Aurangzib to the neglected ford over the Chambal which enabled the prince to turn the flank of Dara's position without loss. But the Mughal official history is silent as to the name of the guide, and it does not support the incredible assertion of the Bundela family-bard, Lal Kavi, that Aurangzib rewarded Champat's invaluable services

by creating him a Commander of Twelve Thousand. We only know that later in the year Champat and his second son Angad were sent to serve in the Mughal army posted in the Panjab. But when Shuja was advancing to Khajwah and the wildest rumours spread through the empire, Champat deserted, and returning home took to his old game of robbery. During the unrest caused by the desertion of Jaswant at Khajwah and Dara's march on Ajmir, Champat made extensive raids and rendered the Malwa road extremely unsafe for travellers. The Emperor sent an army under Subhkaran Bundela and other Rajput officers against the rebel (10 Feb., 1659); but at first their efforts failed, and Champat, taking advantage of the jungles and broken ground of the country long evaded capture and lived by robbery. But the Mughal army was reinforced by a contingent under Rajah Devi Singh Bundela, and the jagirdars and local troops of Malwa were also ordered to assist him. Everybody's hands were now turned against Champat, who fled from place to place closely followed by the imperialists. In fear of capture he could not stay anywhere long, but hid himself in the day-time and changed his abode every night. His followers dwindled away, as his losses in skirmishes could not be made up. Most of the local Bundela chieftains joined in the hunt after him, to prove their loyalty to the throne. His brother and

helper, Sujan Rai, lost his fort of Vedpur and committed suicide to escape arrest. Champat, daily tortured by ague and attended by only 25 retainers, was surprised near Urchha and forced to flee to Sahra in the Sarangpur district of Malwa, whose Rajah* (a chief of the Dhandhera clan) he had befriended in the days of his influence at Shah Jahan's Court. But even here, after a long and exhausting march, suffering from fever and hunger, he was driven off by the approach of the enemy. The outlaw gave himself up to despair and ran blindly onwards like a hunted animal. His mind became confused; nowhere could he find a way of escape. Even his own daughter (the wife of a local chief, Jnan Shah) refused asylum or food to his son Chhatra Sal, though he had been fasting for the last three days and was sinking with fatigue. The Dhandhera clan of Sahra were afraid of imperial wrath for having harboured the outlaw and now thought only of buying the forgiveness of Government by arresting and giving up their guest and refugee. Two hundred armed horsemen were sent by Sahib Rai Dhandhera to dog the steps of the unhappy fugitive under the pretext of forming his body-guard. At

* *Chhatra-prakash* is evidently wrong about this chief, whom it calls "Rajah Indraman of Sahra," because it is clear from the Persian accounts that (i) Indraman was released from prison in 1657 by Aurangzib and not by Champat and (ii) he did not die shortly before Champat, but lived for several years afterwards. (*M. U.* ii. 265).

last about the middle of October 1661, Champat Rai finding capture by these false friends imminent, and unable to defend himself in the extreme agony of fever and weakness, stabbed himself to death, and so also did his constant companion in life, Rani Kali Kumari. His severed head was sent to Aurangzib, as the peace-offering of the Dhandheras.

Thus perished Champat Rai, but his son Chhatra Sal lived to be long a thorn in the side of the Mughals. This gallant youth escaped from his father's enemies, and a few years afterwards he was, at the request of Jai Singh, enlisted in the Mughal army and employed in the war with Shivaji (1665). But the service of the Emperor galled his spirits; he secretly visited Shivaji, who exhorted him to protect Hinduism and resist Aurangzib's policy of religious persecution. Chhatra Sal then deserted from the Deccan, reached Bundelkhand (1671), and took to a life of rebellion and robbery. His history will be told in a later chapter. [Ch. 61.]

§ 9. *Palamau : its early history.*

We shall next pass on to the punishment of Rajah Pratap Rai Chero and the annexation of his kingdom, PALAMAU, which took place only two months after the fall of Champat Rai. Beyond the southern limits of Bihar lies the district of Palamau, as a sort of rugged step leading to the plateau of

Chota Nagpur on the south-east and the Central Provinces on the south-west. It is a wild country, broken up by spurs and peaks, with many rainy-weather rivers unfit for navigation and yielding no assured supply of water for irrigation. The southern part of the district is extremely rocky barren and jungly; in the northern part the valleys are a little wider and more fertile; but "nowhere in the district is it possible to get more than six or seven miles from a well-defined hill. There are no level plains, and the general appearance of the district is that of a confused mass of rocky hills, mostly covered by a dense growth of jungle. From the summit of a ridge or hill, the country appears covered by a waving sheet of low forest, with all signs of human habitation concealed from view, except perhaps a glimpse here and there of a low red tiled roof, a distant grove of trees, or an occasional herd of cattle." The population is scanty, living in small and scattered villages embosomed in the hollows among the hills.*

The dominant people of the district in the 17th and 18th centuries were the Cheros, a Dravidian people, said to have branched off from the Rajbhand tribe which once held sway over the country stretching from Gorakhpur to Bundelkhand and which has left there many remains of its former power.

* O' Malley's *Palamau District Gazetteer* (1907), 2, 3, 6-9.

The growing pressure of Rajput expansion in the Ganges valley dislodged the Cheros from the district of Shahabad. From the Rohtasgarh plateau, which they had long held, they sallied forth to the conquest of Palamau. They first entered this district as mercenary soldiers and then seized the throne by treacherously massacring their employers, Rajput chiefs of the Raksel clan (1613). The conquerors settled in the country in 12,000 families, and were given lands on condition of military service.

This was early in the 17th century. One of the Chero chiefs, "Medini Rai, surnamed the Just, (c. 1625), extended his sway and made himself lord paramount of the southern portion of Gaya and of large portions of Hazaribagh and Sirguja, and penetrated into Chota Nagpur as far as Doisa."* His clansmen were hereditary cattle-lifters and they made life and property insecure on their borders. The Rajahs had evidently come into conflict with the Mughal empire and been forced to promise tribute. When payment was neglected, Shaista Khan, the governor of Bihar, invaded the country (Oct., 1641—February, 1642), received the submission of the chief,

* On the race and early history of the Cheros, O' Malley's *Gaz.*, 18-20, 51-52, Beames, *Memoirs of the Races Folklore &c.*, 1. 33, 59-61. The upper classes of the Cheros in Palamau have now intermarried with the local Rajputs and call themselves *Chaubans*!

Pratap Rai, and returned with an indemnity of Rs. 80,000.

Next year, an attempt was made by the discontented nobles (including Pratap's own uncles) to dethrone him. Both sides begged help from the viceroy of Bihar, with profuse promises. Taking advantage of these family disputes, the Mughals gained possession of the fort of Deogan (near their Gaya frontier), reduced Pratap to the status of a Mughal *mansabdar*, and turned his ancestral kingdom into a fief, subject to an annual payment of one lakh of Rupees (1643).*

The tribute was exorbitant in amount, and beyond the power of the Rajah to pay regularly.†

* Early Mughal relations with Palamau, Abdul Hamid's *Padushah-namah*, II 248-250, 356-361

† The gross revenue collected from the Shahabad district seventy years afterwards was seven lakhs (*Chahar Gulshan*, 65 a) Palamau is incomparably less fertile and smaller in cultivable area. Pratap's heritage had been reduced by the cession of a productive tract in the N. E. corner to the Mughals (in 1643), and much of his territory was held on service tenure yielding no revenue in cash or grain. Under the British, the current demand of land revenue (1905) is only Rs. 1,09,000 (*Gaz.* 139). But in 1643 the gross revenue of Palamau, to be collected by the Rajah, was assessed by the Mughals at 2½ lakhs, i.e., the Rajah had to pay nearly half his income to the paramount Power and could not have possibly maintained himself and his retainers—much less kept state, on the balance, unless the standard assessment was collected every year without fail, which was never the case in such a primitive and sterile country, subject to the calamities of the seasons.

It naturally fell into arrears, while additional provocation was given by the cattle-raids of the Cheros across the Bihar frontier every year. Very likely these evils increased during the War of Succession.

§10. *Mughal conquest of Palamau.*

Aurangzib decided on chastisement. When Daud Khan returned to his viceroyalty of Bihar, about the middle of 1660, orders arrived from the Court urging him to conquer Palamau, and commanding the provincial faujdars, fief-holders, zamindars and other allies to hasten with their followers and co-operate with the governor in the expedition. (*A. N.* 649—660.)

Three forts guarded the kingdom on its northern frontier, *viz.*, Kuthi, 40 miles north of the city of Palamau, Kunda 16 miles south south-east and Deogan, 22 miles west of Kuthi. On 23rd March, 1661, Daud Khan left Patna, accompanied by Mirza Khan the faujdar of Darbhanga, Tahawwur Khan the jagirdar of Chainpur, Rajah Bahroz of Mungir and others. The fort of Kuthi was found evacuated and the Mughals occupied it on 24th April.

The next point of attack was Kunda, an extremely strong hill-fort, with a large and well equipped garrison. By great exertions the Mughals cut a way through the dense bamboo jungle which

covered the sixteen miles that lay between Kuthi and Kunda, and arrived near the latter fort only to find it deserted. On 23rd May, Daud Khan entered Kunda, but soon afterwards dismantled its fortifications, as he considered it impolitic to hold such an out-of-the-way position.

The rainy season having set in, the invaders went into cantonments. Mud forts were built every six miles between Kuthi and Kunda, each garrisoned by a hundred horsemen and some foot musketeers, besides zamindars' levies. Thus communication with the base was kept up and provisions arrived in the camp in safety. Meanwhile, agents had been sent by the Rajah to beg forgiveness and promise obedience and tribute, but their mission failed to turn the Khan from his purpose.

• At the end of the rainy season, the advance on Palamau was resumed on 15th October, 1661. Mirza Khan with 300 cavalry and 200 foot musketeers formed the Van. The Right Wing was composed of 700 horse and 300 foot under Tahawwur Khan and the Left Wing was placed under Daud Khan's nephew Shaikh Tatar with 500 troopers of his own contingent and Rajah Bahroz with 400 cavalry and 1500 infantry. In the Centre was Daud Khan himself with 2000 cavalry, while 500 troopers formed the Rear. The invaders numbered 6,400 strong. A large party of wood-cutters had been sent ahead

under escort of imperial and local officers, to clear the jungle and make a level road to Palamau. Outposts were established at suitable places on the way. Every evening when the halt was made, entrenchments had to be thrown up round the camp to guard against surprise. The advance was necessarily very slow; in nine days only 20 miles were covered.

On 23rd October the camp was pitched at Loharsi, 22 miles north-east of Palamau. At the near approach of the invaders, terror seized the Rajah's heart anew, and he sent his chief minister Surat Singh to the Khan, offering submission and a tribute of one lakh to the Emperor and a present of half a lakh to the Khan. The viceroy reported these terms to the Emperor and waited some time for the reply.

But one day the news reached him that a party of the enemy had plundered a convoy of grain coming to his army, 14 miles from his camp. The Rajah sent agents to disavow all knowledge of this violation of the truce, ascribing it to his subjects, making apologies for it, and paying Rs. 50,000 out of his promised tribute. But Daud Khan refused to listen to him.*

* The printed Persian text of *A. N.* (653) has *Narsi*, corrected in the index as *Tarhasi*. Blochmann takes it to be *Tarhasi*—Mangarh (*J. A. S. B.* Vol. XL., Pt. I. 1871), names which I have not been able

The march was resumed on 21st November and the Mughals arrived within two miles of Palamau on the 29th. The enemy issued from the fort, entrenched one mile in front of the invaders and boldly prepared for resistance. Just then the Emperor's reply arrived, telling Daud Khan to destroy the Rajah unless he turned Muslim, in which case his State would be spared for a tribute. The Khan sent these terms to the Rajah and waited for an answer. But the Mughal army was impatient for fight. Before the Rajah could reply, Tahawwur Khan Birlas forced on a battle without Daud Khan's knowledge. On 7th December he fell on the enemy's trenches with his own division (the Right) only. Daud Khan hastened to his aid and began to entrench at musket-shot from the enemy's lines. From 9 A.M. to sunset, a severe fire was kept up, the losses in Tahawwur Khan's division being 16 killed and 50 wounded. At night the enemy brought two large pieces of cannon out of the fort, mounted them on their battlements and completely dominated the Mughal position, which was on a lower ground.

But next morning Daud Khan seized a hillock

to trace on the map. I read *Loharsi*. (*Ind. At.*, Sh. 104), which is 12½ miles s. s. w. of Koonda. *Kuthi* is given in Rennell's *Atlas*, sheet 8, as *Kooty*. In the *Indian Atlas*, 104, the position corresponds to that of Fort 6 m. south of Imamganj, at the junction of the Chotki and Morhur rivers, 24°23' N. 84°35' E. Koonda is 24°13' N. 84°45' E.

which commanded the enemy's trenches and all the other elevations in the neighbourhood. Dragging guns up to its top, he silenced the enemy's fire. Their courage was shaken and they fled (10th December).

Retiring closer to the fort, the Cheros entrenched the bank of the Auranga river. A dense jungle separated this spot from the Mughal position, and it took Daud Khan two or three days to cut a way through it. On the 13th, the road being sufficiently wide, he advanced upon the enemy. His two nephews, Shaikh Tatar and Shaikh Ahmad, with his own contingent, the imperial mansabdars, Rajah Bahroz's followers under the Rajah's son, and a detachment of Mirza Khan's men were posted on the left and ordered to assault the enemy after advancing through the passes. Shaikh Safi commanded the Right; and Daud Khan with Mirza Khan, Tahawwur Khan, and Rajah Bahroz commanded the Centre. In this formation he fell on the enemy from three sides. After a stubborn fight of six hours, "the breeze of victory blew on the yak cows' tails hanging from the standards of Islam." The enemy fled to the city walls, leaving many dead on the field. The wounded hid themselves in the surrounding hills and woods.

Daud Khan's plan was to halt on the capture of the entrenchments, and to set out against the fort of Palamau after consolidating his gains and guarding

his flanks. But his troops, flushed with victory, could not be held in hand. They galloped in pursuit, forded the river in groups, and kept touch with the enemy's Rear. Then they stormed the walled city; the enemy fled from it, and with great difficulty retired to the two forts, old and new, at Palamau. Pratap Rai, sending out his family and most valuable property into the jungle, stood a siege. The Mughals massacred the people of the city and, advancing, attacked the fort gate. A hot fire was kept up by the garrison till 9 P.M. But an hour and a half afterwards, the Rajah escaped by the postern gate into the jungle. The imperialists now seized both the forts. They had lost 61 killed and 177 wounded. Soon afterwards Deogan fort was also recovered from the enemy.

After the conquest, Daud Khan returned to Patna, leaving Palamau in charge of a Muhammadan *faujdar*. The latter was removed in 1666, and Palamau was then placed under the direct control of the viceroy of Bihar. In the wild rocky country south of Palamau fort, the Chero chiefs retained their independence over a very poor and greatly reduced territory, but the northern portion of the district was administered under the authority of Delhi, by Hindu or Muhammadan nobles such as the Rajahs of Sonpura, and the Nawabs of Husainabad (or Jalpa).*

* O' Malley's *Gaz.*, 24; A N 972.

§11. *Minor rebellions.*

Early in 1662 a disputed succession called in the intervention of the Mughal suzerain in Halar, the north-western district of KATHIAWAD. Here the young Rajah Chhatra Sal, Jam of Nawanagar, had been deposed and imprisoned by his uncle Rai Singh, who had usurped the throne and expelled the Mughal officers deputed to collect the tribute and administer the port near the capital which was also a mint-town and a seat of pearl-fishery. The dispossessed prince appealed to the Emperor, who sent an army under Qutb-ud-din Khan Kheshgi, the faujdar of Junagarh, to restore him to the throne (December). The opposing forces wasted two months, facing each other in trenches and exchanging artillery fire, at a place eight miles from the chief town, till 13th February, 1663, when Qutb-ud-din Khan, learning that a body of 7,000 Rajputs were coming from the Rajah of Kachh to assist Rai Singh, forced an engagement. After a long and desperate fight Rai Singh and other Rajput nobles, as was their wont when victory appeared hopeless, dismounted and flung themselves on the enemy's ranks. The imperialists lost 177 slain and 434 wounded. In the rebel ranks 1,000 common soldiers and 600 notables fell, including Rai Singh himself, one of his sons and his paternal uncle. The reinforcements coming from Kachh returned home when they found that they had arrived too late.

Then the victors marched to Nawanagar and put Chhatra Sal in possession. Qutb-ud-din spent a month or two there to settle the new Government. The city was named *Islam-nagar* by order of the pious Emperor. Timaji, a son of Rai Singh, headed a new rising in Halar, but was defeated by a Mughal detachment and driven off to Kachh. In July 1666, we read of Bakhtaji, the zamindar of Islam-nagar having rebelled; but he fled from the city on the approach of the Mughal faujdar of Sorath (S. Kathiawad). In April next fresh disturbances by Timaji were reported at Court. Evidently the peninsula was long unsettled.*

In 1664 two forces were sent from Darbhanga and Gorakhpur to co-operate in chastising the rebel Rajah of Morang (a hill country west of Kuch Bihar and north of the Purnea district). The campaign took time but ended in success. On 20th Dec. Alawardi Khan the faujdar of Gorakhpur presented to the Emperor some precious things and 14 elephants exacted from Morang. Early in 1676 we read of Morang being conquered anew, by Shaista Khan, the governor of Bengal. ●

A punitive expedition visited the Kumaun hills, the dominion of Rajah Bahadur Chand, in 1665.

* Nawanagar revolt, *A. N.* 768 775; *Akh* $\frac{0}{2}$, $\frac{0}{2}$, $\frac{1}{0}$; *Mirat-i-Ahmadi*, 268 (useless).

The low country was soon occupied and imperial administration set up there (October). But it was no easy task to occupy the hills. In May next, one lakh of Rupees and 200 stone-cutters were sent to strengthen the expeditionary force. The Srinagar Rajah co-operated with the Mughals, but his nephew, who had married into the Kumaun royal family, fought on the other side. The official history silently passes over these operations and does not mention the reason of Bahadur Chand having fallen under imperial displeasure after receiving rewards for loyalty as late as June 1664. A letter written by the Rajah to Alawardi Khan makes the point clear. It runs thus, "I am an old slave of the Emperor, having been brought up by Shah Jahan. My land is the Emperor's. Why then are you ravaging it? I have been falsely accused by the Rajah of Srinagar [of having vast hoards of treasure]. So much gold cannot be collected in our entire hill country by any amount of search. Let him prove his words true. Secondly, as for my going to Srinagar without permission, I am willing to pay a fine to the Emperor." In October 1673, the Rajah received his pardon and sent his son to visit the imperial Court.*

* Morang, A N 850, 875, M A 150 Kumaun, Akh ⁸/₇, ⁹/₃₇, ⁰/₃₈, ⁰/₃₇, M A 128, A N 441, 595, 765, 861 (Rajah loyal).

CHAPTER XXVII

THE IMPERIAL FAMILY AND COURT

§1. *Aurangzib's sons: Muazzam, how treated.*

Like all the other Mughal emperors, Aurangzib was unhappy in his sons. His constant fear was lest the captive Shah Jahan's prophecy should come true and he would receive the same treatment at the hands of his own sons that he had meted out to his father. Against such a retribution he guarded himself to the last day of his life, keeping all his sons under suspicious watch and control, surrounding them with an army of spies in the person of their household servants, minutely regulating every act of their life, and promptly censuring them at the least sign of ambition or encroachment on imperial prerogative.

His eldest son, Muhammad SULTAN deserted to Shuja in the War of Succession (8th June 1659), but came back to the imperial army eight months afterwards, and was confined in the State prison of Gwalior. Occasionally artists were sent there to draw his portrait for the Emperor,* and thus only did the father keep himself informed of the son's exact state

* *Akhbarat*, 9.

of health ! After twelve years of captivity fortune seemed to smile on him again.* In December 1672 he was removed to Salimgarh, the citadel of Delhi, and granted an interview with the Emperor. Aurangzib at this time evidently wanted to cherish Sultan at Court and use him as a pawn to check his second son, Muhammad Muazzam, who had filled the heir-apparent's place during his eldest brother's eclipse, but whose recent conduct had been unsatisfactory. Muhammad Sultan now basked in the sunshine of royal favour : large additions were made to his harem ; he was married to Murad's daughter Dostdar Banu in December 1672, to Bai Bhut Devi, the daughter of the hill-Rajah of Kishtawar in December 1675, and to a niece of Daulatabadi Mahal in the following August ; his mansab and pension were restored ; and he seemed to be on the high road to liberty and recognition as heir to the throne, when death cut his life short at the age of thirty-seven (3rd Dec., 1676).

Muhammad MUAZZAM, who lived to mount his father's throne in 1707 as Bahadur Shah I., took the place of honour at the right hand of his father after the fall of Muhammad Sultan. In May 1663, when only 20 years old, he was sent to the Deccan as

* *M A* 121-125, 139, 148, 155 156, 159-160 ; *K. K.* ii. 236, 247 ; Ishwardas, 72 b.

viceroy, and there he stayed for the next ten years, paying occasional visits to his father in Northern India and being once sent to the Panjab in command of the advanced division of the imperial army (1666) to meet a threatened Persian invasion. But early in 1670* he came under a passing cloud. The official history merely says, "It was reported to the Emperor that the prince, at the instigation of flatterers, had begun to act in a self-willed and independent manner. His Majesty's letters of good counsel producing no effect, he sent the prince's mother, Nawab Bai, to the Deccan to lure him back to the path of duty if the charges against him were true. A noble was also sent from the Court to deliver to him a stern reprimand on behalf of the Emperor. But the reports were found to be utterly false. The prince's character was full of loyalty. He wrote a very submissive reply, expressing his sorrow and regret, and the imperial grace was renewed to him." But he was evidently still regarded with suspicion; at all events he had utterly failed to repress Shivaji, and his constant quarrels with his insubordinate lieutenant Diler Khan rendered the administration of Mughal Deccan by him impossible. So, he was removed from office in January, 1673. The restoration of

* *M. A.* 101; *Diksha*, 73; *Storia*, ii. 162-165, says it was a pretended rebellion by order of Aurangzib. *M. U.* i. 812. For details, see my *Shivaji*, 2nd ed., 192-197.

Muhammad Sultan to favour at this very time may have been intended by Aurangzib to show Muazzam that the Emperor had a second string to his bow and could cut off his refractory son at his pleasure.

Three years later, Muazzam was given the high title of *Shah Alam* (15 Oct., 1676) and sent to command in chief in Afghanistan, and on his return (20 January, 1678) he passed some months at Court exercising great influence and power. Then for a year and a half (Sep. 1678—March 1680) he governed the Deccan, but with all his "vast army, he failed to achieve any success against Shivaji or Bijapur." During the Rajput War he commanded a division in Northern Mewar and then chased the rebel Akbar for some time but without success. When the Emperor went to the Deccan, Shah Alam accompanied him, and led a detachment into Konkan with disastrous results (Sep. 1683—May 1684).

At the siege of Golkonda, Shah Alam's correspondence with the enemy was intercepted, he was found to have encouraged visits from Qutb Shah's agents, received presents from them and introduced slackness into the military operations. There were even suspicions that he had secreted much of the loot of Haidarabad instead of crediting the whole of it to the imperial exchequer. So, on 21st February, 1687, he was arrested with his sons and placed in confinement. His favourite wife, Nur-un-nisa, was

insulted and rebuked by eunuchs at the Emperor's bidding and deprived of her liberty; her property was escheated, and her chief officer was tortured to make him reveal the suspected disloyal acts of his master and the complicity of his mistress in them. (See Ch. 47).

Shah Alam's captivity was relaxed cautiously, little by little, in a very amusing fashion, and he was finally released on 9th May, 1695 and sent to Agra and thence to Multan and afterwards to Afghanistan as viceroy. He had never been brave or proud, and now his spirit was utterly crushed; he lived in a state of abject timidity and intellectual helplessness, deceiving his father by hypocrisy and seeking consolation in the pleasures of the harem. Even his father taunted him with cowardice, though the prince was already a grandfather [*Storia*, iv. 245, ii. 392; *M.A.* 341-344, K.K. 397. *J. Ind. Hist.*, ii. 295-306.]

§2. *Prince Azem, his conduct.*

The disgrace of Shah Alam was Muhammad AZAM's opportunity. This prince* was proud of his descent from "the royal blood of Persia," through his mother, who was sprung from a younger branch of the Safavi dynasty. He was a man of boundless conceit and haughtiness, without any control over his

* *Storia*, ii. 394; *M. A.* 106, 230, 264, 211 (created *Shah*). I have treated his life fully in the *Journal B. & O. Research Society*, March 1924.

tongue or passions even in his terrible father's presence. When roused to anger it was his habit to roll up his sleeves like a wrestler. His vanity was only fed by the affection and favours which Aurangzib constantly bestowed on him, on his wife Jahanzeb Banu (the daughter of Dara Shukoh), and on their son Bidar Bakht, a gallant and capable general and the pet of his grandfather's old age.

About 1670, Mir Khan, the then governor of Allahabad, is said to have "entered into the interests of Prince Muhammad Azam Shah and instigated futile plans [of independence]. The Emperor, hearing of it, cried out. 'This lowly sparrow has not the strength of a high-soaring falcon,' but fearing lest he should stir up even a slight disturbance, His Majesty removed Mir Khan from his rank and attached all his property." (Ishwardas, 61b; *Mirat*, 300.) The official record is silent about the incident; it only tells us that the faujdari of Sambhal which the prince had been holding by deputy was taken away from him in October 1670, but we do not know whether this was done by way of punishment or in the course of ordinary official transfers.* Manucci's story (ii. 394), that Azam "was arrested and locked up in the palace and

* In August 1683, Md Hadi (the son of Mir Khan) was brought under arrest from Azam's army and kept in confinement in Aurangzib's camp. [*M. A.* 237.]

there he remained for a whole year, getting no wine to drink" is incredible; at all events even if true it was not in punishment of any intended rebellion, as the confinement is said to have taken place before his marriage with Dara's daughter, which was celebrated in January, 1669.

Muhammad Azam was the only son of Aurangzib who succeeded in keeping himself clear of prison. He even enjoyed the Emperor's favour in a special degree throughout life, and produced a good impression by his forced march from Bengal to Ajmir in 1679 and again in the rainy season of 1683 in the Deccan to meet his father, and by his theatrical speech in defiance of famine and danger at the siege of Bijapur (1685). A serious illness in 1693, during which Aurangzib personally nursed him, endeared him still more to his father.

After filling many viceroalties, Muhammad Azam was given the title of *Shah-i-Alijah* (31 July, 1681), and employed in the Deccan in independent charge of an army corps like Shah Alam. During the captivity of the latter, Azam took the heir-apparent's seat on the right hand of the Emperor at the public prayers and *darbars*.

On the day of *Id-ul-fitr*, 5th May 1695, when Shah Alam was released, and the Emperor went with his sons to pray in the Grand Mosque at Bijapur, a curious dispute for precedence took place

between the two brothers, which is thus described in the official history :—

“As the eldest son of the Emperor always sits on the right hand of His Majesty, and during Shah Alam’s retreat (*i.e.*, disgrace) Azam had been given that seat of honour, the former asked the Emperor, ‘What are your Majesty’s orders about my rightful claim on the day of *Id*?’ Aurangzib replied, ‘Go to the *Idgah* before my cortege and you will sit on my right hand.’ He did so. When the imperial party reached the steps, Shah Alam advanced, interviewed, and kissed the Emperor’s toes. His Majesty, after shaking hands with him, took his left hand in his own right hand, and entered the mosque. Thus it happened that the eldest prince sat on the right close to the Emperor. Shah-i-Alijah (*i.e.*, Azam) who came behind, placed his sword on the ground before the Emperor and touched the arm of his elder brother wishing him to move away and make room for him to sit on the Emperor’s right. His Majesty’s glance fell on that side; with his right hand he grasped the skirt of Alijah and dragged him to the left side...When the prayers were said and the *khatib* ascended the pulpit (to proclaim the Emperor’s titles), His Majesty rose from his seat, holding the hand of Alijah, and went out by the second gate, making a sign to the eldest prince to go out by the third gate with his sons.” This precaution was taken

to prevent an armed encounter between the retainers of the two rival brothers (M.A. 372.)

Khafi Khan (ii. 407-410) tells a story that in 1692 or 1693 Azam had openly expressed anger and disappointment on hearing of the Emperor's intention to release Shah Alam. Immediately wild rumours spread through the imperial camp that the prince wanted to attack his father and proclaim his own independence, while hostile intentions on the part of the Emperor also were believed by the babblers of Azam's army. But Aurangzib called the prince and his sons to an interview at a lonely place, made an affectation of placing himself entirely in Azam's power, and then dismissed him with a hint that he was lucky in escaping his elder brother's fate. In the meantime Azam's wives and harem women had given him up for lost and were bewailing his supposed captivity. One such lesson was enough for Azam. Ever afterwards he used to tremble and turn pale before opening any letter from his father of which the contents had not been previously reported to him by his agent at Court. He never rebelled. Ishwardas says (87 *a* and *b*) that in 1683 he strongly resented a false suspicion of the Emperor that he was forming a disloyal intrigue with Dilir Khan, and the Emperor had to soothe his son's injured feelings.

§3. *Prince Akbar, his history.*

The only open rebellion against Aurangzib was the work of his favourite son, Muhammad AKBAR. This prince had lost his mother, Dilras Banu, when an infant of one month, and had naturally been treated by his father, and indeed by the entire royal family, with exceptional tenderness. His eldest sister, Zeb-un-nisa, in particular, doted on him and would have backed him in a war of succession.

When not yet fifteen years old, Muhammad Akbar was married to a grand-daughter of Dara Shukoh, and four years later received his first vice-royalty. In 1679 he accompanied the Emperor to the Rajput War in command of the advanced division, and throughout the next year had a full army corps under his orders. Then he lent too ready an ear to evil advisers, proclaimed himself Emperor, issued a manifesto deposing his father as a violator of Islamic Law, and advanced to give him battle (January, 1681). But the attempt was an utter failure, and the unlucky pretender to the throne had to flee for refuge to Shambhuji the Maratha king, and finally, after many adventures, to the Court of Persia. The Shah offered him men and money for a war against his brothers but declined to support him in a parricidal attack on Aurangzib. Nothing was now left for Akbar but to live on the eastern frontier

of Persia and wear his heart out in prayers for his father's speedy death! Aurangzib heard of it, grimly smiled, and said, "Let us see who dies first, he or I," and then quoted the quatrain :

My heart cannot forget the words of the potter
Who made a very delicate China cup and said to it,
'I know not whether the stone flung by Fate
Will break you or me first.' (*Ruqat*, No. 95.)

As we shall see later, Akbar died before the author of his being. But so long as he lived, he was a constant menace to his father and to his eldest brother Shah Alam, the governor of Afghanistan in the closing years of the reign. On hearing of his death Aurangzib heaved a sigh of relief and exclaimed, "The great troubler of the peace of India is gone." (*M.A.* 484.)

Aurangzib's youngest son, Muhammad Kam Bakhsh (born on 24th February, 1667), did not play any part in the history of India till after the fall of the Deccani kingdoms, and therefore he stands outside the scope of this volume. But he, too, had to be kept in confinement for some time (December, 1698 to June, 1699) for his misconduct. [I have treated his life in the *Modern Review*, Jan. 1924.]

§4. *Aurangzib's daughters.*

The Emperor's eldest daughter was Zeb-un-nisa, a gifted poetess and patron of literary men.

She was highly educated by Persian tutoresses in the harem, mastered Arabic theology, and wrote a volume of odes and quatrains under the pen-name of *Makhfi* or the Concealed One. A scandal, originating in the imagination of some Urdu writers of the 19th century, has imputed to her an illicit love for Aqil Khan, a noble of her father's Court. But the story* as fully developed by these writers is inconsistent with the facts of recorded history in all vital points.

Zeb-un-nisā was an ardent partisan of her young brother Muhammad Akbar and held a secret correspondence with him on the eve of his rebellion. When that rising failed and his deserted camp was seized by the imperialists, her letters to him were discovered (January, 1681) and she felt the full weight of her father's wrath, Akbar being out of the reach of his vengeance. Her property and pension of four lakhs a year were attached and she was imprisoned at Salimgarh for the rest of her life (1681-1702). At the news of her death, the Emperor, himself then on the brink of the grave, shed tears and ordered money to be distributed in charity for the good of her soul.

Another daughter of Aurangzib, the Princess Zinat-un-nisa, preferred to live in single blessedness.

* Critically discussed and refuted in my *Studies in Mughal India*.

She is said to have begged her dowry from her father and spent it in building a fine mosque at Delhi, long known as the "Maiden's Mosque" (*Kumari Masjid*). She devoted herself to nursing her father and chaperoning his harem throughout the second half of his reign when he lived in the Deccan. She was a happier if less eminent Jahanara.

Aurangzib is said to have been led by a Muslim faqir's insistence and the Prophet's example to give up the Mughal royal practice of making the daughters of the sovereign live and die as maidens. (*Storia*, ii. 58.) Two of his daughters, Mihr-un-nisa and Zubdat-un-nisa, were given away in marriage, and a third (Badr-un-nisa) died young at the age of twenty-two before a suitable match could be found for her.

• §5. *Aurangzib's sisters : Jahanara.*

The Emperor's eldest sister Jahanara had been a partisan of Dara Shukoh and a supporter of the legitimate authority of Shah Jahan. In 1658 she had tried hard to dissuade Aurangzib and Murad from the fratricidal war, visited their victorious camp at Agra with a proposal of peace, and, on their refusal to accept it, had sternly rebuked them for their unnatural conduct. Then she had chosen the better part by sharing her father's lifelong captivity instead of seeking wealth and freedom by coming over to the victor's side. But her saintly character won

rewards rich beyond the dreams of subserviency. In those long years of gloomy restraint thrice had she entreated Shah Jahan to forgive Aurangzib; twice had the justly incensed father refused; but in the end love had conquered hate, and shortly before his death he had signed a formal pardon, to Aurangzib for all that he had done to his king and father.

When Aurangzib went to Agra after Shah Jahan's funeral, (February, 1666), he repeatedly visited Jahanara,* showed her great affection, and made her the first lady of the realm. All the nobles were ordered to go to her quarters in Agra fort, salam her from outside, and offer presents, while eunuchs conveyed the salute and offerings to the invisible lady within. On the next coronation day (27th March), she was presented with a hundred thousand gold pieces (worth 14 lakhs of Rupees), and her annual pension was raised to seventeen lakhs. The same respect continued to be shown to her throughout life. In October 1666 she removed to Delhi and was given Ali Mardan Khan's grand mansion to live in. Here Aurangzib used to visit her occasionally and talk with her for hours like a loving brother. In December, 1669 he ordered Danishmand Khan, a high minister, to go to her and

* Jahanara secures pardon (K K ii 188, *Storia*, ii 127) is honoured by Aurangzib, (A. N 938, 959, *Akh* $\frac{1}{4}$, $\frac{1}{4}$, $\frac{1}{4}$); gives him frank advice (*Storia*, iv. 59), dies (M A. 213, *Storia*, ii. 256)

standing in her outer drawing-room (*deorhi*) to inform her that he was present there to do any service in which she might command him. From her house her special favourite and almost adopted daughter, Jahanzeb Banu, Dara's orphan child, was married to Aurangzib's third son, Muhammad Azam, in January 1669 with the most lavish pomp. Murad's daughters, too, seem to have received shelter in her house, and to have been given away in marriage by her, while the unhappy Sulaiman Shukoh's daughter, Salima Banu, was brought up by another of the Emperor's sisters, Gauharara Begam, and afterwards married to Muhammad Akbar.

In fact, in Mughal times the first lady of the realm was not the Empress Consort (except in the cases of Nur Jahan and Mumtaz Mahal), but the royal mother or the royal sister. Indian etiquette requires that not the wife but the widowed mother or some other elderly lady should be the mistress of the household. Natural bashfulness would keep an empress from ordering about the general establishment of the harem, regulating the marriages and other ceremonies in the family, or presiding over the female society of the capital. But the death of her husband would at once raise her to the dignity of a widow and the influence of a Queen-mother, and remove from her even the possibility of any younger and fairer rival upplanting her in her husband's favour and hurling

her from her seat of honour and influence. Social decorum prevented an emperor from placing his wife above his mother, his elder sister, or his paternal aunt. Thus it was that dowagers and old maids ruled the ladies' world in the Delhi palace.

At Shah Jahan's accession the dowager Nur Jahan had to be relegated to obscurity as his deadliest enemy and the partisan of his defeated rival Shah-riyar. The Empress Consort, Mumtaz Mahal, lived to share the throne for four years only. Thereafter, Jahanara, as the eldest Princess Royal, continued for 27 years to rule her imperial father's household. She was given the title of *Begam Sahib* or 'Princess *par excellence*,' and even *Padishah Begam* or 'Sovereign Lady.' Shah Jahan's captivity imposed on her, as his nurse and companion, the life of a recluse for eight years. But on his death she emerged, and Aurangzib restored her to her old place as the first lady in the Court, and she continued as such till her death on 6th September, 1681. Her age and position enabled her to give Aurangzib unpleasant but sound advice when none else durst give it. The Emperor mourned her death for three days and ordered her name to be entered in all official papers in future as *Sahibat-uz-zamani* or 'the Mistress of the Age.'

§6. *Princess Raushanara.*

Her younger sister, Raushanara Begam,* had been the warm partisan of Aurangzib during the War of Succession, and had ably intrigued from within the harem at Agra to checkmate his rivals. The day of Aurangzib's triumph was naturally the day of Raushanara's exaltation. At his grand coronation (June 1659) she was presented with five lakhs of Rupees,—a larger sum than his gift to any of his daughters,—and she continued to enjoy her brother's favour, and exercise control over his children and wives, till the return of her elder sister to Court on their father's death. Thereafter we hear nothing more about Raushanara, and she evidently fell to the background, dying on 11th September, 1671, at the age of fifty-six.

During the critical stage of Aurangzib's illness (May 1662) Raushanara is said to have misused the royal privy seal in her keeping, to get together a party of nobles in favour of the succession of the boy prince Azam, and thus contributed to the public alarm. As Manucci writes, "Meanwhile it was terrible to see the city of Delhi in such confusion...Raushanara Begam was the causer of all this uproar. She allowed no one to see the sick Aurangzib, except one eunuch

* *Storia*, ii. 54-60 (usurps authority during Aurangzib's illness; echoed by Bernier, 123-125), *A N* 368 (rewarded by Aurangzib), character in Bernier 132, *Storia*, ii. 35, 189-190.

belonging to her faction." On his recovery, Aurangzib "was much annoyed at her having written letters to the viceroys, governors and generals in order to gain them over to serve Sultan Azam and at her having sealed them with the royal seal...Raushanara lost much of the love that Aurangzib had borne her, he being now angered at her behaviour." (*Storia*, ii. 54-55, 59-60).

The scandalous gossip reported about her by Manucci (ii. 189) on the veracious testimony of a Portuguese half-breed slave woman of the palace and his story that Aurangzib, angered at her profligacy, shortened her life by poison and that she died "swollen out like a hogshead," are unsupported by sober history and may have been examples of the young Italian's credulity. The official history gives her a good character :—"She had noble qualities and admirable traits, and greatly loved her brother (the Emperor). He gave away large sums in charity for the benefit of her soul and showed kindness to her servants." (*M.A.*, 110.)

The other sisters of Aurangzib had no influence on history, but lived quietly in the palace enjoying their pensions.

Aurangzib made a number of matrimonial connections* between his family and those of his

* Marriages. *M. A.* 174 (Sultan), 77 (Azam), 119 (Akbar), 120 and 125 (Mihr and Zubdat), 372 (sons of Shah Alam).

unhappy brothers. We have seen how his eldest son Muhammad Sultan had been married to Shuja's daughter Gulrukh Banu in 1659, and to Murad Bakhsh's daughter Dostdar Banu in 1672. Of his other sons, Muhammad Azam was wedded to Dara's daughter Jahanzeb Banu in 1669, and Muhammad Akbar to Sulaiman Shukoh's daughter, Salima Banu, in 1672. Two of the Emperor's daughters, Mihr-un-nisa and Zubdat-un-nisa, were married to Izad Bakhsh and Sipihr Shukoh, the sons of Murad and Dara respectively (in 1672 and 1673), while later in the reign two daughters of the fugitive Akbar were married to two sons of Shah Alam (1695). Thus in the third generation from Aurangzib his blood became inextricately mingled with the blood of his murdered brothers.

§7. *The Chief Officers of State.*

We now turn to the ministers who composed Aurangzib's Court. At the head of the official hierarchy* stood the *High Diwan* or Chancellor of the Exchequer, the *First Bakhshi* or Pay-master General, and the *Khan-i-saman* or Lord High Steward and Chamberlain. In the Church the highest dignitaries were the *Qazi-ul-quzat* or Supreme Judge of Canon Law, the *Muhtasib* or Censor of Public Morals, and

* The subject has been studied in full detail in my *Mughal Administration*.

the *Sadr-us-sadur* or Chief Justice of Civil Law. The artillery was under a special chief called the *Mir-i-Atish* or Lord Fireworker. As in the Mughal Government every official,—civil, military and ecclesiastical,—was enrolled in the Army List and held a *mansab* which in theory gave him a particular rank among the army officers, there was no Civil Treasury department, but all classes of public officers received their pay and bounty through the Bakhshi. In the reign of Aurangzib the number of Bakhshis was three, with a fourth for the *Ahadis* or gentlemen troopers. The *Khan-i-saman* in those days was an officer of the first rank, who controlled the imperial household and stores, and enjoyed very great power and prestige, though the term has been degraded in modern times to mean waiters at the tables of Anglo-Indian houses.

§8. *The Wazirs of the reign.*

Wazir or Prime Minister seems to have been an honorific title, without necessarily implying the charge of any particular branch of the administration. He was, no doubt, always chief of the revenue department, but it was in his capacity of *Diwan*. All diwans, however, were not wazirs, and we read of no Hindu diwan being given this high title. At several periods the premiership remained vacant, while the duties of the Chancellor's office were done

by a commission of two members, or by the Assistant Diwan (*peshdast*) being authorized to officiate for his chief, but temporarily and with the title of a mere deputy (*Naib Diwan*). The Chancellor had two juniors, *viz.*, the *Diwan of Tankhah* or grants of jagir, and the *Diwan of Khalsa* or crownlands.

Towards the close of Shah Jahan's reign Mir Jumla had been appointed Grand Wazir* (7th July, 1656), but five months afterwards he was sent to the Deccan to assist Aurangzib in the invasion of Bijapur, and the duties of diwan at Court were entrusted to his son Muhammad Amin Khan as his deputy. When in September 1657 Shah Jahan fell ill and Dara seized the administration, he could not, in common prudence, retain for the chief counsellor of the Crown a man who was the protégé and supporter of Aurangzib, and therefore an order signed by Shah Jahan but really inspired by Dara was issued removing Mir Jumla from the wazirship and excluding his deputy from the diwan's office. Jafar Khan was created Prime Minister, and he continued as such during the War of Succession, while the actual administration of the revenue department was conducted by the old

* WAZIRS Jafar Khan, *M U* i 531-535, *A N* 418, 850, *M A* 103, *K. K* ii 234, *Storia*, ii 156 158, 21, 443, 345 iii 416 419 Fazil Khan, *M. U* iii 524-530, *A N* 830, 833 Md Amin Khan rejected, *M. A* 109, *M U* iii. 613 620 Asad Khan, *M U* i 310-320 *Akh.* i 2, *M A.* 85, 103, 108, 125, 152; *Anecdotes* § 11. For list of diwans, I.O.L. MS. 370, f. 99 b

and experienced Assistant Diwan, Raghunath, entitled the Rai-i-raian. On gaining the throne Aurangzib continued this temporary arrangement of the *diwani*, and raised Raghunath to the peerage as Rajah (15 June, 1658), but he naturally refused to confirm his rival's nominee as wazir, and kept the premiership in abeyance for restoration to Mir Jumla. That general, however, had no opportunity of visiting the Court again. From his mock prison at Daulat-abad he joined Aurangzib's camp on the eve of the battle of Khajwah (January 1659), and on the very next day he was deputed to Bengal to hunt Shuja down and govern the eastern province. Here he died at the end of March 1663. Two months afterwards Rajah Raghunath, the acting *diwan*, also passed away.* He was a man of sterling integrity, diligent attention to business and signal capacity for administration. The famous wazir Sadullah Khan had discovered his merits and brought him forward in the revenue department, where he had risen to be permanent Head Assistant (*peshdast*) and even to discharge all the functions of the High Diwan (though without holding the title) temporarily from 7th April to 6th July, 1656, and again from 1658 to his death on 2nd June, 1663. Many anecdotes have come down to us telling of Raghunath's honesty in a department

* Raghunath, *M. U.* ii 282; *A N* 116, 396, 829; *Ruqat-i Alam-giri*. Nos. 56. 149. 154; *Chahar Chaman-i-Brahman* 64.69

notorious for its corruption, his repression of nepotism, and his care for the welfare of the peasants.

It now became necessary to appoint a new wazir and diwan, the first of Aurangzib's reign. The officer chosen was a Persian, Ala-ul-mulk Tuni, surnamed Fazil Khan, a master of elegant prose and verse and a man of unblemished character, who had long enjoyed the ex-Emperor's confidence and filled high offices about Court.* But he was already turned of seventy, and all the work of which he was capable had been practically done in Shah Jahan's reign. He lived to enjoy his new dignity for 16 days only (7th—23rd June, 1663).

Jafar Khan succeeded him as wazir (30th Dec. 1663—6th May, 1670). He was one of the highest grandees of the realm, and had married one sister of the late Empress Mumtaz Mahal, while his nephew had married another. His close connection with the Emperor's family caused him to be regarded in the light of a prince of the blood, and he enjoyed the constant favour of Shah Jahan and received frequent visits at his house from that Emperor and his sons. Even Aurangzib, when cancelling his first premiership, had appointed him viceroy of Malwa (which office he held from 1658 to 1663).

* At the second coronation of Aurangzib he had been appointed to write the imperial letters and patents, which was a part of the duties of the High Diwan. *A. N.* 395.

Jafar Khan was noted for his benevolent character, pleasant manners, and graciousness towards others, but also for a lofty and aristocratic temperament and a proverbial fastidiousness of taste in matters of food and dress. But his official record and extant letters do not show that he had much intellectual keenness or administrative capacity. "He was so civil and courteous that he addressed everybody as 'Sir' and he was incapable of displaying anger. He was very polished and his purity might be called a fetish. This man used to drink his drop of liquor, and on this account Aurangzib, as a strict Musalman, spoke to him saying that it was not a fit thing for the first minister in a kingdom of the faithful to drink wine. Jafar Khan replied that he was an old man, without strength in his hands or firmness in his feet, had little sight in his eyes, and was very poor. By drinking wine he got sight for seeing, power for wielding the pen in the service of His Majesty, felt strength in his feet to run to Court when His Majesty called, and seemed in imagination to become rich." (*Storia*, ii. 156—157.)

The appointment of such a man to the wazirship seems to have been a concession to the elder peers, the remnant of Shah Jahan's time, who were not likely to defy an old and urbane wazir that had already risen to greatness in the late reign and long filled a high place before the public eye. At the

same time social precedence was satisfied by his nearness to the royal family. But he had evidently no influence on the Emperor's policy or administration, and merely did the routine duties of his office and his social functions as the head of the official class and the Court circle. For this last task his age, manners, experience and mastery of Persian eminently fitted him. Aurangzib frequently graced his mansion on the bank of the Jamuna at Delhi with visits, invited him to the palace gardens to see rare flowers in bloom, and deputed him to receive foreign princes and ambassadors on his behalf. But, as we have seen, he was old and infirm, and died on 6th May 1670.

No successor to him was appointed for several years, and during this interval, as at the beginning of his reign, Aurangzib acted as his own Prime Minister. He had his eyes on an officer of whose ability he had the highest opinion and whose company he loved, but who was too young for the premiership according to the received notions of the age. The elevation of such a man would have caused great discontent among the old and first-grade peers who represented the age of Shah Jahan.

This person was Muhammad Ibrahim, surnamed Asad Khan, sister's son of the late wazir and the husband of one of the many sisters of Aurangzib's mother. His handsome person and youthful grace

had made a favourable impression on Shah Jahan, but he had hitherto occupied only the lower ranks of the official ladder. At Jafar Khan's death he was only a Commander of Two Thousand, and Second Paymaster. Social decorum would have been outraged if a mere lad of 48 years and a third-grade official had been at once made Grand Wazir. Aurangzib, therefore, moved cautiously and let six years pass before filling the highest office in his State. On Jafar Khan's death he appointed Asad Khan as Deputy Chancellor (*Naib Diwan*) relieving him of the Second Paymastership soon afterwards (1670).

In September 1671, Mir Jumla's son Muhammad Amin Khan, was summoned by the Emperor with a view to making him wazir. But his haughty spirit, self-willed nature and fearless outspokenness,—which he could not control even in the presence of his master,—marked him out as unfit for the life of a courtier and minister of State, and he was sent back to the charge of a province. On 10th March, 1673, Asad Khan resigned the deputy chancellorship, and that post was put into commission for some years,—all work being done under the joint seals of the Sub-Chancellors of Crownlands and *Tankhah*. At last, on 8th October, 1676, he was invested as Grand Wazir, and presented by the Emperor with the badge of that high office, *viz.*, a jewelled inkpot. He was already turned of fifty, but even then the elder nobles

were not satisfied. As Mahabat Khan, the outspoken governor of Afghanistan, wrote* angrily to the Emperor, "Your Majesty has appointed that suckling Asad Khan as Grand Wazir. The consequences of the premiership of such an unmanly fellow may have reached your ears!"

But Asad Khan's long and honourable tenure of the premiership justified his master's choice. Aurangzib had the highest opinion of his wazir's ability and recommended him to his successor as a very competent counsellor. Asad Khan served as wazir for 31 years, and retired only on Aurangzib's death. In June 1716 he himself died at the ripe old age of 94. He was a grand noble and lived in a princely style above that of other peers, with a weakness for handmaids and singing-girls of whom he kept a large harem and on whom he spent more than his income.

§9. *Lists of high officials.*

The following is a list of the first or Head Bakhshis of Aurangzib's reign.

Paymasters-General

Muhammad Amin Khan, Jan. 1659—Dec. 1667.

Danishmand Khan, Dec. 1667—July 1670.

Lashkar Khan, July 1670—January 1671.

Asad Khan, Feb. 1671 ?—Oct. 1676.

* I.O.L. MS. 2678, p. 123 of the copy made for me.

Sarbuland Khan, 7 Oct. 1676—Dec. 1679.

[Ruhullah Khan I. officiates informally.]

Himmat Khan, Oct. 1680—Jan. 1681.

Ashraf Khan, Jan. 1681—Sept. 1686.

Ruhullah Khan I., Sept. 1686—July 1692.

Bahramand Khan, July 1692—Nov. 1702.

Nusrat Jang K B, Nov. 1702—1707 3

Almost all of them* were Persians by race, one, Danishmand Khan, being himself a Persian emigrant and several others the sons or grandsons of refugees from that country. The Paymasters enjoyed a very high reputation for ability, polish of manners, and power of office management

The KHAN-I-SAMAN, also styled *Mir-i-saman*, was both Lord High Steward and Lord Chamberlain. "He had charge of the whole expenditure of the royal household in reference to both great and small things," (*Storia*. ii. 419), and of the various departments of stores and workshops. During marches he used to accompany the Emperor and control all the workmen, servants and stores of the household. The following is a list of Aurangzib's Chamberlains† :—

* Lives in *M. U* i. 310 (Asad), 272 (Ashraf), 454 (Bahramand), ii. 93 (Nusrat Jang), 309 (Ruhullah), 477 (Sarbuland), 30 (Danishmand); iii. 168 (Lashkar), 613 (Md Amin), 946 (Himmat)

† Lives in *M U* i. 252 (Iftukhar), iii 625 (Md. Ali), 34 (Fazil Kh. III), 159 (Katigar), ii. 315 (Ruhullah Kh. II.), i. 814 (Khudabanda).

Khan-i-samans :

Fazil Khan I. Ala-ul-mulk Tunī, Dec. 1662—June 1663.

Iftikhar Khan Sultan Husain Yezdi, June 1663—March 1670.

Ashraf Khan, March 1670—Nov. 1676.

Ruhullah Khan I., Nov. 1676—? 1678.

Muhammad Ali Khan (s. of Dr. Daud), ? 1678—May 1687.

Kamgar Khan, 1687—1688.

Fazil Khan III., (Itimad Kh.), 1688—1697.

Khanahzad Kh. (Ruhullah Khan II.), 1697—May 1704.

Khudabanda Khan, May 1704—1707.

Every province had its *Sadar* or Judge and Supervisor of endowments to pious men and scholars. Over them all was the *SADAR-US-SADUR* or Chief *Sadar*,* who was also the medium of the Emperor's acts of charity, especially the distribution of the lakh and a half of Rupees which he gave away every year in the month of Ramzan and other sacred occasions. The Chief *Sadars* of Aurangzib's reign are mentioned below.

Sadar-us-sadurs :

Sayyid Hedayatullah Qadiri, June 1658—March 1660.

Shaikh Mirak of Herat, March 1660—November 1661.

Qalich Khan (Abid Kh.), Nov. 1661.—May 1667.

Razavi Khan, May 1667—? June 1681.

* Lives in *M. U.* iii. 120 (Qalich Kh.), ii. 32 (Fazil Kh. II.), iii. 307 (Razavi Kh.), i. 346 (Md. Amin Kh. II.)

Qalich Khan, June 1681—June 1682.

Sharif Khan, June—Oct. 1682.

Fazil Khan II. (Shaikh Makhdum), Oct. 1682—Dec. 1688.*

?—?, 1689—1698.

Qazı Abdullah, (a few months) 1698, (in addition to Chief Qazi-ship).

Md. Amin Khan II. (Chin Bahadur, Itimad-ud-daula), May 1698—1707?

§10. Ecclesiastical officers : Qazis and Censors.

Succession-list of Chief Qazis

Abdul Wahhab Bohra, 1659—1675

Shaikh-ul-Islam, 1676—1683.

Sayyid Abu Said, 1683—1685 (dismissed : died 1688)

Khwajah Abdullah, 1685—1698

Muhammad Akram, 1698—1706

Mulla Haidar, June 1706—1707.

Succession-list of Censors

Mulla Auz Wajih, June 1659—Oct 1663.

Khwajah Qadir, Oct. 1663—Oct 1665.

Muhammad Zahid (son of Qazi Arslan), Oct. 1665—? 1668 or 1669.

Muhammad Husain Jaunpuri, ? 1668—March 1670.

Sayyid Amjad Khan, March 1670—?

Shaikh Nur-ul-Haq, ? 1697—1701 ?

Khwajah Muhammad Shah, ?—1705—?

* During the interval 1689—1698, we have no record of Sadars in the official history.

Abdul Wahhab* was born at Anhilwara Pattan, now a city in the Gaikwad' dominions. He belonged to the Bohra clan, a race of Hindu traders who had been converted to Shia-ism by a famous Muslim saint many centuries ago. But an independent Sultan of Gujrat made several of them Sunnis and thus introduced an element of discord. Since then, the Bohras have been split up into two sects, fighting bitterly over this religious difference. Shaikh Muhammad Tahir of Pattan, a famous scholar of this race, spent many years in Arabia, and on his return vigorously employed the authority of the Mughal Government to put down Shia beliefs and practices among the Bohras, for which he was murdered by the persecuted sect. His grandson, Abdul Wahhab, also made a great name for himself by his mastery of Canon Law and Theology, and served as Qazi of Pattan in Shah Jahan's reign. He joined Aurangzib during his second viceroyalty of the Deccan and was made much of by the prince. After the victory of Samugarh, when the other Qazis refused to declare Aurangzib's usurpation of a living father's throne as legal, Abdul Wahhab issued a decree asserting that as Shah Jahan was physically unfit to govern, the

* *M U* i. 235-241, *K K* 216-217, 247, *Storia*, ii 5-6 188-189, i. 381, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, 261 Ishwardas 70 b Shaikh-ul Islam, *M.U* i. 237; *K.K* ii. 247, 379 414, 438-439, Ishwardas, 71 b, 86 b; *M.A.* 239, 251, 339, 394. *Ruqat-i-Alamgiri*, No. 38 (honesty as judge).

throne was virtually vacant and therefore Aurangzib's accession to it was no violation of Quranic law. For this eminent service his patron made him Chief Qazi of the Empire.

On all administrative questions, Aurangzib sought to follow the rulings of Canon Law and the precedents set by the orthodox Khalifs. The Qazis were therefore his guides not only in the Church but also in the State. Their influence over the civil government was greater than that of the ministers and generals. Abdul Wahhab, in particular, enjoyed the Emperor's confidence and favour in such a degree, as to be all in all at Court. The highest peers of the realm feared and honoured him, while their hearts were consumed by jealousy of the prelate. Mahabat Khan (Lohrasp), the boldest and most outspoken of the courtiers, alone ventured to give voice to their discontent. One day Aurangzib in open Court was anxiously selecting a general for the war with the irrepressible Shivaji. Mahabat Khan ironically remarked, "It is unnecessary to send an army against him. A proclamation by the Chief Qazi would do the work!"

Abdul Wahhab abused his boundless influence over the Emperor to enrich himself. He was the most corrupt and heartless Qazi of the reign. He sold the subordinate Qazi-ships of the cities for money and took bribes in every case that he tried.

At the same time he made profit by engaging in secret trade in rich stuff and jewellery. During his sixteen years of Qazi-ship he amassed a fortune of 33 lakhs of Rupees in cash, besides much jewellery and other valuable things.

His eldest son and successor, Shaikh-ul-Islam, on the other hand, was one of the noblest of characters. No such honest Qazi was ever again seen in India. On his father's death he did not touch a penny of his ill-gotten riches, but gave away his own share of his patrimony to learned men, beggars and his kinsmen. Not only did he decide all cases without the faintest suspicion of corrupt influence or bribery, but he even declined the customary presents and gifts from his nearest friends and kinsmen. He was so impressed by the lying of the witnesses who were usually produced in courts, that after hearing the two sides he seldom gave any decision of his own, on the ground that "in this age of lying witnesses, God alone knows the truth!". This over-scrupulous judge avoided as long as he could the disagreeable necessity of making up his mind on the facts of a case and tried his utmost to induce the two parties to compound their dispute privately!

We can easily understand how he hated the duties of a Qazi and ever sought for some decent excuse to resign his post and retire to a life of peace and religious meditation, washing his hands clean of

“the impurities of the world and its affairs.” But Aurangzib would not part with such a rare combination of judicial honesty, piety and learning. He repeatedly pressed Shaikh-ul-Islam to come to Court and thrust ecclesiastical offices upon him. The Emperor asked of him a decree (*fatwa*) sanctioning his intended invasions of Golkonda and Bijapur. The Qazi honestly condemned the project as “a war between two Muslim States” and therefore a violation of Quranic law. So, he sought to make his escape from the Court and imperial service by going on a pilgrimage to Mecca; (resigned Nov. 1683, sailed from India Dec. 1684). On his return he lived at Pattan and successfully resisted the repeated entreaties of the Emperor to resume his high office. In 1698, the Emperor wrote to him a letter in his own hand inviting him to Court. Shaikh-ul-Islam could not well decline. He set out from his home, praying on the way that God would deliver him from the necessity of again defiling his hands with Government service. The prayer was heard, and he died before reaching the Court.

Sayyid Abu Said, the son-in-law of Abdul Wahhab, succeeded Shaikh-ul-Islam in November 1683, but a year and a half later he was dismissed, probably because his sale of posts and of justice had become intolerable. (May, 1685.)

Mulla Haidar had been Persian secretary to

Shivaji. In 1683 he came over to Aurangzib and was created a Commander o Two Thousand. From being tutor to the Emperor's grandson Azim-ush-shan, he was appointed to the Qazi-ship of Delhi, and finally, in June 1706, as the Chief Qazi.

The first CENSOR of Aurangzib's reign was Mulla Auz Wajih, a native of Samarqand. An unrivalled scholar, he came to India in 1640 and became Mufti of Shah Jahan. Appointed by Aurangzib as Chief Censor in June 1659, "he exerted himself far beyond any other holder of the post in putting down sinful practices." As Censor he enjoyed the rank and emoluments of a Commander of One Thousand, instead of his former stipend of Rs. 1,250 a month. But in October 1663 he lost his office for some offence, and devoted the rest of his life to teaching. In April 1676 he was restored to his *mansab* but not to his post, and died next November.* His successor was Khwajah Sayyid Qadir (A.N. 840). We find Khwajah Muhanımad Shah holding the Censor's office in 1705. (*Akhbarat*, 49—20).

* M.A. 150, 156; K.K. ii. 80; A.N. 392, 840.

CHAPTER XXVIII

MORAL AND RELIGIOUS REGULATIONS

§1. *Abolition of duties on grain and of abwabs.*

Immediately after his second enthronement, Aurangzib took two measures which had become pressing necessities. During the War of Succession the civil administration had broken down in most parts of the empire. Everywhere the strong were oppressing the weak and filling the country with disorder and tumult; the cultivators lost the fruits of their labour through robbery by the powerful or the ravages of war. In short, the economic ruin of many parts of Northern India was complete, and grain was selling at famine prices. The evil was aggravated by the inland transit duties; at every ford, ferry, hill pass or provincial boundary, toll of one-tenth of the value of the goods was taken on the passing merchandise as wages for guarding the roads. This system opened a wide door to oppression and unauthorized exaction, so that in popular speech a road-guard (*rahdar*) came to be called a road-brigand (*rahzan*). In the larger towns, like Agra, Delhi, Lahor and Burhanpur, a duty (called *pandari*) was levied on all articles of food and drink brought from

outside for sale. In the crownlands alone the road-police tax (*rahdari*) yielded 25 lakhs of Rupees a year, and if we add to this the collection made in the tracts under the jagirdars and zamindars, and the perquisites of the office underlings, we shall not be far wrong in putting the total loss of the merchants under this head at a crore of Rupees, or one-twentyfifth of the gross land revenue of the State.

Aurangzib abolished both the *rahdari* and the *pandari* in his demesne lands and requested the jagirdars and zamindars to do the same in their estates. This was done, at least for a time, and there was a free flow of corn to every place affected by scarcity, and the price of grain fell appreciably. This relief to the people came at a most opportune time. The devastation caused by the war did, no doubt, cease in 1660, but for a succession of years afterwards there was scanty rainfall and harvest failure in one province or another. Thanks, however, to the remission of the transit duty on grain, the dearth of one place was easily removed by the surplus produce of another.*

* Remission of tax, A. N. 436-438; K. K. ii. 87-89, 212, *Storia*, ii. 171, 175 (oppression by customs officers); *Fathiyah-i-ibriyah*, Continuation, 128a-129b; *Mirat-i-Ahmad*, 262 & 265, merely copies A. N.; the *farman* of 1659 is given in *Bahar-i-sakhun*, another *farman* remitting *abwabs*, 29 April, 1673, is given in *Mirat*, 302. *Muraqat-i-Hasan*, 203, mentions the first *farman* without giving its

A revenue officers' Guide-book written about the 33rd year of his reign mentions a large number of cesses, many of them trivial and vexatious—as abolished by Aurangzib, up to 1673. (*Zawab-i-Alamgiri*, f. 135a.)

Several of these had been abolished by Firuz Tughlaq as early as the 14th century and by Akbar about a hundred years before Aurangzib; but they had evidently been reimposed by later rulers, or had crept in through the illegal greed of the revenue underlings and local officials and landlords. Khafi Khan (ii. 88) says that nearly eighty cesses were abolished by Aurangzib, though he mentions only fourteen of these by name. He admits however, that they were continued by faujdars and zamindars in the far-off provinces in secret defiance of the Emperor's orders, and that only the *pandari* or ground-rent for the stalls in the open bazars at the capital and other large towns was really given up. The octroi duty on tobacco was abolished about 1666,* as it was an article of universal consumption and the tax was a

schedule Wilson's *Glossary*, 396, has *pandharapatti* for *pandari*. Strict order to enforce the remission, I O L MS 3301, f. 37a. The *abwabs* are fully treated in my *Mughal Administration*, ch. v.

* The date is given by Manucci (ii. 175) who also gives an example of the oppression practised by the tax-gatherers. *M.A.* 530, in saying that they insulted the 'honour' (i.e., women) of the people, evidently refers to the incident narrated by Manucci.

hardship on even the poorest and deprived him of his only solace after work, while the search for contraband tobacco by an army of excisemen led to great oppression, vexatious interference with the people and in many cases violation of the modesty of women.

§2. *Emperor's Islamic ordinances.*

Aurangzib had claimed the throne as the champion of pure Islam against the heretical practices and principles of Dara Shukoh. Now that he was undisputed master of the country, he had to carry out the promises made in his manifesto at the commencement of the war. Soon after his second coronation (June, 1659) he issued the following ordinances* to restore the rules of orthodox Islam in the administration and to bring the lives of the people into closer accord with the teaching of the *Quran*. Every departure from the canonical practices was an innovation (*bidat*) and a mark of heresy, and therefore the special object of his condemnation.

(1) The Mughal emperors before him used to stamp the Muhammadan confession of faith (*kalima*) on their coins. Aurangzib forbade it, lest the holy

* Coronation ordinances—A N 366, 390—392 (Censor), *Mirat-i-Ahmadi*, 260 (bharg cultivation), 263-264 (Censor); *Storia*, ii. 5-7 (Censor), Aqil Khan, 88-89; K K ii. 79 and *Ruqat* No 2 (nauroz) *Muraqat-i-Hasan*, 196 (Censor). Compare Firuz Shah Tughlaq's ordinances in Afif, 373.

words should be spitefully trampled under foot or defiled by unbelievers.

(2) The ancient kings of Persia, and following them the Muslim rulers of that country as well as the Mughal sovereigns of India, used to observe the day when the Sun enters the Aries as a time of rejoicing, because it was the New Year's Day of the Zoroastrian calendar (1st of Farwardin) and the traditional date of the accession of the mythical king Naushirwan. A sort of carnival was held on the occasion at Court and throughout the empire. But the common people looked upon the day as one of special sanctity and religious significance, like the two *Ids* of the Muslim calendar. This was an innovation on the orthodox practice of Islam, and Aurangzib therefore forbade the keeping of the day and transferred the customary Nauroz rejoicings of the Court to the coronation festivity in the month of Ramzan.

(3) A Censor of Morals (*muhtasib*) was appointed to regulate the lives of the people in strict accordance with the Holy Law. "The innovators, atheists, heretics who had deviated from the straight path of Islam, infidels, hypocrites and the spiritually indifferent who had spread over India,—were chastised and forced to give up their wicked courses, obey the theologians and observe the fasts and prayers regularly." (Aqil Khan, 89.)

The duty of the Censor was to enforce the

Prophet's laws and put down the practices forbidden by him, such as drinking distilled spirits or fermented beer, *bhang* and other liquid intoxicants, gambling, and the illicit commerce of the sexes. Opium and *ganja*, however, were not interdicted. The punishment of heretical opinions blasphemy and omission of prayer and fast by Muslims also lay within the province of this Inquisition. Mulla Auz Wajih, the most noted Turani theologian in India, was appointed Censor with the rank of a Commander of One Thousand Horse. A party of *mansabdars* and *ahadis* was posted under him to enforce his orders and put down the bold sinners who would show fight. The provincial governors were ordered to assist the work of moral reform within their own jurisdictions on pain of imperial displeasure. To the end of his reign Aurangzib continued to urge them to enforce the canonical rules about *amr* and *nahi* (things to be done and things to be avoided).

(4) An imperial circular, dated 13th May 1659, was sent to all the provinces, forbidding the cultivation of *bhang* in any part of the empire and directing the revenue collectors to induce the peasants to follow this order and to punish them if they disregarded it.

(5) All the old mosques and monasteries, many of which had become mere ruins through the lapse of time and the neglect of former sovereigns,—were repaired by order of Aurangzib and “made as new.

Imams, muazzins, khatibs and attendants were appointed in them with regular salaries, and students were granted daily allowances according to their progress in knowledge, that they might engage in the study of theology with composure of mind." This was done in and around old Delhi, with special reference to the many edifices raised by the pious zeal of the orthodox Sultan Firuz Shah Tughlaq and Bahlol Lodi. We read that in the ninth year of Aurangzib's reign it cost the State one lakh of Rupees every year to maintain the 600 mosques at Delhi. (*Akhbarat*, 9-22.) Many of them were small or situated in deserted out-of-the-way places and, therefore, could not have afforded religious accommodation to any people in return for the public money spent on them.

§3. *Puritanical and anti-Hindu regulations.*

The measures that Aurangzib took against the Hindus will be described in a subsequent chapter. His puritanical rigour grew with his age. We may conveniently study here his measures for enforcing his own ideas of the morose seriousness of life and punctilious orthodoxy.

(6) At the commencement of the 11th year of his reign, he forbade the Court musicians to perform before him, "as he had no liking for pleasure, and his application to business left him no time for amusement. Gradually music was totally forbidden at

Court" and the State musicians and singers, who had hitherto enjoyed honour and noble rank, were pensioned off. The royal band (*naubat*) was, however, retained.

Music was banished from the Court, but it cannot be banished from the human soul. The sons of the Muses took their revenge by turning the public laughter against their crowned foe. "About one thousand [of the musicians of Delhi] assembled on a Friday when Aurangzib was going to the mosque. They came out with over twenty highly ornamented biers, as is the custom of the country, crying aloud with great grief. From afar Aurangzib saw this multitude and heard their great weeping and lamentation, and, wondering, sent to know the cause of so much sorrow. The musicians replied with sobs that the king's orders had killed Music, therefore they were bearing her to the grave. The king calmly remarked that they should see that she was thoroughly well buried! In spite of this, the nobles did not cease to listen to songs in secret. This strictness was enforced in the principal cities" only.* (*Storia*, ii. 8.)

(7) At the same time the ceremony of weighing the Emperor against gold and silver on his two birthdays (according to the lunar and solar calendars) was stopped. Later in life, he allowed it in the case of

* *M. A.* 71; *K. K.* ii. 212-213.

his sons, on their recovery from illness, in the belief that as the money was given away in charity, the prayers of the poor would do good to the princes.*

(8) In the same year, 1668, the two stone elephants placed by Jahangir on the two side-pillars of the Hatipul gate of Agra fort, were removed by the Emperor "in order to carry out the rules of Canon Law and to abolish innovations."†

(9) About March or April 1670, the courtiers were ordered to give up the Hindu practice of saluting each other by raising the hand to the head and to confine themselves to the cry 'Peace be on you!' (*salam alekum*.) We read of two courtiers being censured for violation of this rule in March 1686. Another regulation, but one intended merely for preserving royal dignity, was issued on 16th April, 1670. By it the courtiers were forbidden even to say *salam alekum* to each other in the imperial presence, as it showed lack of respect for the Crown.‡

(10) In October 1675 the astrologers all over the empire were bound down and made to furnish securities that they would not draw up almanacs [giving forecasts of events] next year.§ But belief in astral

* M. A 75, 81, *Ruqat*, No 78

† M A 77; *Storia*, II 11

‡ M A 98, 272; *Akhbarat*, 13.

§ M A 146 Bernier (161-162) refers to a different incident. The reason for the order could not have been Dara's "craze of

influence was too deeply rooted in the hearts of the Indians,—Hindus and Muslims alike,—to be destroyed by one stroke of the imperial pen, and the stars continued to be studied for various affairs of life, even by the members of the royal family, in spite of the prohibition.

(11) In March 1670 he forbade the festivities which used to be held on his birthday; henceforth the royal band was to play for three hours only instead of the whole day. Early in the 21st year of his reign (November, 1677) the customary rejoicings on the anniversary of his coronation were abolished. "Betel leaves and scents were distributed among those present at Court," but the throne-room was henceforth furnished and upholstered in a cheap and simple style; the clerks were to use porcelain ink-pots instead of silver ones, the money for largesses was to be brought in on shields instead of silver trays; and the grandees were forbidden to make the customary presents to the Emperor. As in Muslim

putting faith in astrologers" mentioned by Manucci (i 224) The printed text of *M. A.* has 'next year', but the prohibition was evidently permanent, and we can get this sense by merely inserting the word 'from' before 'next year,' (az sal-i-nau) A restriction for a single year can be explained only by supposing that the astrologers had been predicting that the next year portended disasters to the country. A similar prophecy upset the public mind on the eve of the Sepoy Mutiny.

Holy Law nobody except a warrior in the time of battle is permitted to wear a dress of pure silk, but all must put on either woollen clothing or a mixed stuff (*mashru*) of silk thread crossed by yarn of some other material, the latter dress was now made compulsory on the courtiers. "In the department of robes of honour (*k̄hilat*) cloth of gold embroidery was ordered to be used in the place of *butadar* ornamented with silver filigree." The railings of gold and silver in the Hall of Public Audience were pronounced uncanonical and replaced by railings of lapis lazuli set on gold! •The planting of rose-beds in any imperial garden, except the two at Agharabad and Nurbari, was forbidden.*

(12) It had formerly been the practice of the emperors to apply a spot of paint (*tika*) with their own fingers to the forehead of great Rajahs when investing them. Early in Aurangzib's reign, the prime minister was ordered to do it for his master, but in May 1679 the ceremony was altogether abolished as savouring of Hinduism; the newly created Rajahs had only to make their bow (*taslim*) to the Emperor who returned the salute. (*M.A.* 176.)

(13) In Kashmir there were many actors or

* *M. A* 98, 162; *Dilkasha*, 62 (says that the celebrations were prohibited at the end of the eighth year; incorrect). Muslims and silk dress.—Hamilton's *Hedaya* ed. 1870, p. 597.

mummers who used to go out of the chief town dressed in their trappings and playing on instruments, to welcome princes and other high persons on the way. Towards the close of his life Aurangzib ordered the local viceroy to put this practice down and take away all their musical instruments wherever found, quoting at the end of his letter the sacred text, "For the sake of God it is binding on us all to order lawful acts and prohibit uncanonical ones." (K.T. 77a.)

(14) All his predecessors on the throne, and he himself up to the eleventh year of his reign, used to appear every morning at a balcony on the wall of the palace and receive the salute of the people assembled on the ground outside. The ceremony was called *darshan* and was akin to the Hindu practice of having a look at one's tutelary idol before beginning the day's work. A class of servile Hindus, popularly called *darshanas*, like the guilds of Augustales of the early Roman empire, regarded their ruler as their earthly divinity, and did not break their fast before having the beatific vision of His Majesty at the *darshan* window. Aurangzib gave up the practice of publicly showing himself there as un-Islamic. (K.K. ii. 213.)

(15) He forbade the roofing over of buildings containing tombs, the lime-washing of sepulchres, and the pilgrimage of women to the graveyards of

saints,* as opposed to Quranic Law. (K.T. 55b, 148a.)

§4. *Aurangzib's attempts at moral reform.*

Life at the capital must have been intolerable for some time after Aurangzib's accession. But the inevitable result soon followed; the attempt to elevate mankind by one leap failed, and the administration made itself ridiculous by violently enforcing for a time, then relaxing, and finally abandoning a code of puritanical morals opposed to the feelings of the entire population, without first trying to educate them to a higher level of thought. As Manucci noticed, "It was so common to drink spirits when Aurangzib ascended the throne, that one day he said in a passion that in all Hindustan no more than two men could be found who did not drink, namely himself and the Chief Qazi....He directed the *kotwal* to search out Muhammadans and Hindus who sold spirits, every one of whom was to lose one hand and one foot.... This penal order was in force for a time; whenever the *kotwal* suspected that spirits were made in any house, he sent his soldiers to plunder everything in it. The regulations were strict at first, but little by

* Firuz Tughlaq's reasons for the prohibition (in Elliot, iii. 380); immorality promoted by these visits (in Storia, iv. 205.)

little they were relaxed,... there being few who do not drink secretly."

Again, with regard to *bhāṅg*, "Not a day passed that on rising in the morning we did not hear the breaking by blows and strokes of the pots and pans in which these beverages are prepared. But, seeing that the ministers themselves also drank and loved to get drunk, the rigour of prohibition was lightened by degrees." So, too, in the case of the order against music: "If in any house, or elsewhere he (i.e., the Censor) heard the sound of singing and instruments, he should forthwith hasten there and arrest as many as he could, breaking the instruments. Thus was caused a great destruction of musical instruments.... In spite of this, the nobles did not cease to listen to songs in secret." (*Storia*, ii. 5-8.)

Some, however, of Aurangzib's regulations were intended to promote general morality without any special reference to Islam. Such, for instance, was his alleged order mentioned by Manucci alone, that the public women and dancing-girls must marry or leave the realm (ii. 9). But the same writer gives an indication elsewhere (ii. 186) that the rule was a dead letter. Notorious instances of gambling were punished by the Emperor. Effeminacy in dress received a summary and practical rebuke when he cut off some inches of cloth from a courtier's cloak which fell below his ankles. The prohibition of

holi celebration in the streets, when obscene songs were sung and faggot was extorted from all people for bonfires, was clearly a police regulation. So also was the order putting a stop to Muharram processions in future in all the provinces, after a deadly fight between rival processions had taken place at Burhanpur in January 1669.*

We have it on the authority of Manucci (ii. 97) that Aurangzib on his return from Kashmir (December 1663) "issued an order that in all lands under Mughal control never again should the officials allow a woman to be burnt. This order endures to this day." This humanitarian rule, though not noticed in the formal histories, is mentioned in the official manuals of the reign. (*Dastur-ul-aml*, 103a.) But the evidence of contemporary European travellers in India shows that the royal prohibition was seldom observed.

The Emperor was very attentive to decorum of manners and took care not to violate any social convention. In the light of his general conduct, I cannot accept the story current at the time that when Dara's severed head was brought to him for inspection he struck it with his sword. Manucci (ii. 359) and the even more credulous English traveller J.

* Gambling *Ruqat* No 27, dress, *ibid* No 147, *holi* festivities, *Mirat*, 276, Muharram procession, K. K. II 214 Castration, *M. A.* 75, K. T. 44a; *Muraqat*, 76

Cambell mention it. But Bernier who was at Delhi at the time and frequently talked with the imperial secretary Danishmand Khan, says (p. 103) that the Emperor turned his face away from "the shocking sight." Shuja's historian Masum (145*b*) says that Aurangzib refused to look at the head as that of an infidel. On 5th September, 1669, learning that Dara's tomb was out of repair and had no cloth covering, he ordered some attendants to be constantly kept there and a sheet to be placed over the tomb. The Court news-letters mention his visits to the Taj Mahal, when he made his salam to his parents' graves and gave away alms.*

Early in his reign he ordered his governor of Kashmir to compel the people of that valley to put on drawers and cover their nakedness (*K.T.* 48*b*), which they were evidently too poor or too primitive to do. He censures his eldest son for going to church in a waistcoat (*nim-astin*) instead of being properly dressed for a serious work like prayer. [*Adab*, 181*b*.]

In the 11th year of his reign he issued orders for the suppression of the practice of castrating children with a view to sell them as slaves.

* For Dara's tomb, *Akhbarat*, 1₉² (contradicts *Storia*, ii. 195). Aurangzib at his father's grave, *Akhbarat*, 1₁¹, 1₇³ ; *M. A* 93.

§5. *Persecution of Dara's favourite theologians.*

The enforcement of Islamic orthodoxy gave Aurangzib an opportunity of punishing those liberal holy men of his creed whom Dara had favoured. His infidelity must have been encouraged by them; at all events he had gained popularity and prestige by his close association with such widely respected devotees. Now was their time of reckoning.

A *mulla* and teacher (*akḥund*) named Shah Muhammad, whose disciples loved to call him "The Man drowned in the Ocean of Communion with God,"—was a native of Badakhshan, and early in life showed his skill in composing sacred verses. After travelling much, he became the disciple of Mian Mir, the saint of Lahor, and finally settled in Kashmir. The fame of his sanctity spread far and wide. Dara Shukoh and Jahanara greatly honoured him, made him large gifts of money and built for him a stone monastery and residence. Nobles, scholars and Shaikhs visited him frequently. He composed a hundred thousand couplets of mystic poetry unfolding his knowledge of God and spiritual truths. Wit sweetened his speech, and many apt repartees of him were long remembered. When Aurangzib came to the throne, Dara's enemies had him summoned to the imperial presence. He went very reluctantly to Lahor and lived there in great distress and fear till

his death, but all the while thanked God that his life was ending, as it had begun, in poverty. Here he died in 1661 and was buried close to the tomb of his master, Mian Mir.*

§6. *Sarmad the mystic.*

A heavier punishment fell on the renowned Sufi ascetic best known by his poetical pen-name of SARMAD† (or Chief). This man was born of Jewish stock at Kashan in Persia and made himself a scholar (*rabbi*) by the study of the Hebrew Scriptures. Then he embraced Islam and, taking the name of Muhammad Said, cultivated Islamic philosophy under two renowned professors in Persia. Coming over to India, like so many other Persians, as a trader, he met at Tatta a Hindu lad named Abhay Chand, with whom he was so infatuated that he gave up his business, became a naked *faqir*, and induced Abhay

* *Iarikh-i Kashmiri* by Azam, 121a—122a. The saint had offered adoration to the rising sun by sending to Aurangzib a laudatory quatrain containing the date of his coronation. (K.K. ii 78.) But he could not escape so easily.

† The fullest account of Sarmad is given in *Dabistan* 194-196, which should be supplemented by selections from his poetry as given in Madhodes's *Bustan-i-maraajat*, *Indian Antiquary*, 1910, 121-122, and (a few) Aqil Kh. 89-90. His life and execution, Aqil Khan, 89-90; *Storia*, i. 223 (as Dara's favourite 'atheist'), 384; anecdotes recorded in *Ind. Antiq.* as cited; Bernier, 317 (beheaded for "his obstinate refusal to put on wearing apparel"); *M.U.* i. 226-227 (useful). *J. A. S. B.* 1924, pp. 111-122. He was buried north-east of the Jama Masjid, Delhi.

Chand to be his disciple. The youth was carefully instructed by him in the Pentateuch and the Psalms, and even translated the first few chapters of the Book of Moses into Persian. Then Sarmad went to Haidarabad in the Deccan (about 1647); but as the *wazir* Shaikh Muhammad Khan did not help him to have audience of Qutb Shah, he came back in disappointment to Delhi, where Dara Shukoh made much of him and introduced him to the favour of Shah Jahan. The prince used to pay frequent visits to the naked *faqir* and listen to his teaching of Sufism.

Sarmad was a pantheist, and his smooth-flowing verses breathe not only the mystic fervour of the Sufi, but also a lofty spirit of catholicity which rises above the wrangle of sects and adores the truth inherent in all creeds. As he taught his pupil Abhay Chand to sing,

"I am a follower of the Furqan—a priest, and an anchorite;
I am a Rabbi of the Jews, an idolator and a Muslim!"

And again,

"In the Kaba and temples alike they preserve
only *His* stone and *His* wood.

At the one place *He* takes the form of the 'black stone'
[adored at the Kaba]
and at the other *He* becomes the idol of the Hindu."

His attitude to Muhammad was one of deep respect. He extolled the Arabian Prophet as a latter-

day Joseph, a more weighty Sun; "Muhammad is to Joseph what the red rose is to the yellow; he is to the Sun what a heavy thing is to a light one." But, on several points of Muslim theology and tradition, his opinions were unorthodox. For instance, he taught that the Old Testament denies the prophethood of Christ, and that the words in the books of the Prophets which the Christians take as referring to the coming Messiah are either applied by Daniel and Isaiah to their own selves, or bear a palpably different interpretation from that put by the Christians. And, again, he held that the advent of Muhammad as a messenger of God is not foreshadowed in the Talmud, but that the Jews are there warned *against* accepting his faith or joining his followers; that Muhammad was the Scourge of God prophesied in the Pentateuch as coming in future to chastise the sinning children of Israel; and that circumcision was an exclusively Jewish sacrament to which the Muslims had no right.

Others of his opinions were equally novel. "God," he held, "is a *material* substance according to the Jews, and His materiality is symbolized by a human figure and body. At times He diffuses Himself like the separate rays of the Sun.... The reward of good deeds and the punishment of sins take place in *this* world. A man's soul is born again after a period of sleep exactly as long as his last life; life in

the world and repose in the grave alternate exactly like day and night....Every element that exists in the universe, is present in the human body....There ought to be, according to the Jewish religion, a living Prophet always present in the world to give currency to the Law of Moses."

Sarmad used to go about stark naked. As an uncompromising Monist, he denied the existence of Matter, and felt no shame about anything pertaining to his body. He justified his imitation of the state of innocence in respect of dress in the very words of his contemporary, John Milton :

"He who invested thee with the king's crown,
Clad me all in the garb of distress.
He put dresses on all whom He saw sinful ,
On the sinless He conferred the robe of nakedness !"*

In support of his conduct he appealed to a Talmudic tradition that the Jews before the time of Moses wore no clothing and that the Prophet Isaiah himself in his old age used to walk naked.

A bench of Muslim theologians sat in judgment over Sarmad and doomed him to death "on account of his nakedness," as Aurangzib's servant Aqil Khan Razi says, or because frequently words opposed

* Cf. *Paradise Lost*, iv. 313—316. "———Dishonest shame of Nature's work, honour dishonourable, Sin-bred, how have ye troubled all mankind With shows instead !"

to the Holy Law were uttered by him,"* as a Hindu writer 80 years afterwards affirmed. But Sarmad's refusal to cover his lower limbs could hardly have been the ground for passing the death sentence on him, because we read of no Hindu Naga *sannyasi* or Jain Digambar monk being beheaded by order of Aurangzib for the same offence. The real reason was political; as even a modern apologist of Aurangzib† admits, "His friendship for Dara Shukoh, whose accession to the empire he is said to have foretold, made him politically a suspect."

Sarmad mounted the scaffold singing extempore verses in a lofty strain of Sufism, and laid his head down on the block rejoicing that the body, which had so long hindered the union of his soul with the Beloved, was at last being removed by the friendly agency of the sword! With his last breath he sang,

"My friend, the naked sword, has come!

I know Thee, in whatever guise Thou comest!"

Some years afterwards another execution for religion is recorded. On 3rd November, 1672 a Shia named Muhammad Tahir, an officer of long

* Anand Ram Mukhlis, tr. by Irvine in *Indian Magazine*, 1903, p. 120.

† Maulvi Abdul Waii, who defends Aurangzib's religious policy and asserts that "the stupendous fabric of the mighty empire of the Mughals fell rapidly into pieces, after his death, not because of Aurangzib's intolerance, but because of his sons' and grandsons'

standing, then acting as *diwan* of Hasan Ali Khan, was beheaded, because he had cursed the first three Khalifs, and the Censor had demanded his death in accordance with Canon Law. [M.A. 120.]

In 1667, a Portuguese friar who had embraced Islam and then reverted to his old faith, was put to death at Aurangabad for apostacy. [Storia, ii. 159.]

The Bohra sect have a tradition that their spiritual guide, Sayyid Qutb-ud-din of Ahmadabad, was killed with 700. of his followers, by order of Aurangzib.* We know from the Persian histories that there was a bloody feud between the Shia and Sunni sections of the Bohras, and also that the influence of the governors of Gujrat used to be directed to the repression of the Shia Bohras, who enjoyed toleration only when the subahdar happened to be a Persian or Shia himself. Aurangzib would naturally have supported the policy of persecuting these heretics (*rafizi*).

impotency and inability to support it." (*Ind. Antiq*, 1910, p. 120). The author of the *Masir-ul-umara* also holds, "In truth the chief reason of his execution was his companionship of Dara Shukoh. Otherwise, [why did not the Emperor punish] the naked fanatics and foolish babblers like him who wander in every lane and bazar?" (i. 227).

* M. U. i. 241; *Mirat-i-Ahmadi*, 377; *Bom. Gaz.* i. pt. 1, 288.

CHAPTER XXIX

RELATIONS WITH THE OUTER MUSLIM WORLD

§1. *Aurangzib sends rich presents to other Muslim States.*

After all his rivals had been destroyed and he was firmly seated on the Peacock Throne, Aurangzib received a succession of embassies from all the Muhammadan States which had trade relations with India. The fame of his victories had spread far and wide and he was congratulated on his accession. His policy at the beginning was to dazzle the eyes of foreign princes by the lavish gift of presents to them and their envoys, and thus induce the outer Muslim world to forget his treatment of his father and brothers, or at least to show courtesy to the successful man of action and master of India's untold wealth, especially when he was so free with his money. The poorer Muhammadan Powers sent embassies so miserably ill-equipped and carrying such worthless presents that it was openly said in India that the missions were not political but commercial. "Every one suspected that they came merely for the sake of obtaining money in return for their presents, and of gaining still more considerable sums by means of the numerous horses and different articles of merchandise,

which they introduced into the kingdom free of all duty, as property belonging to ambassadors. With the produce of these horses and merchandise, they purchased the manufactures of India which they also claimed the privilege of taking out of the kingdom without payment of the impost charged on all commodities exported." (Bernier, 134; *Storia*, ii. 115.)

Later in his reign, partly because his aim had by that time been realized, and partly because his constant wars had drained his treasury dry, his liberality to foreign Courts and envoys was greatly curtailed. He, however, continued to the end of his reign to maintain friendly intercourse with the Muslim States of Central Asia and Arabia by letter and embassy.

§2. *Diplomatic intercourse with the Sharif of Mecca.*

Among the chiefs of Islam, the Sharif of Mecca held a position of peculiar honour and importance. He had control over the holy places, and through him alone could alms from outside reach the pious men and mendicants who lived in that sacred soil to which the heart of the entire Muslim world turns in prayer five times a day. After the War of Succession, Aurangzib planned to drown in a shower of gold any scruples which the headmen and theologians of the Holy City might have felt in acknowledging as lawful

sovereign the usurper of a loving father's throne.* In November, 1659, shortly after his grand coronation, he despatched Mir Ibrahim, a pious Sayyid, with six lakhs and sixty thousand Rupees for distribution among the Sayyids, recluses, servitors of the mosques and shrines, and devotees at Mecca and Medina. The chief of the mission died in Arabia about June 1661 and the charge of the party was transferred to Haji Ahmad Said, who carried his pious task out, and returned to Court in March 1665, bringing with himself Sayyid Yahiya, the bearer of a friendly letter and some relics from the Sharif of Mecca. This envoy received Rs. 13,000 in return.

Thereafter agents of the Sharif used to visit the Delhi Court every year and levy contributions in the name of the Prophet. Thus, we find that in 1668 they took away Rs. 9,000, in 1671 Rs. 30,000 and 100 gold pieces, in 1674 Rs. 5,000, and in 1686 Rs. 5,000. Besides these, large sums were often

* Manucci says that at first "the holy men of Mecca declined to accept the gifts sent by Aurangzib because his father was still alive" (ii 3), but in a few years the Grand Sharif repented of it and "sent envoys to find out if Aurangzib would consent to renew the offering that he had before sent" (ii 114) Naturally the official history of the reign would be silent about any such rebuff, if the Emperor received it. I can only suspect from the long time which the Mughal embassy at Mecca took to do its work that there was some such hitch. The party sent out with the gifts was absent from India for more than *five years*, which cannot be explained by imagining that the members had an insatiable appetite for pilgrimage (*haj*).

sent by Aurangzib through his own agents for distribution in the Holy City. In December 1684 he entrusted the Shaikh-ul-Islam (the resigned Chief Qazi) with a casket full of supplicatory letters addressed to the Prophet with a request to deposit it at the foot of the Prophet's tomb. In December 1693 when his son Muhammad Azam recovered from a serious illness, he sent Rs. 1,20,000 to be spent in charity at Mecca and Medina.

But at last the Sharif's greed made Aurangzib turn against him. In the last decade of his reign he wrote to his *wāzir*, "The Sharif of Mecca, having heard of the great wealth of India, sends an envoy every year for making his own gain. The money that I send there is meant for the poor and not for *him*. Devise some means by which it may reach them and the hands of this unrighteous exactor may not touch it. Ask of the [Arab] traders at Surat who have the best repute and substance, if they can convey my money to the poor of the Holy Cities in safety. If so, it will be sent through their agency. My object is to please the souls of the lovers of God and not to proclaim my charity." (*Ruqat*, No. 174.) Two other letters make the same complaint of the Sharif intercepting the royal alms and diverting the money to his own use, while the mendicants and recluses of Mecca starved. At last Aurangzib resorted to the policy of sending money secretly and

in small instalments to the needy people of the Holy Cities, through the merchants of Surat, without the agency or even knowledge of the Sharif.* (K.T., 25b, 114b.)

§3. *Interchange of embassies and letters with the Shah of Persia.*

We have seen how the Shah of Persia had intrigued with Dara and Murad during the War of Succession and had also written to the two Shia rulers of the Deccan urging them to assert themselves while the Mughal empire was torn by quarrels among the princes. But when Aurangzib made himself undisputed master of the throne, Shah Abbas II. sent a grand embassy under Budaq Beg, the captain of his musketeers, to congratulate him on his accession and to wish him a long reign.

The Persians have been rightly called the Frenchmen of Asia. Their country has been the spring-head of the culture thought and fashion of the entire Islamic world. Persian influence has moulded the poetry of all Muslim lands, and Persian manners

* Mecca embassies.—Bernier, 133. *Storia* ii 115; *A. N.*, 449-450, 627, 882, 886, 977; *K.K.*, ii. 412 (1692-93 A.D.); *M. A.*, 76, 108, 140, 251, 285 (probably Ali Aqa of p. 285 was the same man as Ahmad Aqa of p. 271), 364. With I.O.L. Pers. MS. 3172 are bound up several Arabic letters from the Sharif of Mecca to Shah Jahan and his sons (mostly formal).

and taste have been laboriously, if sometimes clumsily, imitated by all Muhammadan Courts from Cordova and Constantinople to Delhi and Seringapatam. To gain a word of praise from the countrymen of Firdausi and Hafiz has been the dream of all writers in the predominant literary language of Asia, and every historian and letter-writer in Persian has trembled in fear till his work has received the seal of approbation from the fastidious judges of Iran. Kings have dreaded the sharpness of a Persian satirist's pen more than their enemies' swords.

The news that a Persian mission was coming caused a flutter in the Mughal Court. Every one from the Emperor down to the meanest guardsman felt that he and his country were on their trial. His manners and conduct would be judged by the masters of social decorum in all Asia, and if he was found wanting in correctness of taste and proper dignity in the least particular, he would be made the laughing-stock of the entire Muslim world. This natural anxiety was aggravated by the large number of Persian refugees serving in India who gave highly coloured pictures of the power and civilization of the Court of Iran and sneered at the Indo-Musalmans as half-polished barbarians. There was the greatest fear that the Persian envoy would not observe the Indian Court etiquette at his presentation, but cleverly put some mark of inferiority or some slight on the

Mughal Emperor, who had a hereditary rivalry with the royal house of Persia for social predominance.

Budaq Beg's forerunner came on 24th March, 1661 and presented his country's famous melons (*kharbuza*) and other fruits, receiving Rs. 2,500 in return.* The ambassador himself reached Delhi by way of Baluchistan and Multan and had his first audience on 22nd May. A right royal welcome was accorded to him. "Soldiers were posted on both sides of the street, a league in length, through which the ambassador would pass. The principal streets were decorated with rich stuffs, both in the shops and also at the windows, and the ambassador was brought through them, escorted by a number of officers, with music, drums, pipes and trumpets. On his entering the fort, or royal palace, he was saluted by all the artillery....It was a fine sight to see the ambassador followed by his 500 horsemen, almost all of the same height and appearance, large-limbed and handsome men, with huge moustaches, and riding excellent and well-equipped horses." (*Storia*, ii. 49, 53.)

The gifts from Persia consisted of 66 swift Iraqi horses and a round pearl weighing 37 carats and

* He was probably the bearer of the shorter letter of congratulation from the Shah given in *Ruqut-i-Shah Abbas Sanii*, pp. 28-33, while the longer one (pp. 71-81) was delivered by Budaq Beg.

valued at Rs. 60,000,—the whole being worth Rs. 4,22,000. The Shah in his letter congratulated Aurangzib on his accession and offered his friendly help whenever the Mughal Emperor would need it; he referred to the long-standing friendship between the royal houses of Persia and India, made much of Shah Tahmasp's assistance to Humayun in recovering his throne, went through the history of Qandahar, remarking how he had most reluctantly used force in taking it from Shah Jahan's hands, and concluded by wishing that the relations between them might continue friendly in future in spite of his retaining that fort.

Budaq Beg reported to his master his satisfaction at the princely treatment accorded to him. The Shah having expressed a wish to taste the betel leaf (*pan*) which is universally chewed in India, quantities of the rarest variety of the leaf were sent to him repeatedly. He now acknowledged them and also granted Aurangzib's request that Burhan-ud-din, the son-in-law of his minister Fazil Khan, might be allowed to emigrate to India. The royal letter from Persia told the envoy, evidently for communication to Aurangzib as an instance of his master's power, that the Shah had recently reduced to submission Tahmuras Khan the Prince of Georgia, who had defied Persian arms for two generations.

On 27th July the envoy was given leave to

depart. On him and his entourage the Emperor conferred gifts worth Rs. 5,55,000.* The despatch of a return embassy charged with a reply to Shah Abbas's letter, was delayed by the Emperor's illness and his visit to Kashmir. Tarbiyat Khan, the governor of Multan and a Commander of 4000 Horse, was selected for the mission and sent off from the Court on 2nd November, 1663, with presents worth more than seven lakhs of Rupees, and a letter drafted by Danishmand Khan, the scholarly Persian courtier known to readers of Bernier's *Travels* as the French doctor's patron. We possess this letter in which, as was the literary usage in such compositions, the sense is buried under piled up flowers of rhetoric and an endless succession of epithets. The patronizing tone in which the Shah had offered his friendly help and probably also his reference to Qandahar where Aurangzib had twice failed and the Persian arms had triumphed, galled the spirit of the Mughal Emperor. He replied by thanking the Shah for his friendly views, but declared in a lofty tone that he needed no *man's* help as he depended solely on

* Budaq Beg's name is given as *Buudaq Sultan*, *Tufangchi Aqasi*, in the *Ruqat-i-Shah Abbas Sani*. For his embassy, *A. N.* 609, 614, 621, 628, 664; *Storia*, ii. 47-54; Bernier, 146-151; *Ruqat-i-Shah Abbas Sani*, 156-162 (Shah to his envoy in India), 28-33 and 71-81. Br. Mus. Or. 1641, f. 72a—73b gives details and valuation of the presents from the Shah and his envoy.

God's favour; his astonishing victories were a proof of God's abounding grace on him. Then he naturally glided into a long and exultant narrative of his triumphs over his brothers, and concluded with a self-righteous declaration that he was devoting every hour of his life to doing good to his subjects, promoting peace and prosperity in the land, and advancing the cause of Islam. (*Bahar-i-sak̤hun.*)

§4. Quarrel with Persia.

The Mughal envoy had audience of the Shah at Isfahan, but he was very rudely treated and subjected to much humiliation and suffering. The Persian king often uttered threats of invading India in his presence. It was probably at this time that he sent Aurangzib a long letter* composed by Mirza Tahir Wahid, vigorously defending the Shia religion, glorifying the Persian royal house, sneering at Aurangzib, and bragging of his own success as a ruler and defender of the true faith!

At last after a year's stay in Persia, Tarbiyat Khān was given conge at Farahabad, and entrusted with a taunting letter for Aurangzib. In it Shah Abbas writes, "I learn that most of the zamindars of India are in rebellion because their ruler is weak, incompetent and without resources. The chief of

* *Faiyaz-ul-qawāriin*, 389-398.

them is the impious *kāfir* Shiva, who had long lived in such obscurity that none knew of his name; but now, taking advantage of your lack of means and the retreat of your troops, he has made himself visible like the peak of a mountain, seized many forts, slain or captured many of your soldiers, occupied much of that country, plundered and wasted many of your ports, cities and villages, and finally wants to come to grips with you. You style yourself a World-conqueror (*Alamgir*) while you have only conquered your father; and having gained composure of mind by the murder of your brothers—who were lawful heirs to your father's land and wealth—you have abandoned the royal practices of doing justice and charity and are busying yourself in the company of men who call incantation and Satanic magic the knowledge of God and the exposition of Truth. You have failed in every undertaking that required manliness. It is beyond your power to repress lawless men; you have become helpless and distracted by your lack of material and money and the defeat of your troops. Thanks to the favour of God and the Imams, it is my nature to cherish those who are crushed, and my ancestors have been the refuge of the kings of the world,—witness how we restored to their thrones Humayun and Nazar Muhammad Khan. Now that you, the successor of Humayun, are in distress, it is my royal aim to go personally to

India with my multitudinous army, meet you (which has long been my desire), give you every help and extinguish the fire of disorder with the lustre [*lit.*, water] of my sword—like that of Ali,—so that the people might be delivered from the oppression of lawless men, and sing my praises. God keep you safe amidst your misfortunes!''*

With this letter Tarbiyat Khan reached Agra (where the Court then was) in September 1666. Aurangzib vented his impotent rage on the innocent envoy, accused him of having failed in his duty, denied him audience, degraded him in rank and finally sent him off as *subahdar* to the penal province of Orissa (June 1667).†

The threat contained in the Shah's letter was confirmed by reports from Persia that he was making preparations for invading India by way of Khurasan and Afghanistan. Evidently there was great alarm in the country at the news. Prince Muazzam was at once sent with Jaswant Singh and a large army towards Afghanistan, while the Emperor promised to follow. But the danger was exaggerated by the

* *Faiyaz-ul-qawanin*, 496-499. Manucci records the incorrect rumour that such a taunting letter was sent with Budaq Beg (ii. 52). The taunting correspondence between Aurangzib and the Shah has been printed in the Report of the Lahor Session of the Indian Historical Records Commission, Jan. 1920.

† Tarbiyat Kh.'s mission, *A. N.* 974, disgrace 977, 1033 and 1050; *Storia*, ii. 128-131, 146-147 (fullest).

Mughal Court's ignorance of the true state of things in Persia. The Safavi monarchy was really very weak, as Bernier shrewdly suspected. (*Travels*, 149.) Shah Abbas II., however, died on 22nd August, and the imagined danger to India blew over. For the rest of Aurangzib's reign, Persia was powerless for offence. But, as a historian of Persia has remarked, "few dynasties have lived so long and so successfully on their reputation as did that of the Safavis after the death of Shah Abbas I.," and Aurangzib kept a vigilant eye on the n.w. frontier, forbidding any nearer approach of the Persian outposts for facility of trade, or the admission of large caravans of Persian horse-dealers into India lest they should be invaders in disguise.* To the last day of his life he continued to speak of the Persians as *Irani ghul-i-bayabani* ('carrion-eating demons') and *batil mazhaban*, or 'false believers.'

In 1688 Aurangzib tried to intervene in a struggle between the Shah of Persia and Ahmad, his rebel governor of Herat, by helping the latter in besieging Qandahar. But nothing came of the attempt. (Ishwardas, 133b.)

* For the threatened Persian invasion, A. N. 974, 975, 984; *Stone*, II. 146-149; *Anecdotes*, § 51; K K. II. 202. For Aurangzib's vigilance, *Anecdotes*, § 49, 50, and 52. For Safavi weakness, *Sykes, History of Persia*, II. 296.

§5. *Relations with Central Asia.*

With the Powers of Central Asia, Aurangzib's intercourse was more frequent and uniformly cordial. The first foreign embassy that he received after his accession was one sent by Subhan Quli, king of Balkh, which presented him (January and February, 1661) with valuable Turki horses, camels, hunting animals, dry fruits, &c., and received Rs. 26,000 in return. On 19th November in the same year, Khwajah Ahmad, the envoy of Abdul Aziz Khan, king of Bukhara, made his bow and delivered to Aurangzib a congratulatory letter from his chivalrous antagonist of the war of 1647. On the ambassador and his entourage the Emperor spent one lakh and twenty thousand Rupees, besides Rs. 12,000 sent to the Bukhara chancellor. But both the envoys from Balkh and Bukhara died in India from the effects of the very miserly and dirty way in which they lived.

The compliment was returned by the despatch of a mission from India to Central Asia, under Mustafa Khan Khafi (2nd July, 1664), with gifts worth 1½ lakhs for Abdul Aziz Khan and one lakh for Subhan Quli Khan. Two other envoys came from these kings in 1667, and received in return 2 lakhs and 1½ lakhs respectively in cash and kind. These Central Asian Powers kept up frequent intercourse with Aurangzib throughout his reign, by

means of friendly letters and gifts, and we have many mentions of envoys coming from them.

In April 1664 arrived Mir Fulad, with a friendly letter from Abdullah Khan, king of Kashghar, and in June he returned with gifts worth half a lakh for himself and his master. A reply was despatched in October 1665 with Khwajah Ishaq, who returned from the way on learning that a civil war had broken out in the country. Peace having been restored, he was sent again in November next year. Three other embassies from the same country are recorded in the official history of the reign. Envoys were also received from Urganj (Khiva) and Shahar-nau, but they were on a smaller scale and represented petty chieftains only.*

In 1668 came a guest of the highest rank from Central Asia. Abdullah Khan, king of Kashghar, was deposed by his son Bulbaras Khan, and when fleeing to India with his family was robbed of all his property on the way. In this distressed condition he was met and relieved by Khwajah Ishaq, the

* Balkh missions.—*A. N.* 605-8 (in 1661), 1050, 1063 (in 1667); *Storia*, II 36-44 (= Bernier, 116-123) graphic description, *M. A.* 90 (in 1669), 149 (in 1676), 193 (in 1680), 483 (1704), 516 (1706) Bukhara missions.—*A. N.* 637, 644, 662-665, 673, 738, (1661 62) 863 (1664), 1035, 1049 (1667), *M. A.* 104 (1670), 108 (1671), 158 (1676) 216 (1681), 337 (1690), 440 (1701, from "Turan") Urganj missions.—*A. N.* 1048, 1063 (1667); *M. A.* 112 (1671), 207 (1681) Kashghar missions.—*A. N.* 858-61 (1664), 915 (1665), 984 (1666); *M. A.* 79 (1669), 228 (1683), 337 (1690). Shahar-nau.—*M. A.* 240 (1683).

envoy sent earlier from the Mughal Court. On hearing the news, Aurangzib wrote to his governors of Kashmir and the Panjab to study the ex-king's comfort in every way, pay him one lakh of Rupees for his expenses, and supply him with the imperial plate tents and furniture. The subahdar of Kashmir was commanded to escort him personally to Delhi.

The royal fugitive reached the capital on 15th March, and was welcomed on the way by the Grand Wazir and the Paymaster, and presented to the Emperor, who cordially received him, shook hands with him, seated him near his person and dined with him. The guest was lodged in a fine mansion on the Jamuna which had been furnished with the Emperor's own upholstery, and was daily supplied with food from the imperial kitchen. He roamed in the imperial pleasure gardens with his wives, and was treated to an elephant-combat, which was an exclusive prerogative of the Mughal sovereigns. After spending eight months in happiness at Delhi, he set out to visit Mecca. The same honours were done to him on the way to the port of embarkation. The Mughal Government spent on this august guest ten lakhs of Rupees in all or $1\frac{1}{2}$ million livres of the French money of the time. In August 1670 he reached Surat on his return from Mecca, received one lakh of Rupees more from the treasury, and settled

at Delhi, where he died in extreme old age, on 20th October, 1675.*

There were a few scholars and merchants in Central Asia with whom Aurangzib regularly corresponded. One such was Khwajah Abdul Ghaffar of Trans-Oxiana, to whom he used to write letters describing his conquests in the Deccan during his second viceroyalty and his victories over his brothers. These foreign friends were not forgotten after his accession. Abdul Ghaffar was presented with Rs. 12,000 in 1660 and again in 1661, with Rs. 5,000 in 1663, Rs. 10,000 in 1665, and Rs. 14,000 in 1667. Other Khwajahs of that country were similarly enriched with purses from Aurangzib.†

§6. *Relations with Turkey and Abyssinia.*

Turkey in Europe was too remote from India and probably also too dissimilar in civilization to come within the sphere of Aurangzib's interests. Late in life, in June 1690, he received the only embassy from Constantinople, charged with a letter for him. It should be noted that both in the Mughal official record of this event and also in an Arabic letter written by

* Abdullah Khan in India, *A. N.* 1064 66; *M. A.* 71-76, 105, 113, 143; *Storia*, iii. 190-193.

† Abdul Ghaffar,—letters in *Adab*, 131b—135b, gifts in *A. N.* 462, 605, 848, 876, 1035. Other Khwajahs, *A. N.* 605. Khwajahs of Juibar in *A. N.* 1063.

Shah Jahan in November 1651 to the ruler of Turkey, the latter is spoken of merely as the *Cæsar of Rome*, i.e., the master of the Eastern Roman Empire, and never as *Khalifa* or 'Commander of the Faithful,' though his titles fill five lines in the Khuda Bakhsh MS. where the letter is given in full. So, too, Shah Abbas II. addresses the lord of Constantinople as the *Khundkâr of Rome* and not as *Khalifa* or *Sultan*. In fact, the ruler of every Muhammadan State (including the orthodox Aurangzib) called himself the only lawful successor of the Prophet and the *Khalifa of the Age*, without admitting the least superiority, temporal or spiritual, on the part of the sovereign who held the holy places of Arabia. The theory that the Sultan of Turkey is the spiritual head of the Muslim world is a fiction of the late nineteenth century, which we owe to the Indian pilgrims to Mecca.*

With the Turkish possessions in Arabia, however, Aurangzib had more intimate contact. In 1661, Husain Pasha, the governor of Basra, sent an agent

* Turkish envoy to Aurangzib, *M. A.* 337. Shah Jahan's letter, Waris's *Padishahnamah*, 55a—56b. Shah Abbas II.'s letters to the ruler of Turkey, his *Ruqat*, 2-7, 10-13. In January 1667, Aurangzib contemplated sending Shah Khwajah to Turkey (*Akhbarat* $\frac{9}{25}$), but evidently nothing came of it.

In Irvine MS. 350, f. 40a, in an anecdote ascribed to Aurangzib, the ruler of Turkey is similarly designated "Cæsar of Rome."

with a congratulatory letter and the gift of some Arab steeds and Georgian slaves to the Emperor. Both master and man were highly rewarded. In 1669 this Pasha fell under his sovereign's displeasure and was removed from his office. Afraid to return to Constantinople, and yet unable to remain at Basra, he preferred exile from home, and at first went with his family to Persia, where he met with such a cold reception from the Shah that he turned to the rich Court of Delhi. Aurangzib welcomed the refugee (1st July), sending the highest grandees of the Court to meet him on the way and usher him into the Presence. The Pasha was graciously stroked on the back by the imperial hand as he stooped to kiss the throne, and was immediately raised to the rank of a Commander of Five Thousand with the title of *Islam Khan*, while his two sons also got high *mansabs*. After some delay and hesitation the family settled in India and rose to eminence in the service of the State.

Yahiya Pasha, who had succeeded Husain Pasha in the government of Basra, gave up his post, came to Delhi in August 1671, and was enrolled in the Mughal peerage.*

* *Basra mission*, A. N. 606, 619, 636; *Storia*, ii. 115. Husain Pasha, M. A. 85—87, 121; M. U. i. 241—247. Yahiya Pasha, M. A. 110.

Some petty chiefs of Arabia also formed friendly relations with the Court of Delhi. From the governor of Hadramaut or Southern Arabia lying north-east of Aden, messengers and letters were received by Aurangzib in March 1665, March 1667, and again in August 1692. Imam Ismail, the governor of Yaman or S. W. Arabia, presented nine Arab horses in March 1665. In 1667 a letter was received from the governor of Mokah.

With the Powers of Africa, Aurangzib had very slight connection. A Sayyid of Barbary (*Maghrib*) who served at the temple of Kaba in Mecca, sent him a complimentary letter in 1665. But in May 1683 Sayyid Ahmad, the brother of the ruler of Barbary, came to India and was presented with Rs. 5,000. The official history records that in March 1665, Siddi Kamil presented himself before the Emperor with a letter from the king of Abyssinia, and that he was given *conge* next month. This "Ethiopian embassy" is the subject of a dispute between Bernier and Manucci, the former maintaining that they were genuine envoys robbed of their all by Shivaji at Surat, and the latter holding them to be sharpers who tried to repair their bankrupt fortunes by posing as ambassadors and playing upon Aurangzib's well-known zeal for spreading Islam. Though the king of Abyssinia was a Christian, his envoys produced a

letter in which he begged money from Aurangzib for repairing a mosque which had been built in Abyssinia over the remains of a Muslim missionary from Mecca but pulled down by the Portuguese.* Manucci regards the letter as forged and the requests contained in it as "a thing incredible" and decides "simply from it that this embassy was fictitious."

But there was such a large Muhammadan population in Abyssinia that I do not see anything strange in this request of its king. The fame of India as a milch cow had spread even further west than Ethiopia. Moreover, a second and unquestionable embassy from the same country visited Aurangzib in February or March 1671, and that proves the existence of diplomatic intercourse. In mediæval times, no doubt, traders and even pilgrims were sometimes charged by princes with letters for their very distant brethren, and such couriers often gave themselves the airs of ambassadors.

* Hadramaut, *A. N.* 883, 886, 1035; *M. A.* 350 Yaman, *A. N.* 886, Bernier, 113. Mokah, *A. N.* 1035 Barbary, *A. N.* 883, 886, *M. A.* 227. Abyssinia, *A. N.* 883, 886; Bernier, 134-144, *Storia*, ii. 110-114; *M. A.* 108 (1671). According to the official history, Rs. 2,000 was presented to the Abyssinian envoy, Siddi Kamil, and Rs. 12,000 to the king of that country, on 23 April, 1665. The ambassador who came from the same king in 1671 carried away Rs. 10,000 in gifts.

CHAPTER XXX

THE LAST YEARS OF SHAH JAHAN

§1. *Shah Jahan strictly confined in Agra fort.*

When Shah Jahan opened the gates of Agra fort to his victorious son, he became a prisoner for the rest of his life. To the "king of kings" the change was very bitter indeed, and it was only after many a struggle that he accepted it. But, from the circumstances of the case; it was impossible for him to free himself; he was old and infirm; all his officials had deserted to the victor; harem women and eunuchs were the only counsellors and executive instruments left to him. Outside, he was girt round by an unbroken ring of his enemy's guards and watched with sleepless vigilance by his enemy's spies; his loyal son Dara Shukoh was far away beyond the reach of his letters, for his emissaries were all intercepted by Aurangzib's men. A Great Mughal who could not himself ride to battle and had no faithful noble to fight for him, was a superfluity in Nature's economy. He must retire from the stage. This stern law Shah Jahan was slow to admit.

When, on 8th June, 1658, Prince Muhammad Sultan, on behalf of Aurangzib, first visited the fallen Emperor in Agra fort, he was well received

by his grandfather. There is a story that Shah Jahan greatly flattered the young man and urged him to seize the throne and rule as his deputy, promising to lend him the prestige of the lawful Emperor's authority in a war with Aurangzib. But if any such temptation was really offered, Muhammad Sultan was too wise to yield to it. For, he had no independent position or power, he was acting merely as his father's agent, as a channel of communication between Aurangzib and Shah Jahan. He had to report every incident and conversation in the fort to his father very promptly and obey his written directions implicitly at every step of the negotiations with Shah Jahan, and the troops guarding the captive Emperor were under Aurangzib's own orders. No one could visit the ex-Emperor without Aurangzib's permission. The least breach of these precautions brought down on Sultan's head the sharp rebuke of his father.*

According to another story current at the time and recorded in contemporary histories of secondary value, Shah Jahan invited Aurangzib to Agra fort, intending to have him assassinated by the fierce Tartar women who formed the Amazonian guard of the harem. But the plot, if ever it was formed, proved futile, for treachery of this kind was the first thing

* Muhammad interviews Shah Jahan, Bernier, 62. Muhammad as Shah Jahan's keeper, *Adab*, 188a & b, ante, Ch. 17 § 7n.

to be suspected and guarded against in that age; and Aurangzib's advisers, Shaikh Mir and Shaista Khan in particular, dissuaded him from visiting his incensed father. A slave named Nahar-dil is said to have betrayed the plot and an alleged incriminating letter from Shah Jahan to Dara. (*Ante*, Ch. 17 §7.)

§2. *Shah Jahan's futile attempts to regain liberty.*

Shuja's historian, Muhammad Masum, who lived in Bengal and heard only the most distorted versions of Court incidents, records what was probably no better than bazar gossip. According to him, Shah Jahan wrote a letter to Murad urging him to assassinate Aurangzib and Muhammad Sultan at a banquet, release his father and reign in his name; the careless Murad thrust the letter into a book and forgot all about it; but his librarian discovered it and sold the secret to Aurangzib, who promptly removed the danger by imprisoning his younger brother.

We may reject these stories as false, but there is evidence of the fact that the fallen Emperor continued to address letters to Dara breathing undiminished affection and offering him help and advice. The eunuchs who tried to smuggle these notes out of the fort were intercepted by Aurangzib's men and severely punished. The captive made a last bid for liberty when Shuja was reported to be

advancing from Patna to seize Agra. The old Emperor sent out letters blessing the enterprise and calling upon all loyal subjects to rally round his coming deliverer. A letter of encouragement written by him in Hindi reached Shuja, but only to draw that prince on to his doom at Khajwa.*

All the attempts of Shah Jahan failed, and their only result was to tighten the bonds of his captivity. He became, in effect, a prisoner doomed to the strictest confinement. Immediately on getting possession of Agra fort, Aurangzib had posted a strong body of guards there. Prince Muhammad Sultan was soon afterwards ordered to take up his residence in the fort, and all the houses near it were compulsorily vacated by order of Government and given to the officers of the guard, "so that they might live close to the fort and be present at all hours." (*Adab*, 188a, 189a.)

§3. *Jalous watch kept over Shah Jahan.*

Shah Jahan was now completely ringed round by enemies. No one could interview him except in the company of Muhammad Sultan and with Aurangzib's previous sanction. Every remark made

* Masum 79a—81a, (alleged letter to Murad) *Adab*, 262a (ref. to Hindi letter to Shuja, eunuchs smuggling letters out of the fort punished).

by the captive had to be reported promptly to Aurangzib. The same attitude of suspicion and watchfulness continued to the end. As the Italian gunner Manucci writes, "Going several times into the fort, I noted that the imprisonment of Shah Jahan was closer than can be expressed. There passed not a day, while I and others were in conversation with the governor, that there did not come under-eunuchs to whisper into his ear an account of all the acts and words of Shah Jahan." (*Storia*, ii. 77.)

Aurangzib repeatedly asked his father to stop writing letters to people outside, as they only tended "to raise tumults and increase disorder in the realm." Shah Jahan declined, saying in anger, "Am I his son that I should obey his orders? I cannot possibly give up this practice." Aurangzib, therefore, had to take rigorous measures, "by way of precaution; and to destroy the root of the mischief by removing from Shah Jahan's Court the eunuchs who used to smuggle such letters outside." A warning was given to the remaining eunuchs that "if they behaved like Wafa (the offending eunuch), they would suffer like Wafa." Even writing materials were withheld from the captive; whenever he had occasion to write a letter, a particular eunuch who alone could act as clerk had to be summoned, and this man wrote from Shah Jahan's dictation. (*Adab*, 262, 261b.) All such correspondence was open and had necessarily

to pass through the hands of the royal jailors. It was now impossible for the deposed Emperor to send out any autograph letter for gaining the belief of his partisans and rousing them to make an effort for his restoration.

It is very curious that forty years afterwards the same suspicious watch was kept by Aurangzib over his son ! Shah Alam had been kept in confinement for years on suspicion of disloyally intriguing with the Deccani Powers, and when he was released and sent to Multan as governor, he was not allowed to take his writing-case with himself to his harem, but it was kept in charge of Aurangzib's female agent and spy (*mahaldar*) who was under orders to attend and watch the prince while writing. (*Anec.* §16.)

§4. *Aurangzib's wrangles with Shah Jahan for the jewels in Agra fort.*

The fall of the most magnificent of the Great Mughals was robbed of dignity by Aurangzib's insatiable cupidity. History records many sordid wrangles between father and son for the possession of the crown jewels worn by Shah Jahan or kept in Agra fort. The captive Emperor could never forget that he was their lawful owner and that his son was an usurper without any moral right to State property. To this argument Aurangzib replied, "The royal property and treasures exist for the good of the

community, because these pay no tithe...The king is only God's chosen custodian and the trustee of God's money for the benefit of the people." All the crown property in Agra fort, therefore, belonged to him as the reigning sovereign, while Shah Jahan had not only lost his right to them, but, as he had now taken to a life of religious meditation and retirement, even the jewels he wore on his person were unseemly and inconsistent with his present character of a recluse !

The gossipy Masum tells us that Aurangzib sent his eldest son to beg the Peacock Throne from Shah Jahan, and that the old man, under the pretext of having a last look at it, took away two of its panels which were most richly set with diamonds and rubies, but afterwards gave them up, partly at his grandson's entreaty and partly in fear of violence.

Again, Dara at the time of his flight had deposited 27 lakhs of Rupees worth of jewels, belonging to his wives and daughters, in the strong room of the ladies' quarters inside Agra fort. Aurangzib demanded their surrender. Shah Jahan long resisted and remonstrated; but at last he yielded them. According to Khafi Khan and Manucci, Aurangzib's greed was insatiable: he asked for the rosary of 100 round pearls,—all of one colour, size and weight,—worth four lakhs of Rupees, and the thumb-ring (*arsti*) of diamond, which

his father constantly wore on his person,—saying that they became a king better than a recluse such as Shah Jahan now was! The deposed Emperor sorrowfully gave up the ring, but said, "I use the rosary in saying my prayers. I shall give it up only after pounding the pearls in a mortar!"—at which Aurangzib desisted.*

Again, Aurangzib demanded that Dara's women singers should be sent to him "as there is no skilled songstress with me whose music may soothe my heart, and as you have no liking for songs in these days." Shah Jahan flew into a rage at the proposal, but Aurangzib replied, "If your objection is due to their being Dara's concubines, well, other persons of the same class have been taken into my house. What harm is there if his servants live with me?" (*Adab*, 263b.)

Immediately after the capitulation of Agra fort (8th June 1658), Aurangzib had sealed up all the rooms of royal apparel, furniture, plate, jewels and treasure,—both those attached to the Hall of Private Audience and also those in other places outside the harem. All the property was ordered to be "attached

* Dispute about the Peacock Throne, Masum, 77a—79a Dispute over jewellery, Bernier, 127; *Storia*, ii. 20-21; K K ii. 106. *Adab*, 261b (in December 1658 Aurangzib thanks Shah Jahan for presenting him with some jewels of Dara). *A.N* 662 records, "On 10 Feb. 1662, Shah Jahan sent to Aurangzib jewellery worth 16 lakhs of Rupees" Cf. Bernier, 166; *Storia*, ii. 117

strictly and with every possible care." The jewels and jewelled ware, in particular, were ordered to be kept constantly under lock and seal in the rooms of the *Ghusal-khanah* in charge of Aurangzib's trusted eunuch Mutamad. They were opened very rarely and always in the presence of that eunuch and the responsible superintendent (*darogha*) and keeper (*tahvildar*), and immediately afterwards locked and sealed with triple seals.

At first out of consideration for Shah Jahan's feelings he was allowed to have a look at any of these carefully guarded articles at his pleasure. Prince Muhammad Sultan was directed to omit no caution when opening the store-rooms of the fort for taking anything out for Shah Jahan, but at the same time "to manage the affair in such a way that he might not be pained in mind by the occurrence." Evidently the rooms in the harem portion of the fort were always accessible to the captive, for he now lived within its bounds. Here his drinking vessels were kept.*

On the departure of Muhammad Sultan, the eunuch Mutamad became all in all and treated Shah Jahan with great harshness and neglect. "He sometimes allowed it to be seen that he treated him (*i.e.*

* Property in Agra fort how safeguarded, *Adab*, 137 (may be shown to Shah Jahan when desired), 262 (wardrobe), 262b (*abdar-khanah*)

Shah Jahan) as a miserable slave. Once an under-eunuch came to tell him that Shah Jahan was in want of slippers. . . The eunuch, immeasurably stingy, sent him shoes neither of eight Rupees nor of four nor of two, but the common leather shoes. He smiled over it as if he had done some great deed. One day he (Shah Jahan) sent him two violins he used, asking for them to be repaired, and sent inside again as quickly as possible. The eunuch did not trouble himself about having them repaired; then three days afterwards Shah Jahan sent to inquire. At this the eunuch flew into a rage." (*Storia*, II. 77-78.)

When Khwajah Mamur the keeper of the ex-Emperor's wardrobe died, the rooms of that department were kept sealed up for some days, and Shah Jahan experienced great difficulty and delay in getting a change of apparel, till a successor was appointed.

§5. *Bitter correspondence between Aurangzib and his deposed father.*

During the first year of his captivity a very acrimonious correspondence passed between father and son. Throughout the controversy Aurangzib poses as the champion of Islam and good government, as the humble instrument of God in the work of reform and popular beneficence; he condemns his father's incompetent and unjust rule, and defends

his own conduct with all the mingled self-righteousness and affected humility of a Pharisee.* To the charge of being an unnatural son and a rebel, he replies thus :

“So long as you held the reins of government, I never did anything without your permission, nor did I ever step beyond my jurisdiction. The Searcher of Hearts be my witness for this. During your illness Dara usurped all power, girt up his loins to promote Hinduism and destroy Islam, and acted as king, totally setting you aside. The government fell into disorder. None of your servants durst inform you of the true state of the realm.....If, God forbid it, the aim of that infidel had succeeded, and the world had been obscured with the gloom of infidelity, and Islam had lost its lustre, it would have been hard [for us] to answer for it on the Last Day.” And, again, “My march on Agra was not due to a rebellious spirit, but to a desire to put an end to Dara’s usurpation, his lapse from Islam and his exaltation of idolatry throughout the empire.....I was compelled, out of regard for the next world, to undertake

* Of this correspondence we possess only the letters of Aurangzib to his father,—eight in number,—given in *Adab*, 260a—264a. Three of them are reproduced inaccurately in K K II 101-106, and brief summaries of a few are given by Bernier, 167-168 and Manucci, II 19-20. The contents of the letters that Shah Jahan wrote to Aurangzib we can infer from the quotations made from them by the latter before answering them.

the heavy load of this task and engage in looking after the interests of the populace and peasantry."

As for the fratricidal war, he ascribes its origin not to his own ambition but to Shah Jahan's partiality to his eldest son and the mortal enmity of his brothers to himself. "Although I heard that the raising of disturbances and the throwing of [my] affairs into confusion were due to your instigation, and that my brothers were acting under your orders, I was not moved by the news, but remained loyal to you.....till I knew for certain that you did not love me but were trying to place some other son in power.....

If you had not helped in various ways and raised to a position of trust, your eldest son,—whose ability and God-fearing character are probably manifest to you now,—and if, out of regard for him, you had not failed to make any provision for the safety of your other sons, then all the brothers would have lived together peacefully and the fire of civil war would not have blazed forth."

Aurangzib was convinced that there could be no peace in the realm until Dara and Shuja were driven out of India or sent to share Murad's captivity. He, therefore, had to exercise some of the prerogatives of the crown, such as enlisting officers and granting titles and posts, for, without such means "the work of God and the people" that he had

undertaken could not have been carried to a successful end. He had at last "to take up the perilous load of the crown, out of sheer necessity and not from free choice,—for restoring peace and the rules of Islam in the realm so as to be able to answer on the Day of Reckoning, and for saving the people from destruction and the affairs of my ancestral kingdom from confusion."

His own idea of the king's position and duty is high, even stoical: "Kingship means the protection of the realm and the guardianship (of the people) and not the enjoyment of bodily repose or the lusts of the flesh."

§6. *Aurangzib's self-righteous exultation.*

He points exultantly to his own success against heavy odds, as a proof of God's favour to him and of the righteousness of his cause: "As my aim was good, I gained the victory in spite of my small force, in both the battles (*viz.*, Dharmat and Samugarh.)If God had not approved of my enterprise, how could I have gained victories which are only His gifts?"

Shah Jahan, therefore, as a wise man must submit to the divine dispensation and accept Aurangzib's triumph as the best thing that could have happened to him! "Nothing can happen without God's will. Therefore, this great event is

not due to any mortal's power or will. Why do you, though a wise man, consider another as the author of what is (really) God's doing? Submit to the will of God, and your sorrows and tribulations will turn into peace and contentment!" Nay more, the deposed Emperor must thank the son that had deposed him: "If you look (at the matter) with eyes of justice, you have no cause of complaint in that I have relieved you of such a heavy load and taken it on my own shoulders and made my (hitherto) free mind the slave of a thousand afflictions and fatigue."

In utter scorn for such hypocrisy, Shah Jahan taunted Aurangzib with being a robber of other people's property, while professing to be a true Musalman. The prince defended his conduct in a lofty strain of idealism: "You have written that it is contrary to the Muslim faith to seize another's property. Know that the royal property and treasures exist for the good of the people.....A kingdom is not a hereditary private property. The king is merely God's elected custodian and trustee of His money for the good of the subjects."

Aurangzib's harsh and contemptuous references to Dara and Shuja had greatly offended his father, and now his defence of such language touched the fallen old monarch as with a red-hot iron: "How do you still regard the memory of [your brothers] Khusrau and Parviz, whom you did to death before

your accession and who had threatened no injury to you?"

§7. *The Nemesis of Aurangzib.*

Next, Shah Jahan warned his cruel son to remember that *his* sons might treat him as he had treated his own father! Aurangzib's reply breathes the confident self-righteousness of the Pharisee: "Well, nothing happens without God's will. The fate that you have mentioned overtook (my) elders also. How can I escape from the dispensations of Providence? Every one gets from God a return according to his own intentions, and as my intentions are good, I believe that I shall not get anything but good [from my sons]."

But Shah Jahan was a truer prophet than his boastful son. The Nemesis of Aurangzib came in the person of his fourth son Muhammad Akbar. When that prince rebelled in 1681, he addressed a bitter and taunting letter to his father,* which bears a striking similarity to Aurangzib's present letters to Shah Jahan. In it Aurangzib is taxed with administrative failure and advised to pass his old age in religious meditation as an atonement for the sin of having deposed his father and murdered two of his

* Prince Akbar's taunting letter to Aurangzib in January 1681,—R A S MS 71, A S B MS f 56, and *Zahir-ul-insha* Translated in my *Studies in Mughal India*, 98-106

brothers. His favour to his eldest son Shah Alam is flung in his teeth, and young Akbar's revolt is justified by the same Pharisaical plea that *he* had taken on his own shoulders the heavy burden of kingship in order to save the people from ruin and his patrimony from waste in consequence of *Aurangzib's* misgovernment! And finally, Aurangzib is asked, with what propriety he could tax Akbar with being an unnatural son when he himself had rebelled against his own father!

The correspondence between Shah Jahan and his son at last became intolerably bitter, and the latter gave up writing to the ex-Emperor at first in his own hand and then even through his secretaries,—in order, as he says, “to close the path of saying and hearing [such taunts].”

Thus, in the conflict with the pen Shah Jahan proved no more successful than in the conflict with the sword. At last he bowed to the inevitable and, like a child that cries itself to sleep, he ceased to complain.*

§8. *Shah Jahan's last years in prison: life of resignation and devotion.*

He had, indeed, need of resignation to the will of God. Blow after blow fell on his stricken heart.

* Shah Jahan's captive life is best described in Kambu's *Amal-i-salih*, 18a, 24b-25b. Bernier, 165; *Storia* II. 64-67, 77-78.

First Dara Shukoh, then Murad Bakhsh, then Sulaiman Shukoh, were done to death by Aurangzib. Shuja and all his children were driven to destruction among the unknown horrors of the land of the Mags. "But in spite of these calamities, he never lost patience or thankfulness to God. In the seven years of his captivity many of his devoted servants were ruined and many other untoward events happened. But to the last day his heart was the home of endurance and steadiness." (Kambu, 24b.)

Religion gave him solace. His constant companion now was Sayyid Muhammad of Qanauj. This pious man officiated as his chaplain, lector and almoner,—discoursed on the *Quran* and the Prophet's *Traditions*, conducted prayers at the Court, and conveyed Shah Jahan's gifts to the needy outside. "All the ex-Emperor's time was divided between (professing) obedience to God, prayer, performance of the obligatory religious services with all the *sunun*,—reading the *Quran* and copying its verses, reciting the *Traditions* or hearing them read, or listening to the histories of the great men of the past.

Another no less saintly but more tender comforter he had in his daughter Jahanara, whose loving care atoned for the cruelty of all his other offspring and

Redeemed Nature from the general curse
Which twain had brought her to.

This princess, a disciple of the saint Mian Mir, now practically led the life of a nun in the harem of Agra fort, nursing her aged and 'orlorn father with the devotion of a mother and daughter in one, while she also looked after the orphan daughters of Dara and Murad whom she had gathered under her protecting wings. In such spiritual company, freed from all the world's concerns, his heart steeled by every bereavement that Fate could inflict, Shah Jahan prepared himself for the better land. He completely detached himself from this world. Death lost its terrors in his eyes, and even appeared as a welcome release from misery. He loved to discourse on it frequently.

§9. *Shah Jahan's last illness and death.*

That deliverance, so wistfully desired but so calmly waited for, came in January 1666. On the 7th of that month, as the effect of rubbing him with a medicated oil, Shah Jahan was seized with a fever. Soon strangury and griping of the stomach supervened. After nine days the obstruction was removed by a surgeon named Brindaban, and the patient felt much relief. But his weakness went on increasing; he had completed 74 years of age and had gone through much hardship in campaigns and rapid marches before his accession to the throne. The intense cold of midwinter lowered his vitality. "His

strength was gone ; his lips and tongue were parched from drinking cold *sharbat* to allay thirst. Weakness overpowered his limbs ; medicine and diet produced no effect."

Early in the night of Monday, 22nd January, his condition was declared hopeless, and the end was expected any moment. At the news that death was near, Shah Jahan thanked God for all the gifts and favours received in life and proclaimed his resignation to the will of his Maker. With perfect composure, he gave directions for his funeral, offered consolation to his surviving wives, Akbarabadi Mahal and Fathpuri Mahal, his eldest daughter Jahanara, and the other ladies of the harem, who were weeping round his bed, and charged Jahanara to look after her half-sister Purhunar Banu and other women, whom his death would leave helpless. Next, he made his will ; took leave of his family and servants, giving them his last presents and keepsakes, and ordered the *Quran* to be read. Finally, while the sacred verses were being solemnly intoned, amidst the wail of the women and the sobs of his attendants, Shah Jahan, retaining full consciousness to the last and gazing on the resting-place of his beloved and long-lost Mumtaz Mahal, repeated the Muslim confession of faith, and murmured the prayer,

"O God ! make my condition good in this world and the next, and save me from the torments of hell-fire !"

A moment later he sank peacefully into eternal rest.*

It was a quarter past seven in the evening. The body lay in the octagonal tower (Musamman Burj), where life had departed, in full view of the Taj Mahal, where he wished his mortal remains to mingle with those of his queen. Then, at the order of Jahanara, Radandaz Khan, the commandant of Agra fort, and the eunuch Bahlol came inside the harem quarters, and opening the wicket (*khirki*) in the gate of the fort, sent men out to call Sayyid Muhammad Qanauji and Qazi Qurban of the City to come and prepare the corpse for burial.

§10. *Shah Jahan's funeral.*

At midnight these two arrived and laid on the dead man a heavy fine for having neglected the fasts and prayers of Islam. Then they went to the octagonal tower, made their bow to Jahanara, removed the body to the hall near the tower, bathed and shrouded it and placed it in a sandal-wood coffin.

Jahanara had wished that the corpse might be taken to the Taj Mahal next day in a grand procession befitting the funeral of an Emperor of Delhi,—“the officers of State carrying the coffin on their shoulders ;

* Last illness and death of Shah Jahan, best described in Kambu, 25b—26a, and *A.N.* 926, 931—932. Bernier, 198; *Storia*, ii. 125-126 (bazar gossip.) K. K. ii. 188 (Jahanara secures her father's pardon for Aurangzib; cf. *Storia*, ii. 127.)

all the rich men and nobles of Agra and its environs and all the scholars, theologians, and popular leaders of the capital walking beside the bier with bare heads and feet, and chanting the *credo* and *laud*; the common people in their tens of thousand forming the rear of the procession; gold and silver being scattered on both sides every now and then as they moved on." But it was not to be. Aurangzib had not cared to come to his dying father's side, nor to send instructions for his funeral, and even his delegate, Prince Muazzam, had started too late to arrive in time for the ceremony. "Jahanara was powerless, the ordering of the affair was in the hands of others;" and so the most magnificent of the Mughal emperors had to be carried to his last resting-place on earth "by a few men—eunuchs and the like, in a manner unlike the funeral of other emperors and unworthy of his ancestry."

The officers in the fort broke open the door at the base of the staircase of the tower, which had been walled up during Shah Jahan's captivity, and took the coffin out. Passing through the gate of the outermost enclosure, opposite that door, they reached the open plain outside the fort. Here Hushdar Khan, the *subahdar* of Agra, with the local officers joined them, and led the party to the riverside at dawn. Then, conveying the coffin over the Jamuna in a boat, they reached the Taj Mahal.

Here the *qazis*, respectable men, leading citizens, scholars and holy men of Agra had assembled. They read the funeral prayer over the corpse at noon and taking it inside the dome of the Taj Mahal buried it by the side of all that remained on earth of Mumtaz Mahal.*

The public grief at the death of Shah Jahan was universal and sincere. All his virtues were told over again and his few faults forgotten. He had been a good ruler, as kind to his subjects as to his family, stern in punishing oppressive tax-collectors and governors, and erring, if at all, on the side of excessive leniency. His Court had been magnificent beyond comparison and his public buildings were the pride of the age. At his death "the cry of lamentation rose up from every house in the lanes and market-places alike."†

Nearly a month after the event Aurangzib came to Agra and visited Jahanara, whom he showed every courtesy and favour, and promised to allow as much influence and honour as she had enjoyed in her father's reign. During the last days of Shah Jahan, her entreaties had conquered his just resentment and

* Funeral of Shah Jahan, Kambu 26a, A N 932—934, Aql Kh 108, *Storia*, II 126

† Character and popularity of Shah Jahan, Kambu, 27a, K K II 187, *Dilkasha*, 51

he had at last signed, after many previous refusals, a pardon to Aurangzib for the wrongs he had done to him.

§11. *Public opinion on Aurangzib's treatment of his father.*

Aurangzib's treatment of his father outraged not only the moral sense but also the social decorum of the age.* Rebellion against a reigning father was the curse of the Mughal imperial family. Jahangir had risen against Akbar's Government and Shah Jahan against that of Jahangir. They had unhesitatingly encountered and even slain their fathers' generals or rival brothers, but shrunk from facing their fathers in battle. At the arrival of the emperor in person the rebellious prince had either made his submission or fled in shame. But Aurangzib's ambition had ridden over decency and the established conventions of society. Hence, he now came to be

*Opinion of Amanat Khan Khwafi, *diwan* of Lahor, in *M U*.
i. 14 Khush-hal Khan Khattak (Biddulph, 54) sang of Aurangzib :

"Such is the grief that he brought on the house of his own father,
Arabs and Persia alike are confounded at his deeds.

Who has heard of such deeds among the descendants of

Adam?"

Mecca opinion in *Storia*, II. 3 Opinion of a former Qazi-ul-quzat (*Mirāt-i-Ahmadi*, 216). Shah Abbas II.'s opinion, *ante* p. 111. Aurangzib's letter of condolence to Jahanara on hearing of Shah Jahan's death and her reply are given in the *Ruqat-i-Hamid-ud-din Khan* (my second MS.), pp. 133 and 155.

execrated by the public as a bold bad man, without fear, without pity, without shame.

To recover public respect, he had to pose as the champion of Islamic orthodoxy, as the reluctant and compelled instrument of the divine will in a mission of much needed religious reform. Hence he displayed extreme zeal in restoring the ordinances of pure Islam and removing heretical innovations, that the people might forget his past conduct as a son and as a brother, till at last his Court historian could write of him, "His imperial robe of state thinly veiled the *darvish's* frock that he wore beneath it." (*M.A.* 333.)

CHAPTER XXXI

INVASION OF KUCH BIHAR AND ASSAM

§1. *The Geography of the Assam Valley.*

At the extreme north-eastern corner of our country, through a cleft in the Himalayan range, the drainage of the Tibet plateau escapes into India. Arrested by the rocky wall of the Garo Khasia and Naga hills on the south, the mighty volume of water sweeps westwards, scoring out a deep and broad bed nearly four hundred miles long, from Sadiya to Dhubri, and then turns due south to mingle with the Ganges at Goalnanda. This river is the Brahmaputra, and its valley is the province of Assam. From East Bengal it is divided by the long succession of hills that begin at the s. w. corner of the province and end, in the extreme east, in the Patkoi range, the border-line between Assam and Burma.

The copious rainfall on the eastern Himalayas, descending in torrents, has carved many a river which cut up the plains north of the Brahmaputra into a number of valleys, each bounded by rivers on three sides and by the mountain on the fourth. The successive advances of the Assam kingdom have been westwards and its shrinkings eastwards, from one of these feeder rivers to the next. These rivers,

—the Bharali, the Bar Nadi, the Monas and the Sankosh,—have been the boundary between the kingdom of Assam and its rivals, Kuch Bihar or Mughal India, in different ages. The south Brahmaputra valley is similarly furrowed by innumerable streams, but these have in general a western or markedly north-western inclination.

Closely surrounded in the north, east and south by rugged hills whose slopes are held by savage tribes, Assam is practically impervious to attack from these directions.* But it is not so well protected in the west, where it merges in the plains of North Bengal. From the Kuch Bihar side invasions have been easily conducted into the north Brahmaputra valley, and armies have also sometimes marched into Assam from Dacca by following the left bank of the Brahmaputra and turning the extreme western end of the Garo hills. But every hostile army operating in southern Assam must depend for its success, and even for its very life, on the support of a strong flotilla of war-boats. If it loses the command of the water highway, it is crushed between the river in the north and the savage-haunted hills in the south. Dacca is too far-off and the way to it is too circuitous for any reinforcement to be sent up from it by land in time.

* The only exceptions are the conquests by the Ahoms and the Burmese; but these were rather migrations of kindred tribes.

The river Sankosh now forms the boundary between Bengal and Assam. But the western districts of Assam, *viz.* Goalpara and Kamrup, enclosed by the Sankosh and the Bar Nadi, have been connected with Bengal almost throughout their entire history, often politically, always by culture.

§2. *Kuch Bihar and its rulers.*

At the end of the 15th century the flourishing kingdom of Kamata, which stretched from the Karatoya river to the Bar Nadi and included the modern districts of Rangpur, Kuch Bihar, Goalpara and Kamrup, was overthrown by the Muslims. A few years of anarchy followed. Then Vishwa Sinha, the son of a Koch mother by a Mech father, founded a dynasty which still rules over KUCH BIHAR. A valiant fighter and born leader of men, he soon gained possession of the entire territory of the old Kamata kings.* The successful soldier of fortune (reigned 1515-1540) adopted the Hindu religion and Hindu culture and ably organized his administration and army. His eldest son Nara Narayan (r. 1540-1584) wore the crown for 44 years, but led the life of a saintly recluse. The real power of the State was wielded by the king's younger brother, the Commander-in-Chief Shukladhwaj, surnamed the Kite Prince (*Chila Rai*), who led the Koch armies almost to the farthest eastern limit of Assam and achieved a

series of brilliant but shortlived victories, extorting from the Assam king an admission of Koch suzerainty. His death (c. 1576) was followed by the loss of the recent gains. A domestic quarrel led to still further dismemberment of the kingdom: Raghudev, the son of Chila Rai, claimed a share in the State, and was installed by his meek uncle as king over Kamrup, or the land east of the Sankosh, which the Muslim historians call KOCH HAJO. Raghudev's son Parikshit attacked Lakshmi Narayan, the son and successor of Nara Narayan on the throne of Kuch Bihar, who sought the aid of the Mughal governor of Dacca. The Muslim army, guided by its Koch auxiliaries, conquered and annexed Parikshit's kingdom (1612) and held it in force. Thus the Mughal frontier was carried up to the Bar Nadi river, and the Mughal Government came into contact with the Ahom kings who ruled over Eastern Assam, across that stream.* ●

* Early Kuch Bihar history.—H. N. Chaudhuri's *Cooch Behar State* (1903), 220-235; Gait's *History of Assam* (2nd ed.) 42-66, 96-100; *Buranji* viii, 33-42. Gait, 66, says that on the conquest of Koch Hajo the Mughal frontier extended to the Bar Nadi, but on p. 108 he implies that the Bharali was the boundary, as *Buranji* viii, p. 42 explicitly asserts. *Pad.*, ii, 97, says that Kajali, at the mouth of the Kallang, was the place where Assam proper begins and that Singtri was an Assamese town. This would make the Bar Nadi the eastern frontier of Koch Hajo as held by the Mughals in 1637.

§3. *The Ahoms : their character and government.*

The Ahoms were a branch of the Shan race, whose cradle was the hilly region lying north and east of Upper Burma. In the 13th century a prince of their ancient kingdom of Pong left his home with a band of adventurers, crossed the Patkoi range, and established himself in the s. e. corner of the Brahmaputra valley. He then advanced westwards, conquering the tribes on the way, and after many wanderings made Charaideo, in the south Sibsagar district, his capital. The defeated clans were of Mongoloid origin like the Ahoms themselves, and the victors very wisely welded them into one nation by intermarriage and conciliatory treatment. The Ahoms also received frequent reinforcements from their kith beyond the Patkoi hills, and, with their numbers largely increased in these two ways, they continued to force their way down the Brahmaputra valley.

Over all the population the political organization and civilization of the conquerors were imposed. The Ahoms were a hardy race of demon-worshippers, eating beef and fowl and drinking spirituous liquor, with the Burmese expertness in building stockades and bamboo-bridges, plying boats and making night attacks. They were feudally organized under a number of noblemen (called *Gohains*, *Baruas*, and

Phukans). The nobles cultivated their estates by slave labour. The entire adult male population was liable to military service. Their army consisted entirely of foot-soldiers, stiffened by elephants, on which rode their captains. The men were ferocious in their manners and brutal in temper, but possessed great bodily strength, power of endurance and fearlessness, making rapid marches and showing an enterprising spirit in war. They were afraid of horses; but a land of jungle, *nalas* and quagmires, with few roads, is not suited to cavalry.

The king was the patriarch of the clan; he decided questions of social precedence and caste purity, made religious sacrifices for the good of the entire tribe, and was venerated as a semi-divine being and the custodian of the tutelary god of the tribe (*Somdeo*). Ahom punishments were draconic, men being put to death with torture at the slightest fault and even at the mere caprice of the king. Women, no doubt, enjoyed freedom of movement, and lived unveiled, but polygamy was the general practice, wives being regarded as mere chattels, and changing owners, even in the royal family. Cruelty and sensuality were the vices of the Ahom kings, but this fact does not seem to have impaired their military efficiency.*

* Ahom migration, character and civilization.—Gait, 70-105, 119-122, 141-151, 233-246; *Padishahnamah*, ii. 68; *Fathiyah-i-ibriyah*,

Such were the Ahoms by origin. But in the course of their stay in Assam, they began to change under the influence of Indian civilization and the Hindu religion. Ahom kings had married into the Kamata and Kuch Bihar families, and Hindu priests and artisans had entered Assam in the train of these queens. Victory in wars with the Pathan Sultans of Bengal had led to the Ahoms learning the use of fire-arms and (probably) of horses from their enemies, and to the settlement of large numbers of captive Bengalis (mostly Muhammadans) in the country. Lastly, the Vajshnav religion was preached by Shankardev and other saints, and it made great progress in the land, introducing a new element into the life of the people and dotting the country with Vaishnav monasteries (*satra*), whose abbots exercised great influence on many of the kings and vast numbers of the common people, though their wealth and Court favour were envied by the nobles. In short, by the end of the 16th century the Ahoms became Hinduized, and fifty years later we find their kings adopting Hindu names. Their old social system still remained, and spirit-worship was still the groundwork of their faith, though both continued to

change increasingly under the steady if silent pressure of Hinduism.*

The weak point of the Ahom kingdom was its diversity of population. The dominant race was the Ahoms, whom the Muhammadan historian calls "the true Assamese" and whose high qualities have been described above. The middle stratum of the population was composed of the Assamese proper,—plainmen with many Bengal affinities, defective in physical strength, endurance and martial spirit. At the bottom of society lay a vast body of slaves, some being Mongoloid serfs; but most being Bengali prisoners of war. These last were unwilling dwellers in the land, and at the first shock of foreign invasion rose against their masters. (*Fathiyah*, 64, 44, 48—49.)

§4. *Ahom expansion and wars with Mughals.*

Throughout the 15th and 16th centuries the Ahom kingdom went on expanding. The many wild tribes on the hill-slopes north and south of the valley were subdued; the many encounters with the Koch kings and Muslim rulers of Bengal resulted on the whole in Ahom success, till by the end of the 16th century their domination stretched up to the Bar Nadi

* Hindu and Bengali influence on the Ahoms.—Gait, (Hindu marriages) 43, 80, 84, 103, 107; (Bengali settlers), 95, 99, 101, 103; (Hindu religion adopted) 58, 82, 83, 86, 97, 104, 121, 125, 168-170; *Fathiyah-i-ibriyah*, 59, 66.

river in the north-west and the Kallang river in the s. w.

Early in the 17th century, the Mughals, after annexing Koch Hajo (1612), had a long war with the Ahoms, who had harboured a prince of the deposed dynasty. At last*in 1638 a peace was made, by which the Muhammadans were allowed to retain the country west of the Bar Nadi in the north Brahmaputra valley, and west of the Asurar Ali in the region south of that great river.*

This peace lasted for 21 years and was broken only amidst the general disorder which spread through the Mughal empire during the great War of Succession.

The trouble was begun by Kuch Bihar. From Akbar's reign onwards the Koch kings had been obedient vassals of the Mughal emperor, as their only protector from the Pathan Sultans of Bengal and the descendants of Chila Rai in Koch Hajo. They had sent embassies and even personally paid their respects to the throne of Delhi, and the imperial frontier in North Bengal had been always respected by them.

§5. *Ahom conquest of Kamrup, 1658.*

But when in 1657 Shuja set out with most of the troops of Bengal to contest the throne, Pran

* Gait, 107-118; *Buranji* viii., 43-79. *Baharistan* (fullest of details up to 1627).

Narayan, the Rajah of Kuch Bihar,* took advantage of the defenceless state of the province, drove away the Mughal envoy who had come to demand the annual tribute, and sent an army under his *wazir* Bhabanath to arrest an obnoxious vassal who had fled to Mughal territory (Hajo). A small imperial force that advanced to oppose Bhabanath was easily defeated. At the same time the Ahom viceroy of the west was making preparations for war and had bridged the Kallang river, for entering Mughal Kamrup. Mir Lutfullah Shirazi, the *faujdar* of Gauhati, fearing attack from two sides and knowing help from Bengal to be impossible, fled by boat to Dacca "with the speed of lightning and wind." The Assamese occupied the capital of Kamrup without a blow, and seized 140 horses, 40 pieces of cannon, and 200 matchlocks, besides much other property there. "The usurpers of Assam swept the whole country of Kamrup with the broom of plunder, carried off to their own kingdom all the movable and

* The Rajah's name is wrongly given in the Persian histories as *Bhim Narayan* or *Pem Narayan*. The correct form is given in the Assam and Kuch Bihar chronicles. Pran Narayan's paternal uncle, Bhim Narayan, never came to the throne. The *Buranji from Khunlung and Khunlai*, vol. i. pp. 653-656, gives the best account of the cause of the invasion: "Taking advantage of the quarrel (among the sons of Shah Jahan), Pran Narayan tried to deliver his country from Musalman sovereignty. In the month of Magh he sent word

immovable things, and by levelling down houses left no sign of habitation."

Pran Narayan proposed a friendly division of the conquest with the Ahom king Jayadhwaj, but the latter rejected the offer and drove Bhabanath beyond the Sankosh river. Thus the entire western Brahmaputra valley fell into the hands of the Ahoms, and their outposts were pushed on as far south as Hatchila near Karibari, only five days' march from Dacca.*

This happened early in 1658, and for three years the invaders were left undisturbed. But by June 1660 the civil war was finally over, Shuja had been driven out of India, and Mir Jumla was appointed viceroy of Bengal with orders to "punish the lawless zamindars of the province, especially those of Assam and Mag (Arracan) who had caused injury and molestation to the Muslims."

to Durlava Narayan (a local Rajah loyally governing a Mughal district) asking him to shake off the (foreign) yoke on their father's country DN replied that PN had been given charge of the country by the Musalmans under a *sarad* in due order and the same thing had been done to him (D N) and so he did not like to rise against the Emperor Hearing this P N sent orders to Bhayanat Kaji (*sic*,) to capture D N, who fled for shelter to Mahital Narayan of Beltala "

* For these Koch and Ahom invasions, *Fathuyah*, 67, *Burani* viii 82-86, A 196-198 Gait 127-128

The *Purani Asam Burani* ed by H C Goswami (1922), pp 115-119, gives a somewhat different account

§6. *Mir Jumla prepares for war, 1661.*

“The time for retribution had arrived.” Hearing of Aurangzib’s final triumph and of the military and naval preparations at Dacca, both the kings of Kuch Bihar and Assam sent envoys offering to restore the territory they had seized, “to guard it in the meantime” as they alleged. Accordingly, a force was sent from Dacca under Rashid Khan to take delivery of Kamrup from the Ahoms. But the disloyalty of a vassal like Pran Narayan could not be pardoned. A second force was detached under Rajah Sujan Singh to conquer Kuch Bihar and punish its king.

Rashid Khan advanced unopposed to Rangamati (at the western end of Kamrup) and stopped there, while Sujan Singh halted opposite Ek Duar, a fortified gateway leading into Kuch Bihar, and both applied for reinforcements in view of the enemy’s superior strength. Then Mir Jumla determined to conduct the war in person. For this, preparations were made on an adequate scale.*

On 1st November, 1661, the viceroy started from Dacca with an army of 12,000 horse, and 30,000 foot. A vast flotilla of war-vessels (at least 323 boats of all kinds) accompanied him,—the most

* Aurangzib’s letter of appointment addressed to Mir Jumla, in Ishwardas, 50a. War preparations at Dacca and abortive negotiations, *Fathiyah*, 8-9, 25, 40.

powerful of them being *ghurabs* or floating batteries, each towed by four long row-boats (called *kosas*) and carrying 14 guns and a crew of 60 men. Most of the naval officers and sailors were Portuguese or half-breeds, with some English and Dutch sailors too. On water the Mughals had an overwhelming superiority.*

§7. *Mughals conquer Kuch Bihar.*

Mir Jumla made his way into Kuch Bihar by an obscure and neglected highway. The advance was very slow, as the dense bamboo groves had to be cleared to make a way. In six days the Mughal army reached the capital (19th December), which had been deserted by the Rajah and his people in terror. The name of the town was changed to Alamgir-nagar; the Muslim call to prayer, so long forbidden

* On reaching Lakhau (8th March, 1662) the Mughal fleet numbered 323 boats (*Fathiyah*, 43). A few had been lost in a tempest before (Gait, 131). For the European mariners and the doings of the fleet, see the Dutchmen's narrative in Glanville, *Relation of an unfortunate voyage to the Kingdom of Bengala*, (1682), 140-183. Mir Jumla's army is estimated in the *Buranyia* (Gait, 129) at 12,000 horse and 30,000 foot, and in *Fathiyah*, 89, at ten or twelve thousand horse and numerous infantry. Useful information from Dutch sources in *Storia*, iv. 430 (Mir Jumla's original force consisted of 12,000 cavalry). Manucci (ii. 98) gives him 40,000 horsemen, but that was the full contingent kept under the governor of Dacca (ii. 430). *Riyaz-us-salatin* gives Mir Jumla 20,000 efficient cavalry and numerous infantry.

in the city, was chanted from the lofty roof of the palace, and a mosque built by demolishing the principal temple. The whole kingdom was annexed to the Mughal empire, and an officer, Isfandiyar Beg, left to garrison the capital. The Rajah, an indolent voluptuary, had fled to Bhutan, but his eldest son joined the Muslims in the hope of the throne and even offered to arrest his father.

From the opening of the campaign Mir Jumla, mounted on a hardy pony, had guided the march. He forbade plunder and outrage by the soldiers and camp-followers, and so strictly did he punish the first offenders that such crimes ceased in the Mughal camp, the people were reassured and came back to their homes and fields, and the imperialists were abundantly supplied with provisions locally.*

§8. *Mir Jumla conquers Assam.*

After a 16 days' stay the general left Kuch Bihar (4th January, 1662), absorbed Rashid Khan's detachment at Rangamati, and invaded Assam. "On account of the jungles and numerous *nalas* the daily progress did not exceed 4 or 5 miles." The men had to go through unspeakable fatigue which the Commander-in-Chief shared with the humblest private. His resolution bore down all opposition of

* For Mir Jumla in Kuch Bihar, *Fathiyah*, 10—18. For the Assam War, *Storia*, (ii. 98-102) and Bernier (171-173) are very brief.

Nature and man. The Ahom army, devastated by cholera, offered a feeble resistance, always retreating before the invaders or being routed with heavy slaughter. The Muslims advanced* victoriously up the Brahmaputra, carrying all the stockades, trenches and holes full of bamboo spikes on the way. Fort after fort was occupied,—Jogigupha at the mouth of the Monas river (20th January), Gauhati, Srighat at the mouth of the Bar Nadi (5th Feb.), Pandu, Beltala, and Kajali at the mouth of the Kallang,—most of which the enemy had evacuated in terror. Some of the feudal lords of Assam—e.g., the Rajahs of Darrang and Dimarua, now deserted to the Mughals.

Samdhara at the mouth of the Bharali river and Simla-garh opposite to it on the south bank of the Brahmaputra, were now the only strongholds that lay in the path to Garhgaon, the Ahom capital. On 25th February, Simla-garh was most gallantly stormed by Dilir Khan, and this feat struck such terror into the hearts of the Ahoms that they fled from the almost impregnable fort of Samdhara without waiting for an attack. The Ahom fleet tried its

* Mir Jumla's advance to Lakhau, *Fathiyah*, 18-43; *Buranji* viii, 82-90 (mentions two battles, viz. at Pancharatna on the Monas and at Samdhara, at both of which the Ahoms were defeated). *Cait.* 129-133. The naval battle in *Fathiyah*, 37-39, and *Glanius*, 154-161. Full history of the Mughal invasion in *Buranji from Khunlung and Khunlai*, i. 655-745, ii. 1-9, after which *Purani Asam Buranji* (ed. H. C. Goswami) has no independent value.

fortune against the Mughal navy in the night of 3rd March, when Mir Jumla's army was too far from the bank to co-operate in the defence; but the Mughals gained a signal victory, annihilating the enemy's naval power and seizing 300 boats.

Then, by way of Salagarh and Lakhau, the invaders reached Garhgaon on 17th March. Jayadhwaj had fled away, abandoning his capital and all his property. His chief commander, the Bar Gohain, after retreating along the north bank of the Brahmaputra, parallel to Mir Jumla's line of march on the south bank, now fled to the Tiru mountains. The Ahoms recognized that it was impossible to resist the Mughal army.

From 19th December, 1661, the day of the fall of Kuch Bihar, to 17th March, when he entered Garhgaon, Mir Jumla's advance had been a triumphal march. As the historian Talish rightly boasts, "Two kingdoms have been seldom conquered in the course of the same year" by one army. The spoils taken in Assam were enormous:—82 elephants, 3 lakhs of Rupees in cash, 675 pieces of artillery, 1343 camel-swivels, 1200 *Ramchangis*, 6750 matchlocks, 340 maunds of gunpowder, a thousand and odd boats, and 173 storehouses of paddy, each containing from 10 to 1000 maunds of grain.*

* Capture of Garhgaon. *Fathiyah*, 43-45 (march from Lakhau), 47-48 and 49-50 (spoils of war), 66-69 (city described); Gait, 134.

§9. *Mughal army at Garhgaon during rains.*

The rainy season was approaching, and Mir Jumla made his arrangements for going into cantonments and keeping hold of the country. Owing to the shallowness of the Dikhu river on which Garhgaon stood, the fleet could not sail up to that town, but had to halt some 18 miles north-west, at Lakhau, which stood at the junction of the old beds of the Brahmaputra and Dihing rivers. The army, however, could not leave Garhgaon, as the immense booty seized there could not be removed for want of transport and the elephants,—the richest portion of the spoils,—took time to be trained for marching. The Nawab with the main army went into quarters at Mathurapur, a village lying on a high ground, seven miles s. e. of Garhgaon (31st March). The Ahom capital, containing all the artillery, elephants, stores and property of the Mughal army, was held by a strong garrison under Mir Murtaza. Many outposts were set up: north of Garhgaon at Ramdang and Trimohani up to the point where the Dikhu falls into the Dihing; westwards at Gajpur and Dewalgaon on the way to Lakhau: southwards at Deopani and Silpani up to the skirt of the Tiru hills; and eastwards at Abhaypur, 16 miles from Garhgaon on the Namrup side. A body of sturdy men from

Dariabad (in Oudh) under Jalal Khan held the bank of the Dihing, evidently north-east of Garhgaon. From Lakhau westwards the line of posts ran along the Brahmaputra to Gauhati.

The enemy's forces were thus distributed: the Bar Gohain occupied the mountains south of Garhgaon, most of the other nobles with their followers lived in the huge island of Majuli, formed by the fork of the Brahmaputra and the Dihing, while the Rajah fled to Namrup, the easternmost province of his dominion.*

§10. *Constant fighting with Ahoms.*

.But there was no repose in the Mughal outposts even from the first. The Ahoms had been scared away and not crushed. They soon resumed the offensive. Throughout the month of April there were frequent skirmishes, mostly night attacks on the outposts. Even Garhgaon was assaulted; but the sleepless vigilance of Mir Murtaza foiled the attempt. On the whole the balance of fighting was in favour of the Mughals, when early in May, the rains came down in torrents, the rivers rose in flood, the

* Disposition of the rival forces, *Fathiyah*, 69-74; Gait, 135-136. Fighting during the rainy season, *Fathiyah*, 75-118, 119-127 (doings of the fleet at Lakhau), 128-139 (epidemic in Mughal camp); *Baranji* viii. 91-92, *Baranji from Khunlung and Khunlai*, ii. 1-5; Gait, 137-138. I have often borrowed the language of the *Fathiyah*, with or without quotation marks.

movement of troops by land became impossible, and the imperial outposts were isolated. In fact, during the whole rainy season, from the beginning of May to near the end of October, the Mughal army in Assam lived in a state of siege.* Each of its posts stood like an island surrounded by water,—the few raised paths being held by the enemy, and no provision coming from the fleet at Lakhau because the river of Garhgaon was not deep enough for the large armed boats, while the small trading vessels could not safely ply on it so long as the Ahom entrenchments on its banks were not carried.

The rain poured down incessantly, turning the fields into lakes and the *nalas* into raging torrents. The Mughal army consisting mainly of cavalry and fighting with cumbrous heavy artillery, could not operate freely when cramped within its cantonments. At times even the tents were flooded, and horse and foot had to stand knee-deep in water. For lack of proper food, cavalry horses and draught cattle perished by the thousand. No supplies of any kind, not even news, could come from the outside world.

* "In no history has it been read that in any age from the advent of Adam to this time a force of 10 or 12 thousand cavalry and many infantry and numberless camp-followers remained for six months powerless and enclosed like the centre of a circle by brooks and streams,—so that nobody could place his foot outside the circumference of the camp." *Fathiyah*, 89. One MS. reads "42,000 cavalry." But 42,000 was the total strength.

The nights were disturbed by the noisy attacks of the Ahoms.

§11. *Mir Jumla's communication with fleet cut off.*

Early in May, Dewalgaon was attacked by the enemy, but relieved in time. On the 10th, however, the outpost at Gajpur fell, and the Ahoms held the north bank of the Dihing from Trimohani to near Lakhau, cutting off communications between the Mughal army and navy. Mir Jumla sent a detachment under Sarandaz Khan with ten war-boats and several empty merchant vessels under Muhammad Murad to recover Gajpur. But the two commanders quarrelled, the land force returned from the way (23rd May), the flotilla pushed on, but was attacked by the Ahoms from land and water alike and fled in a panic, losing all the material and ships to the enemy. Only the boats of Dilir Khan and his Afghans forced a way through the enemy's lines and reached Dewalgaon in safety.

This success emboldened the Ahoms. An attack on the *thana* of Deopani was repulsed after desperate fighting, but the place continued to be invested. At Garhgaon, too, the enemy concentrated and kept the garrison in perpetual alarm. The neighbouring peasantry, who had submitted to the Mughals, now began to flee away. To complete the misfortune of the invaders the news arrived that

Kuch Bihar had been recovered by its Rajah and the imperial garrison expelled from the country.

At the end of May, Mir Jumla made a great effort to reopen communications with the fleet. Farhad Khan, the best fighter in the Mughal army, was sent out with a picked force to destroy the enemy's trenches on the way, reinforce the *thanas* of Ramdang and Trimohani, restore that of Gajpur, and fetch supplies from Lakhau.

It was a formidable task, doomed to failure from the outset, by reason of his lack of boats. Leaving Garhgaon in the night of 27th May, he waded through mud and ditches to the village of Tiok* between Trimohani and Gajpur, where his further progress was rendered impossible by flood.† Farhad Khan in despair tried to return to Trimohani, but found his path barred by Ahom entrenchments and wet ditches. The enemy's boats surrounded his force and began to gall him with artillery fire. He had no boats and no provisions, and his fate seemed hopeless. For a week he was besieged where he stood,

* Different from *Tiok* of Gait's map. The *Buranj* *Khunlung* mentions this name. The Persian MS. reads *Batak* or *Tik*.

† "The field looked like a larger river than the Dihing itself. No road was visible in any direction. The rain fell from the sky and water swelled up from the ground; the flood spread over the encampment, the tents looked like bubbles on the surface of the water; the horsemen sat all night on their chargers, and the infantry stood on their legs [in water]." *Fathiyah*, 82.

unable to fetch provisions or counter-attack the enemy for want of boats.

A relieving force under Muhammad Mumin Beg was held up on the way by a rise in the flood. Dilir Khan's proposal to send a column on elephants to the rescue of Farhad Khan, was rejected as likely to involve only additional loss. Consternation and despair reigned at the Mughal head-quarters and Farhad Khan's force was given up for lost.

But that commander's firmness and military skill triumphed over difficulties which would have overwhelmed a lesser man. After being beleaguered for a week, during which he ate up his oxen and horses, he seized some Ahom boats by a clever feint, and early next morning crossed the *nala*, surprised the negligent Ahom force on the other bank, and put it to utter rout. The Mughals now returned to Trimohani in safety (about 6th June).

§12. *Garhgaon completely invested.*

"After the return of Farhad Khan the roads were all closed, and the audacity of the Ahoms passed all bounds." It became impossible to issue from any outpost or send support to it. Mir Jumla, therefore, withdrew all his *thanas*. The Ahom king recovered all his country east of Lakhau. The Mughals held only Garhgaon and Mathurapur, and so close was the enemy's investment that even between these two

camp traffic was not safe without a strong escort. The beleaguered Mughals despaired of ever returning to Hindustan, and at Delhi "funeral rites were performed for the Assam expeditionary force."

The vigour of Ahom attack was now redoubled. Their king himself came out of Namrup and took post at Solaguri, only four days' march from Garhgaon. The Baduli Phukan was appointed prime minister and Commander-in-Chief and sent to destroy the invaders. Orders were issued to all the nobles and people of the kingdom to assist and obey him implicitly.

The Phukan ran up six miles of walls—broad, high, turreted and strong,—on the bank of the Dilli, east of Mathurapur, connecting the southern hills with the Dihing. But a severe defeat at the hands of Dilir Khan put an end to his night attacks on Mathurapur. A detachment under Sujan Singh chastised the Rajah of Sairing, who was meditating an attack on Garhgaon. The minor encounters that took place almost daily are beyond count. The well-bred cavaliers of Delhi fought without heeding how they were blistered by the sun, or soaked in water and bespattered with mud,—but ever vigilant and ever ready to repel the enemy. "The saddles were never bare of the riders; the horses' backs were never stripped of the saddles; servants ceased to attend on their masters, but each and all, at the least alarm,

leaped up from his post and wielded his sword with both hands."

§13. *The fight for Garhgaon.*

After his failure to take Mathurapur, the Ahom general turned against Garhgaon and attacked it every night. He burnt down all the houses of the Rajah and the nobles outside the bamboo palisade of the city and in its environs. But Mir Jumla strengthened the defence by sending Farhad Khan (14th June) there. The fortifications of the city were improved and rearranged. Vigorous sorties were made to dislodge the enemy from the gardens and stockades in the neighbourhood.

After almost daily attacks and alarms, an assault in force was delivered on Garhgaon in the night of 8th July. The Ahoms broke down the bamboo railing on the north side of the palace enclosure, routed the Buxari matchlock-men posted there, and seized half the enclosure, which was the citadel of Garhgaon. "Great confusion and tumult arose." The darkness of the night added to the confusion as the advancing Mughals could not tell friend from foe. Happily, some of the Ahoms set fire to the thatched roof of a mansion and the blaze enabled the Mughals to charge and expel the enemy. A heroic onset by Farhad Khan cleared even the embankment outside the fencing, but he was wounded in the fight.

Finally, by the exertion of every man in the garrison the fort was completely recovered, and the night of crisis passed away.

A mud wall was rapidly run up in the place of the bamboo fencing, and the ground in front of it was cleared of houses and trees. This wall, in fact, saved Garhgaon. Thereafter the night attacks continued, no doubt, and the grandest of all the assaults was delivered on 12th July by the entire Ahom army in four divisions from four sides at the same time; but they all failed, and never again was the enclosure penetrated by the enemy. Moreover, from the middle of July the garrison began to make vigorous reprisals. Under the new commandant, Rashid Khan, they repeatedly sallied out and dispersed the enemy from the banks of the three streams that lie between Garhgaon and Mathurapur. "In short, repose and peace visited the inmates of the city and fort of Garhgaon." And on 7th July couriers brought the happy news that the fleet at Lakhau had kept communication with Bengal open and was more than holding its own in the encounters with the Ahoms of Majuli island.

§14. *Pestilence and famine in Mughal camp.*

But man is the least of the enemies that an invader of Assam has to dread. In August a terrible epidemic broke out at Mathurapur. From the hill immediately south of it, bearing the appropriate name

of Fever Mountain (*Jwar Parbat*) blew pestilential airs and from the foot of the hill rolled down streams of putrid water. In the Mughal camp fever and flux carried off hundreds daily. Medicine had no effect, and the dead could not be given a decent burial on account of their vast number. Dilir Khan's corps was reduced from 1,500 troopers to about 450. The whole of Assam was infected; and two hundred and thirty thousand of its people died of disease that year, according to the Baduli Phukan's estimate.

In the Mughal camp no suitable diet or comfort was available for the sick; all had to live on coarse rice; no wheat, no pulse, no *ghee*, no sugar, and no opium or tobacco except a little at fabulous prices. A pipe of tobacco sold at Rs. 3, a *tola* of opium at a gold *mohar*, a *seer* of *mung-dal* at Rs. 10, and salt also at the same rate as the last. The Hindustani and Turki soldiers languished for want of wheaten bread; the horses perished from eating rice. For a time the Muslim soldiers and camp-followers lived on the meat of the lean and worn out draught oxen, till these too came to an end. The soldiers,—Rajput and Muslim alike, were opium-eaters to a man, and they underwent unspeakable agony at being deprived of the accustomed drug.

At last life at Mathurapur became unbearable, and on 17th August the army returned to Garhgaon. Much of the stored rice and many of the sick were

left behind for want of transport. "It is not known what fate overtook them when the Ahoms reoccupied Mathurapur."

The exultant Ahoms renewed their attacks on Garhgaon and there was fighting every night outside the fort. A grand attack on 15th September was defeated and the victorious Mughals chased the enemy for miles with heavy slaughter. Thereafter the Ahoms grew quiet and shrank from again provoking the Mughal army. But the pestilence now reached its extreme. The refugees from Mathurapur had infected the garrison of Garhgaon, and diverse and mutually opposed diseases broke out. "All kinds of food-stuffs disappeared except coarse red rice, without salt, and the fruit of the lime tree. Poor men did not spare the leaves on the trees, the grass on the ground or the herbs on the riverside in the pang of hunger." Mir Jumla lived and ate like the common soldiers, though he had a good store of delicacies. Much heroic self-sacrifice and social service* were rendered by some other Muslim officers too, in that dreadful period.

By the third week of September, the worst was

* *Fathiyah*, 130-132 and 137-138 (famine and epidemic in consequence of eating coarse food), 130 and 131 (agonies of habitual opium eaters), 131 (Mahmud Beg, paymaster, makes a gift of his store of tobacco); 138 (Muhammad Mumin Tabrizi, historiographer, nurses the sick, till he dies of disease).

over. The rain began to decrease, the flood went down, the roads reappeared, "pleasant breezes began to blow, and flowers to blossom." A few days earlier cheering news had come from the fleet at Lakhau, which had restored the *thana* at Dewalgaon.

§15. *Success of the Mughal navy at Lakhau.*

Through all these dark months of alarm, suspense and even despair, the one steadfast ray of hope came from the Mughal navy under admiral Ibn Husain. The *nawwara* saved itself and thus saved the army, for, no invader of the Brahmaputra valley from Bengal can triumph or even remain alive without the mastery of the water and unbroken communication with his base by boat. When, early in the rainy season, Mir Jumla was isolated by the enemy, Ibn Husain acted on his own initiative very wisely and successfully. He made no futile attempt to reopen the road to Garhgaon before the return of dry weather, he withdrew the *thana* of Dewalgaon as needlessly expensive, but strengthened the outposts at Koliabar and westwards as vitally necessary for safeguarding his communication with Bengal. His boats plied up and down the river and kept constant touch with Gauhati and through it with Dacca and Delhi. Then he landed and made reprisals against the Ahom nobles sheltering in the

Majuli island, so as to make it impossible for them to molest the fleet at its anchorage at Lakhau.

And finally, when the rains began to decrease he was first in the field; he re-established the *thana* of Dewalgaon and sent messengers with news of the outside world to the besieged Nawab and co-operated from the north to open the road to Garhgaon.*

§16. *Mir Jumla resumes the offensive after the rains.*

It was now Mir Jumla's turn to make an effort and open the way to Lakhau from his side. For this purpose the Dikhu was bridged near Garhgaon after three unsuccessful attempts. A force was sent (25th Sep.) under Abul Hasan to follow the circuitous high road from the Dikhu bank opposite Garhgaon, by way of Sairing and the southern hills, to Dewalgaon. The expedition was an unqualified success: outposts were set up at Sairing and Gajpur, Dewalgaon was reached and communication reopened with the fleet. From Lakhau large quantities of provisions were now sent by land and water under escort, and arrived at Garhgaon on 24th and 31st October respectively.

* Doings of the Mughal fleet stationed at Lakhau, *Fathiyah*, 119-127. "If God forbid it! the least weakness had overtaken the fleet, then immediately on hearing the news of it the men of the army would have cut the thread of the hope of life, and a terrible disaster would have taken place, and the liberation of the army would have become difficult." (*Ibid.* p. 126.)

Plenty now took the place of famine, and the joy of the Mughal camp knew no bound. The land having dried, the Mughal cavalry was again irresistible, and Jayadhwaj and his nobles fled to the hills of Namrup a second time. The Assamese peasantry, who had returned during the rains, again deserted their fields and huts and betook themselves to the hills across the Brahmaputra with their families and movable property.

§17. *His march to Tipam.*

Mir Jumla now resumed the offensive.* On 10th November, a flotilla left Garhgaon under Abul Hasan, made its way up the Dilli river from its mouth and took the Baduli Phukan's trenches in the extreme rear, routing the Ahoms after an obstinate fight. But the enemy's lines at that place were 20 miles from Garhgaon. So, on the 16th Mir Jumla himself set out to drive the enemy off and hunt the Rajah out of Namrup. After taking the Baduli Phukan's entrenchments north-east of Garhgaon, he arrived at the Dihing on 20th November, and then by way of Solaguri at Tipam, on the other side of the river (18th December). This was destined to be the farthest point of his advance.

On 20th November he had a fainting fit. "This

* Mughals resume the offensive at the end of the rainy season, *Fathiyah*, 139-153; *Buranji from Khanlung and Khanlai*, ii. 4-9.

was the beginning of the disease of which he was to die." But he clung tenaciously to his purpose, and continued to lead the army. On 30th November the Baduli Phukan came over to the Mughal side, and was highly rewarded and made the Emperor's viceroy for Eastern Assam. More Ahom notables followed his profitable example of desertion, and Jayadhwaj was left helpless and alone in the pestilential hills of Namrup.* The Baduli Phukan soon raised a local levy of three to four thousand men and accompanied the Mughal Van in an attempt to hunt his former master down.

But on 10th December, Mir Jumla had a severe attack of illness; a burning fever seized him, to which pleurisy was soon added. Still he persisted in advancing, and reached Tipam on the 18th. But the entire army refused to enter Namrup, whose very air was said to be fatal to all forms of life, and where no provision could come from outside by land or water.† The soldiers and officers alike plotted to desert their general and return home. But Dilir

* * Desertion of Ahom nobles, *Fathiyah*, 96, 147-150; *Buranj* viii. 92-93; *Khunlung & Khunlai*, ii. 1-2, 6-8 (long list of traitors). "On hearing the news of Baduli Phukan having been made Rajah [of Namrup under Mughal suzerainty] half the men left the king." (p. 8).

† Their desire to escape from Assam was sharpened by the news that owing to a famine in Dacca no grain could be expected from Bengal, and that even the fleet at Lakhau had been put on reduced rations and the sailors were despondent. (*Fathiyah*, 149).

Khan quieted them and at the same time counselled Mir Jumla to give up his purpose.

§18. *Treaty of peace.*

Meantime the Ahom king and nobles despairing of resistance, had been making overtures of peace. And now Mir Jumla listened to them, and through Dilir Khan's mediation a treaty was signed on the following terms :

(i) Jayadhwaj would send his daughter and the sons of the Tipam Rajah to the Mughal Court.

(ii) The Ahom king would deliver immediately a war-indemnity of 20,000 *tolas* of gold, 1,20,000 *tolas* of silver, and 20 elephants to the Emperor (besides 15 and 5 elephants for Mir Jumla and Dilir Khan respectively).

(iii) During the next 12 months he would deliver 3 lakhs of *tolas* of silver and 90 elephants in three equal instalments, as the balance of the indemnity.

(iv) Thereafter he would pay an annual tribute of 20 elephants.

(v) Pending the full payment of the indemnity, the sons of the Burha Gohain, the Bar Gohain, the Garhgaonia Phukan, and the Bar Patra Phukan, were to be held by the Nawab as hostages.

(vi) Assam west of the Bharali river on the north bank of the Brahmaputra and west of the Kallang

river on the south bank,* was to be annexed to the Mughal empire. Thus the Mughals were to get more than half of the province of Darrang, rich in elephants.

(vii) The captives carried off by the Ahoms from the Mughal dominions (esp. Kamrup) were to be released, as also the wife and children of the Baduli Phukan whom the king had thrown into prison.†

On 5th January, 1663, the Ahom king's daughter, hostages, and some gold silver and elephants, as part of the indemnity, reached the Mughal camp, and five days later Mir Jumla began his return march.‡ The Nawab travelled by *palki* owing to his illness, and after suffering many hardships on the way and constantly getting worse, reached Pandu on 11th February. Here he made his dispositions for the administration of Kamrup and the reconquest of Kuch Bihar, and conciliated and gave leave to the vassal Rajahs of Darrang and Dimarua who had joined his side. Baritala was reached on 28th

* Dimarua, Beltala, and the kingdom of the Nakti Rani adjoining the Garo hills, were included in Mughal Assam. For Nak-kati Rani, *J. B. & O. R. S.* i. 182 n.

† Peace, *Fathiyah*, 95-96 (early abortive negotiations), 154-159, *Buranji* viii. 93-94; Book II. (b) pp. 3-8 (full details of the instalments of war-indemnity).

‡ The rapture of his army at the order of retreat can be judged from the fact that the subject fills two pages of Talish's history with rhapsodies.

February, but the alarming increase of his illness forced him to give up the plan of invading Kuch Bihar in person; and at last, yielding to medical advice he embarked in a boat and glided down the river towards Dacca, dying on the way on 31st March, 1663: (*Fath.* 160-171.)

§19. *The losses and gains of the expedition.*

The Mughal *thanas* were safely withdrawn from the country restored to the Ahoms, and the retreat of the army and navy alike was effected skillfully and cautiously, without any loss.

Judged as a military exploit, Mir Jumla's invasion of Assam was a success. He overran the country almost to its farthest limits, kept hold of the capital, forced the Rajah to make a humiliating treaty, realized a large indemnity, and secured the promise of a large cession of territory and further payments. If its political consequences were not permanent, if the ceded districts were lost and even Gauhati wrested from the Mughal grasp only four years after his death, the fault was not his. No race can maintain an empire unless its sons are willing to garrison their conquests, and Mughal soldiers were heartily sick of this land of flood and earthquake, pestilence and witchcraft. It is surprising that Aurangzib did not lay to heart his own experiences in Balkh in his father's reign.

The one dark spot in the campaign was the isolation of the Mughal troops during the six months of rain. But this in itself would have mattered little if Garhgaon could have been provisioned with the accustomed food and comforts of the warriors of Upper India and their horses. The beleaguered army suffered many privations, but they were not once defeated by the Ahoms; their losses were not from the enemy's sword but from the stroke of pestilence which the general could not have foreseen or averted. At the end of the rainy season he was once more ready to assert his power, and the Ahoms found themselves utterly helpless. The shock of Mughal invasion impaired the fabric of the Ahom State, the feudatories became refractory, the population was woefully thinned by war famine and plague, the king died a broken down man only eight months after Mir Jumla's return, and so miserably crushed was the country by the Muslim attack that the gods had to be propitiated with special rites to bring national prosperity back.*

§20. *Greatness of Mir Jumla's character.*

Though Mir Jumla's expedition ended in heavy loss of men, his own death from disease and exhaus-

* "My brother Sutamla [Jayadhwaj Sinha] did not offer any sacrifice to Indra and other gods. So the Musalmans could come to our country and devastate it. The Karis and Hajuas were massacred

tion, and the speedy loss of his acquisitions in Kuch Bihar and Assam, yet his character shone with supreme radiance in this enterprise. He did nothing which does not reflect the highest credit on him. No other general of that age conducted war with so much humanity and justice, nor kept his soldiers, privates and captains alike, under such discipline; no other general could have retained to the last the confidence and even affection of his subordinates amidst such appalling sufferings and dangers. The owner of 20 maunds of diamonds, viceroy of the rich province of Bengal, he shared with the meanest soldier the privations of the march and brought premature death on himself by scorning delights and living laborious days. On the day when he crossed the Kuch Bihar frontier, he issued strict orders forbidding plunder, rape and oppression on the people, and saw to it that his orders were obeyed. The stern punishment which he meted out to the first few offenders had a

and great misery was suffered by all" (Order of Chakradhwaj in *Buranyi Khunlung* etc ii 25-27) "When the war with the Musalmans came to an end, most of the Dekaris ceased to pay their tribute to the heavenly king" (Phuleshwar Phukan's *Buranyi*, 337) The vassal Rajahs of Darrang and Dimarua had gone over to the Mughals. The helplessness of Jayadhwaj Srimha when he made peace with Mir Jumla is admitted in *Buranyi Khunlung* &c, ii 8-9, "Book II" (b) 2, viii. 93 "The Baduli Phukan told Khwajah Bhor Mal that up to that time (July 1662), 2,30,000 Assamese had perished of pestilence in the hills" (*Fathiyah*, 129).

salutary effect.* "This order continued in force up to the day of the return of the army from Assam, and during the year's stay of the imperial army in that country, not a single officer, private or camp-follower durst even cast a wistful glance of plunder or kidnapping at the property and women of the people of the land." And when during the rains Farhad Khan made an example of the treacherous villagers near Ramdang, who after professing submission to the Mughals used to join the Ahoms in their night attacks, Mir Jumla was displeased at the maltreatment of their women, condemned such "frightfulness," and set the captives free at once. At the time of the retreat from Assam, he forbade his army "even more strongly than before to molest the peasantry of the country or to rob their goods."† We realize Mir Jumla's peculiar excellence more clearly by contrast with others. When his eagle eyes were removed, the Mughal officers began to oppress the people of Kuch Bihar and lost that kingdom by exciting popular hatred.

With a hero like Mir Jumla, the rhetoric of the historian Talish ceases to be extravagance; his eulogy of the general is not fulsome flattery but homage deservedly paid to a born king of men.

* *Fathiyah* (35 36) humorously describes the disappointment of the would be plunderers and ravishers at the frustration of all their hopes.

† Mir Jumla's strict discipline and prohibition of plunder, *Fathiyah*, 15, 35, 160, 86 87 (Farhad Khan censured)

CHAPTER XXXII

EASTERN INDIA AFTER THE DEATH OF MIR JUMLA, 1663—1707

§1. *Causes of friction with the Ahoms after the peace.*

The retreat of Mir Jumla was not followed by the Mughals abandoning that part of Assam which the treaty had given to them; they continued to hold important points in it. Kajali on the south bank and Bansbari on the north bank remained their easternmost posts till 1667. The promised war-indemnity was also paid in full, though not in one year's time as stipulated, because we read of the last instalment being paid as late as May 1667. The Emperor and Dilir Khan corresponded with the Ahom king and his ministers in very friendly terms and presents were exchanged between the two Courts. But the Mughal *faujdar* of Gauhati seems to have been exasperated at the delay in the payment of the balance of the indemnity, and began to dun for it with growing harshness. The Mughal Government also dealt in an ungenerous and grasping way with the Ahom king in money matters. Whenever any of the elephants forming part of the indemnity died on the way to the Court after having been delivered to the Mughal agent,

the Assam Government had to bear the loss and pay Rs. 2,000 for it. We know that many such elephants died every year, and thus the Ahoms, with all their sacrifices barely succeeded in clearing the balance of the war-indemnity, but the annual tribute fell into arrears.*

Another cause of disagreement was that many subjects of Assam had accompanied the imperial army to Bengal. When Jayadhwaj remonstrated, Mir Jumla replied, "I am not carrying any one away with me by force or under pressure. I have merely not forbidden those who are following me of their

* The terms of the treaty were that the Ahom king should deliver as war-indemnity 20 thousand tolas of gold, one lakh and 20 thousand tolas of silver and 20 elephants immediately, and thereafter a balance of 3 lakh tolas of silver and 90 elephants in three equal instalments, besides 20 elephants as the annual tribute (*Fathiyah*, 154. But *Buranji* II (b), 3 and 6 gives figures for gold and silver inconsistent with each other and with the Mughal account). The gold silver and 20 elephants were delivered on 5-9 Jan. 1663 (*Fathiyah*, 157-158). As for the balance, it was paid thus:—"In Chaitra 1584 Saka (=March 1663) 30 elephants were delivered....In Falgun 1585 (Feb. 1664) 40 elephants were delivered....In Aghan 1586 (Nov. 1664) 13 elephants were delivered....In Kartik 1585 (Oct. 1663) one lakh of Rupees was offered....In the same year in Falgun (Feb. 1664), Rs. 40,000 was paid. In Kartik 1586 (Oct. 1664) Rs. 40,000 was paid; in Bhadra (Aug-Sep.), ten elephants were given; in Jaishtha 1588 (May 1667) one lakh of Rupees and 50 elephants as equivalent to a further sum of one lakh." [*Buranji*, II. (b), 6-8.] This makes a total of 143 elephants and Rs. 2,80,000, paid to the Mughals. But at least 24 of the elephants are stated to have died and their price, at Rs. 2,000 for each, recovered from the Ahoms! For the correspondence about the indemnity, *Buranji* II. (b), 11-21.

own free choice." The Ahoms took this as a violation of the treaty by which each party had undertaken to restore the "captive" subjects of the other. Again, the Ahom king complained that the Mughal officers had encroached on his territory and refused to go back to their frontier as marked in the treaty. It was only by appealing to the Emperor himself that an order was secured for the restoration of the disputed territory to its rightful owner. The Bar Phukan, jealous of the influence of the Burha Gohain, intrigued with the Muslims for a new invasion of Assam; but the conspiracy was detected and eight nobles put to death for participation in it.

For these reasons the new king Chakradhwaj had been brooding over the injustice and insolence of the Mughals, ever since his accession in November 1663. He had been growing colder and more stiff-necked in his receptions of the Mughal envoys. At last his endurance reached its limit when Sayyid Firuz Khan, the new faujdar of Gauhati, demanded the balance of the indemnity in very provoking terms. Against the advice of his nobles, Chakradhwaj determined on war and made preparations for it.*

* For the causes of dispute, (Assamese accompany Mir Jumla) *Fathiyah*, 160 & 162; (Phukan intrigue with Mughals) *Buranji Khunlung* ii. 13-14; (Boundary dispute), *ibid.* 12, 18. *Buranji* II. (b). 10-11, 18; viii. 97. (Dunning for tribute), *Buranji* viii. 97-98.

§2. *Ahom king renews war and recovers Kamrup.*

In the meantime he had re-established friendly relations with the Rajah of Kuch Bihar and his lately disloyal vassal princes, and subdued several of the wild tribes along his frontier. A series of forts were built on strategic points along the Brahmaputra to support the intended advance westwards into Kamrup. The gods were propitiated by a grand religious sacrifice, and the augurs found the omens favourable.

His plans having been matured, Chakradhwaj sent two armies under his Phukans down the two banks of the Brahmaputra in August 1667. The forts of Bansbari, Kajali, Jaiduar, Itakhali, Shahburj, Pandu and Rangmahal fell in rapid succession, and finally Gauhati itself was captured about the beginning of November. Its fugitive *faujdar* was defeated and taken prisoner on the bank of the Monas. Immense quantities of arms, horses, and other spoils fell into the hands of the victors, and large numbers of Muslims, including several officers, were taken prisoner and massacred. At one blow the Mughal frontier was pushed back to the Monas river. Gauhati became the seat of an Ahom viceroy and was strongly fortified. Forts were also erected at Pandu and Srighat.

Next season the Mughals renewed the war, and

some fighting took place round Rangamati and the country south of it across the river. Rajah Indraman, an imperial officer, advanced towards Srighat, but was compelled to retreat with failure.*

§3. *Long and desultory warfare under Ram Singh.*

Soon afterwards, the supreme command in Kamrup was transferred to other hands. In December 1667, the Emperor, on hearing of the loss of Gauhati, had appointed Rajah Ram Singh, the son of Mirza Rajah Jai Singh, to recover the imperial prestige in Assam. The Rajah was accompanied by 4,000 troopers in his own pay, besides 1500 gentlemen-troopers (*ahadis*) and 500 artillerymen of the imperial service. Auxiliaries from Kuch Bihar, numbering 15,000 archers, also joined him, but their fighting value was little. The Bengal viceroy was ordered to reinforce him out of his own contingent. On the way through Patna the Rajah took with himself the Sikh guru Tegh Bahadur.

Ram Singh† reached Rangamati in February 1669. But from the first his task was hopeless.

* Ahom capture of Gauhati in 1667, *Buranji Khunlung*, ii 15-28 (preparations), 28-38 (campaign); viii 98-101; *A.N.* 1068.

† Ram Singh's campaigns in Assam, *Buranji Khunlung* ii. 38-58 (full details of desultory fighting for years), viii. 101-110, *A.N.* 1068-9 (Ram Singh's forces), *M.A.* 97 (Ram Singh promoted, Feb. 1670), 154 (Ram Singh from Assam has audience, 24 June, 1676).

Service in Assam was extremely unpopular, and no soldier would go there unless compelled. Indeed, there is reason to believe that Ram Singh was sent to Assam as a punishment for his having secretly helped Shivaji to escape from captivity at Agra. He had only 8,000 troopers round his standards, and his losses were seldom replenished. The Ahoms, being a nation in arms, mustered one hundred thousand when mobilized. Unlike the time of Mir Jumla's invasion, the mastery of the water now belonged to the Ahoms, and the Mughals could do little with their 40 war-vessels on the Brahmaputra.

The situation was rendered worse by the insubordination and disloyalty of Rashid Khan, the faujdar of Gauhati. Instead of obeying Ram Singh, as he had been ordered, this man foolishly set up a claim to equality of rank with him. Having lived at Gauhati with viceregal splendour and been all in all in the eyes of the Ahoms, he could not brook to take his orders from Ram Singh. He was even suspected, probably with truth, of being in secret correspondence with the enemy; at all events they found a friend in him. At last Ram Singh had to

Akhbarat 12th year, 4, 11, 12, 13th year, 17, 35 (very useful); Macauliffe's *Sikh Religion*, iv. 348—351, 354—357, (legendary). Aurangzib's real motive in sending Ram Singh to Assam is given by Manucci (ii. 153)

expel Rashid Khan from his camp after cutting his tent ropes.

From his base at Rangamati, the Rajah advanced along the north Brahmaputra valley. The Ahoms fell back before him, and he reached the Bar Nadi. The Mughals gained a few victories, but no decisive success; and soon the tide of war began to turn against them and they had to fall back westwards to Hajo. Then he laid siege to Gauhati, but all his attempts to take it failed; and after wasting four months he had to retire with heavy loss. A detachment which had advanced into Darrang was cut off by the local Rani. The Ahoms bought the aid of the Nagas, and these wild warriors proved a new danger to the Mughals.

In the second half of 1670 the imperial forces suffered three serious defeats. Ram Singh now begged for peace, on condition of a return to the ancient boundary. Both sides were weary of the war. But the death of Chakradhwaj and other causes greatly protracted the negotiations, during which, however, there was a lull in the fighting.

The attempts at peace failed. The Ahoms renewed their attacks and the fresh troops that now joined Ram Singh (especially the Bengal *zamindar* Munawwar Khan), bore down his apathy to war. A long course of desultory fighting followed, the general result of which was the success of the

Ahoms. So, in March 1671 Ram Singh retired to Rangamati, foiled in his purpose and heartily sick of the war. Here on the Assam border he stayed for some years, but was too weak to attempt an advance again. Finally in 1676 he received permission to leave Bengal, and reached the imperial Court in June. Darrang and Beltala were lost to the Mughals.

§4. *Gauhati recovered and lost again.*

After the death of Chakradhwaj (1670), the Ahom monarchy was greatly weakened by internal troubles. From 1670 to 1681 "in the short space of eleven years there were no less than seven kings, not one of whom died a natural death." The king was a mere puppet; ambitious and unscrupulous nobles usurped the supreme power, fought each other for selfish gain, made and unmade kings. "The patriotic feeling became so weakened that many deserted to the Muhammadans."* In February, 1679 the Bar Phukan, in fear of his rival the Burha Gohain, betrayed Gauhati into the hands of the Mughals. For this "conquest" the Emperor rewarded his son, Muhammad Azam, the viceroy of Bengal.†

* *Buranji* viii. 112—121; *Khunlung*, ii. 64—121, Gait, 166 and 170 (quoted above).

† Mughals recover Gauhati, *M. A.* 173, *Buranji* viii. 118, *Khunlung*, ii. 119—121, Gait, 164.

But the Mughal triumph was shortlived. In 1681 Gadadhar Singh ascended the Ahom throne and soon retrieved the glory of his house. "The era of weak and incompetent princes, and of unscrupulous and ambitious ministers came to an end; internal corruptions and dissensions ceased, and the Ahoms were once more able to present a united face against their external foes." He easily ousted the Mughals from Gauhati, and took "a vast amount of booty, including gold and silver; elephants, horses and buffaloes; cannon of all sizes; and guns, swords and spears." "This was the last Muhammadan war. Henceforward the Monas was accepted by both sides as the boundary." Kamrup was finally lost to Bengal.*

§5. *Mughal relations with Kuch Bihar after 1663.*

We now turn to the history of the other Mongoloid peoples with whom the empire came into conflict after the death of Mir Jumla. At the time of his retreat from Assam (Feb. 1663), the Mughal garrison expelled from Kuch Bihar was waiting under Isfandiyar Beg at Ghoraghat, and another force was left with Askar Khan outside the kingdom with orders to recover it. The death of the Nawab threw the enterprise into delay; the officiating viceroy, Daud Khan, neglected to send up

* Gait, 166; *Baranji* viii. 122-123.

reinforcements, and all that Askar Khan could do was to confirm his possession of the *chakla* of Fathpur outside the wall (*al*) of Kuch Bihar, which had been wrested by the Mughals early in the war.*

In March 1664, Shaista Khan, the new governor of Bengal, reached Rajmahal, and announced his design to conquer Kuch Bihar on his way to Dacca. At the news of it, the Koch Rajah made his submission, offering to pay $5\frac{1}{2}$ lakhs of Rupees as indemnity. The terms were accepted, and the Mughal army was ordered to withdraw from the Kuch frontier as soon as two instalments of this money were paid. We know that the tribute reached the imperial Court on 6th December 1665.†

Rajah Pran Narayan died in 1666, and thereafter, for nearly half a century, the State was paralysed by civil wars, royal oppression and internal disorder. The Mughals took advantage of it to extend their sway over the southern and eastern portions of the kingdom, conquering much of the present districts of Rangpur and western Kamrup, and forcing the Rajah in 1711 to confirm these gains by treaty.‡ The historian Ishwardas (123*a*) says

* *Fathiyah*, 80 (why the Mughals were expelled from Kuch Bihar). 168, 170-171 (Mir Jumla's last dispositions for reconquest of Kuch Bihar); *Continuation*, 110 b.

† *Fathiyah*, *Continuation*, 121 b; *Akhbarat*, 8th year, 14.

‡ H. N. Chaudhuri's *Cooch Behar State*, 238-241. "In 1687 the Mughals under Ibadat Khan occupied the three central *chaklas* of

that about 1685 Bhawanidas, son of Todar Mal, a deputy of the viceroy of Bengal, seized the capital of Kuch Bihar and expelled the Rajah, but that he perished with his entire army of 4,000 cavalry in a fire and the Rajah then recovered his city. No other authority supports this statement.

§6. *The Mags of Arrakan wrest Chatgaon from Bengal, 1459.*

From the Mongoloid peoples in the north-east of Bengal, we now turn to those in the south-east of the province, where the death of Mir Jumla was soon followed by a brilliant success of the highest value, the conquest of CHATGAON by Shaista Khan.

The letter appointing Mir Jumla governor of Bengal had ordered him to chastise the rulers of Assam and Arrakan, after settling the affairs of his province. The Emperor's directions were that, after conquering Assam and restoring imperial prestige in that quarter, the army should march to Arrakan and try to rescue the unhappy survivors of the family of Shuja and get authentic news about

Fathpur, Qazirhat and Kankina. The officers in charge of these, as well as Tepa, Manthona Jhori and other *parganas* consented to pay tribute to the *subah* of Bengal. Panga and Baikunthpur transferred their allegiance to the Musalmans." (240.) In 1711 the *chaklas* of Boda Patgram and Purbabag were ceded to the Muslims.

the end of that luckless prince.* Mir Jumla had died at the end of the Assam war. And, so, his second and unaccomplished task devolved upon his successor Shaista Khan.

The district of Chatgaon was for many centuries the debatable land between the Muslim rulers of Bengal and the Mongoloid chiefs of Arrakan. Early in the 15th century a fugitive Rajah of Arrakan had taken refuge in Bengal and been restored (1430) to the throne by a Muslim army from Gaur. He had promised to be tributary to his patron, and he and his successors for many generations used to add Muslim titles, like Ali Khan, Sikandar Shah and Salim Shah, to their Burmese Pali names and to issue coins stamped with the Muslim confession of faith (*kalima*). But in the very next reign the Arrakanese threw off their political dependence on Bengal, and a little later (1459) they wrested the whole of the Chatgaon district from the Bengal Sultan, Barbak Shah. The decay of the Pathan monarchy and the anarchy attending the long-drawn Mughal conquest of Bengal in Akbar's reign gave the Arrakanese a free hand, and they now consolidated their authority over Chatgaon and even seized parts of the Noakhali and Tippara districts, up to the Meghna river.

* The *farman* of appointment is given in Ishwardas, 50 a; Fathiyah, 25; Bernier, 179 (order to Shaista Khan).

Early in the 17th century, Islam Khan, the viceroy of Bengal, recovered from the grasp of the Arrakanese the country east of the Meghna up to the Feni river, which thenceforth formed the eastern boundary of the Mughals. But here their further progress was arrested and during the next half century the Mag ascendancy in the rivers and creeks of East Bengal became complete in consequence of Jahangir's supine administration, the rebellion of his heir Shah Jahan, and the increase of the Arrakanese naval power by the infusion of a foreign element.*

§7. *Portuguese pirates of Chatgaon.*

These were the Portuguese adventurers and their half-caste offspring. As early as 1517 the first Portuguese ship had touched at Arrakan and received an invitation to trade. In 1532 a closer intercourse sprang up: "big ships" of the foreigners began to visit the country, and, though they at first plundered the coast villages, friendlier relations were soon formed. Portuguese soldiers of fortune took service under the local Rajah and rose to great influence and power. The Portuguese traders made

* Early history of Arrakan in Phayre's *History of Burma*, 77-79, 172. Previous encounters between the Arrakanese and the Mughal governors. *Baharistan* (best for 1608—1622); *Fathigah, Continuation*, 154 b—156 a, 164a, 176 a and b; Stewart's *History of Bengal*, Sec. vi.

some settlements on the coast, especially at Dianga (22 miles south of Chatgaon town) and Syriam, at the mouth of the Pegu river.

But these were private men unauthorized by their sovereign's representative in India. Their main occupation was piracy in the Bay of Bengal, varied by service as mercenary soldiers and private trade in salt and such other commodities. Their power, by reason of its isolation from the Government of their mother country, was easily broken by the local princes, and they failed to found any independent colony in these parts. In 1607 the king of Arrakan took Dianga and massacred the foreign settlers. The most notorious of these pirates, Sebastian Gonzalves Tibao,* seized Sondip and two other islands at the head of the Bay of Bengal and created a reign of terror at the mouths of the Ganges by the range and boldness of his depredations, the ruthless vigour of his rule, his administrative capacity and inborn command over men. But in 1617 the Arrakanese conquered Sondip and Gonzalves disappeared from history. Syriam, too, was wrested from the Portuguese. Thereafter, the Portuguese settlers in Arrakan gave

* Career of Sebastian Gonzalves, Campos's *History of the Portuguese in Bengal*, 81-87, 154-157 (best); Phayre, 174-176. Stewart's *Bengal*, vi under Ialam Kh. and Qasim Khan. Portuguese intercourse with Arrakan, Phayre, 79, 171-174. D'Anvers, ii. 123.

up all attempts at independence and territorial power, and lived on as the obedient instruments of the local Rajah.

The Burmese are noted for their skill in managing boats and loose formation fighting in jungle and river. Allied to the Portuguese, they became irresistible in our eastern waters. The Mughal soldiers,—Turks, Afghans and Rajputs alike,—were mere landsmen; expert riders, no doubt, but hopelessly inefficient on board ship. The sea was not their element, and they used to run into port for shelter at the least sign of a gale. The swift galleasses of the Arrakanese made raids in the rivers and creeks of Dacca and Bakarganj without meeting with any reprisal or even opposition from the local Mughal officers. After taking Sondip in 1617, the Arrakan king occupied a portion of the Bakarganj district. He sacked the town of Dacca itself in 1625 and for years afterwards continued to levy blackmail from Eastern Bengal. One Mughal viceroy, Khanahzad Khan, retired to Rajmahal in fear of the pirates, leaving the defence of Dacca to his subordinates. (*Cont.* 176b.)

§8. *Feringi pirates ravage East Bengal.*

A contemporary historian, Shihab-ud-din Talish, thus describes the ways of the pirates:—
“The Arrakan pirates, both Mag and Feringi, used

constantly to come by the water-route and plunder Bengal. They carried off the Hindus and Muslims that they could seize, pierced the palms of their hands, passed thin strips of cane through the holes and threw them huddled together under the decks of their ships. Every morning they flung down some uncooked rice to the captives from above, as we fling grain to fowl. On reaching home the pirates employed some of the hardy men that survived such treatment in tillage and other degrading pursuits. The others were sold to the Dutch, English and French merchants at the ports of the Deccan. Sometimes they brought their captives to the ports of Tamluk and Baleshwar for sale at high prices. Anchoring a short distance from the coast they sent a man ashore with information [about the prisoners]. The local officers, in fear of the pirates committing any depredation or kidnapping there, stood on the shore with a number of followers, and sent a man with money on board. If the terms were satisfactory, the pirates took the ransom and set the captives free with the man. Only the Feringis sold their prisoners. But the Mags employed all whom they had carried off in agriculture and other services, or as domestic servants and concubines."

"As they continually practised raids for a long time, Bengal daily became more and more desolate and less and less able to resist them. Not a house

was left inhabited on either side of the rivers lying on their track from Chatgaon to Dacca. The district of Bakla (i.e. Bakarganj and part of Dacca), which formerly abounded in houses and cultivated fields and yielded a large revenue as duty on betel-nuts, was swept so clean with their broom of plunder and abduction that none was left to tenant any house or kindle a light in that region."

"The sailors of the Bengal flotilla were inspired with such fear of the pirates that whenever a hundred war-boats of the former sighted only four of the latter, the Bengal crew thought themselves lucky if they could save their lives by flight;* and when the distance was too short to permit escape, they—rowers, sepoys, and gunners alike—threw themselves overboard, preferring drowning to captivity."

"Many Feringis living at Chatgaon used to visit the imperial dominions for plunder and abduction. Half their booty they gave to the Rajah of Arrakan, and the other half they kept. They were known as the *Harmad* (i.e., *Armada*) and owned a hundred swift *jalia* boats full of war-material.....Latterly the Rajah of Arrakan did not send his own fleet to plunder the Mughal territory, as he considered the Feringi pirates in the light of his servants and shared their booty."

"When Shaista Khan asked the Feringi

* This is supported by Bernier, p. 179.

deserters, what salary the Mag king^o had assigned to them, they replied, 'Our salary was the Mughal empire. We considered the whole of Bengal as our *jagir*! We had not to bother ourselves about *amlas* and *amins*, but levied our rent all the year round without any difficulty. We have kept the papers of the division of the booty for the last forty years.'

The contemporary European travellers, Bernier and Manucci, give them the lowest possible character: "These people (says the French doctor) were Christians only in name; the lives led by them were most detestable, massacring or poisoning one another without compunction or remorse, and sometimes assassinating even their priests, who were too often no better than their murderers" (p. 174). Manucci knew them to be equally bad, as "men hard of heart, accustomed to kill even little children without a regret. They boasted among themselves of having reached the very acme of evil-doing. If any one undertook to speak of these men, of their violence and of their barbarous habits, he would find enough to fill several books." (ii. 117.)

"In Jahangir's reign the Mag pirates used to come to Dacca for plunder by the stream which, after leaving the Brahmaputra, passes by Khizirpur and falls into the river of Dacca. Autumn and winter were the season of their raids. After some time this water-route to Dacca was closed by the drying up of

the above stream and also some points in the Brahmaputra, and the pirates ceased to visit Dacca town, but plundered the villages only."

Their lines of advance are thus clearly indicated by Shihab-ud-din Talish: "When the pirates came from Chatgaon to ravage Bengal, they skirted the imperial frontier post of Bhalua on their right and the island of Sondip on their left and reached the village of Sangramgarh, at the southern apex of the delta of Dacca, [some 36 miles from Dacca] and the then point of junction of the Brahmaputra and the Ganges. From this place they sailed up the Ganges if they wished to plunder Jessore, Hughli and Bhushna, or up the Brahmaputra if Vikrampur, Sonargaon and Dacca were their objective."*

A heavy loss was caused to imperial revenue by the depopulation of the riverside areas of East Bengal. Imperial prestige was even more grievously affected. As Shihab-ud-din Talish complains, "In no other part of the Mughal dominions has any neighbouring infidel king the power to oppress and domineer over Muslims, but has to humble himself to save his lands; in Bengal alone the opposite is the case." (*Cont.*, 125 a.) The safety of the province demanded that the nest of pirates should be

* Account of the Feringi pirates, in *Fathuyah*, Continuation 122 b —125 b, 108 a, 139 a and b, 150 b, 152 a, (translated in my *Studies in Mughal India*). Bernier, 174-179; A.N. 941.

conquered. Chatgaon was a convenient half-way house between Arrakan and Bengal, and the base of operations of the pirates. The king of Arrakan, therefore, strongly defended this outpost of his dominions. "Every year the Rajah of Arrakan sends to Chatgaon a hundred ships full of soldiers and artillery munitions, with a relieving officer, and then the former officer with the ships sent the previous year returns to Arrakan. There is always some trusted relative or faithful clansman of the Rajah in charge of the Government of Chatgaon." (*Ibid.*, 163 b.)

§9. *Bengal flotilla created anew by Shaista Khan.*

At first sight, Shaista Khan's task seemed to be utterly hopeless. The Arrakanese were supreme at sea and had a long and unbroken record of success in keeping foreign invaders out of their land. "Their cannon are beyond computation and their war-vessels exceed the waves of the sea in number." On the other hand, the Mughal flotilla stationed in the eastern waters had now ceased to exist. "During the viceroyalty of Prince Shuja, great administrative confusion was produced by his slackness, and the rent-collectors by their extortion and violence ruined the estates which yielded the maintenance charge of the Bengal navy, 14 lakhs of Rupees a year. Mir Jumla abolished the old system of management and naval

organization, but before he could set a new one afoot, he succumbed to disease. Many naval officers and men, too, perished in the Assam expedition, so that at the time of Mir Jumla's death the Bengal navy (*nawwara*) was utterly ruined.* Early in 1664 the pirates came to Bagadia, in the Dacca district and defeated Munawwar Khan, a *zamindar*, who bore the high title of the cruising admiral. The few war-vessels that still belonged to the *nawwara* were thus lost, and its name alone was left in Bengal." (*Continuation*, 112b—122.)

But Shaista Khan's spirit and energy overcame every obstacle: a navy was created anew and manned and equipped for war in a little over a year. Immediately on his arrival in Bengal, (March, 1664) he issued urgent orders to the Inspector of the Fleet to renovate the *nawwara*, gave him plenary powers, and sent bailiffs to every province to seize the timber and ship-wrights and take them to the great dockyards of Dacca. Boats were also built at the minor ports, such as Hughli, Jessore, Chilmari, Karibari, and Baleshwar. At Dacca, where he arrived in December, "he devoted all his energy to the rebuilding of

* In 1662, during Mir Jumla's absence in Assam, the pirates carried off from the neighbourhood of Dacca the Mughal 'cruising admiral' who was the adopted son of the deputy governor of Dacca, and advanced plundering up to Nazirpur, on the way to Rajmahal." *Fathiyah*, *Continuation*, 125 b.

the flotilla. Not for a moment did he neglect to mature plans for assembling the crew, laying in stores of provisions and needments, and collecting carpenters and ship-building materials. For all posts in the navy expert officers were selected. Through his ceaseless exertions in a short time nearly 300 ships were built and equipped." (Cont., 115b, 137b—138a.)

§10. *Conquest of Sondip as a base.*

A navy having been created, the next step was to secure bases for the coming expedition against Chatgaon. At Dhapa, six miles s. e. of Dacca town, a hundred war-vessels were stationed and 200 more at Sangramgarh* 30 miles further south, the two posts being connected by a military road raised above the flood level. The island of Sondip is a very convenient half-way house between Sangramgarh and Chatgaon, being only six hours' sail of the latter town. It had hitherto been a no-man's land, which the Portuguese pirates and Arrakanese troops had successively occupied and deluged in blood. Its present master was Dilawwar, a run-away captain of the Mughal navy, but a warrior and ruler of remarkable ability.

* Sangramgarh, "18 kos from Dacca" (Cont. 140 a), and "21 kos from Sripur" (A.N. 944), which last was opposite Chandpur (Cont. 164 a). *Daapeka Kella* in Rennell's *Atlas*, Sh XII.

The first Mughal attack on the island was made on 9th November, 1665 by admiral Abul Hasan. Dilawwar, now an old man of eighty, fought with the valour of a youth and the skill of a veteran, but was defeated and driven with two wounds into the jungle in the interior. The Mughals, who had brought no horses with them, withdrew after dismantling both his forts and removing the artillery. Nine days later they returned in full strength. Dilawwar, who had repaired his forts, fought with the same heroism as before, but was vanquished and taken away in chains to Dacca with his family of 92 men women and children, as prisoners of war. There the wounded lion died in his cage in a few days. His grown up sons were kept in confinement, but land was granted for the support of the younger members of his family. A Mughal garrison of a thousand men was put in the island, and it was brought under the imperial civil administration.*

§11. *The Feringis of Chatgaon come over to the Mughals.*

Meantime Shaista Khan had been trying hard to cut off the right arm of the enemy, by winning the Feringis of Chatgaon over. He had sent them

* Sondip : *Fathiyah*, Cont., 142 b-145 a (description of island), 147 a—150 a (conquest); *A.N.* 944—946 (conquest). Traditions about Dilawwar *Journal of the Moslem Institute* (Calcutta), vol. iii, No. 1 (July, 1907.)

tempting offers of service under the Mughals, by means of their brethren trading at Larikol, Tamluk and Hughli. At this time there was some friction between them and their Arrakanese masters. The story of Shaista Khan's intrigue with them* had reached the ears of the Mag king and he planned to lure their families to his capital and massacre the Feringi men at Chatgaon. Just then, some of the Feringis assassinated a great prince of Arrakan, and in fear of punishment the whole colony hurriedly fled from Chatgaon with their families and property in 42 *jalia* boats, and sailed to Farhad Khan, the Mughal commandant of Noakhali (December, 1665), who sent their Chief Captain to Shaista Khan at Dacca. A bounty of Rs. 2,000 and a monthly pay of Rs. 500 were given to the Chief Captain,† and their other leaders were rewarded with similar liberality and enrolled in the imperial service.

“The coming over of the Feringis gave composure to the hearts of the people of Bengal.....The viceroy regarded this event as the commencement of victory.” The Chief Captain informed him that the

* Winning over of the Feringis.—*Fathiyah*, *Cont.* 116 b, 150 b—152 a; Bernier, 180—181; *Storia*, ii. 118; *A. N.* 946—947.

† *Fathiyah*, *Continuation*, 153 a. Manucci says that Rs. 50,000 had been paid in advance to the captain through his brother, a merchant of Hughli, named Antonio de Rego, as a bribe for desertion. (ii. 118). The Persian histories call him *Capitao mor*, which is a Portuguese title meaning ‘chief captain’ and is not a family name.

Arrakanese king, secure in the strength of the Feringis, had hitherto neglected the defence and provisioning of Chatgaon and that the place could be easily taken if the Mughals attacked it immediately without giving him time to wake up and send reinforcements from his capital.

§12. *Expedition starts against Chatgaon.*

No time was, therefore, lost on the Mughal side. On 24th December, 1665, the expeditionary force, 6,500 strong, left Dacca under command of Buzurg Ummed Khan, a son of Shaista Khan.* The imperial fleet numbered 288 vessels of all kinds,—21 of them being gunboats or *ghurabs*, 157 fast-rowing *kosas*, and 96 *jalias*. The Feringis, with about 40 vessels of their own, acted as auxiliaries.

The army and navy were concentrated at Noakhali. The plan of campaign was that the fleet under Ibn Husa'in should creep along the coast, while the army should march parallel to it, each supporting the other. Farhad Khan, who had won his laurels in the Assam war, led the vanguard, and advanced cutting the jungle along the sea-shore stage by stage and making a way.

* Mughal conquest of Chatgaon, *Fathuyah, Continuation*, 138 a—175 b (MS abruptly ends on 27 Jan 1666), translated by me in *Studies in Mughal India*. A.N. 947-956, Phayre, 180 (scanty). No detail in Bernier or Manucci.

Leaving Noakhali Farhad Khan reached the frontier outpost of Jagdia on 12th January, 1666, crossed the Feni river two days later, and entered the Arrakanese territory.

The fleet entered the Kumaria creek only two marches short of Chatgaon, and landed a body of pioneers who began to cut the jungle *forward* in the direction of Chatgaon and *behind* towards the advancing army, which was also clearing a way in its front. The two divisions joined hands on the 21st. Buzurg Ummed Khan brought up the rear several miles behind.* Beyond this point the jungle was very dense and the road very bad, so that Farhad Khan's advance was extremely slow.

§13. *Naval battles.*

On the 23rd, the Mughal admiral sailed out of Kumaria and encountered the enemy's fleet, consisting of 10 *ghurabs* and 45 *jalias*, which had come out of the Kathalia creek to give battle. The Feringis led the Mughal Van, and their onset decided the day. The Mags in the *ghurabs* jumped overboard giving their ships up to capture, while the *jalias* fled. But the defeated force was only the light squardon of

* Talish says that on 21st January, when Farhad Khan joined Ibn Husain in the Khamaria creek, Buzurg Ummed Khan arrived with the main army three *kos* behind (Cont 161 b.) But A.N. (949) says that on that date the Commander-in-Chief was 8 *kos* in the rear of this advanced position, and 20 *kos* from Chatgaon.

the Arrakan navy. Their larger ships,—called *khalus* and *dhum*s which carried more guns,—were now discovered in the Hurla creek. Ibn Husain sailed against them, and they too came out into the open sea. The two lines stood facing each other and there was only a distant artillery duel, but no closer action, during the afternoon and night.

The second and greater victory was won next morning (24th January), when “the Muslims flying their victorious banners, beating their drums, and sounding their bugles and trumpets, advanced upon the enemy, firing their guns and putting their biggest ships in the front line and their smaller and faster boats in the rear.” The enemy again resorted to flight, their light *jalias* taking the bigger gunboats in tow, and retreated into the Karnafuli river, firing on the advancing Mughals. Entering the mouth of the river at 3 P.M., they drew up their ships in line of battle between Chatgaon and an island in mid-stream. On the opposite bank, close to the village of Feringi-bandar, the Arrakanese had erected three bamboo stockades, filled with artillery and musketeers (*Telingas*). These opened fire on the Mughal fleet. But Ibn Husain sent most of his ships up the river and also made an attack by land. The garrison, after a stubborn fight, abandoned the stockades, which the Mughals burnt.

Then the Mughals, flushed with victory,

“dashed themselves upon the enemy’s ships. The Chief Captain and other Feringi pirates, the Nawab’s officers and Munawwar Khan *zamindar* came swiftly up from different sides. A great battle was fought. The fort of Chatgaon also opened fire on the Mughals. At last the enemy were vanquished; many of their sailors jumped overboard and escaped by swimming, a few being drowned; the rest were slain or taken prisoner. Several of the Arrakanese ships were sunk by gun-fire or ramming, and the remainder consisting of 135 vessels became the prize of the victors. Thus the Chatgaon squadron of the Arrakanese navy was annihilated at one blow.

§14. *Capture of Chatgaon fort.*

After the victory, the imperial fleet anchored in the river a little below the town. Here many more Feringis joined them. Next day, (25th January) the fort of Chatgaon was besieged. The Arrakanese garrison resisted for a day; but they were hopelessly weakened by the loss of their entire fleet and thrown into despair by the news of the near approach of the Mughal land-forces under Farhad Khan. Early in the morning of the 26th the fort capitulated to Ibn Husain; but the disorderly followers of the *zamindar* Munawwar Khan who entered first with a view to plunder, set fire to the houses, and much of the town, including two state elephants, was burnt. The

Arrakanese also fled from the fort on the other bank of the Karnafuli river, but the fugitives were attacked and plundered by their former slaves, the kidnapped Muslims of Bengal who had been settled here as peasants.

Meantime, ever since hearing the news of the advance of the fleet on the 23rd, the army under Farhad Khan had been making strenuous efforts to force a way through the dense jungle towards Chatgaon. At his approach the Mags abandoned their outposts in his way. The Commander-in-Chief himself arrived at Chatgaon on the 26th and made his triumphal entry into the fort the next day. The prize taken was of little money value. It consisted of three elephants, 1026 pieces of cannon made of brass and iron (mostly small pieces, carrying 1 lb. or smaller shot), many matchlocks and camel-swivels (*zamburaks*), and much ammunition. To this must be added the price of two thousand Mag captives, taken in the entire campaign, and sold into slavery. But the most glorious result of the victory was the release and restoration to home of thousands of Bengal peasants who had been kidnapped by the pirates and held in serfdom. As Shaista Khan very happily put it in his reply to the Emperor's inquiry about the money gain from the newly conquered province, "In truth, its revenue (*jama*) is the composure (*jamait*) of the minds of the Muslims [with

regard to the pirates]. We can easily imagine how fast cultivation will increase in Bengal, now that Mag violence has been put down." (Cont., 174b.) The fall of Chatgaon caused indescribable joy throughout Bengal. The victors were highly rewarded by the Court. The Nawab gave "wealth beyond measure to the Feringi pirates and one month's pay as bounty to his own officers and the crew of the *nawwara*." (Cont., 172b.)

§15. *Later history of Chatgaon in Mughal possession.*

The new conquest was placed under direct Mughal administration. Chatgaon became the seat of a Mughal *faujdar*, and the name of the town was changed by imperial order to Islamabad. A detachment under Mir Murtaza took the port of Ramu, some sixty miles further south; but it was soon afterwards evacuated, as the distance of the outpost was too great and the land-route to it too full of difficulties to make its retention easy.

In April 1670, the Arrakanese were reported to be planning a raid into Chatgaon. (*Akhbarat*, 13—17.) But probably nothing came of it, as their country now entered on a long period of internal disorders, the archers of the royal guard massacring the royal family and setting up and pulling down puppet kings. In 1710 this Pretorian corps was

suppressed. At the same time the death of Aurangzib was followed by a decline of Mughal power east of the Feni river, and the Arrakanese king plundered Sondip and Hatiya. "But Chatgaon, which the kings of Arrakan had possessed for a century and a quarter was lost, and since that time the Arrakanese have never, except during plundering incursions, held any of the country north of Ramu." (Phayre, 180-181.)

Thus, early in the reign of Aurangzib, the Mag power in Chatgaon fell for ever, without a worthy struggle. Such is the fate of nations that prefer ease to manly exertion, the acquisition of wealth to patriotic sacrifice, and leave their national defence in the hands of aliens.

APPENDIX IV

WHO WAS THE CAPTOR OF CHATGAON?

There is some conflict between Talish and the *Alamgirnamah* as to the details of the fall of Chatgaon. The former (1) ascribes the Mughal victories almost entirely to the Feringis, (2) makes the *qiladar* of Chatgaon capitulate to admiral Ibn Husain, giving the Mughal army no share in the event, and (3) interposes only one night between the naval victory in the Karnafuli river and the opening of the gates of Chatgaon to the Mughals. The official history (*Alamgirnamah*) ignores the most important part played by the Feringis in the campaign, implies that

the fort surrendered to the land-forces under Buzurg Ummad Khan himself, and gives 36 hours to the siege.

Now, on the first point Talish is right beyond dispute. When we bear in mind the utter demoralization of the Mughal *nawwara*, we are driven to hold with Talish that the first naval victory over the Arrakanese was entirely and the second principally due to the Feringis. As regards the difference of dates, (the third point,) Talish is clearly wrong. Unfortunately the autograph MS. of his *Continuation* ends abruptly, indicating that the author did not live to complete or even correct it, and no second copy of it has been discovered. A mistake of dates towards the very end of such a work is quite natural.

On the second point, too, I am inclined to accept Talish's view. The version of events given by the *Alamgirnamah* is just possible, but seems to me to be unlikely. It is clear from the details of the operations that the total loss of their *navy* took the heart out of the garrison of Chatgaon and hastened the fall of the fort. No doubt, the news of the approach of Farhad Khan led to the evacuation of the outposts in the environs of Chatgaon by the Arrakanese and to the flight of many people from that fort itself, but the Mughal land-forces do not seem to have contributed much to the fall of Chatgaon by any direct attack. Even their vanguard had hardly time enough to entrench and begin a regular siege before the capitulation.

The *A. N.* says that in the evening of 23rd January, "Buzurg Ummad Khan, on hearing of the first naval victory, ordered Farhad Khan not to wait for jungle-cutting and road-making, but to hasten and join the *nawwara*. He himself advanced quickly. Next day (*i.e.*, the 24th) Farhad Khan arrived at the bank of the Karnafuli. The following day (*i.e.*, the 25th) Buzurg Ummad Khan

reached the foot of the fort of Chatgaon with the rest of the army, and the imperial forces by land and sea invested the fort,...and gained possession of it on the 2nd day of the siege, i.e., the 26th" (pp. 951—952).

These dates are, however, rendered improbable by the distance and the broken pathless character of the intervening country. At the end of the 21st Farhad Khan came into touch with the fleet at Kumaria, which is 2 days' march by land (say 20 miles) from Chatgaon, while Buzurg Ummed Khan halted 20 miles further behind (according to *A. N.* 949). When early on the 23rd, the fleet sailed out of Kumaria seeking battle, Farhad Khan "advanced by land to co-operate with the navy, by the road which the men of the ships had made. *Beyond the clearing he could not go*, on account of the density of the jungle" (*Cont.*, 168a). Here, in the night of the 23rd he received the Commander-in-Chief's order to push on and join the *nawwara*. How could he have crossed 16 or 17 miles of such a pathless jungly country in one day and arrived at Chatgaon on the 24th, and how could Buzurg Ummed Khan, who was one or probably two marches in the rear, have reached the walls of that fort on the 25th, as the *A. N.* would have us believe? This difficulty is avoided by Talish's statement that the capture of Chatgaon was the work of the navy alone and not the result of a regular siege. I think that the Mughal army reached Chatgaon on the 25th when practically all was over except the shouting. It is just possible that Buzurg Ummed Khan was in at the fall of Chatgaon, but his arrival under its walls before the actual surrender (morning of the 26th) is rendered improbable by the distance.

CHAPTER XXXIII

THE AFGHAN WAR

§1. *Forward frontier policy followed at Aurangzib's accession.*

When the extinction of his rivals at last left Aurangzib the undisputed lord of Hindustan, he had leisure to turn to the civil government, which had fallen into slackness during Shah Jahan's last years and into great disorder during the all-engrossing War of Succession. The Emperor set himself to restore order and to infuse vigour into the administration, as he had promised to the public in the manifesto issued by him to justify his usurpation of the throne. A period of strong government began. Everywhere the provincial viceroys began to assert imperial prestige. Energetic *subahdars* extended the bounds of the empire to Assam, Chatgaon, Palamau and other districts. Local notables found out that disobedience of orders or independence of attitude on their part would be tolerated no longer. The border tribes were taught that no violation of the imperial frontier would go unpunished. This policy precipitated a long and costly war with the Afghans.

§2. *The Afghans, their social organization and character.*

Along our entire north-western border,—in the

valleys leading from India to Kashmir and Afghanistan, and in the encompassing hills, live numberless Turko-Iranian clans, called Pathans in the north and Baluches in the south. Nine centuries ago we first hear of them as an obscure and savage people against whom the Turkish rulers of Ghazni had to wage occasional war. Later they were converted to Islam, but the new creed made no moral transformation among them. They retained their old speech, their old tribal organization, and their immemorial profession of brigandage. In the course of time, after long wanderings from the cradle of their race in southern and south-eastern Afghanistan, the Pathans settled as the dominant class in the regions where we now find them.

Brave and hardy as these people are above all the races of the plains, they are torn by the feud of clan against clan and often of family against family. In all their history they have failed to establish any large and compact State, or even any enduring confederacy of tribes. The promise of a career of plunder has held together these born warriors for a time, but they have always separated on the death of the successful leader. The Afghans have never sent any large military force outside except as the mercenaries of some great conqueror, and in their homes they have united only under the stress of a common danger, such as an invasion of

their *entire* country. They have never formed a nation, but always clans. Within the clans even, the strict discipline of the Rajput tribal system is wanting. The Rathor or Sisodia obeys his chieftain as a 'emi-god, or at least as the father of a family of which all who bear the tribal name are the children. But the Yusufzai or Afridi follows his chieftain only while it is his interest or pleasure to do so.

Weak as the Afghans are for conducting distant or long campaigns on a large or organized scale, they are weaker still in diplomacy and internal administration. An ambitious man among them gathers together a number of families and makes himself chief for the time being; another man does the same thing, and, if more successful in rapine, supplants the former. These ever-forming ever-dissolving groups of families are the only effective forces of an Afghan clan for offence or defence; the nominal chieftain merely governs on the sufferance of his followers. This lack of a common head makes it impossible for an Afghan clan to enter into any treaty obligation for the whole body, even if they knew the sacredness of plighted word,—for they have no machinery for ensuring respect for such undertakings from all their members. The family and not the clan is the true unit of Afghan society.

Such were the enemies with whom the empire

had to wage an intermittent war ever since the days of Akbar, and who taxed all the resources of Aurangzib during the second decade of his reign.

The trouble began with the Yusufzais. The present home of this clan lies in the Swat and Bajaur valleys and the plain of north Peshawar,—a rough semi-circle bounded on three sides by the Indus, Kabul and Swat rivers, and on the fourth by the lower Kashmir hills. Hither they had migrated in the 16th century from the Qandahar region and settled in the lands of the Dalzaqs, an Indian race, whom they gradually ousted. Their progress was unwittingly aided by the Mughal emperors who slew and deported the Dalzaqs in large numbers, so that the district was almost entirely denuded of them. Thus, by the end of the reign of Jahangir the occupation of this tract by the Yusufzais was completed.*

§3. *The Afghans as professional robbers, ever at war with Government.*

The new comers proved themselves the most formidable enemies of the peace of the country and the safety of the roads ever seen in that unquiet

* Migrations of the Pathan clans A.N. 1039, Bellew's *General Report on the Yusufzais* (1864), 64-67, 152-179; *Encyclopædia of Islam*, i. 149—154; *Peshawar District Gazetteer*, (1898), 49-58. Pathan character and government: Bellew, ch. v. *Peshawar Dist. Gaz* 119-122, 129-134, Elphinstone's *Cabul* (1815), Bk. II. ch. 2, 6, 7, Bk. III. ch. 1.

region. Highway robbery was the hereditary profession of these hardy savages, as cunning as they were bold. The plains of Peshawar and the narrow valleys embosomed among the rugged hills, yielded too scanty a sustenance for their fast-growing numbers; and the peaceful gains of agriculture were too poor and slow a reward in comparison with the plunder of their more industrious neighbours and of the rich traders passing within easy reach of them. The right of the hillmen,—Afridis, Shinwaris, Yusufzais and Khataks,—to levy toll on the traffic between India and Kabul, had been practically admitted by the Mughal Government, which had found by long experience that it was cheaper to bribe the clansmen than to coerce them, as a means of preserving order in that region and keeping the roads open. But even political pensions were not always effective in securing their obedience. Every year this prolific race multiplied, and the growing population, "more numerous than ants or locusts," and ignorant or contemptuous of peaceful industries, pined for some outlet for their martial instincts. A leader sprang up, pretending sanctity or princely descent, organized a band of young men by feeding them for some time at his own cost, and then swooped down upon the fields of rival clans or the imperial territory below, and recovered his expenses and rewarded his retainers by plunder. The gang held together so

long as the stream of booty did not fail; but when it ran dry, or the least inequality in its division was suspected, these natural democrats turned their arms against one another, and the league broke up.*

But the dissolution of a powerful band in this way gave no enduring peace to the plains; the units of Afghan society,—the families of fighting men under their grey beards,—remained intact, and soon formed a new combination and under a new leader returned to their occupation of plunder. The occasional victories of the guardians of law and order checked for a time, but could not finally remove this source of disturbance, as its economic causes remained unchanged. A strong Mughal emperor would resolve to enforce his authority and protect his subjects; armies would be poured into the valleys of the clansmen and after heavy losses their organized resistance would be beaten down, their houses demolished, the level country held by means of a chain of military posts, their crops cut down and the Afghan population thinned by the sword. But every now and then they would cut off a weak garrison; the Mughal outposts would have to be withdrawn in winter and the work of pacification renewed in spring.

When the Government, firmly disregarding the

* Bellew, 204. "A famous saint among the Yusufzais is said to have left his tribe a blessing and a curse, 'That they should always be free, but that they should never be united.'" (Elphinstone, 338.)

huge expenditure of men and money in these hills, persisted in the policy of annual invasion and chastisement, the tribes would make peace, promise tribute and obedience, and the weary Mughal troops would gladly withdraw. But such promises were forgotten as soon as the sufferings of the late war became a shadowy memory. In a few years the growth of population would more than fill the void caused by the Mughal sword; and the hungry hordes would again begin to swarm into the neighbouring districts or plunder trade-caravans.

The first serious attempt to enforce peace on the n. w. frontier was made by Akbar. Incautious Mughal commanders suffered losses, and the terrible disaster of February 1586, when an army of 8,000 men under Rajah Birbal was cut off in a Swat defile, created a terror of Afghan prowess and aversion to hill fighting throughout the imperial dominions. The defeat was, no doubt, soon avenged by Rajput valour and skill, but the Mughals had finally to patch up a peace by pensioning the tribal leaders and overlooking their depredations. Under Jahangir and Shah Jahan, the same state of things continued, varied by occasional risings of the clans, which cost the Mughals dear. The march of vast armies from India into Afghanistan for the wars in Balkh and Qandahar awed the frontiersmen into peace for a time in the middle of the 17th century. But there was a revival

of trouble in the closing years of Shah Jahan's reign. With the accession of Aurangzib the evil grew worse.*

§4. *Yusufzai rising of 1667.*

Early in 1667 began another movement for expansion among the Yusufzais. One of their great men, named Bhagu, drew the heads of other families into his scheme, crowned a pretended scion of their ancient kings as Muhammad Shah, and secured religious prestige to his banners by association with Mulla Chalak,† who enjoyed a great local reputation for sanctity. A central authority and rallying point for the tribesmen being thus found, Bhagu as *wazir* and virtual king, organized an expeditionary force of 5,000 clansmen under Mulla Chalak. They crossed the Indus above Attock and invaded Pakhli, a plain lying east of that river, in the Hazara district, through which ran the principal road to Kashmir. Here Shadman, a local chieftain, and other Mughal officers entrusted with the defence of the Attock region had their estates. The Yusufzais captured the fort of

* *Tab. Akb.* 369. *Al Badayuni*, ii. 350. *Imp. Gaz.* (3rd. ed.), xix. 152. *Bellew*, 72-74. *Peshawar Dist. Gaz.*, 58-61. *M U.* i. 279-280.

† *A.N.* 1041. *The Hazara Dist. Gaz.*, ed. 1907, p. 123, says, "The latest inroad was probably early in the 18th century, and was led by a Saiad named Jalal Baba, whose tomb is in the Bhogarmang valley." If, as I suspect, *Chalak* of the *MA.* is a misprint for *Jalal*, the invasion took place half a century earlier than the time stated in the *Gazetteer*.

Chhachal, the seat of Shadman, drove away the lawful owner's agents and began to levy rent from the peasantry for themselves. Their success attracted more of their clansmen into the district; the number of invaders daily increased, other Mughal posts were attacked and the hard-pressed officers prayed to the authorities at Peshawar and Delhi for relief. Other Yusufzai bands began to plunder the imperial territory on the bank of the Kabul river in the western Peshawar and Attock districts.*

§5. *Mughal victories over Yusufzais.*

The Emperor took measures of defence. His plan was to invade the enemy's country in three divisions.' The *faujdar* of Attock, Kamil Khan, was ordered to march against the rebels with the available forces in his neighbourhood, the governor of Kabul to send 13,000 men of his contingent, and Muhammad Amin Khan to go there from the Court with 10,000 picked troops. The last two divisions took time to arrive on the scene, and therefore Kamil Khan, the energetic man on the spot, without waiting for them left Attock with the loyal Khatak and Khokhar levies under their own chiefs, and marched towards the ferry of Harun wishing to cross the Indus there and enter the Yusufzai country. The enemy anticipated the invasion by coming over to the south side of the river in full force and holding the ferry

* A.N. 1042; *Akhbarat*, year 10, sheets 3 and 4.

of Harun against the imperialists. On 1st April, Kamil Khan was reinforced by a detachment of Khokhars and Rajputs sent by the deputy governor of Peshawar. The small Mughal army marched north-eastwards, the Indus protecting their Left flank, their Van being led by the Khokhar chieftain and their Right by Rajah Maha Singh of the Bhadauriya clan of Rajputs. They boldly attacked the ten thousand men who formed the Yusufzai front ranks, and behind whom stood 15,000 others. After a stubborn fight, the enemy broke and were driven into the river ; two thousand of them were slain, many wounded, and many more drowned ; but the remnant of their army found a ford and escaped. Forty prisoners were taken, and a pyramid was built with the heads of the slain. The imperial territory on this side of the Indus was cleared of the enemy. (A. N. 1042-'44.)

But the Mughal force was not yet strong enough to attempt an invasion of the north bank. So, Kamil Khan made a long halt at Harun. Throughout April reinforcements continued to pour in, and on 2nd May Shamshir Khan, at the head of a large detachment from Afghanistan, reached Attock, took over the supreme command, and crossed the Indus into the Yusufzai country. The enemy took post at Ohind, 16 miles above Attock, at "the mouth of their hilly country."

Shamshir fought many a battle with them and gained many a success. Entrenching his camp at Ohind, he occupied the level country of Mandaur where the Yusufzais used to grow their food crops, and destroyed all their farms and homestead in the lowlands. On 4th June, he marched out of Ohind to attack Bhagu in his present position. The villages of Panjpir, Chand, Mansur, and four unnamed hamlets 10 miles from Murghiz, were taken after hard fighting against heavy odds and with considerable losses; the houses were burnt down, the property looted and no vestige of cultivation left. The unrest had spread to other frontier tribes, and now the Akuzais and Malizais of Swat and Tirah came to the help of the Yusufzais. The vast numbers and excellent marksmanship of the hillmen at one time threatened a reverse to the Mughal arms, but in the end the imperial artillery triumphed, and the enemy were pushed back to their trenches at Mansur on the Panjshir river, which the Mughals carried at the gallop. (28th June, 1667.) A hilltop where the remnant of the enemy made a last stand, was stormed. The victory was complete; three hundred prisoners including several headmen (*maliks*) were taken, and many Afghans were slain or drowned in the river.*

* A N 1044-'45, 1052-'56 Life of Shamshir Khan, (Hayat, of the Tarin clan) M U II 677-679

Meantime, a force of 9,000 men, with a large staff of Rajput and Muslim officers carefully selected by the Emperor himself, and including 500 gentlemen-troopers (*ahadis*), had been sent from the Court on 2nd May, under the Pay-master General Muhammad Amin Khan, one of the highest grandees of the realm. He crossed the Kabul river at Nari (22nd August), reached Lakhi, and took over the supreme command from Shamshir. That able officer had already brought the Utmanzai clan over to the imperial side, and the alliance was now cemented with gifts. After a three days' halt at Lakhi, Muhammad Amin Khan set out against the Shipa sept near Shahbazgarhi, and sent out strong detachments against the tribes of Bajaur. The Mughal advanced guards under Mir Khan, after plundering the villages near Shahbazgarhi and penetrating to the valley of Karahmar, lifted 6,000 heads of cattle, and fell back on the main army. The Commander-in-Chief himself entered the Swat valley, destroyed the village of Hijaz, and returned to Ohind on 6th October. Here he received orders recalling him to Court. Shamshir was left in command with an addition of 2,000 men to his contingent.*

For a time the Yusufzais seem to have been

* A.N., 1046, 1058-1060. *Akhbarat*, year 10, sheets 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, (useful details).

quieted by these hard blows or weakened by internal quarrels; at all events there was no general rising of the frontier tribes before 1672. In the middle of 1671 Maharajah Jaswant Singh with his brave Rathors was appointed to hold the outpost of Jamrud. The strong Mughal garrisons succeeded in keeping the country under control.

§6. *Afridi rising of 1672; disaster to Md. Amin Khan's army.*

In 1672, however, began a formidable danger. The tactless action of the *faujdar* of Jalalabad bred discontent among the Khaibar clans. The Afridis rose under their chieftain Acmal Khan,* a born general, who crowned himself king, struck coins in his own name, and proclaiming war against the Mughals, summoned all the Pathan clans to join the national movement. With a following "more numerous than ants and locusts," he closed the Khaibar Pass.†

In the spring of 1672, Muhammad Amin Khan, now viceroy of Afghanistan, after passing the winter in the milder climate of Peshawar, started for Kabul,

* So the name is spelt by Biddulph, while K K. ii. 232 and M U. i. 281 have 'Aimal', and *Akhbarat* has 'Aiman,' evidently a copyist's error. The provocation given to the Afghans is mentioned by Ishwardas, 63a, and Manucci (*Storia*, ii. 199)

† For the passes of the Afghan frontier, see Markham's paper in *Proceedings of Royal Geogr. Soc.* Jan. 1879, pp. 38-62.

with his army and suite, and accompanied by their families and household property. At Jamrud he learnt that the Afghans had blocked the way ahead. But the son of Mir Jumla was notorious for his insane pride and self-will, which he did not care to curb even in the Emperor's presence, and which turned his subordinates into trembling flatterers. When they at last mustered courage to inform him of his danger and to advise a parley with the Afghans, they met with an angry rebuff. Intoxicated with wealth and power, ignorant of the enemy's numbers and despising their prowess, he rushed blindly in to his doom. Advancing to Ali Masjid (21st April) he entrenched. At night the Afridis descended from the hillside and cut him off from the stream whence he drew his water supply. Next day men and beasts in the imperial army began to perish of thirst from the heat of the sun. The Khan now opened negotiations, but the Afghans demanded a special blackmail in addition to the restoration of their annual subsidies. He rejected the terms and sent a body of veterans under his son Abdullah and other high officers to dislodge the foe. The Afghans assailed them with a storm of missiles. From the lofty peak of Tartara, 3,400 feet overhead, stones were rolled down on the doomed men crowded in the narrow gorge below. The leaders were soon killed, and disorder seized the Mughal army. "Horses, elephants and men

were mixed up in confusion." The Afghans now charged down the hillside, slaying and plundering the entire Mughal camp. "Every one fled to the hill or desert.....Sons were separated from fathers, daughters from mothers, wives from husbands, masters from servants."

Utterly humbled and exhausted, Muhammad Amin Khan, and some of his high officers, succeeded in escaping to Peshawar with their bare lives; but everything else was lost. "Ten thousand men fell under the enemy's sword in the field, and above two krores of Rupees in cash and kind was looted by the enemy. They captured twenty thousand men and women and sent them to Central Asia for sale."* The viceroy's family—his mother, wife and daughter,—had been made captive, and though he secured their release by paying a huge ransom, his wife in bitterness of disgrace refused to return to him and took the veil as a nun at a local saint's tomb. Among the slain were his son Mir Abdullah, his son-in-law Mirza Sultan, Jahangir Quli Khan, and Mirza Bakhshi.

Returning to Peshawar, Muhammad Amin

* The booty taken was enormous, as M Amin Khan had inherited the fabulous wealth of Mir Jumla. Khush-hal sings, "Forty thousand Mughals were cut to pieces. Their wives and their daughters were the prisoners of the Afghans, And strings on strings of horses, camels, and elephants were taken." (*Coahul*, 196.) See also Manucci (*Storia*, II. 199, 201) for his wealth.

Khan took impotent vengeance, for the consequences of his own folly. "In anger he killed Mustajab, one of the chief men of Peshawar, who had accompanied him but had not reported anything about the wickedness of the Afghans though he knew of it. In his death agony Mustajab cried out for a little water to drink. The Khan answered, 'Many Muslims have died of thirst. It is not wrong that you should die of the same cause, as a reparation for it.' ""*

The disaster was complete. For the nearest parallel to it men had to go back a hundred years to the reign of Akbar, when an entire Mughal army, under Rajah Bir Bal, had been cut off by the Afghans in the same province. This signal victory increased the prestige and resources of the Afridi leader. The tale of his rich booty went the round of the hills, and lured recruits to his banners.

§7. *Khush-hal Khan Khatak, the enemy of Aurangzib.*

Khush-hal Khan,† the chieftain of the Khataks,

* Disaster to M Amin Khan *MA*, 117-118, Ishwardas 63a-65a (best account), *K K* II 232-233, *Storia*, II 199-201

† My account of Khush hal Khan is based on Biddulph's *Afghan Poetry in the 17th Century*, supplemented by *AN* 1042, (he joins the Mughal force sent against the Yusufzais), *Akhbarat*, year 10, sheet 9, year 17, sheet 2, (his son at Court) and Elphinstone's *Cabul*, 193-197. Selections from Khush-hal's poems have been also translated by Elphinstone (*Cabul*, 196-197) and by Raverty in his *Selections from the Poetry of the Afghans*, (London, 1862) I quote Biddulph.

seems to have taken up arms against the Mughals at this time. This large and warlike clan occupies the southern part of the Peshawar district and much of Kohat and Banu. Khush-hal had years ago inspired defiance of the imperial Government. But an Afghan's kinsmen are his greatest foes. The Khatak chieftain was invited to a *darbar* at Peshawar, treacherously arrested in concert with his uncles, fettered with shackles weighing 10 lbs. each, and sent off to Hindustan as a prisoner. The viceroy of Kabul objecting to the release of this turbulent man, the Emperor kept him in prison at Delhi (April 1664) and Rantambhor. The poet solaced his captive hours by writing spirited verses in Pushtu, denouncing Aurangzib's injustice and cruelty, and cursing the Indian climate. But he evidently made terms with the Government, for he returned to Delhi in December 1666, and three months later we find him and his son Ashraf in the Mughal force that invaded the Yusufzai country. The Yusufzais were the hereditary enemies of the Khataks, as the boundaries of the two clans met in the middle of the Peshawar district, and a wedge of Khatak settlement was also inserted in the body of the Yusufzai territory north of the Indus. Khush-hal's father had been slain by the Yusufzais. Prompted either by love of revenge or by the wish to secure release from prison, he readily accepted a command in the Mughal service, and

fought in the Yusufzai campaign at the head of his clansmen.

But his heart yearned for the free life of a mountain chief, and now, joining Acmal, he became the leading spirit of the national opposition, inspiring the tribesmen with his pen no less than his sword, and winning many a victory over the Mughals.

The danger to the empire was very great. Not only was the rising a national one, affecting the whole Pathan land "from Qandahar to Attock," but its leaders were also men who had served in the Mughal army in Hindustan* and the Deccan, and knew the organization efficiency and tactics of the imperialists. The two sides had the same arms, and except that the Afghans lacked heavy artillery, the superiority lay with them, as they were hardy hillmen fighting in their own rugged country, while the Indian troops have always had a horror of mountain war and aversion to facing privation and cold.

§8. *Early Mughal failures; Mahabat Khan's slackness.*

The Emperor, immediately on hearing of the disaster, ordered Fidai Khan the governor of Lahor

* Khush-hal Khan was a Mughal mansabdar, as his father Shahbaz had been (*Akhbarat*, year 10, sh 9) On 30 March, 1667 the Emperor, who had at first appointed Acmal Afridi to accompany M Amin Khan to Peshawar, detained him and then sent him to fight in the Deccan, by way of precaution (*Ibid.* 10/4.)

to hasten to Peshawar (18th May) to guard against any Afghan incursion. Muhammad Amin Khan was degraded and sent off to Gujrat as *subahdar*. Mahabat Khan, who had governed Afghanistan thrice before, and achieved success in dealing with this people, was recalled from the Deccan and sent to Kabul as viceroy for the fourth time. Much was hoped from his proved ability and local knowledge. But the new governor shrank from risking the fate of his predecessor. He avoided any energetic action against the exultant Afghans, and made a secret arrangement with them, each side promising not to molest the other. In this way he dawdled away months at Peshawar, first urging the smallness of his force and then the approach of winter as a plea for his inaction. Next spring, a sergeant at the mace was sent from the Court to drive him on to Kabul, and at last he went there by the Karapa Pass after bribing the Afghans on the way not to oppose him. But the Khaibar route remained closed as before. The Emperor was highly displeased at Mahabat's conduct* and sent Shujaet Khan in independent command of a large force with abundant war-material and artillery, to punish the Afghans (14th November, 1673). Jaswant Singh was to co-operate with him.

* M.A. 121, 129, Ishwardas, 65b-67a. Mahabat's letter to Aurangzib (I. O. L. MS. 2678, pp. 122-126 of the copy made for me). *Storia*, ii. 202, 205. Life of Mahabat Kh. in *M. U.* iii. 590-594, 384.

§9. *Disaster to Shujaet Khan, 1674.*

Shujaet Khan was a man of humble origin who had risen to high rank and the Emperor's favour by his success in quelling the Satnami rising. He was therefore regarded with jealousy and contempt by high-born officers like Mahabat Khan and Maharajah Jaswant Singh, and the more so as his appointment implied the Emperor's distrust of their ability. Shujaet, on his part, proud of his master's favour and of his own past triumphs, despised the advice of Jaswant, and took his own line of action. This lack of co-operation among the Mughal leaders caused the disaster of 1674.

Early in that year many of the clans sent deputations to Peshawar and swore friendship to the Mughals. Shujaet Khan,* without waiting for the others to submit, and in disregard of Jaswant's counsel, tried to push on to Kabul. After crossing the Gandab, he ascended the saddle (*kotal*) of the Karapa Pass (21st February). That night there was a heavy fall of rain and snow; and every one in the Indian camp was brought to death's door by the extreme cold and wet. The Afghans from the heights on the two sides began to harass the suffering

* Disaster to Shujaet Khan: *M.A.* 131, Ishwardas (the best account) 67a-69a. The Karapa Pass lies north-east of the Kabul river, while the Khaibar Pass lies south-west. (Map accompanying Markham's paper.)

army. "The night was so very dark that the planets missed their way in the wide plain of the sky, and, therefore, all men were frightened and troubled,—unable either to advance or retreat. The Khan, proud of his bravery, began to fight with bows and muskets. The Afghans showered stones, arrows, and bullets. But what the imperialists discharged missed the mark, while the missiles of the Afghans all took effect." The imperialists, perplexed and shaken, retreated to a safer position for the rest of the night. But many of them were benumbed to death in the Pass and many others paralysed by the cold. At dawn the Afghans charged the miserable army from all sides. Shujaet Khan, forgetful of his duty as general, sought and found a soldier's death in the front rank. His leaderless troops were hemmed round; but a band of 500 Rathors, wisely sent by Jaswant, arrived with guns, broke the enemy's cordon, and brought the remnant of the army back to camp after a long and desperate fight at close quarters. Three hundred of the Rajputs sacrificed themselves in this heroic exploit. Of Shujaet's followers thousands had fallen before.

§10. *Aurangzib goes to Peshawar; Mughal success, peace restored on frontier.*

This second disaster, occurring less than two years after the first, convinced Aurangzib that a

supreme effort should be made to restore imperial prestige. He himself went to Hasan Abdal, between Rawal Pindi and Peshawar, (26th June, 1674), and stayed there for a year and a half directing the operations. A vast army accompanied him with a large park of artillery: Strong and well-equipped columns with plenty of material were sent into the enemy's country. Aghar Khan, a Turkish noble, who had often distinguished himself by fighting the Afghans, was hurriedly recalled from the Deccan and deputed to clear the way in the Khaibar region, (July). Prince Akbar under the guardianship of the minister Asad Khan marched to Kabul by way of Kohat,* with a large army and a number of high officers, (end of September). Mahabat Khan was removed from his post as viceroy, on suspicion of having connived at the destruction of Shujaet Khan.†

With Aurangzib's arrival on the scene, imperial

* Aurangzib says in one of his letters that the prince should march by way of Sufed Khak (which, as we know from *Kalimat* 41a, was the Karapa route). But *M.A.* (136) says that he followed the Kohat road. Aurangzib renamed Sufed Khak as Mughalabad (*M.A.* 145)

† On learning of this false accusation, Mahabat Khan wrote a very bitter letter to the Emperor. (I.O.L. M.S. 2678, pp. 122-126 of the copy made for me.) In it he defends his own character and that of Jaswant, calls Shujaet Khan a *pai* (low rascal), and taxes the Emperor with cherishing base favourites.

diplomacy, no less than imperial arms, began to have effect. Many clans were induced to send deputations to him and were won over by the grant of presents, pensions, *jagirs*, and posts in the Mughal army to their headmen. The Bangashes and some of the tribes of the Peshawar district at once joined the Emperor's side, and sent contingents of their men to fight under his banners. As for the irreconcilables whom neither the concentration of imperial force could overawe, nor the treasures of India could buy, their valleys were penetrated by detachments from Peshawar. Thus, in a short time, the Ghorai, Ghilzai, Shirrani and Yusufzai clans were defeated and ousted from their villages. A Mughal outpost held Bazarak, the Shirrani capital. At this the Daudzai, Tarakzai and Tirahi tribes made their submission.*

Muhammad Ashraf, the son of the Khatak chieftain Khush-hal Khan, entered the imperial service; but his father continued in opposition. Similarly, the son of Bhagu, the Yusufzai ringleader, offered to wait on the Emperor on receiving an assurance of safety. Dariya Khan Afridi's followers promised to bring the head of Acmal, the Afridi pretender, if their past misdeeds were forgiven, (end of August). [*Akhbarat*, 17—20.]

* M.A. 132-133, 136; Ishwardas, 69a—70b (here followed); K.K. ii. 237.

§11. *Aghar Khan's victories.*

Meantime, great deeds were being done by Aghar Khan west of Peshawar. First he foiled a night attack of the Mohmands and their allies, and retaliated by slaying 300 of them, ravaging their homes, and bringing away 2,000 captives and much booty. Then he tried to open the Khaibar Pass by leading the Van of the army of Fidai Khan, the new governor of Kabul. Forty thousand Afghans opposed him near Ali Masjid, but after a long contest in which both sides lost heavily and Aghar Khan was severely wounded, the enemy fled, leaving behind them many thousands of dead and prisoners.

But still the Afghans were not crushed; they rallied in a short time and closed the path further ahead. The jealousy of his colleagues, especially of the Hindustani nobles, added to the difficulties of Aghar Khan and his brother Turks. So, he escorted Fidai Khan to Jalalabad by way of Bazarak and Seh Chuba, fighting all the way. Next, with a force of 5,000 Rajputs and Afghan friendlies, he occupied Nangrahar and tried to keep the roads open. The Chilzais who had seized the Jagdalak Pass were repeatedly defeated and expelled from it. When he was staying at the outpost of Gandamak, the Afghans, 30 or 40 thousand strong, attacked him at night. The battle raged till the next afternoon, when

the enemy were repulsed. Of all the Mughal generals he alone was uniformly victorious over the frontier tribes, and Afghan mothers, it is said, used to hush their babies to sleep with his dreaded name. (K. K. ii. 237—246.)

The Emperor's plan was that Prince Akbar should advance eastwards from Jalalabad, sending his Van under Jaswant Singh by way of the Khaibar and a division under Hasan Beg Khan by way of the Karapa defile,—while a detachment from Peshawar under Aghar Khan would march westwards, so that the Khaibar tribes would be enveloped and crushed by this simultaneous attack, and no grain from outside would reach the Afghan rebels.* We have already seen what Aghar Khan did. But evidently Prince Akbar could not carry out his part of the plan of campaign. He passed a short time at Kabul, settling the affairs of the province, and then returned to Hasan Abdal, leaving Fidai Khan in command.

§12. *Fighting in 1675; disaster to Muḳarram Khan.*

In the spring of 1675, when Fidai Khan set out on his return from Kabul to Peshawar, the Afghans attacked him in the Jagdalak Pass. His Van was defeated, its Arab commander was slain, and many of the elephants, artillery, baggage and women of this

* *Aḳhbarat*, 17—2, (Aurangzib's instructions to Akbar).

division were carried off by the enemy. But the viceroy's courage and steadiness saved the Centre. Aghar Khan, then at the *thana* of Gandamak, on hearing of his critical situation, came to the rescue by rapid marches, took charge of the viceroy's vanguard, and forced the Jagdalak Pass in the teeth of Afghan opposition, routing the enemy from the hilltops.

Early in June, however, "a great defeat befell the imperial army." Mukarram Khan with a large force was operating against the Afghans near the saddle (*kotal*) of Khapush in the Bajaur country. After defeating several bodies of the enemy and plundering their villages, he was one day decoyed by the appearance of a small band of them to advance and give chase. Suddenly two large Afghan forces which had been lying in ambush, "concealed in the waist of the hill," fell upon him. The Mughals were hopelessly outnumbered, and lost heavily, including the youthful hero Shamshir Khan, a brother of Mukarram, and Mir Azizullah, his sister's husband. "Lack of water and of paths on any side whatever caused the death of many soldiers, both horse and foot." Mukarram Khan with a handful of survivors escaped to Bajaur and took refuge with its *thanadar*. (*M.A.* 144—145).

Retributory measures were taken immediately, and all the Mughal positions in Afghanistan were

strengthened. The imperial Paymaster, Sarbuland Khan, was sent with 9,000 men and a vast quantity of material against the enemy (14 June). The ever-victorious Aghar Khan was appointed to Jalalabad, and other capable officers to Jagdalak, Laghman, Gharib-khanah, Danki, and Bangashat, in command of outposts. Fidai Khan, the governor of the province, was given the title of Azam Khan Kokah, in reward of his activity in punishing the Afghans.

At the end of August came the news of two reverses, though on a small scale: Hazbar Khan, the *thanadar* of Jagdalak was slain with his son and other Mughal soldiers; Abdullah, the *thanadar* of Barangab and Surkhab, was driven out of his post, after losing many of his troops. (*M.A.* 146.) But, on the whole, the imperialists held their own by means of outposts and forts at strategic points in the Pathan country. By the end of the year 1675 the situation had sufficiently improved* to enable the Emperor to leave Hasan Abdal and return to Delhi (where he arrived on 27th March next).

§13. *Amir Khan, able governor of Afghanistan.*

On 15th October, 1676, Prince Muazzam was appointed to the Kabul expedition. He was given

* This is my view, based on Ishwardas (71a). But Manucci and Khush-hal Khan state that the Emperor returned with failure. It is evident that he had not achieved success.

the high title of *Shah-i-Alam* (King of the Universe), a hundred thousand gold pieces, and two lakhs of Rupees in jewellery, and sent from Delhi with a splendid train of the most distinguished officers, artillery, material, and a well-filled war-chest. Among his lieutenants was Mir Khan, the son of Khalilullah, who had previously distinguished himself by leading a successful punitive expedition against the Yusufzais of Shahbazgarhi and suppressing two rebellious Afghan chiefs in Bihar. Once he had fallen under royal displeasure on the suspicion of having encouraged Prince Azam in disloyal ambition. But the cloud had blown over; he had been reinstated and created Amir Khan* (January, 1675). And now he fought so well under the banners of Shah Alam that at the prince's recommendation he was appointed viceroy of Kabul (19th March, 1677), in the place of Azam Khan. The prince himself arrived at Kabul on 15th August, 1677 and after a few months' stay returned to India, reaching Delhi on 20th January, 1678. Throughout the year 1677 peace was observed between the Mughals and the Afghans, as both sides suffered from the effects of a seven months' drought and famine.

Amir Khan arrived at his post on 8th June, 1678, and continued to govern Afghanistan with

* For the history of Amir Khan, *M.A.* 82, 113, 146; Ishwardas, 61b, 73a; *M.U.* i. 277-286; *Studies in Mughal India*, 111-115.

signal ability till his death twenty years later. His first attack on Acmal's troops in the Jalalabad district having failed, he took to diplomacy. He set himself to win the hearts of the Afghans and enter into social relations with them, with such success that the chiefs of the clans "left their shy and unsocial manners and began to visit him without any suspicion." They became very friendly to him, and every one of them looked up to him for advice in conducting his domestic affairs. Under his astute management, they ceased to trouble the imperial Government and spent their energies in internecine quarrels. Once he broke up the confederacy under Acmal by secretly instigating that chieftain's followers to ask him to divide the conquered territory among them. Acmal declined the proposal, saying, "How can a small territory be divided among so many men?" The disappointed hillmen threw up his service and began to return home in anger. Acmal had at last to make a division of the land; but as he naturally showed greater consideration to his own clansmen and kinsfolk, his other followers were disgusted and left his camp. Much of Amir Khan's administrative success was due to the wise counsel tact and energy of his wife, Sahibji, a daughter of Ali Mardan Khan.

§14. *Emperor's Afghan policy; peace restored.*

The Emperor triumphed in Afghanistan by

following the policy of paying subsidies and setting clan against clan,—or, to use his own metaphor, “breaking two bones by knocking them together.” (K. T., 47a, 74a.) The imperial dominions were no longer invaded from beyond the border. The Khaibar route was kept open by paying regular pensions to the hillmen. And though some tribe or other continued refractory, the Emperor had no anxiety about that region during Amir Khan’s viceroyalty.*

This conciliatory policy created a division among the frontier clans. The Yusufzais, who had begun the trouble, submitted early, and the north Peshawar district was soon pacified. The Afridis remained in arms longer. But an Afghan confederacy is short-lived. Amir Khan’s diplomacy broke up the following of Acmal. And when that self-styled king died, the Afridis made terms with the empire.

§15. *Khush-hal Khan continues resistance.*

The struggle was however continued for many years afterwards by the stern and unbending

* In *Kalimat*, 16b, Aurangzib describes the deceased Amur Khan’s administrative methods,—how he was a just governor possessed of practical skill and tact in dealing with all, how he used to make savings in the budgeted expenditure of the province and keep the passes open to traffic, and how he kept many of the hillmen usefully employed by enlisting them in the imperial service and profusely bribed the clans out of the imperial coffers, his own income and his illegal exactions. Also 11b.

independent Khush-hal Khan Khatak, with the memory of his captivity in Aurangzib's dungeons rankling in his bosom. The Bangashes and Yusufzais,—his very son Ashraf,—were fighting against him in the Mughal ranks; but neither age, nor a growing sense of the hopelessness of his cause, could tame his bitterness of feeling and obduracy of spirit. Alone he kept the flag of Pathan freedom flying, till his own son betrayed him into the enemy's hands. As he complains,—

"Gone are Acmal Khan and Darya, who had good
judgment ;
 Now Khush-hal alone stands in the Mughal's way.
* * * *

I alone amongst them am concerned for my nation's
honour.

At ease are the Yusufzais cultivating their fields—
 The Afridis, Mohmands, Shinwaris, what are they
about ?

Spread is the Mughal army in Nangrahar,
 With calls for succour to them am I wearied ;
 Deaf are they, no attention is paid to my cries,
 While all the other Pathans from Qandahar to Attock
 Are openly or secretly combined in honour's cause."

But one solace he had in his deathless hate of the unjust Emperor who had imprisoned him by stratagem. An exile from his country, a captive in the enemy's fortress, he could still boast,

"I am he who has sorely wounded Aurang's heart.
 Khaibar's pass have I made to the Mughals their
dearest purchase.

In every spot have they paid taxes to the Pathans.

* * * *

Of his armies destroyed what account is there?

The treasures of Hindustan have been scattered
before us,
Swallowed by the mountains has been his ruddy gold."

Ruinous as the Afghan war was to imperial finances, its political effect was even more harmful. It made the employment of Afghans in the ensuing Rajput war impossible, though Afghans were just the class of soldiers who could have won victory for the imperialists in that rugged and barren country. Moreover, it relieved the pressure on Shivaji by draining the Deccan of the best Mughal troops for service on the n.w. frontier. (*Storia*, ii. 203.) The Maratha chief took advantage of this diversion of his enemy's strength to sweep in a dazzling succession of triumphs through Golkonda to the Karnatak and back again through Mysore and Bijapur to Raigarh, during the fifteen months following December 1676. It was the climax of his career; but the Afridis and Khataks made its unbroken success possible.

CHAPTER XXXIV

THE ISLAMIC STATE CHURCH IN INDIA

§1. *The Muslim State entirely subordinate to the Church.*

By the theory of its origin the Muslim State is a theocracy. Its true king is God, and earthly rulers are merely His agents, bound to enforce His law on all. Civil Law is completely subordinated to Religious Law and, indeed, merges its existence in the latter. The civil authorities exist solely to spread and enforce the true faith. In such a State, infidelity is logically equivalent to treason, because the infidel repudiates the authority of the true king and pays homage to his rivals, the false gods and goddesses. All the resources of the State, all the forces under the political authorities, are in strict legality at the disposal of the missionary propaganda of the true faith.

Therefore, the toleration of any sect outside the fold of orthodox Islam is no better than compounding with sin. And the worst form of sin is polytheism, the belief that the one true God has partners in the form of other deities.* Such a belief is the rankest

* The Arabic term for polytheism is *shirk*, meaning "associating other [false gods] with God." (Hughes, *Dictionary of Islam*, 579.)

ingratitude (*kufur*)* to Him who gives us our life and daily bread.

Islamic theology, therefore, tells the true believer that his highest duty is to make "exertion (*jihad*) in the path of God,"† by waging war against infidel lands (*dar-ul-harb*) till they become a part of the realm of Islam (*dar-ul-Islam*) and their populations are converted into true believers. After conquest the entire infidel population becomes theoretically reduced to the status of slaves of the conquering army. The men taken with arms are to be slain or sold into slavery and their wives and children reduced to servitude. As for the non-combatants among the vanquished, if they are not massacred outright,—as the Canon lawyer Shafi declares to be the Quranic injunction,—it is only to give them a respite till they are so wisely guided as to accept the true faith.

§2. *Ideal of a Muslim State.*

The conversion of the entire population to Islam

* *Kufur* means literally 'covering up the truth (regarding God),' and secondarily 'ingratitude.' A *kafir* is a man guilty of *kufur*.

† *Jihad fi sabil uillah* (*Quran*, ix. 29) For *jihad* see Hughes, 243-248, 710; *Encyclopædia of Islam*, i. 1041. "And when the sacred months are passed, kill those who join other deities with God, wherever ye shall find them. But if they shall convert, then let them go their way." (*Quran*, ix. 5, 6.) "Say to the infidels, if they desist from their unbelief, what is now past shall be forgiven them. But if they return to it, ..fight then against them till strife be at an end, and the religion be all of it God's" (viii. 39-42.)

and the extinction of every form of dissent, is the ideal of the Muslim State. If any infidel is suffered to exist in the community, it is as a necessary evil, and for a transitional period only. Political and social disabilities must be imposed on him, and bribes offered to him from the public funds, to hasten the day of his spiritual enlightenment and the addition of his name to the roll of true believers.* The growth of the infidel population in number or wealth would, therefore, defeat the very end of the State. Hence, a true Islamic king is bound to look on jubilantly when his infidel subjects cut each other's throats, for "whichever side may be slain, Islam is the gainer," (*har taraf ke shawwad kushta sud-i-Islam ast*). If for instance, two rival orders of Hindu monks fought each other to the death for precedence in bathing in a holy tank, a Muslim king like Akbar was expected to abdicate his function of guardian of the public peace, and assist them in mutually thinning the number of the infidels.†

* "With regard to the idolators of a non-Arabic country, Shafi maintains that destruction is incurred by them also; but other learned doctors agree that it is lawful to reduce them to slavery, thus allowing them, as it were, a respite during which it may please God to direct them into the right path, but making, at the same time, their persons and substance subservient to the cause of Islam." (Hughes, 710.) *Encyclo. Islam*, i. 917 (*dar-ul-harb*.)

† Khuda Bakhsh MS. of *Khandan-i-Timuria*, 322a, where Akbar's action is justified on the principle, *Har taraf &c. Tabaqat-i-Akbar*, 279.

§3. *Political disabilities of non-Muslims.*

A non-Muslim, therefore, cannot be a citizen of the State; he is a member of a depressed class; his status is a modified form of slavery. He lives under a contract (*zimma*) with the State: for the life and property that are grudgingly spared to him by the Commander of the Faithful he must undergo political and social disabilities; and pay a commutation-money (*jaziya*). In short, his continued existence in the State after the conquest of his country by the Muslims is conditional upon his person and property being made subservient to the cause of Islam.

He must pay a tax for his land (*kharaj*), from which the early Muslims were exempt; he must pay other exactions for the maintenance of the army, in which he cannot enlist even if he offers to render personal service instead of paying the poll-tax; and he must show by humility of dress and behaviour that he belongs to a subject class. No non-Muslim (*zimmi*) can wear fine dresses, ride on horseback or carry arms; he must behave respectfully and submissively to every member of the dominant sect.*

* For *zimmis* or protected non-Muslims, Hughes 710-713; *Encyclopædia of Islam*, i. 958, 1051; Muir's *Caliphate*, 3rd ed., 149-158. "Each adult, male, free, sane *Zimmi* must pay a poll tax, *jizya*. His real estate either becomes a *waqf* for the whole body of Muslims, but of which he continues to have the use, or he holds it still as his own. In either event he pays on it and its crops a land-tax, *kharaj*, which on the owner being a Muslim falls. He is liable also to other

As the learned Qazi Mughis-ud-din declared to Ala-ud-din Khalji, in accordance with the teaching of the books on Canon Law :— ‘The Hindus are designated in the Law as ‘payers of tribute’ (*kharaj-guzar*); and when the revenue officer demands silver from them, they should, without question and with all humility and respect, tender gold. If the officer throws dirt into their mouths, they must without reluctance open their mouths wide to receive it. By these acts of degradation are shown the extreme obedience of the *zimmi*, the glorification of the true faith of Islam, and the abasement of false faiths. God himself orders them to be humiliated, [as He says, ‘till they pay *jaziya*] with the hand and are humbled.’...The Prophet has commanded us to slay them, plunder them, and make them captive...No other religious authority except the great Imam [Hanifa] whose faith we follow, has sanctioned the imposition of the *jaziya* on Hindus. According to all other theologians, the rule for Hindus is ‘Either death or Islam.’ ” (Zia Barani, 290.)

exactions for the maintenance of the Muslim armies. He must distinguish himself from believers by dress, not riding on horseback or carrying weapons, and by a generally respectful attitude towards Muslims. He is also under certain legal disabilities with regard to testimony in lawcourts, protection under criminal law and in marriage...Nor in the exercise of their worship may they (the *Zimmis*) use an offensive publicity. *They are not citizens of the Muslim State.*” (*Encyclo. Islam*, i. 958-959.)

The *zimmi* is under certain legal disabilities with regard to testimony in lawcourts, protection under criminal law, and marriage. The State, as the other party in the contract (*zimma*), guarantees to him security of life and property and a modified protection in the exercise of his religion :—he cannot erect new temples, and has to avoid any offensive publicity in the exercise of his faith. But everything short of open physical persecution,—everything that would not be a flagrant breach of the contract of protection, can be legitimately practised by the Muslim ruler to reduce the number of the undesirable alien sect.

§4. *Necessary effects of Muslim conquest.*

The history of the world under Muslim rule illustrates how theology has repeatedly prevailed over political wisdom. The early Arab conquerors, notably in Sindh, followed the wise and profitable policy of leaving the shrines and religious practices of the non-Muslim population practically undisturbed. On the first capture of a city the inhabitants were called upon to accept Islam. If they agreed, they were given full rights with the conquerors; otherwise, by paying a compounding fee (*jaziya*), they secured the right of exercising their religion. The demolition of the chief temple in the captured city and the erection of a mosque on its site was an invariable incident of Muslim conquest. But there

was at first no wanton or systematic iconoclasm. With the growth of the Muslim population, however, the long enjoyment of unchallenged power bred in them a spirit of intolerance and a love of persecution.* Every device short of massacre in cold blood was resorted to in order to convert heathen subjects. In addition to the poll-tax and public degradation in dress and demeanour imposed on them, the non-Muslims were subjected to various hopes and fears. Rewards in the form of money and public employment were offered to apostates from Hinduism. The leaders of Hindu religion and society were systematically repressed, to deprive the sect of spiritual instruction, and their religious gatherings and processions were forbidden in order to prevent the growth of solidarity and a sense of communal strength among them. No new temple was allowed to be built† nor any old one to be

* Elliot, i. 469. The *zimmis* "may repair and even rebuild existing churches, but not erect new ones on new sites." (*Encyclo.*, i. 959.) "The construction of places of worship in the Muslim territory is unlawful for them, unless within their own houses, but if churches and synagogues originally belonging to Christians and Jews be destroyed or fall to decay, they are at liberty to rebuild and repair them." (Hughes, 711.) "It has been settled according to Canon Law that no long standing temple should be demolished nor any new one allowed to be built" (Aurangzib's Benares *farman*, *J.A.S.B.*, 1911, 689).

† Firuz Shah Tughlaq destroyed all new idol-temples in Delhi and its environs, and "killed the leaders of infidelity and subjected the

repaired, so that the total disappearance of all places of Hindu worship was to be merely a question of time. But even this delay, this slow operation of Time, was intolerable to many of the more fiery spirits of Islam, who tried to hasten the abolition of "infidelity" by anticipating the destructive hand of Time and forcibly pulling down temples.

In this later age, particularly among the Turks, who were new converts to Islam and had all the fiery zeal of neophytes, the old Arab toleration of false faiths appeared sinful and the suppression of infidels, however accomplished, a supreme merit in the eyes of God. Outside their own realms, the destruction of temples and the slaughter of Hindus sanctified every war of aggression. Thus a frame of mind was produced in the Muslim community which habitually regarded plunder and homicide as the purest of human acts, as "exertion in the path of God." When Timur, for instance, was tempted by the report of the vast wealth of India to come and plunder it, he announced his aim to be "to overthrow their temples and idols and become *ghazis* and *mujahids* before God;...since the inhabitants are chiefly polytheists and infidels, and idolators and worshippers of the Sun, by the order of God and

lower orders to stripes and chastisement, as a warning to all men that no *zimmi* could follow such wicked practices in a Muslim country" (Elliot, III. 380-381.)

His Prophet it is right for us to conquer them." (Elliot, iii. 396.) This motive sanctified all his massacres and outrages in the eyes of his fellow-believers. Again, in 1569, when a noble named Husain Khan went on a private predatory expedition into the Sewalik mountains on "hearing that the bricks of the temples were of silver and gold, and conceiving a desire for this and all other unguarded treasures, of which he had heard a lying report," the pious historian Al Badayuni (ii. 125) calls it a religious war. When Muhammad Adil Shah sent his armies to attack the Hindus of the Karnatak, whose only fault was their wealth, his Court historian designated this campaign of slaughter, rapine and outrage as the realization of a long cherished pious resolution. (*Bas. Sal.* 304.) The murder of infidels (*kafir-kushi*) is counted a merit in a Muslim. It is not necessary that he should tame his own passions or mortify his flesh; it is not necessary for him to grow a rich growth of spirituality. He has only to slay a certain class of his fellow-beings or plunder their lands and wealth, and this act in itself would raise his soul to heaven.*

* When, in 1910, Boutros Pasha was murdered by an Egyptian Muhammadan for no personal provocation but for the political reason that he had presided over the court that sentenced the Denshawai villagers, and the guilt of the murderer was conclusively proved by evidence, the Chief Qazi of Egypt pronounced the judgment that according to Islam it is no crime for a Muslim to slay an unbeliever.

A religion whose followers are taught to regard robbery and murder as a religious duty, is incompatible with the progress of mankind or with the peace of the world.

§5. *Influence of the Quranic political ideals on the Muslim population.*

Nor has it been conducive to the true interests of its followers. Muslim polity formed "the faithful" into a body with no other profession than war. As long as there were any fresh lands to conquer and any rich *kafirs* to plunder, all went well with the State.* The dominant body prospered and multiplied rapidly; even arts and industries, literature and painting of a certain type were fostered. But when the tide of Muslim expansion reached its farthest limit and broke in vain on the hills of Assam and Chatgaon, or the arid rocks of Maharashtra, there was nothing to avert a rapid downfall. The State had no economic basis, and was not able to stand a time of peace. Repose was fatal not only to its growth but to its very life.

This is the opinion held by the highest exponent of Islamic law in a modern civilized country.

* "The Arabs lived on the fat of the conquered provinces, and subject peoples served them. Of booty taken in war four-fifths were distributed to the army on the field. And there arose, also, new sources of revenue in the land assessment and poll-tax of conquered countries, the surplus of which, after defraying civil and military charges, became equally with spoils of war patrimony of the Arab nation." (Muir's *Caliphate*, 158.) Elliot, i. 461.

For, the cruel kindness of the Government had unfitted the dominant people for avocations of peace and the silent but deadly struggle for existence. Like the Romans of the empire and the Spaniards of the 16th and 17th centuries, the Turks are an essentially military and non-economic people. War is the only trade they have a natural aptitude for, and peace means to them "unemployment," vice and downfall.

The settled principle of Islam ended by making the Muslims a privileged class, nourished on State bounties, naturally prone to indolence in peace times and unable to stand on their own legs in the arena of life. Brave and active as the hungry first conquerors were, their sons merely lived on the paternal fiefs without feeling any incentive to exertion, and soon began to look on military service as a hateful tax payable for their lands.* Public office came to be regarded as the birthright of the faithful, and so every inducement to display superior ability or exertion was taken away from them. The enormous

* "The old *Shamsi* military grantees of land were unfit for service, and never went out [on campaign] Thirty or forty years had passed ...Some of these holders of service lands went leisurely to perform their military duties, but the greater part stayed at home making excuses" When orders were issued by Balban for the enforcement of military service and the resumption of the lands of the infirm, widows and orphans, "a loud outcry arose in every quarter" and the Sultan withdrew his order! (Elliot, iii. 107-108.)

areas of land given away by the kings as religious and service grants, nourished thousands of Muslim families in a life of slothful ease, while the natural increase of every succeeding generation turned their competence into deepening squalor. The vast sums* spent by the State in maintaining pauper houses and in scattering alms during Ramzan and other holy days and joyous ceremonies, were a direct premium on laziness. It was more lucrative and comfortable to be a *faqir* at the capital than to earn an honest living as a cultivator, subject to the caprices of the seasons and the worse caprices of the revenue underlings and officials on tour. Thus a lazy and pampered class was created in the empire, who sapped its strength and was the first to suffer when its prosperity was arrested. Wealth bred indolence and love of ease; these soon led to vice; and vice finally brought about poverty and ruin.

§6. *Moral and economic decay of the rulers and of the subject population under Islam.*

At the same time that the ruling class was placed on an unsound non-economic basis, the treatment of the subject people prevented the full

* In June 1663, Aurangzib ordered that Rs 1.49,000 should be spent annually in alms to beggars. This was in addition to what he gave away on his two birthdays, lunar and solar, every year and on other special occasions. A.N. 830-831.

development of the resources of the State by them. When a class of men is publicly depressed and harassed by law and executive caprice alike, it merely contents itself with dragging on an animal existence. With every generous instinct of the soul crushed out of them, with intellectual culture merely adding a keen edge to their sense of humiliation, the Hindus could not be expected to produce the utmost of which they were capable; their lot was to be hewers of wood and drawers of water to their masters, to bring grist to the fiscal mill, to develop a low cunning and flattery as the only means of saving what they could out of the fruits of their own labour. Amidst such social conditions, the human hand and the human mind cannot achieve their best; the human soul cannot soar to its highest pitch. The barrenness of the Hindu intellect and the meanness of spirit of the Hindu upper classes are the greatest condemnation of Muhammadan rule in India. The Islamic political tree, judged by its fruit, was an utter failure.

As a widely travelled and profound modern philosopher writes, "Islam is a religion of absolute surrender and submissiveness to God—but to a God of a certain character—a War-Lord who is entitled to do with us as he will and who bids us stand ever in line of battle against the foe...The ritual of this belief embodies the idea of discipline. When the

true believers every day at fixed hours perform their prayers in serried ranks in the mosque, all going through the same gestures at the same moment, this is not, as in Hinduism, done as a method of self-realization, but in the spirit in which the Prussian soldier defiled before his Kaiser. This military basis of Islam explains all the essential virtues of the Musalman. It also explains his fundamental defects—his unprogressiveness, his incapacity to adapt himself, his lack of initiative and invention. The soldier has simply to obey orders. All the rest is the affair of Allah.” (H. Keyserling’s *Travel Diary of a Philosopher*).

§7. *Formation of a nation impossible
in a theocracy.*

When public offices are distributed in consideration of race or creed and not of merit, when birth and not efficiency is the qualification demanded in those who are to serve the State, public posts rightly come to be regarded as the spoils of war ; the official system becomes a hereditary form of military pension and not a machinery for doing certain necessary services to the community at a minimum cost and maximum efficiency. The non-Muslim populations are, therefore, driven to conclude that they have no lot or part in such a State ; it is alien to them, and its fall would mean no injury to

the community but only a personal loss to a body of self-seekers. The Islamic theocracy when set up over a composite population has the worst vices of oligarchy and of alien rule combined.

In Mughal India it was, in addition, the domination of a small minority. And this minority differed from the politically depressed majority not in race or culture, but in creed only. Centuries of inter-marriage had left no Muhammadan in India—not even of the blood royal—who could claim absolute purity of foreign descent; they were all Hindustan-born, Hindu blood flowed in their veins, they had the same language, manners and dress as their Hindu subjects. The minority, therefore, could not justify its monopoly of power and office, its political privileges and social hauteur, by any pretended superiority of racial qualities, physical or mental. Religion was the only line dividing the two classes. Thus the subjects' attitude to the State was naturally vitiated by the odium which theological differences excite all the world over. It was rightly felt by all persons outside the fold of the dominant creed that the power and resources of the community, entrusted to the Government for the public good, were being misused by being applied to the propaganda of a Church which aimed at their extinction. Such a State had no right to be called national; it did not rest on the love and devotion of the people.

§8. *Toleration under Islam exceptional and contrary to Quranic law.*

Such was the ideal of the State as conceived by orthodox Islam, and such were its results when carried out to the full extent of its theory. It was the accepted political end, not of the ignorant peasantry or rude soldiery, but of kings and ministers, scholars and saints. No doubt, common sense often triumphed over logic and statesmanship over theology; or the weakness of human nature made it impossible for every king and every officer to enforce the intolerant system everywhere or in its entirety. Thus it happened that under Muslim rule there were periods when the Hindus enjoyed toleration and security of property, or when an enlightened and liberal king encouraged them to make progress in literature and art, wealth and public service, and his State grew in strength and material resources.

But such indulgence of infidelity was by its very nature precarious and exceptional. The Muslim world regarded it as a deplorable falling off from the orthodox ideal, and a wicked neglect of royal duty. The liberal king would be publicly reprimanded by some pious scholar for having bartered his soul away for gold; he would be called upon to return to the pure and unadulterated law of Islam. Quotations from the Holy Book would support the demand of the bigot and would find a

ready response in the hearts of the Muslim soldiery on whose sword depends the king's power,—for, in Islamic theory, he does not occupy the throne by hereditary succession or divine right; he is merely the elected captain of the militant body of Islam (*amir-ul-muminin*), the responsible first servant of the community (*jamait*). For the stability of his own position he must throw political wisdom to the winds, and “chastise the infidels” according to the letter of the Law.

Therefore, the growth and progress of non-Muslims, even their continued existence, is incompatible with the basic principles of a Muslim State. The political community is in a condition of unstable equilibrium, till either the dissenters are wiped out or the sceptre passes out of Muslim hands. The literal interpretation of the Quranic Law sets up a chronic antagonism between the rulers and the ruled, which has, in the end, broken up every Islamic State with a composite population. And the reign of Aurangzib was to illustrate this truth in a form clear to the meanest intellect.

§9. *Aurangzib's early bigotry.*

Aurangzib began his attack on Hinduism* in

* All the authorities on Aurangzib's temple demolition are collected together in Appendix V, and no separate reference to them will be given by means of footnotes.

an insidious way. In the first year of his reign, in a charter granted to a priest of Benares, he avowed that his religion *forbade* him to allow *the building of new temples*, but did not enjoin the destruction of old ones. During his viceroyalty of Gujrat, 1644, he had desecrated the recently built Hindu temple of Chintaman in Ahmadabad by killing a cow in it and then turned the building into a mosque. He had at that time also demolished many other HINDU TEMPLES in the province; these were probably new constructions. An order issued early in his reign has been preserved in which the local officers in every town and village of Orissa from Katak to Medinipur are called upon to pull down all temples, including even clay huts, built during the last 10 or 12 years, and to allow *no old temple to be repaired*.

§10. *His destruction of Hindu temples.*

Next, he took a step further, and in the 12th year of his reign (9th April, 1669) he issued a general order "to demolish all the schools and temples of the infidels and to put down their religious teaching and practices." His destroying hand now fell on the great shrines that commanded the veneration of the Hindus all over India,—such as the second temple of Somnath* built by the pious

* The Somnath temple, formerly of wood, was built of stone by Bhimadeva, and fully restored by Kumarapala (r. 1143-74) It was

zeal of Bhimadeva soon after the destruction of the older and more famous one at the hands of Mahmud of Ghazni, the Vishwanath temple of Benares, and the Keshav Rai temple of Mathura, that "wonder of the age" on which a Bundela Rajah had lavished 33 lakhs of Rupees. And the governors of the provinces had no peace till they could certify to the Emperor that the order of demolition had been carried out in their respective provinces.

The holy city of Mathura has always been the special victim of Muslim bigotry. It was the birth-place of Krishna, the most popular of the "false gods" of India,—a deity for whom millions of "infidels" felt a personal love. The city stood on the king's highway between Agra and Delhi, and its lofty spires, almost visible from the Agra palace,*—seemed to taunt the Mughal emperors with lukewarmness in "exalting Islam and casting infidelity down." Aurangzib's baleful eye had been directed to the Hindu Bethlehem very early. He had appointed a "religious man," Abdun Nabi, as *faujdar* of Mathura to repress the Hindus.

often sacked by the Muhammadans, particularly in 1297 and 1394, — the last attack being very destructive. (*Bombay Gazetteer*, vol. 1 pt. 1 169, 189-190, 205, 223.)

* "Among others was destroyed the great temple of Mathura, which was of such a height that its gilded pinnacle could be seen from Agra" (*Storia*, ii. 154.) For iconoclasm at Mathura under Sikandar Lodi, Elliot, iv. 447.

On 14th October, 1666, learning that there was a stone railing in the temple of Keshav Rai, which Dara Shukoh had presented to it, Aurangzib ordered it to be removed, as a scandalous example of a Muslim's coquetry with idolatry. And finally in January 1670, his zeal, stimulated by the pious meditations of Ramzan, led him to send forth commands to destroy this temple altogether and to change the name of the city to *Islamabad*. Ujjain suffered a similar fate at the same time. A systematic plan was followed for carrying out the policy of iconoclasm. Officers were appointed in all the sub-divisions and cities of the empire as Censors of Morals (*muhtasib*), to enforce the regulations of Islam, such as the suppression of the use of wine and *bhang*, and of gambling. The destruction of Hindu places of worship was one of their chief duties, and so large was the number of officers employed in the task that a "Director General" (*darogha*) had to be placed over them to guide their activity.

How strictly the imperial orders were enforced we can see from the fact that even in remote East Bengal and Orissa, on the extreme frontier of the empire, the local officers sent their men round to pull down all the temples and smash all the images within their jurisdictions. In June 1680, the temples of Amber, the capital of the loyal State of Jaipur, were broken down.

Neither age nor experience of life softened Aurangzib's bigotry. When an old man of over eighty, we find him inquiring whether the Hindu worship, which he had put down at Somnath early in his reign, had been revived through the slackness of the local governor, and, again, telling one of his generals to take his own time in destroying a certain famous temple in the Deccan, as "it had no legs to walk away on." In 1674 he confiscated all the lands held by Hindus as religious grants (*wazifa*) in Gujrat. [*Mirat*, 305.]

§11. *Jaziya or poll-tax on non-Muslims.*

For permission to live in an Islamic State the unbeliever had to pay a tax called JAZIYA,* which means *substitute money*, i.e., the price of indulgence. It was first imposed by Muhammad, who bade his followers "fight those who do not profess the true faith, till they pay *jaziya* with the hand in humility." (*Quran*, ix. 29.) The last two words of this command have been taken by the Muslim commentators to mean that the tax should be levied in a manner

* For the *jaziya*, Hughes, 248; *Encyclopædia of Islam*, i. 1051-1052; Elliot, i. 476; Barani's *Tarikh-i-Firuz Shahi*, 290. For the rate and manner of levying, Br. Mus. MS. Or 1641, 65b-66b; *Mirat-i-Ahmadi*, 313-314 (followed by me); Ishwardas, 74; *Storia*, ii. 234. For its imposition by Aurangzib, *M.A.* 174, Khafi Khan, ii. 255, 278-279, 377-378. In the 37th year of his reign (1693) a *sanad* was issued exempting the Christians [of Agra] and their priests from the capitation tax. (*J.A.S.B.* 1912, p. 328.)

humiliating to the taxpayers. As the scholars and divines of the time informed Aurangzib, the books on Muslim Canon Law lay down that the proper method of collecting the *jaziya* is for the *zimmi* to pay the tax personally; if he sends the money by the hand of an agent it is to be refused; the taxed person must come on foot and make the payment standing, while the receiver should be seated and after placing his hand above that of the *zimmi* should take the money and cry out, "O, *zimmi*! pay the commutation money."

Women, children below fourteen, and slaves were exempted from the tax; blind men, cripples and lunatics paid only when they were wealthy; monks were untaxed if they were poor, but if they belonged to rich monasteries the heads of these religious houses had to pay. The impost was not proportioned to a man's actual income, but the assesses were roughly divided into three classes according as their property was estimated at not more than 200 *dirhams* ("the poor"), between 200 and ten thousand *dirhams* ("the middle class"), and above ten thousand ("the rich"). Money-changers, cloth-dealers, landowners, merchants, and physicians were placed in the highest class while artisans,—such as tailors, dyers, cobblers, and shoemakers were counted as "poor". This last class paid only when their professional income left a

margin above the cost of maintaining themselves and their families. Beggars and paupers naturally escaped the tax.

§12. *Rates of jaziya.*

The rates of taxation were fixed at 12, 24 and 48 *dirhams* a year for the three classes respectively,—or Rs. $3\frac{1}{3}$, Rs. $6\frac{2}{3}$ and Rs. $13\frac{1}{3}$. On the poor, therefore, the incidence of the tax was at least 6 per cent of the gross income; on the middle class it ranged from 6 to $\frac{1}{4}$ p. c., and on the rich it was always lighter even than $2\frac{1}{2}$ per thousand. In violation of modern canons of taxation, the *jaziya* hit the poorest portion of the population hardest. It could never be less than Rs. $3\frac{1}{3}$ on a man, which was the money-value of nine maunds of wheat flour at the average market price of the end of the 16th century. (*Ain*, i. 63.) The State, therefore, at the lowest incidence of the tax, annually took away from the poor man the full value of one year's food as the price of religious indulgence. Secondly, all Government officials were exempted from the tax, though they were the wealthiest members of their respective classes in society.

Under the early Muslim rulers of India, the *jaziya* had been levied on all Hindus except the Brahmans,—who had been spared by the politic and conciliatory system introduced into Sindh by

Muhammad bin Qasim. Firuz Shah in his old age withdrew the privilege and the Brahmans were taxed like other unbelievers.* The wise statesmanship of Akbar abolished the tax and removed an invidious badge of degradation from the majority of his subjects (1564). A century afterwards Aurangzib reversed this policy.

§13. *Strict levy of jaziya; Hindu protest crushed.*

By imperial orders the *jaziya* was reimposed on the "unbelievers" in all parts of the empire from 2nd April, 1679, in order, as the Court historian records, to "spread Islam and put down the practice of infidelity." When the news spread, the Hindus of Delhi and its environs gathered together in hundreds and stood on the bank of the Jamuna below the balcony of morning salute in the palace-wall, and piteously cried for the withdrawal of the impost. But the Emperor turned a deaf ear to their plaintive wail. When next Friday he wanted to ride to the Jama Mosque to attend the public prayer, the whole road from the gate of the Fort to the mosque was blocked by a crowd of Hindu suppliants, whose number was swollen by all the shopkeepers and craftsmen of Delhi city and the cantonment bazar, out for a demonstration. The crowd did not disperse in spite

* Elliot, i 476. Afif's *Tarikh-i-Firuz Shahi*, 382. Akbar abolished it in March 1564 (*Akbarnamah*, tr ii 316) and not in 1579 as Al Badayuni wrongly states (text, ii 276.)

of warning; and the Emperor after waiting vainly for an hour ordered elephants to be driven through the mass of men, trampling them down and clearing a way for him. The Hindu protest continued for some days, but in the end the Emperor's firmness triumphed and the subject people ceased to protest. A temperate and reasoned letter from Shivaji urging the impolicy of the new impost and appealing to Aurangzib to think of the common Father of mankind and the equality of all sincere beliefs in God's eyes, met with no better success. (*Vide* Appendix VI.)

In levying the *jaziya*, Aurangzib was deaf to the pleadings of pity and political expediency alike. In Mughal Deccan, particularly in Burhanpur, the tax could be realized only by force. But Aurangzib was inexorable and ordered the Prefect of the City police to chastise every defaulter. This had the desired effect, and a strict collector like Mir Abdul Karim increased the yield of the tax from Rs. 26,000 a year for the whole city to more than four times the amount in three months for half the city only (1682). When a minister wished to oust his rival from favour, he had only to complain that the latter had excused some Hindus from paying the poll-tax;* and the Emperor would plainly tell the lenient revenue

* Khafi Khan, ii. 278-279, 377-378.

minister, "You are free to grant remissions of revenue of all other kinds; but if you remit any man's *jaziya*—which I have succeeded with great difficulty in laying on the infidels, it will be an impious change (*bidat*) and will cause the whole system of collecting the poll-tax to fall into disorder."

Again, when the enforced levy of this tax scared Hindu traders away from the Mughal territory in the Deccan and caused scarcity of grain in the camp of the imperial army, Aurangzib vetoed his general's proposal to suspend the *jaziya* in that locality. His soldiers might starve, but should he jeopardize his soul by violating the Quranic precept to take *jaziya* from the infidels?*

An army of Muslim collectors and *amins*,—usually men of reputed scholarship and orthodoxy,—spread over the country to assess and realize the tax. So large was their number, that in 1687 an Inspector-General of *jaziya* was appointed to tour through the four provinces of the Deccan and see that these men did their work properly. (*M.A.* 297.)

* *Anecdotes of Aurangzib*, §72 The authorities quoted in this and the previous paragraph seem to contradict Ishwardas, who says (111b) that the Emperor excused the *jaziya*, *sair* and other cesses at Haidarabad for one year after its conquest, because the governor had reported that the inhabitants could not pay the tax on account of their poverty, and that if the tax were levied the place would be depopulated. The relief, if given, was temporary and intended to make the place recover from the ravages of war and famine.

§14. *Effect of jaziya.*

The tax yielded a very large sum. In the province of Gujrat, for instance, it was 5 lakhs of Rupees a year, which amounted to $3\frac{1}{2}$ p. c. of its total gross revenue.* Now, if we make allowance for the facts that Gujrat had a large Muhammadan population which contributed to the general revenue but not to the *jaziya* and that the custom duties of the busy ports of Surat, Broach and Cambay greatly swelled the total revenue collected in the province, we shall not be far wrong in holding that the *jaziya* meant for the Hindus an addition of fully one-third to every subject's *direct* contribution to the State. To be a Muslim was to be free from this extra taxation.

The officially avowed policy in reimposing the *jaziya* was to increase the number of Muslims by putting pressure on the Hindus.† As the

* *Mirat-i-Ahmadi*, 314. The revenue of the province of Gujrat about 1695 was 145 lakhs of Rupees (*India of Aurangzib*, xxxii.)

† As the official history written from State papers at the instance of his favourite secretary puts it, "All the aims of the religious Emperor being directed to the spread of the law of Islam and the overthrow of infidel practices, he issued orders that from 1st Rabi ul awwal (=2 April 1679), *jaziya* should be levied from the *zimmis* in accordance with the Quranic injunction till they pay compensation out of their hands in humility." (*M.A.* 174) The *Mirat-i-Ahmadi*, 313, another history based upon official papers, ascribes the same motive to the Emperor. The theory of some modern writers that the *jaziya* was only commutation money paid for exemption from military

contemporary observer Manucci noticed, "Many Hindus who were unable to pay turned Muhammadan, to obtain relief from the insults of the collectors.....Aurangzib rejoices that by such exactions these Hindus will be forced into embracing the Muhammadan faith." (*Storia*, ii. 234, iv. 117.)

§15. *Discriminating custom duties in favour of Muhammadans.*

By an ordinance issued on 10th April, 1665, the CUSTOM DUTY on all commodities brought in for sale was fixed at $2\frac{1}{2}$ p. c. of the *value* in the case of Muslims and 5 p. c. in that of Hindu vendors. This was called the *mahsul* or duty, and must not be confounded with the *zakat* or tithes which all Muslims had to pay on the annual *increase* of their wealth, and the proceeds of which could by the Quranic law be spent on Muhammadans alone.

On 9th May, 1667, the Emperor abolished the custom duty altogether in the case of Muslim traders, while that on the Hindus was retained at the old level. Apart from the political immorality of favouring one creed above all others, the direct sacrifice of public revenue was very great, and the

service is not borne out by history, for it was as late as 10th May, 1855 that "the *jaziya* as a tax on the free exercise of religion was replaced by a tax for exemption from military service" even in European Turkey. (*Encyclo. Islam*, i. 1052.)

real loss to the State was likely to be still greater as the Hindu traders had now a strong temptation to pass their goods off as the property of Muslims, in collusion with the latter. The danger was not unknown to Aurangzib, as this very ordinance warns the local officers to guard against such fraud. And yet, in defiance of the laws of economics and the teaching of sound statesmanship, he put his tariff on the basis of religious discrimination alone.*

A third instrument of the policy of putting economic pressure on unbelievers, was the granting of rewards to converts and the offering of posts in the public service on condition of turning Muslim.† The revenue drawn from the entire population was spent in aiding the mission propaganda of the dominant minority. Infidels were bribed into accepting the royal faith by the offer of money allowances, robes of honour, posts, liberation from prison, or succession to disputed property.

* With regard to the custom duty I have followed *Mirat-i-Ahmadi*, 272 and 280. But Khafi Khan, ii. 229-230, puts it in the inverse order. *M.A.* 530. *Storia*, ii. 61. For the *zakat* or tithe, Hamilton's *Hedaya*, 2nd ed. (1870), xli. 1; Hughes, 699-700. Aurangzib's regulations on the *zakat* are given in *Mirat*, 312, 315, 317, 336.

† For rewards to Hindus on conversion to Islam, Elliot, iii. 604; *M.A.*, 528; *Akhbarat*, 28. $\frac{1}{8}$, $\frac{1}{16}$, $\frac{1}{32}$, $\frac{1}{64}$. List of converts, *M.A.* 94, 220, 270, 273, 396; *K.K.* ii. 461; *M.U.* ii. 281; Inayatullah's *Ahkam*, 197b; *Mirat*, 314, Tod, i. 413. Posts and zamindaris given to converts, *Akhbarat*, $\frac{1}{8}$, $\frac{1}{16}$, $\frac{1}{32}$, $\frac{1}{64}$, $\frac{1}{128}$, $\frac{1}{256}$. *Storia*, iv. 439.

§16. *Hindus excluded from public offices.*

From time immemorial, service in the revenue department had brought daily bread to middle class Hindus able to read and write. Under Aurangzib, "qanungo-ship on condition of turning Muslim" became a proverbial expression; and several families in the Panjab still preserve his letters patent in which this condition of office is unblushingly laid down. Several other instances of it are also recorded in the extant news-letters of his Court.

In 1671 an ordinance was issued that the rent-collectors of the Crownlands must be Muslims, and all viceroys and *taluqdars* were ordered to dismiss their Hindu head clerks (*peshkars*) and accountants (*diwanian*) and replace them by Muslims. As the official historian of the reign exultantly points out, "By one stroke of the pen he dismissed all the Hindu writers from his service." (*M.A.* 528.) It was found impossible to run the administration after dismissing the Hindu *peshkars* of the provincial governors, but in some places Muslims replaced Hindu *kroris* (district rent-collectors). Later on, the Emperor yielded so far to necessity as to allow half the *peshkars* of the revenue minister and paymaster's departments to be Hindus and the other half Muhammadans.*

* K. K. ii. 249, 252. Khafi Khan gives the date as 1082 A. H., which if meant for the 14th year of the reign would correspond to

There were other temptations as well for seducing Hindus from their own faith. Some of the converts were, by the Emperor's orders, placed on elephants and carried in procession through the city to the accompaniment of a band and flags. Others got daily stipends, four annas at the lowest. Most of the new Muslims, however, were only granted food money for the month following their conversion and circumcision, and then dismissed with robes of honour. There was a general rule to this effect in the provinces.*

In March 1695 all Hindus, with the exception of the Rajputs, were forbidden to ride *palkis*, elephants or thorough-bred horses, or to carry arms. (K. K. ii. 395; M. A. 370.)

§17. *Hindu fairs put down.*

On certain days of the calendar, the Hindus all over India hold fairs near their holy places. Men, women and children in vast numbers gather together,

1671 A D But M A 98, while silently passing over the other pro Islamic ordinances, places one of them (that prohibiting Muslims to salute by raising the hand to the head) in the 13th year (1670) though Khafi Khan ascribes all of them to the 14th year *Storia*, ii 154 (Hindu officers replaced by Muslims), iii 171 One of Aurangzib's letters (*Kalimat-i-Tayyibat*, 77b) states, "A Hindu cannot be appointed, probably a Muslim has been chosen instead of him [by you.]" Again, to his son Muhammad Azam he writes, "Why do you recommend a Hindu to be appointed *vice* a Muslim, knowing it to be opposed to my wishes?" (*Ruqat*, No. 33)

* M.A. 274, *Akhbarat*, year 10, sheet 9; *Mirat*, 314.

nominally to bathe in the sacred water, worship the idol, or follow the religious procession, but mainly to buy things in the booths set up and the packs opened by the traders. To our village women in particular such fairs are the only means of relieving the monotony of their life of toil and the only occasion for an outing in the whole year. Here they meet their distant friends and kinsfolk, and enjoy the show. The Indian Muslims, no less than the Hindus, flock to such gatherings. They offer a combination of amusement, business and piety, probably in a gradually decreasing proportion. The traders do a roaring business. The Mughal Government on such occasions earned a large sum from market-toll in each of the provinces.

A very grand fair of this kind used to be held at a tank in the village of Malwa up to the 14th century; but Firuz Shah Tughlaq put it down with bloodshed. Aurangzib revived the same policy and in 1668 forbade such fairs throughout his dominions. (Elliot, iii. 380. K. K. ii. 212.) The coincidence was ominous: the Tughlaq empire perished only one generation after Firuz.

The Hindu festival of lamps (*diwali*) and spring carnival (*holi*) were ordered to be held only outside bazars and under some restraints.*

* Aurangzib contemptuously refers to *holi* in K. T. 7a. The

APPENDIX V

TEMPLE DESTRUCTION BY AURANGZIB

Before accession.

"The temple of Chintaman, situated close to Sarashpur, and built by Sitadas jeweller, was converted into a mosque named *Quwat-ul-islam* by order of the Prince Aurangzib, in 1645." (*Mirat-i-Ahmadi*, 232.) The *Bombay Gazetteer*, vol. 1. pt. 1. p. 280, adds that he slaughtered a cow in the temple, but Shah Jahan ordered the building to be restored to the Hindus.

"In Ahmadabad and other *parganas* of Gujrat in the days before my accession [many] temples were destroyed by my order. They have been repaired and idol worship has been resumed. Carry out the former order." *Farman* dated 20 Nov., 1665. (*Mirat*, 275.)

"The village of Satara near Aurangabad was my hunting-ground. Here on the top of a hill stood a temple with an image of Khande Rai. By God's grace I demolished it, and forbade the temple dancers (*murlis*) to ply their shameful trade."—Aurangzib to Bidar Bakht in *Kalimat-i-Tayyibat*, 7b.

holi and Muharram celebrations were not really stopped, as is asserted by *Storia*, ii. 154 and K.K. ii. 214. Aurangzib's order to the subahdar of Gujrat, 20 Nov. 1665, is clear:—"In the city and *parganas* of Ahmadabad (*i.e.*, Gujrat), the Hindus following their superstitious customs light lamps in the night of *diwali*, and during the days of *holi* open their mouths in obscene speech and kindle the *holi* bonfire in *chaklas* and bazars, throwing into the fire the faggot of all people that they can seize by force or theft. It is ordered that in bazars there should be no illumination at *diwali*, nobody's faggot should be taken by force or theft and flung into the *holi* bonfire, and no obscene language used." (*Mirat*, 276.) It was really a police regulation as regards *holi*, and an act of bigotry only in connection with *diwali*.

After accession.

"It has been decided according to our Canon Law that long standing temples should not be demolished, but no new temple allowed to be built.....Information has reached our...Court that certain persons have harassed the Hindus resident in Benares and its environs and certain Brahmans who have the right of holding charge of the ancient temples there, and that they further desire to remove these Brahmans from their ancient office. Therefore, our royal command is that you should direct that in future no person shall in unlawful ways interfere with or disturb the Brahmans and other Hindus resident in those places."—Aurangzib's "Benares *farman*" addressed to Abul Hasan, dated 28th Feb., 1659, granted through the mediation of Prince Muhammad Sultan. *J.A.S.B.* 1911, p. 689, with many mistakes, notably about the date, which I have corrected from a photograph of the *farman*.

"The temple of Somnath was demolished early in my reign and idol worship (there) put down. It is not known what the state of things there is at present. If the idolators have again taken to the worship of images at the place, then destroy the temple in such a way that no trace of the building may be left, and also expel them (the worshippers) from the place."—Letter of Aurangzib in the last decade of his reign. Inayetullah's *Ahkām*, 10a : *Mirat* 372.

19 Dec., 1661. Mir Jumla entered the city of Kuch Bihar, which had been evacuated by its king and people, and "appointed Sayyid Md. Sadiq to be chief judge, with directions to destroy all the Hindu temples and to erect mosques in their stead. The general himself with a battle-axe broke the image of Narayan."—Stewart's *Bengal*.

"The Emperor learning that in the temple of Keshav Rai at Mathura there was a stone railing presented by

Dara Shukoh, remarked, 'In the Muslim faith it is a sin even to look at a temple, and this Dara had restored a railing in a temple! This fact is not creditable to the Muhammadans. Remove the railing.' By his order Abdun Nabi Khan (the *faujdar* of Mathura) removed it."—*Akhbarat*, 9th year, sheet 7, (14 Oct., 1666).

20th Nov. 1665. "As it has come to His Majesty's knowledge that some inhabitants of the *mahals* appertaining to the province of Gujrat have [again] built the temples which had been demolished by imperial order before his accession, therefore His Majesty orders that the formerly demolished and recently restored temples should be pulled down."—*Farman* given in *Mirat*, 273.

9th April, 1669. "The Emperor ordered the governors of all the provinces to demolish the schools and temples of the infidels and strongly put down their teaching and religious practices."—*Masir-i-Alamgiri*, 81. (De Graaf, when at Hughli in 1670, heard of the order. Orme's *Frag.*, 250.)

May, 1669. "Salih Bahadur, mace-bearer, was sent to pull down the temple of Malarna."—*M.A.* 84.

2nd Sep. "News came to Court that according to the Emperor's command, his officers had demolished the temple of Vishwanath at Benares."—*Ibid.*, 88.

[This was "the temple of Kirtti Visvesvara, at that time a modern shrine of Akbar's period."—Crooke's *N.W.P.*, 112.]

January, 1670. "In this month of Ramzan, the religious-minded Emperor ordered the demolition of the temple at Mathura known as the *Dehra* of Keshav Rai. His officers accomplished it in a short time. A grand mosque was built on its site at a vast expenditure. The temple had been built by Bir Singh Dev Bundela, at a cost of 33 lakhs of Rupees. Praised be the God of the great

faith of Islam that in the auspicious reign of this destroyer of infidelity and turbulence, such a marvellous and [seemingly] impossible feat was accomplished. On seeing this [instance of the] strength of the Emperor's faith and the grandeur of his devotion to God, the Rājahs felt suffocated and they stood in amazement like statues facing the walls. The idols, large and small, set with costly jewels, which had been set up in the temple, were brought to Agra and buried under the steps of the mosque of Jahanara, to be trodden upon continually."—*Ibid.*, 95-96.

"He partially destroyed the Sitaramji temple at Soron ; one of his officers slew the priests, broke the image, and defiled the sanctuary at Devi Patan in Gonda."—Crooke's *N.W.P.*, 112.

7th April, 1670. "News came from Malwa that Wazir Khan had sent Gada Beg, a slave, with 400 troopers, to destroy all temples around Ujjain.....A Rawat of the place resisted and slew Gada Beg with 121 of his men."—*Ākhbarat*, 13th year, sheet 17.

"Order issued on all *faujdar*s of *thanas*, civil officers (*mutasaddis*), agents of jagirdars, *kroris*, and *amlas*, from Katak to Medinipur on the frontier of Orissa :—The imperial paymaster Asad Khan has sent a letter written by order of the Emperor, to say, that the Emperor learning from the news-letters of the province of Orissa that at the village of Tilkuti in Medinipur a temple has been [newly] built, has issued his august mandate for its destruction, and the destruction of all temples built anywhere in this province by the worthless infidels. Therefore, you are commanded with extreme urgency that immediately on the receipt of this letter you should destroy the above-mentioned temples. Every idol-house built during the last 10 or 12 years, whether with brick or clay, should be demolished without delay. Also, do not allow the crushed

Hindus and despicable infidels to repair their old temples. Reports of the destruction of temples should be sent to the Court under the seal of the *qazis* and attested by pious Shaikhs."—*Muraqat-i-Abul Hasan*, (completed in 1670 A.D.) p. 202.

"In every *pargana* officers have come from the *thanas* with orders from the Presence for the destruction of idols."—A letter preserved in the Yasho-Madhav temple of Dhamrai in the Dacca district, dated 27 June, 1672, and printed in J. M. Ray's *Bengali History of Dacca*, i. 389.

"Darab Khan was sent with a strong force to punish the Rajputs of Khandela and demolish the great temple of that place." (*M.A.* 171.) "He attacked the place on 8th March, 1679, and pulled down the temples of Khandela and Sanula and all other temples in the neighbourhood." (*M.A.* 173.)

25 May 1679. "Khan i-Jahan Bahadur returned from Jodhpur after demolishing its temples, and bringing with himself several cart-loads of idols. The Emperor ordered that the idols,—which were mostly of gold silver brass copper or stone and adorned with jewels,—should be cast in the quadrangle of the Court and under the steps of the Jama Mosque for being trodden upon."—*M.A.* 175.

Jan. 1680. "The grand temple in front of the Maharana's mansion [at Udaipur]—one of the wonderful buildings of the age, which had cost the infidels much money—was destroyed and its images broken." (*M.A.* 186.) "On 24 Jan. the Emperor went to view the lake Udaisagar and ordered all the three temples on its banks to be pulled down" (p. 188.) "On 29 Jan. Hasan Ali Khan reported that 172 other temples in the environs of Udaipur had been demolished" (p. 189.) "On 22nd Feb. the Emperor went to look at Chitor, and by his order the 63 temples of the place were destroyed" (p. 189.)

10 Aug. 1680. Abu Turab returned to Court and reported that he had pulled down 66 temples in Amber" (p. 194). 2 Aug. 1680. Temple of Someshwar in western Mewar ordered to be destroyed.—*Adab*, 287a and 290a.

Sep. 1687. On the capture of Golkonda, the Emperor appointed Abdur Rahim Khan as Censor of the city of Haidarabad with orders to put down infidel practices and [heretical] innovations and destroy the temples and build mosques on their sites.—Khafi Khan, ii. 358-359.

Circa 1690. Instances of Aurangzib's temple destruction at Ellora, Trimbakeshwar, Narsinghpur (foiled by snakes, scorpions and other poisonous insects), Pandharpur, Jejuri (foiled by the deity!) and Yavat (Bhuleshwar) are given by K. N. Sane in *Varshik Itibritta* for Shaka 1838, pp. 133-135.

1693. The Emperor ordered the destruction of the Hateshwar temple at Vadnagar, the special guardian of the Nagar Brahmins.—*Mirat*, 346.

3rd April 1694. "The Emperor learnt from a secret news-writer of Delhi that in Jaisinghpura Bairagis used to worship idols, and that the Censor on hearing of it had gone there, arrested Sri Krishna Bairagi and taken him with 15 idols away to his house; then the Rajputs had assembled, flocked to the Censor's house, wounded three footmen of the Censor and tried to seize the Censor himself; so that the latter set the Bairagi free and sent the copper idols to the local subahdar."—*Akhbarat*, year 37, sheet 57.

Middle of 1698. "Hamid-ud-din Khan Bahadur who had been deputed to destroy the temple of Bijapur and build a mosque (there), returned to Court after carrying the order out and was praised by the Emperor."—*M.A.* 396.

"The demolition of a temple is possible at any time,

as it cannot walk away from its place."—Aurangzib to Zulfiqar Khan and Mughal Khan in *K. T.* 39a.

"The houses of this country [Maharashtra] are exceedingly strong and built solely of stone and iron. The hatchet-men of the Government in the course of my marching do not get sufficient strength and power (*i.e.*, time) to destroy and raze the temples of the infidels that meet the eye on the way. You should appoint an orthodox inspector (*darogha*) who may afterwards destroy them at leisure and dig up their foundations."—Aurangzib to Ruhullah Khan in *Kalimat-i-Aurangzib*, p. 34 of Rampur MS. and f. 35a of I. O. L. MS 3301.

1 Jan. 1705. "The Emperor, surmoning Muhammad Khalil and Khidmat Rai, the *darogha* of hatchet-men, ordered them to demolish the temple of Pandharpur, and to take the butchers of the camp there and slaughter cows in the temple ..It was done."—*Akhbarat*, 49-7.

APPENDIX VI

SHIVAJI'S REMONSTRANCE AGAINST THE IMPOSITION OF THE JAZIYA

To the Emperor Alamgir—

"This firm and constant well-wisher Shivaji, after rendering thanks for the grace of God and the favours of the Emperor,—which are clearer than the Sun,—begs to inform your Majesty that, although this well-wisher was led by his adverse Fate to come away from your august Presence without taking leave, yet he is ever ready to perform, to the fullest extent possible and proper, everything that duty as a servant and gratitude demand of him.

My excellent services and devotion to the welfare of the State are fully known to the princes, *Khans*, *amirs*,

Rajahs and *rais* of India, to the rulers of Persia, Central Asia, Turkey and Syria, to the inhabitants of the seven climes of the globe, and to wayfarers on land and sea ; and very likely their light has flashed on your Majesty's capacious mind. So, with a view to rendering good service and earning the imperial favour, I submit the following words in a spirit of devotion to the public welfare :—

It has recently come to my ears that, on the ground of the war with me having exhausted your wealth and emptied the imperial treasury, your Majesty has ordered that money under the name of *jaziya* should be collected from the Hindus and the imperial needs supplied with it. May it please your Majesty! That architect of the fabric of empire, [Jalal-ud-din] Akbar Padishah, reigned with full power for 52 [lunar] years. He adopted the admirable policy of universal harmony (*sulh-i-kul*) in relation to all the various sects, such as Christians, Jews, Muslims, Dadu's followers, sky-worshippers (*falakia*), *malakias*, materialists (*ansaria*), atheists (*daharia*). Brahman and Jain priests. The aim of his liberal heart was to cherish and protect all the people. So, he became famous under the title of 'the World's spiritual guide' (*Jagat Guru*).

Next, the Emperor Nur-ud-din Jahangir for 22 years spread his gracious shade on the head of the world and its dwellers, gave his heart to his friends and his hand to his work, and gained his desires. The Emperor Shah Jahan for 32 years cast his blessed shade on the head of the world and gathered the fruit of eternal life,—which is only another name for goodness and fair fame,—as the result of his happy time on earth. (*Verses*)

**He who lives with a good name gains
everlasting wealth,
Because after his death, the recital of his
good deeds keeps his name alive.**

Through the auspicious effect of this sublime disposition, wherever he [Akbar] bent the glance of his august wish, Victory and Success advanced to welcome him on the way. In his reign many kingdoms and forts were conquered. The state and power of these emperors can be easily understood from the fact that Alamgir Padishah has failed and become bewildered in the attempt to merely follow their political system. They, too, had the power of levying the *jaziya* ; but they did not give place to bigotry in their hearts, as they considered all men, high and low, created by God, to be [living] examples of the nature of diverse creeds and temperaments. Their kindness and benevolence endure on the pages of Time as their memorial, and so prayer and praise for these (three) pure souls will dwell for ever in the hearts and tongues of mankind, among both great and small. Prosperity is the fruit of one's intentions. Therefore, their wealth and good fortune continued to increase, as God's creatures reposed in the cradle of peace and safety [in their reigns] and their undertakings succeeded.

But in *your* Majesty's reign, many of the forts and provinces have gone out of your possession, and the rest will soon do so, too, because there will be no slackness on my part in ruining and devastating them. Your peasants are down-trodden ; the yield of every village has declined, in the place of one lakh (of Rupees) only one thousand, and in the place of a thousand only ten are collected, and that too with difficulty. When Poverty and Beggary have made their homes in the palaces of the Emperor and the princes, the condition of the grandees and officers can be easily imagined. It is a reign in which the army is in a ferment, the merchants complain ; the Muslims cry, the Hindus are grilled ; most men lack bread at night, and in the day-time inflame their own cheeks by

slapping them [in anguish]. How can the royal spirit permit you to add the hardship of the *jaziya* to this grievous state of things? The infamy will quickly spread from west to east and become recorded in books of history that the Emperor of Hindustan, coveting the beggars' bowls, takes *jaziya* from Brahmans and Jain monks, *yogis*, *sannyasis*, *bairags*, paupers, mendicants, ruined wretches, and the famine-stricken,—that his valour is shown by attacks on the wallets of beggars,—that he dashes down [to the ground] the name and honour of the Timurids!

May it please your Majesty ! If you believe in the true Divine Book and Word of God (i.e., the *Quran*), you will find there [that God is styled] *Rabb-ul-alam*, the Lord of all men, and not *Rabb-ul-musalmin*, the Lord of the Muhammadans only. Verily, Islam and Hinduism are terms of contrast. They are [diverse pigments] used by the true Divine Painter for blending the colours and filling in the outlines [of His picture of the entire human species]. If it be a mosque, the call to prayer is chanted in remembrance of Him. If it be a temple, the bell is rung in yearning for Him only. To show bigotry for any man's creed and practices is equivalent to altering the words of the Holy Book. To draw (new) lines on a picture is to find fault with the painter. (*Verses*)

Lay not thy hand in disapproval on anything
you see, be it good, be it bad,
To call the handiwork faulty is to find fault
with the craftsman.

In strict justice the *jaziya* is not at all lawful. From the political point of view it can be allowed only if a beautiful woman wearing gold ornaments can pass from one country to another without fear or molestation. [But] in these days even the cities are being plundered, what shall I say of the open country? Apart from its injustice,

this imposition of the *jaziya* is an innovation in India and inexpedient.

If you imagine piety to consist in oppressing the people and terrorizing the Hindus, you ought first to levy the *jaziya* from Rana Raj Singh, who is the head of the Hindus. Then it will not be so very difficult to collect it from me, as I am at your service. But to oppress ants and flies is far from displaying valour and spirit.

I wonder at the strange fidelity of your officers that they neglect to tell you of the true state of things, but cover a blazing fire with straw! May the sun of your royalty continue to shine above the horizon of greatness!"

[R. A. S. MS. 71 ascribes the authorship of this letter to Shivaji, A.S.B. MS. 56 to Shambhuji, Orme's *Fragments*, p. 252, to Jaswant Singh, and Tod, i. ch. 13, to Maharana Raj Singh. Now, Shambhuji and Jaswant are ruled out by the dates. The internal evidence and autobiographical details of the writer apply to Shivaji and not to Raj Singh. R.A.S. MS. adds that the letter was drafted by Nila Prabhu, the Persian Secretary (*Parasnis*) of Shivaji. In the penultimate paragraph of the letter. *Rajah Ram Singh* is given for *Rana Raj Singh* by A.S.B. MS. and Orme; but no Jaipur chieftain could have been "the head of the Hindus." I have critically discussed and annotated this letter in *Modern Review*, January, 1908, pp. 21-23].

CHAPTER XXXV

HINDU REACTION

§1. *Hindus of Mathura district oppressed.*

Such open attacks on Hinduism by all the forces of Government naturally produced great discontent among the persecuted sect. Some frantic attempts were made on the Emperor's life, but they were childish and ended in failure. The wandering Hindu saint Uddhav Bairagi was imprisoned in the police station "as a punishment for his seduction of men to falsehood." In June 1669, two of his Rajput disciples stabbed to death Qazi Abul Mukaram, by way of revenge. Aurangzib put to death not only the two murderers but also their innocent spiritual guide. (M.A. 84.)

Early in 1669 a most formidable popular rising took place in the Mathura district. The Indian peasant, especially in Agra, Mathura and Oudh, was a bad taxpayer in Muslim times, and the collection of revenue often required the use of force. Akbar's wise regulations for giving fixity to the State demand and protecting the ryots from illegal exactions had disappeared with him. Under his successors a revenue collector was, no doubt, removed from his post when his oppression became intolerable and the

public outcry against him repeatedly reached the Emperor's ears. But such cases were exceptional. In the Mathura district in particular, nothing was done by Government to win the love and willing obedience of the peasantry, but rather a policy was followed which left behind it a legacy of undying hatred.

For instance, we read how a local *faujdar* named Murshid Quli Khan Turkman (who died in 1638) took advantage of his campaigns against refractory tenants to gratify his lust. When the villagers were defeated he seized all their most beautiful women and placed them in his harem. Another practice of this licentious officer is thus described in the *Masir-ul-umara* (iii. 422):

"On the birthday of Krishna, a vast gathering of Hindu men and women takes place at Govardhan on the Jamuna opposite Mathura. The Khan, painting his forehead and wearing a *dhoti* like a Hindu, used to walk up and down in the crowd. Whenever he saw a woman whose beauty filled even the Moon with envy, he snatched her away like a wolf pouncing upon a flock, and placing her in the boat which his men had kept ready on the bank, he sped to Agra. The Hindu [for shame] never divulged what had happened to his daughter."

Abdun Nabi Khan, who was *faujdar* of Mathura from August 1660 to May 1669, was free from such

vices. But he gave the people equally strong provocation in another way. He had started life as an officer of Sadullah Khar, the famous *wazir*. His able and honest management of his master's private estates greatly improved their income and prosperity. It attracted Shah Jahan's attention. One day he smilingly asked his *wazir*, "How is it that you have a Philosopher's stone but do not present it to me?" Sadullah understood his meaning and replied, "Yes, your Majesty, Abdun Nabi is a man in outward form, but he has the property of creating gold." Passing on to the imperial service, Abdun Nabi occupied trusted though subordinate positions and rose to the rank of a Commander of Two Thousand before his death. He amassed property worth more than 30 lakhs of Rupees, besides building a grand mosque at his own expense.

Aurangzib chose him as faujdar of Mathura probably because he, being "a religious man" (as the Court history calls him), was expected to enter heartily into the Emperor's policy of "rooting out idolatry." Soon after joining this post Abdun Nabi built a Jama Masjid in the heart of the city of Mathura (1661-1662) on the ruins of a Hindu temple. Later, in 1666, he forcibly removed the carved stone railing presented by Dara Shukoh to Keshav Rai's temple. When in 1669 the Jat peasantry rose under the leadership of Gokla, the zamindar of Tilpat, Abdun

Nabi* marched out to attack them in the village of Bashara, but was shot dead during the encounter (about 10th May). Gokla, flushed with victory, looted the pargana of Sadabad, and the disorder spread to the Agra district.

§2. *Rising of Jat peasantry in Mathura.*

At this Aurangzib sent a strong force under Radandaz Khan to quell the rebellion, while high officers like Saf Shikan Khan and Hasan Ali Khan were successively appointed faujdars of Mathura. Throughout the year 1669 lawlessness reigned in the district. An attempt in September to make terms with Gokla by granting him a pardon on condition of the restitution of all his booty, failed. By the end of November the situation had become so serious that the Emperor had to march from Delhi to the affected area. On 4th December Hasan Ali Khan attacked the rebel villagers of Rewarah, Chandar-kaha, and Sarkhud. They fought till noon, when being unable to resist any longer, many of them slaughtered their women and rushed upon the swords of the Mughals, fighting with the recklessness of despair. The loss of the imperialists was heavy, while the rebels had

* Abdun Nabi, *Ruqat* No. 34 (Philosopher's stone); *A.N.* 573, 966; *M.A.* 75, 83 (death); *N.W. Gaz.* viii. pt. I. 93; *Akhbarat*, 9, 7. There is a village named after Abdun Nabi on the left bank of the Jamuna opposite Mathura and south of Gokul.

300 killed and 250 (both men and women) taken captive. During the campaign the Emperor very humanely detached 200 horsemen to guard the crops of the villagers and prevent the soldiers from oppressing any of them or taking any child prisoner.*

Next month Hasan Ali Khan with his lieutenant Shaikh Razi-ud-din of Bhagalpur (who was a rare combination of soldier, theologian, traveller and business man in one) defeated Gokla. The rebels, who mustered 20,000 strong, mostly Jat and other stalwart peasants, encountered the imperial forces at a place 20 miles from Tilpat, and charged most gallantly. But after a very long and bloody contest they gave way before the superior discipline and artillery of the Mughals, and fled to Tilpat which was besieged for three days and at last stormed at the point of the sword. The havoc was terrible. On the victors' side 4,000 men fell and on the rebels' 5,000, while 7,000 persons, including Gokla and his family, were taken prisoner. The Jat leader's limbs were hacked off one by one on the platform of the police office of Agra, his family was forcibly converted to Islam, and his followers were kept in prison in charge of the provost of the imperial camp. Innocent strangers who had been arrested along with the rebels, were ordered to be set free after proper

* Peasant risings in Mathura and Agra districts.—*M.A.* 83, 92-94, 110; Ishwardas, 53 (fall of Gokla); *Akhbarat*, $\frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{1}{2}$.

inquiries, while the old men and children were handed over to an eunuch of the Court.

But the trouble did not die out with the loss of one leader. We read that even as late as March of that year (1670), Hasan Ali Khan was "engaged in enslaving and capturing the rebels, plundering their houses, extirpating their families, and dismantling their strong [mud] forts." These measures had the desired effect, and in a short time peace was restored to the district.

But the peace did not last more than ten years. In June 1681, the faujdar of the environs of Agra had to lead an expedition against some villagers and was mortally wounded by them. This was a purely agrarian revolt, and was probably soon ended. In 1686, when the Emperor was engaged with his many enemies in the Deccan, the second great Jat rising began, under the leadership of Rajaram, and though Rajaram was soon slain, his brother's son Churaman, with his head-quarters at Sansani, carried on an intermittent war till the end of Aurangzib's life, and could not be subdued by that Emperor's decadent successors. [See Ch. 59.]

§3. *The Satnami sect: their character.*

The revolt of the SATNAMI faqirs in May 1672 has gained a place in the history of Aurangzib out of all proportion to its size or political importance.

Unlike other popular disturbances of the reign it appealed to the vulgar craze for the supernatural and sent a short thrill of fear through the capital itself. Hence, men greatly marvelled at it and it became the talk of the age.*

The title *Satnamis* has been adopted by at least three religious bodies of Northern India. The one best known nowadays was founded in 1775 in Oudh, but we are not here concerned with it. The sect that rose against Aurangzib was really the *Sadhs*, who employ the name Satnami among themselves. They are a unitarian community, founded in 1543 by Birbhan of Bijesar, near Narnol, and may be looked upon as an offshoot of the Rai Dasīs. [Hastings's *Encyclopædia of Religion*, xi. 46, 210.] The people nicknamed them *Mundiyas* or *Shavelings* from their practice of shaving off all the hair, —even the eye-brows, from their heads. The sect is scattered all over Upper India, and has monasteries in many places, but its stronghold in the 17th century was the district of Narnol, 75 miles south-west of Delhi. The religious mysteries practised by these sectaries were abominable, and a contemporary Hindu historian, Ishwardas Nagar, thus describes the repulsion which they excited: "The Satnamis are

* *Satnamis*.—*M.A.* 115; *K.K.* ii. 252—254; Ishwardas 61b; *Storia*, ii. 167—168. Wilson's *Religious Sects of the Hindus* describes another sect bearing the same name but founded about 1775.

extremely filthy and wicked. In their rules they make no distinction between Hindus and Musalmans, and eat pigs and other unclean animals. If a dog is served up before them, they do not show any disgust at it! In sin and immorality they see no blame." (61b.)

But evidently their esoteric doctrines and rites did not make them bad citizens or men. Khafi Khan (ii. 252) gives them a good character as an honest and manly brotherhood, saying, "Though they dress like faqirs, most of them follow agriculture or trade on a small capital. Following the path of their own faith they wish to live with a good name and never attempt to obtain money by any dishonest or unlawful means. If any one tries to oppress them, they cannot endure it. Most of them carry arms."

§4. *Satnami rebellion, its history*

These people came into conflict with the forces of Government from a purely temporal cause. "One day a Satnami cultivator near Narnol had a hot dispute with a foot-soldier (*piada*) who was watching a field, and the soldier broke the peasant's head with his thick stick. A party of Satnamis beat the assailant till he seemed dead. The *shiqdar* (petty revenue collector), hearing of it, sent a body of *piadas* to arrest the men; but the Satnamis assembled in force, beat the *piadas*, wounded some of them,

and snatched away their arms. Their number and tumult increased every hour."

The quarrel soon took on a religious colour and assumed the form of a war for the liberation of the Hindus by an attack on Aurangzib himself. An old prophetess appeared among them and declared that her spells could raise an invisible army at night, that the Satnamis fighting under her banner would be invulnerable to the enemy's weapons, and that if one of them fell eighty others would spring up in his place. The movement spread like wildfire and the Government was completely taken by surprise. The rising looked like a sudden "irruption of ants out of the ground or of locusts from the sky." Soon some five thousand Satnamis were up in arms. The local officers underrated the danger and sent out troops in small parties which were successively defeated. These initial victories only raised the confidence of the rebels and confirmed the tale of their magical power. They plundered many villages in the district and when, at last, the faujdar of Narnol came out to meet them, they routed him with heavy loss and seized the town.

The danger now assumed threatening proportions. The victorious rebels plundered Narnol, demolished its mosques, and established their own administration in the district, holding it by means of outposts and collecting the revenue from the peasants.

"The zamindars of the neighbourhood and some foolish Rajputs seized the opportunity to rebel and withhold the payment of revenue to the State. The disturbance daily grew worse." "The rebels marched to Bairat Singhana, looting the villages. The noise of their tumult reached Delhi, where the grain supply became scanty and the citizens were greatly alarmed and distracted." Superstitious terror demoralized the imperial army. "Magical powers were ascribed to the Satnamis...Great Rajahs and experienced generals with large armies were appointed against them, but refused to face them, though they had arrived within 32 or 34 miles of Delhi."

Aurangzib was now fully roused. On 15th March he sent a large force, 10,000 strong, under Radandaz Khan and many other high officers with artillery and a detachment from the Emperor's body-guard against the rebels. To counteract the spells of the Satnamis, the Emperor, who had the reputation of being a living saint (*Alamgir zinda pir*), wrote out prayers and magical figures with his own hand and ordered the papers to be sewed on to the banners of his army and displayed before the enemy. The encounter was terrible. "The rebels advanced to the attack. In spite of their poverty in war-material, they enacted the scenes of the great war of the *Mahabharat*. The Muslim heroes reddened their pitiless swords in the blood of the wretches." After a most

obstinate battle, two thousand of the Satnamis fell on the field, while many more were slain during the pursuit. "Very few of them escaped; and that tract of country was cleared of the infidels." In the imperial ranks 200 were killed, and Rajah Bishnu Singh Kachhwa, who had fought most gallantly, had his elephant wounded in seven places. The victors were richly rewarded. Radandaz Khan was given the title of Shujaet Khan, and all the officers, high and low alike, received promotion and robes of honour. The artillery planted outside Delhi to command the approaches to the city, stood there for some time after as an eloquent memorial of the panic created at the capital by the Satnami advance.

§5. *The course of the Sikh religion.*

The Mughal empire soon afterwards created a more formidable enemy, who continued to wage war with it till its downfall. These were the SIKHS.

Towards the close of the 15th century, when the first wave of Muslim immigration into India had worn itself out, leaving the country in political disruption social disorder and moral decadence, there arose in the extreme east and the extreme west of India two Hindu reformers who called upon the people to prefer the essence to the form of religion, a living faith to a dead mechanical ritual, and the spirit to the letter of their scriptures. Both of them insisted on the unity

of the Godhead underlying the multitude of the idols of popular worship. Both taught that God can be realized only by means of a love as ardent and all-absorbing as the conjugal passion. Both urged on their hearers to work out their salvation personally by strenuous holy living and not to imagine that it can be won through any other man's exertions or the mechanical repetition of any words. Both invited earnest believers to their folds without distinction of caste or creed, and tried to form a brotherhood of the elect. Both attempts, after glorious success for three generations, ended in failure, and their only result has been to add two more names to the long list of the religious sects of the Hindus. The goal of Chaitanya* was lost when his Church passed under the control of Brahman Goswamis who developed a very subtle and esoteric theology in which the brain has suppressed the heart, and his Vaishnava followers now form two sharply divided sections,—an emotional but morally undisciplined rabble at the base, and a keenly intellectual but cold and fastidious priesthood at the top, without any link between them. The aims of Nanak were abandoned when his successors in the leadership of the Sikhs set up a temporal dominion for themselves and made military drill take the place of moral self-reform and spiritual growth.

* For the teachings of Chaitanya, see my work *Chaitanya's Life and Teachings*, 2nd ed.

“The liberation which Baba Nanak realized in his heart was not political liberty, but spiritual freedom. Nanak had called upon his disciples to free themselves from selfishness, from narrow bigotry, from spiritual lethargy. Guru Govind organized the Sikhs to suit a special purpose. He called in the human energy of the Sikhs from all other sides and made it flow in one particular channel only; they ceased to be full, free men. He converted the spiritual unity of the Sikhs into a means of worldly success; he dwarfed the unity of a religious sect into an instrument of political advancement. Hence the Sikhs, who had been advancing for centuries to be true men, now suddenly stopped short and became mere *soldiers*! The end of Sikh history looks very sad. When a river, which had left the pure, snowy, cloud-kissing hilltops to reach the ocean, disappears in a sandy plain, losing its dance, losing its song, a sorry sight is its failure. Even so, when the pure white stream of energy which issued from a *bhaktā*’s heart to cleanse and fertilize the earth ends in the red mire of a military cantonment, men can see no glory, no joy in it.....To-day there is no spirit of progress among the Sikhs. They have crystallized into a small sect. Centuries have failed to produce a new spiritual teacher from among them.”*

* Rabindranath Tagore, as translated by me in *Modern Review*, April, 1911, 334-338. Cf. Pincott, “The religion of Nanak began in

§6. *Life and teachings of Nanak.*

Nanak, a Hindu of the Khatri or trader caste, was born in 1469 at Talwandi (now, Nanakana), 35 miles s. w. of Lahor. In early youth he began to consort with holy men and wandering friars and have ecstatic visions, and then throwing up his post under Daulat Khan Lodi he took to a life of religious travel and preaching. The essence of his creed was belief in the one true living God, and the shaping of every man's conduct in such a way as to realize that God. In his moments of inspiration he held communion with his Maker and sang of Him in the very language of the Song of Songs. Like Kabir and other Indian saints before him, he preached against the hollowness of conventional beliefs and mechanical rites, and urged his hearers to go back to the very spring-head of a personal and living faith. It was only natural that such a teacher should denounce the Hindus and Muhammadans of the age as false to their creeds, and that his insistence on the common truth of all religions should make all spiritual-minded men among both sects accept him as their master and guide, even as Kabir had been accepted. But the vulgar people and the selfish priests raised the cry that Nanak had condemned their scriptures as inefficacious for salvation, that he was saying "There

large-hearted tolerance; and political causes operated to convert its adherents into a narrow-minded sect."

is no Hindu and there is* no Musalman," and even that he had "become a Turk!"*

Indeed, there was much in Nanak's speech and conduct to lend colour to such a charge. His dress was as eclectic as his doctrines. "The Guru set out towards the east, having arrayed himself in a strange motley of Hindu and Muhammadan religious habiliments.....He wore a necklace of bones, and imprinted a saffron mark on his forehead in the style of Hindus." (Mac. i. 58.)

His devotion to one God, "the True, the Immortal, the Self-existent, the Pure, the Invisible," made him reject incarnations and idols as abominations, while his insistence on right conduct cut away the basis of ritualistic practices and set prayers. As he said, repeating the words of Kabir, "O brethren, the Vedas and the Quran are false, and free not the mind from anxiety.....God can be obtained by humility and prayer, self-restraint, searching of the heart, and fixed gaze on Him." (Mac. i. 177.)

Nanak (who lived till 1538) drew round himself a band of earnest worshippers, and in time they

* Macauliffe's *Sikh Religion*, 6 vols., Hughes's *Dictionary of Islam*, 583-594 (article by F. Pincott), *Dabistan-ul-mazahib* (Bombay lithographed text), 178-193, and Sujan Rai Khatn's *Khulasat-ut-tawarikh*, as trans. by me in *India of Aurangzeb*, 88-91, are our original sources of information about the Sikh gurus. I shall, in future, refer to the first of these works as 'Mac.'

solidified into a sect. But his original intention was to save all souls without distinction, and not to found a narrow brotherhood with its peculiar dress, marks, doctrines, form of worship and scripture. He acknowledged no *guru* save God and no worship except the practice of virtue. Even his hymns were mostly adapted from the sacred songs left behind by the monotheistic reformers of the past, and had nothing distinctive, nothing sectarian about them.

This liberality of mind, devotion to the essence of religion, and contempt for wealth and power continued to mark the Sikh gurus throughout the 16th century, from Nanak to Arjun the 5th guru. Their saintly lives won the reverence of the Mughal emperors and they had no quarrel either with Islam or the State.

§7. *Change in the lives and aims of the later Gurus.*

Before the reign of Aurangzib the Sikhs were never persecuted on *religious* grounds, and their collision with the Mughal Government, which began in Jahangir's time, was due entirely to *secular* causes, and the change in the character of the gurus was solely responsible for it.*

* "The entire reversal of the project [of Nanak to reconcile Hinduism with Muhammadanism] and the production of the deadliest of feuds between Muhammadans and Sikhs.....~~was~~ as much due to political causes as to a steady departure from the teachings of the Founder of Sikhism." (Pincott, in Hughes, 591.)

Nanak had no guru save God, and his two immediate successors were chosen for superior character only. But after the third guru the headship of the Church became hereditary. The guru was credited with superhuman powers; he was invested with regal pomp, and man-worship began to infect the Sikhs. When boys of nine and even five years (like Govind Rai and Har Krishan respectively) were accepted as spiritual leaders, it was clear that the guru had ceased to be regarded as a human teacher and was held to be born with supernatural powers like an incarnation of God, whose acts could not be judged by the standard of human reason.*

Under Arjun, the 5th guru (1581-1606), the number of Sikh converts greatly increased, and with them the guru's income. As a contemporary remarked, "The Emperor [Akbar] and kings bow before him. Wealth ever cometh to him." (Mac. iii. 28.) "The royal state and retinue" of this guru were so great that even a Chancellor (*diwan*) of the empire considered the guru's son a desirable match for his daughter, but the guru scornfully declined the alliance. With the business instincts of a Khatri (petty trader), guru Arjun organized a permanent

* So, too Baba Atal, the son of Har Govind, though only 8 years old, conveyed "a profound meaning in whatever he said even jestingly," (Mac., iv. 130) and was believed to be "a treasury of miraculous power." (131.)

source of income. A band of agents called *masands* were stationed in every city from Kabul to Dacca where there was a Sikh, to collect the tithes and offerings of the faithful; and this spiritual tribute, so far as it escaped peculation by the agents, reached the central treasury at Amritsar. The guru was treated as a temporal king and girt round by a body of courtiers and ministers called *masands*, which is the Hindi corruption of the title *masnad-i-ala* borne by nobles under the Pathan Sultans of Delhi. Like the Muslim kings, too, the gurus used to take several wives.* They also began to be called *Padishahs* or Emperors.

The effects of this conversion of a spiritual guide into an earthly ruler began to show themselves clearly after the death of Arjun. That guru was a man of peace and humility, and devoted himself to consolidating the Church. He completed the two sacred tanks at Amritsar, built the first temple for enshrining the Holy Book (*Granth*) on the site of the present Golden Temple, drew up a scheme of daily religious services for the Sikhs, and gave the final shape to their scriptures by compiling a volume of hymns selected from those composed by his four predecessors as well as those current among "the

* Har Rai, 7th guru, when a mere boy of nine, was "wedded collectively" to all the daughters of a follower named Daya Ram. (Mac. iii. 225)

followers of the principal Indian saints, Hindu and Muhammadan, since the days of Jaidev." (Mac. iii. 60.)

§8. *Conflict of the Gurus with the Mughal Government.*

At the very end of his career, Arjun made the sole mistake of his life. Moved by compassion and entreaty, he in a weak moment blessed the banners of Khusrau, the rival of Jahangir for the Mughal throne, and even gave money help to that prince. On the defeat of the pretender, Jahangir fined the guru two lakhs of Rupees for his disloyalty to the king *de jure*. The Sikhs were willing to subscribe the amount; but the man of God forbade them, saying, "Whatever money I have, is for the poor, the friendless and the stranger." (iii. 92.) He regarded the fine as an unjust imposition, refused to pay it, and stoically endured imprisonment and torture, which were the usual punishments of revenue defaulters in those days. Worn out by being forced to sit in the burning sand of Lahor, he died in June 1606. This was clearly not a case of religious persecution, but merely the customary punishment of a political offender.

With his son Har Govind (1606-1645), a new era began. He was a man of a less spiritual fibre than Arjun. "Unlike his father, Har Govind

constantly trained himself in martial exercises and systematically turned his attention to the chase." Early in his pontificate, he began to enlist men and increase his bodyguard of 52 warriors till it became a small army. When the saintly old Sikh, Bhai Budha, remonstrated against this unspiritual passion, Har Govind replied, "I wear two swords as emblems of spiritual and temporal authority. In the guru's house religion *and worldly enjoyment* shall be combined." His retinue during his tours to places of pilgrimage was large enough to scare away holy men by suggesting that some Rajah had arrived! (Mac. iv. 4-5, 53.)

Under the easy and good-natured Jahangir, Har Govind was fairly well treated by the imperial family, though he had to undergo twelve years' confinement in Gwalior fort to make him pay the balance of his father's fine. But the growing military strength and royal pomp of the guru and his worldly spirit and tastes made a conflict between him and the Government of the country inevitable, and it broke out after Shah Jahan's accession. When that Emperor was hawking near Amritsar, the guru entered the same area in pursuit of game, and his Sikhs quarrelled with the servants of the imperial hunt about a bird. The two parties came to blows, and in the end the imperialists were beaten off with slaughter. An army was sent against the audacious

rebel, but it was routed with heavy loss, at Sangrana, near Amritsar, 1628. (Mac. iv. 80-98.)

The victor's fame spread far and wide. "Many men came to enlist under the guru's banner. They said that no one else had power to contend with the Emperor."*

Such an open defiance of imperial authority could not be tolerated near Lahor. Larger and larger armies were sent against the guru, and though he gained some successes at first, his house and property at Amritsar were, in the end, seized, and he was forced to take refuge at Kiratpur in the Kashmir hills beyond the reach of Mughal arms.†

Here he died in 1645, after investing his younger grandson, Har Rai, a boy of fourteen, as his successor. An elder grandson, named Dhir Mal, set up as guru in the Panjab plains, in alliance with the imperial Government, and kept possession of the original copy of the *Granth*, which had already attained to the veneration of a tutelary idol.

Har Rai's pontificate (1645-1661) was uneventful. But Dara Shukoh had paid him visits of respect

* He had so completely sunk the character of a religious reformer in that of a conquering general, that he had no scruple in enlisting large bands of Afghan mercenaries. These afterwards deserted him, joined the imperial general, and attacked the guru.

† *Dabistan*, 188. The Sikh accounts disguise the guru's defeat, but they can offer no explanation of his flight to the hills if he had been, as they allege, always victorious over the imperialists.

in the course of his general devotion to *sadhus*, and the guru had blessed the prince when a fugitive in the Panjab after the battle of Samugarh. Aurangzib summoned Har Rai to answer for his conduct. The guru sent his eldest son Ram Rai to Court, but that young man temporized and ingratiated himself with the Mughal, for which his father disinherited him. Har Rai died in 1661 after investing his second son, Har Krishan, as his successor. Ram Rai immediately proclaimed himself guru and claimed his father's heritage. Taking advantage of the disputed succession to the leadership of the Church, "the *masands* collected and kept the greater part of the offerings for themselves." (Mac., iv. 314-317.)

§9. *Tegh Bahadur's career.*

Aurangzib summoned Har Krishan to Delhi to decide the suit. But before it could be done, the boy guru died of small-pox (1664), and the same scene of disorder and rapacity again broke out among the Sikhs. "Twenty-two [men] of Bakala claimed the right to succeed him. These self-made gurus forcibly took the offerings of the Sikhs." (Mac., iv. 332.) After a time Tegh Bahadur, the youngest son of Har Govind, succeeded in being recognized as guru by most of the Sikhs. With his personal followers he accompanied Rajah Ram Singh (the son of Mirza Rajah Jai Singh) to the Assam war

(1668) and fought in the Mughal ranks as a mercenary; but he came back to Upper India in a few years, and took up his residence at Anandpur.

From this place he was drawn into the whirlwind which Aurangzib had raised by his policy of religious persecution. A soldier and priest could not remain indifferent while his creed was being wantonly attacked and its holy places desecrated.* He encouraged the resistance of the Hindus of Kashmir to forcible conversion to Islam and openly defied the Emperor. Taken to Delhi, he was cast into prison and called upon to embrace Islam, and on his refusal was tortured for five days and then beheaded on a warrant from the Emperor. According to another account, the long-continued torture induced him to command a Sikh, who was with him, to cut off his head. (Hughes, 593.)

Now at last open war broke out between the Sikhs and Islam. The murdered guru's followers were furious; one of them threw bricks at the Emperor (27th Oct. 1676) when he was alighting from his boat on his return from the Jama Masjid.

* Khafi Khan (ii. 652) says, "Aurangzib ordered the temples of the Sikhs to be destroyed and the guru's agents (*masands*) for collecting the tithes and presents of the faithful to be expelled from the cities." Life of Tegn Bahadur in Mac., iv. 331-387. The Persian histories are silent about him. For Guru Govind, Mac., vol. v., supplemented by Irvine's "Guru Govind and Banda" in *J. A. S. B.*, 1894, pp. 110 *et seq.* (reprinted in *Later Mughals*, i. 80-92.)

(M.A. 154.) But such attempts at retaliation were futile. Soon a leader appeared among the Sikhs who organized the sect into the most efficient and implacable enemy of the Mughal empire and the Muslim faith. Govind Rai, the tenth and last guru (1676—1708) and the only son of Tegh Bahadur, was a man of whom it had been prophesied before his birth that "he would convert jackals into tigers and sparrows into hawks." He was not the person to leave his father's death unavenged. All his thoughts were directed to turning the Sikhs into soldiers, to the exclusion of every other aim.

§10. *Military organization of the Sikhs.*

We have by this time travelled very far indeed from Baba Nanak's ideal,* and we may here pause to consider what causes made the success of Guru Govind possible. The first was the gradual elevation of the guru to a superhuman position. Nanak, like every other Hindu religious preacher, had laid stress on the help which a true teacher (*guru*) can give in leading a man to the path of virtue; the guidance of

* As Har Rai once said, "The vessel which Baba Nanak had constructed for the salvation of the world, had almost foundered." (Mac. v. 151.) F. Pincott remarks. "The religious aspect of the movement became gradually converted into a military and political propaganda. No contrast, indeed, could be greater than that between the inoffensive and gentle-minded Nanak and the warlike and ambitious Gurus of later times." (Hughes, 594.)

one experienced in such things saves the disciple-much difficulty, chance of error, and loss of time. "The object of the gurushiṛ is to save the world, to give instruction in the true Name, and to blend men with their Creator" (iv. 316). Such being the guru's function, he was to be implicitly obeyed. As Bhai Gurudas, who lived in the late 16th century, says in his exposition of the essence of the Sikh religion: "The Sikh who receiveth the guru's instruction is really a Sikh. To become a disciple is, as it were, to become dead. A disciple must be like a purchased slave, fit to be yoked to any work which may serve his guru. Love none but the guru: all other love is false." (Mac. iv. 244-263.)

A natural consequence of such teaching was the blind unquestioning devotion of the Sikhs to their spiritual head. The author of *Dabistan*, who had frequent intercourse with Har Govind, narrates a story (p. 193) how a certain guru praised a parrot and a Sikh immediately went to its owner and offered to barter his wife and daughter for the bird! In other words, he had no hesitation in dooming his wife and daughter to a life of infamy simply to gratify a passing fancy of his guru. The perversion of moral judgment and ignorance of the relative value of things illustrated by this anecdote and another* that I have

* *Dabistan*, 192. It shows that the Sikhs of the middle 17th century held the same views about women that the Anabaptists of

omitted for the sake of decency, are extreme; but so too is the spirit of devotion among the followers of the gurus.

This implicit faith in a common superior knit the Sikhs together like the soldiers of a regiment. As Har Govind told his disciples, "Deem the Sikh who comes to you with the guru's name on his lips as your guru." (iv. 219.) The Sikhs were famous in the 17th century for their sense of brotherhood and love for each other.*

This was quite natural, as the Sikhs felt themselves to be a chosen people, the Lord's elect. We again quote the language of Bhai Gurudas: "Truth is hidden both from the Hindus and the Muhammadans; both sects have gone astray. But when they lay aside superstition they form one body of Sikhs. . . : Where there are two Sikhs, there is a company of saints; where there are five Sikhs, there is God!" (iv. 272 and 243.) The unity due to sameness of religion was further cemented by the abolition of caste distinctions under orders of Govind. All restrictions about food and drink, so prevalent

Munster did. Macauliffe considers this author's testimony about the guru as "of the highest importance" (iv. 217).

* Sujan Rai of Batala wrote in 1695, "The reliance which this sect has on its leader is seldom seen in other sects. If a wayfarer arrives at midnight and takes the name of Baba Nanak, he is treated as a brother." (*India of Aur.* 91.) Mac. v. 90-92.

in Hindu society, had already been discarded, and to be a Sikh was to be "as free in matters of eating and drinking as a Musalma." (iv. 219.)

Everything was, therefore, ready for converting the sect into a military body obedient to its chief to the death, and what is even more difficult, ever ready to surrender the individual conscience to that of the guru. If Cromwell's Ironsides could have been inspired with the Jesuits' unquestioning acceptance of their Superior's decisions on moral and spiritual questions, the result would have equalled Guru Govind's Sikhs as a fighting machine.

§11. *Guru Govind, his ideal and career.*

Govind steadily drilled his followers, gave them a distinctive dress and a new oath of baptism, and began a policy of open hostility to Islam. He harangued the Hindus to rise against Muslim persecution, and imposed a fine of Rs. 125 on his followers for saluting any Muhammadan saint's tomb. His aims were frankly material. "Mother dear, I have been considering how I may *confer empire* on the Khalsa." And, again, "I shall make men of all four castes lions and destroy the Mughals." (Mac. v. 109 and 99.) Clearly, Nanak's ideal of the kingdom of heaven to be won by holy living and holy dying, by humility and prayer, self-restraint and meditation, —had been entirely abandoned. Guru Govind lived

in princely state, kept a train of poets in his Court, and made plenty of gold ornaments for himself and his family. His bodyguards were provided with arrows tipped with gold to the value of Rs. 16 each; and he had a big war-drum made in imitation of the Mughal imperial band, while his troops insulted and robbed the subjects of his host, the Bilaspur hill-Rajah, like the liveried retainers of the barons of mediæval England. (v. 59, 111, 5, 137.)

In the hills of North Panjab, Govind passed most of his life, constantly fighting with the hill-Rajahs from Jammu to Srinagar in Garhwal, who were disgusted with his followers' violence and scared by his own ambition,—or with the Mughal officers and independent local Muslim chiefs who raided the hills in quest of tribute and plunder. Large imperial forces were sent from Sarhind to co-operate with the quotas of the hill-Rajahs and suppress the guru; but they were usually worsted. He was once defeated and expelled from Anandpur, but recovered the town on the retreat of the imperialists. His army went on increasing, as recruits from the Panjab *doabs* flocked to him and received baptism. Even Muslims were enlisted. Anandpur was five times invested. In the last attack, after undergoing great hardship and loss, with his followers and family threatening to desert if he prolonged the resistance, the guru evacuated the fort, and then went to Kiratpur,

Nirmoh and Rupar, closely pursued by the Mughals. At Chamkaur with only 40 Sikhs he stood a siege in a Jat cultivator's house; but two of his sons were slain and he fled. Next he passed through many adventures and hairbreadth escapes, changing his place of shelter repeatedly like a hunted animal. His two remaining sons were arrested by the governor of Sarhind and put to death (1705). The Mughal officers plundered parties of Sikhs going to make offerings to their guru. (Mac. v. 121-222.) Then Govind with his few but faithful guards undertook a journey to Southern India by way of Bikanir and Baghaur; but returned to Northern India on hearing of Aurangzib's death (1707). He is said to have assisted Bahadur Shah I. in securing the throne, and that Emperor made much of him at Agra and induced him to accompany him on the march to Rajputana and the Deccan. The guru reached Nander on the Godavari, 150 miles n. w. of Haidarabad in August 1707 at the head of some infantry and 2 to 3 hundred cavalry, and there after a stay of more than a year he was stabbed to death by an Afghan (1708). With him the line of gurus ended. (v. 226-246.)

§12. *Sikh history after the last Guru's death.*

The guru was gone, but not the Sikh people. In the hour of his final defeat at Chamkaur, Govind's parting instructions had been to make the Sikhs

independent of a supreme guide and to turn them into a military democracy. "He seated near him the five Sikhs who alone remained of the army, and proceeded to entrust the guruship to them. He said, 'I shall ever be among five Sikhs. Wherever there are five Sikhs of mine assembled, they shall be priests of all priests.' " (v. 189.)

Even in the darkest days of Gurū Govind's life bands of his followers, each acting under an independent leader, used to harass the Mughal officers and raid parts of the Panjab. Of one such band the fate is thus described in a letter of Aurangzib (written about 1701-1705): "I learn from the news-letter of Shah Alam's camp sent by Khwajah Mubarak that nearly 20,000 Hindus, who call themselves the Khalsa of Govind the follower of Nanak, had assembled and gone to the country of the Barakzai under the escort of the Yusufzai Afghans, and that the men of the escort and other Afghans of the neighbourhood of the Nilab river had fallen on them, so that the party had been killed or drowned. The Emperor orders that the prince should imprison these misbelievers, and expel them from that district."*

Thus we see that the Mughal Government under Aurangzib did succeed in breaking up the guru's power. It robbed the Sikhs of a common leader and

* Inayatullah's *Aḥkam*, 2a. Readers of Kipling will remember the story of "The Lost Legion" in this connection.

a rallying centre. Thereafter the Sikhs continued to disturb public peace, but only in isolated bands. They were no longer an army fighting under one chief, with a definite political aim, but merely moving bodies of brigands,—extremely brave, enthusiastic, and hardy; but essentially plunderers uninspired by any ambition to build up an organized Government in the land. If Aurangzib had been followed by worthy successors, these Sikh bands would have been hunted down as surely as the Mirzas and Champat Rai Bundela had been in the past, and Dhundhia Waug and Tantia Topi were to be under British rule.

If Ranjit Singh had not risen, there would have been no large and united State under Sikh dominion, but a number of petty principalities in the Panjab with a ruling aristocracy of Sikh soldiers, sending their organized marauders every year to raid and lay waste the country up to Delhi, Saharanpur and even Hardwar, or engaged in their selfish internecine wars between clan and clan. These would have been silently absorbed in the expanding British empire. The Persian and not the Sikh gave the death-blow to the Mughal empire, and it was not from the heirs of Aurangzib but from the Afghan inheritors of Nadir Shah that the Sikhs conquered the Panjab.

CHAPTER XXXVI

INVASION OF RAJPUTANA, 1679-1680

§1. *Marwar, its soil and crops.*

Westwards beyond the Aravali range lies the kingdom of Marwar, a vast plain broken here and there by bold conical rocks of low elevation. Its northern half is the fringe of the Indian desert, an arid waste of level sands and sand-hills. The eastern and southern districts are formed out of the valley of the Luni, a rainy-weather river which presents a dry bed for ten months in the year. But in a land with an annual rainfall of only five inches, even such a river is of priceless importance, and half the agricultural wealth of the country is dependent on the Luni. In four of the districts the soil is comparatively fertile, wells of good water abound, irrigation is freely practised, and the cultivator is rewarded with two harvests in the year. Elsewhere the water is too far below the surface to permit irrigation, or the alkali in the soil forbids any growth of vegetation. The hardy millet *bajra* and a few pulses are the staple crops of the land.

But there are some spots with a soil of greater fertility and a more copious water-supply, especially some shallow marshes, where good crops of wheat, gram and opium are raised. The kingdom abounds

in salt lakes and pools, but this source of wealth was of little value in an age when transport was costly and markets distant.*

§2. *Strategic importance of Marwar.*

But, with all its agricultural poverty, this 'desert land' (*Maru-mar*) enjoyed a peculiar importance in the geography of Mughal India. The shortest and easiest trade-route from the Mughal capital to the rich manufacturing city of Ahmadabad and the busy port of Cambay lay through its limits. From Agra the western road through the loyal State of Jaipur to the imperial city of Ajmir was safe and well-frequented. Thereafter it crossed a gap in the Aravali barrier and ran level through the Marwar cities of Pali and Jhalor to Ahmadabad. The alternative or eastern route through the Malwa plateau and the broken jungly Panch Mahals was longer and marked by many a rise and fall. Indeed, the Marwar road was so manifestly advantageous that as early as the 12th century after Christ trade caravans are known to have regularly used it, and a race of robbers found a rich income by raiding Pali and levying blackmail on the transit of goods. The convenient* situation of Pali, as a half-way house

* *Rajputana Gazetteer* (1879), ii. 222-228, 238 (following Tod, ii. ch. 16).

between Ahmadabad and Ajmir, made it the chief commercial mart of Western Rajputana.*

If such a province could be annexed to the imperial dominions or placed under a servile and dependent Rajah, Mughal traders and Mughal armies would be able to pass easily from the capital to Western India and the Arabian Sea, the proud lord of Udaipur would be taken in flank, and a long wedge of Muslim territory would be driven right across Rajputana, cleaving it into two isolated halves which could be crushed in detail.

§3. *Jaswant and Aurangzib.*

A special reason, besides its strategic importance, made the kingdom of Marwar a desirable acquisition in Aurangzib's eyes. It was the foremost Hindu State of Northern India at this time.† Its chieftain was Jaswant Singh, who enjoyed the unrivalled rank of a Maharajah and whom the death of Jai Singh thirteen years ago had left as the leading Hindu peer of the Mughal Court. If his power passed on to a worthy successor, that successor would be the pillar of the Hindus' hopes all over the empire

* *Raj. Gaz.*, ii. 230, 263 (following Tod, ii ch. 1 and 16).

† The Maharana of Udaipur, in spite of his pre-eminent descent, was a negligible factor of the Hindu population of the Mughal world, as he hid himself among his mountain fastnesses, and never appeared in the Mughal Court or camp.

and the centre of the Hindu opposition to the policy of temple destruction and *jaziya*.

We know not whether Jaswant's sins of twenty years ago,—his presumption in opposing Aurangzib at Dharmat, after all the other nobles had declined to confront a prince of the blood, his treachery at Khajwa, his coquetting with Dara on the eve of the battle of Deorai,—still rankled in Aurangzib's bosom, as Khafi Khan asserts, and he now sought to take a safe if belated vengeance. But it is clear that the success of his plan of the forcible conversion of the Hindus required that Jaswant's State should sink into a quiescent dependency or a regular province of the empire. Hindu resistance to the policy of religious persecution must be deprived of a possible efficient head.*

§4. *Death of Jaswant; Mughals occupy Marwar.*

On 10th December, 1678, Maharajah Jaswant Singh died at Jamrud when commanding the Mughal posts in the Khaibar Pass† and the Peshawar district in general. The news reached the Emperor at Delhi in the fourth week of the month, and he immediately

* Khafi Khan, ii. 259. *Storia*, ii. 234. Tod, i. ch. 13, ii ch. 7. In a letter written in 1659, Aurangzib speaks of Jaswant as "the infidel who has destroyed mosques and built idol-temples on their sites." (*Adab*, 263a.)

† He was never viceroy of Afghanistan or even governor of Kabul city, but merely *thanadar* of Jamrud.

formed his plans with regard to the State of Jodhpur. True, Jaswant had left no son to succeed him. But his elder brother Amar Singh,—disinherited and banished from Marwar by an angry father,—was now represented by his grandson Indra Singh, the Rao of Nagor and a loyal grandee of the imperial Court.* If Aurangzib had wished to preserve the life of the Jodhpur State, he had only to invest Indra Singh with the lordship of the Rathor clan. But for more than five months after Jaswant's death no successor was appointed to his vacant throne.

On the contrary, immediately on hearing of Jaswant's death Aurangzib took steps to seize his kingdom. Muslim officers were appointed as *faujdar*, *qiladar*, *kotwal* and *amin* of Jodhpur, and the whole country was brought under direct Mughal rule. On 9th January, 1679, the Emperor himself set out for Ajmir, in order to be close enough to Jodhpur to overawe opposition and direct the military operations that might be necessary. High officers, like the *wazir* Asad Khan, Shaista Khan, and Prince Akbar, were summoned from their provinces to reinforce the Emperor at Ajmir. (M.A. 171-173.)

*M. A. 175, speaks of Indra Singh as the son of Rao Rai Singh and grandson of Amar Singh. Also M. U. ii. 236, and *Dilkasha*, 165. Ishwardas, 74b, and a rejected MS. of M. A. call him the son of Amar Singh. Tod names him 'Rutna the son of Umra.' But M. A. is correct.

But this overwhelming display of force was unnecessary. The death of Jaswant had thrown the Rathors into confusion and dismay. The State was without a head. Jaswant's highest officers and best troops were absent in Afghanistan. At first no resistance could be offered to the vast and well-directed Mughal armies that poured into the land. Khan-i-Jahan Bahadur with a band of high officers was sent on 7th February to occupy the country, demolish its temples, and seize the late Maharajah's property. On 1st March a detachment under Khidmat-guzar Khan entered the hill-fort of Siwanah, where the Rajahs of Marwar used to keep their treasures, and searched for them. But as the quest yielded nothing but a few old cloths, another officer was sent with masons to dig under the fort-walls, new mansions and courtyard, in search of buried treasure! The *diwan* of Crownlands was deputed to Jodhpur to make an inventory of Jaswant's property and prepare a statement of the revenue of the different districts of the State.*

Some days before ordering the last steps, Aurangzib had learnt (on 26th February) that two of Jaswant's widows had given birth to two posthumous sons at Lahor.† But the Emperor was not to be moved from his policy of annexing Marwar by any

* M.A. 172; *Akh.* 22/1 (official records).

† M.A. 173; *Ishwardas*, 73b.

regard for the law of legitimate succession. The arrangements for occupying the country being complete and national resistance seeming hopelessly impossible, he returned from Ajmir to Delhi (2nd April). On that day the invidious poll-tax on the Hindus was imposed again after a century of abeyance.*

Next month Khan-i-Jahan returned to Court after taking possession of Jodhpur city and demolishing its temples. He was granted a special audience and highly praised for his services. "The cart-loads of idols he had brought away were ordered to be cast down in the Armoury Square of Delhi fort and under the steps of the Jama Mosque, to be trodden upon." Indra Singh Rathor, the chieftain of Nagor, and grand-nephew of Jaswant, was invested as Rajah of Jodhpur in return for a succession fee of 36 lakhs of Rupees (26th May), and sent to Marwar. But the Mughal administrators and generals in occupation of the country were retained there, evidently to help the new Rajah in taking possession of his State.†

The force massed at Ajmir was dispersed as the imperial policy seemed to have completely triumphed. Marwar, however, was far from being settled. "At the death of the Maharajah the head

* M.A. 174; *Mirat-i-Ahmadi*, 313; Ishwardas, 74a

† M.A. 175-176. Ishwardas, 75a, says that the Emperor angrily dismissed Khan-i-Jahan for recommending that Jodhpur should be given to Jaswant's new-born son.

of every Rajput house in Marwar, out of the proud ambition of asserting his leadership, got ready to create disturbance and mischief.* These troublers of peace might in time have been put down by efficient rule and the steady pressure of Mughal force. But a new actor now entered the scene to disturb and eventually to defeat the imperial policy. This was Ajit Singh, the son of Jaswant.

§5. *Sons born to Jaswant.*

On the death of the Maharajah at Jamrud, five of his wives and seven of his concubines burnt themselves with his corpse. His followers began a hurried return to their homeland from the uncongenial climate of Afghanistan which had killed both Jaswant and his son Jagat Singh, the hope of his old age. On reaching Lahor two of the widowed Ranis gave birth to two sons (February, 1679), one of whom died in a few weeks, while the other, Ajit Singh, lived to mount the throne of Jodhpur after a most eventful and romantic career.†

As early as 26th February the Rathor ministers had waited on the Emperor and pleaded in vain for a recognition of the succession of Ajit to his father's heritage. At the end of June the Maharajah's family reached Delhi, and the rights of Ajit were again urged

* Ishwardas, 74b.

† Tod, ii. ch. 6 & 7; Ishwardas, 73b.

before Aurangzib; but he only ordered that the child should be brought up in his harem, with a promise to give him a rank in the Mughal peerage and investiture as Rajah when he would come of age.* One contemporary historian says that the throne of Jodhpur was offered to Ajit on condition of his turning Muslim.† Such a proposal would be quite in keeping with Aurangzib's past policy, as he had lately given the zamindaris of Chaukigarh, Deogarh, and Mau to those among rival claimants who had agreed to accept Islam. The assertion is corroborated by the fact that the counterfeit Ajit Singh whom he kept in ward, was brought up as a Muslim, given a Muslim name, Muhammadi Raj, and on his death buried as a Muslim.‡ Some years later Aurangzib also pressed the captive Shahu Bhonsla to embrace Islam.

The loyal Rathors were seized with consternation at Aurangzib's proposal. Their cherished religion itself was in danger of being subtly overthrown. The life of the royal infant would scarcely be safe in the charge of his greedy and bigoted guardian. The clansmen vowed to die to a man to save their chieftain's heir. But even Rajput devotion and Rajput heroism would have availed little without the

* *M. A.* 173, 177

† *Dilkasha*, 164

‡ *Akhbarat*, year 13 sheets 10, 24, 32; *M. U.* ii 281; *Tod*, i. p. 413 (later); *Ishwardas*, 144 a.

guiding genius of Durgadas, the flower of Rathor chivalry.

§6. *Durgadas Rathor, his character.*

Durgadas, one of the several sons of Jaswant's minister Askaran, the baron of Drunera, was born in 1638 at the village of lesser Salwe. When quite a lad he had shown his keen regard for his king's good name by slaying some royal grooms who had been feeding the State camels on the standing crops of the peasantry and wickedly asserting that it was done by the Rajah's command. But for his twenty-five years' unflagging exertion and wise contrivance, Ajit Singh could not have secured his father's throne. In scorn of the frequent risk of capture and other dangers of such a long journey, he volunteered to escort the luckless rebel Prince Akbar to the Maratha Court and thus saved him from the horrors of Aurangzib's vengeance. A soul of honour, he kept the deserted daughter of Akbar free from every stain and provided her with every facility for Islamic religious training in the wilderness of Marwar. Fighting against terrible odds and a host of enemies on every side, with distrust and wavering among his own countrymen, he kept the cause of his chieftain triumphant. Mughal gold could not seduce, Mughal arms could not daunt that constant heart. Almost alone among the Rathors he displayed the rare

combination of the dash and reckless valour of a Rajput soldier with the tact, diplomacy and organizing power of a Mughal minister of State. No wonder that the Rathor bard should pray that every Rajput mother might have a son like Durgadas :*

Eh mata put esa jin .

Jesa Durga-das. .

When Aurangzib demanded the surrender of the infant Ajit Singh and placed a guard round his house to prevent his escape, Durgadas took counsel with his brother nobles and quickly formed a plan for saving his infant master.* They pleaded with Aurangzib for delay, urging that the child was too young to be parted from his mother, and promising to present him at Court when he had grown up. The Emperor's wrath was inflamed by this resistance and on 15th July he sent a strong force under the Provost of Delhi city and the Captain of the imperial guards to seize the Ranis and Ajit and lodge them in the prison fortress of Nurgarh.†

§7. *The fight to save Ajit Singh.*

The imperialists shrank from provoking the "death-loving Rajputs" to extreme courses, and at

* Tod, ii. ch. 7 and end of ch. 9 The anecdote about young Durgadas I owe to M. M. Haraprasad Shastri. For Aurangzib's recognition of Durgadas's services in giving religious education to Akbar's daughter, Ishwardas, 167 b. [Post ch 58 §6.]

† M. A. 177; Ishwardas, 75a and b.

first tried persuasion, but in vain. The Rathor plan was to ensure the escape of Ajit by offering desperate resistance and sacrificing their own lives freely in a series of rear-guard actions. While a smart musketry fire was being exchanged between the two sides, Raghunath, a Bhatti noble of Jodhpur, with a hundred devoted troopers made a sortie from one side of the mansion: Lance in hand, with faces grim as Death, the Rathor heroes rushed upon their foes; they had taken leave of life by making their last oblations to the gods and swallowing a double dose of their sweetest earthly solace, opium. Before their wild charge the imperialists quailed, and seizing this momentary confusion Durgadas slipped out with Ajit and the Ranis dressed in male attire, and rode direct for Marwar. For an hour and a half Raghunath dyed the streets of Deîhi with blood, but at last he fell with 70 of his comrades. The Mughals now set off in pursuit, but Durgadas had covered nine miles by the time he was overtaken. It was now Ranchhordas Jodha's turn to face round with a small band and gain precious time by barring the enemy's path. When their resistance was at last borne down and the Mughals rode over their corpses to the fugitives, Durgadas sent the Maharajah's family onwards with forty troopers, while he himself stayed behind at the head of 50 men and checked the Mughals for an hour. It was now evening; the Mughals were worn

out by the long ride and the three murderous conflicts ; and so when the wounded Durgadas cut his way out with seven troopers, the sole remnant of his gallant band, the pursuit was abandoned. The baffled Mughals returned to Delhi. Durgadas rejoined his prince and safely conducted him to Marwar (23rd July).*

Ajit grew up in strict concealment among a monastic brotherhood on the lonely rock of Abu. But his escape from Delhi had become known and his name became the rallying cry of the Rathor legitimists. Aurangzib's policy in Marwar seemed to have been wrecked. But his statecraft struck a shrewd blow to counter the action of Durgadas : he brought up a milkman's infant in his harem as the true Ajit Singh and proclaimed Durgadas's protegee to be a bogus prince. At the same time he dismissed the degraded Tahir Khan, the *faujdar* of Jodhpur, for failure to keep Durgadas out, and also dethroned Indra Singh, the two months' Rajah of Marwar, for his manifest incapacity to "rule fifty thousand Rathor blades." (*M.A.* 179; *Dilkasha*, 165; *Tod*, ii. ch. 7.)

* This account of the escape of Ajit is based on Ishwardas, 75a—76b, because he was in close touch with the Rathors and afterwards acted as a go-between in inducing Durgadas to submit to the Mughal Government. *Tod*, ii ch 7, as usual, indulges in rhapsodies. *Dilkasha*, 164, is meagre. Khafi Khan, ii 259-260, supports Ishwardas. The official history, *M.A.*, 178, represents it as an imperial victory !

§8. *Aurangzib annexes Marwar.*

A strong force was sent into Marwar under Sarbuland Khan (17th August), and a fortnight later the Emperor himself started for Ajmir to direct the reconquest of the State. Anarchy and slaughter were let loose on the doomed province. The nationalist party was threatened by a host of enemies. The Parihars,—the dispossessed ancient lords of the land and the hereditary enemies of the Rathor interlopers,—tried to revive their historic kingdom of Gurjara-Pratihara by seizing Mandor, the ancient capital, 5 miles north of Jodhpur.

The Emperor called up heavy reinforcements from the distant provinces, and took up his headquarters at Ajmir on 25th September, and though he himself spent the next month in comparative quiet for keeping the fast of Ramzan, his army advanced fighting under his son Muhammad Akbar. The Mughal Van was led by Tahawwur Khan, the *faujdar* of Ajmir. The Mairtia clan of Rathors, under one Raj Singh, barred his path in front of the temple of the Boar near the sacred lake of Pushkar, and a three days' continuous battle ended only with the extinction of the brave defenders after mounds of the dead had been piled up on both sides (19th August).*

* *Raj vritas* calls the place Joginipur, and gives 28th August as the date of the battle, which according to this poem ended in a complete rout of the Mughals.

This was the last pitched battle of the campaign; thereafter the Rajputs always carried on a guerilla warfare from their lurking places in the hills and desert. The Emperor now divided Marwar into districts over each of which a Mughal officer was placed as *faujdar* (end of October). The pretence of rule by a vassal Rajah was given up, and the State placed under the direct administration of the Crown.*

Advancing north-west from Ajmir, Prince Akbar entered Marwar and forced his way to Mairta. His route is still marked by the cenotaphs of the Rathor heroes who tried to stem the tide of invasion with small bands of their brethren or personal retainers. But no resistance could stand against such odds, and the whole country was soon occupied by the foe. "As the cloud pours water upon the earth, so did Aurangzib pour his barbarians over the land... Jodhpur fell and was pillaged and all the great towns in the plains of Mairta, Didwana, and Rohit, shared a similar fate. The emblems of religion were trampled under foot, the temples thrown down and mosques erected on their sites." But this policy of aggression and religious persecution, by provoking a natural reaction brought about its own failure; the Rathors and Sisodias united in defence of their common faith, the Maharana of Udaipur took up the

* *M. A.*, 179—182; Ishwardas, 76b; Tod, *ibid.* Tahawwur is the "Tyber" of Tod.

cause of Ajit Singh, and the war entered on a new stage (end of November, 1679). [Tod, ii. ch. 7.]

§9. *Maharana of Mewar's relations with the
Emperor.*

Ever since the time of Jahangir, the chief of Mewar had been loyal to the Mughal throne. True, he had never personally appeared at Court to make his bow among the vassals of the empire. But the imperial dignity had been satisfied with his rendering such homage by deputy,—usually through a son or a younger brother. Every now and then the Maharana had sent agents to the Emperor with complimentary gifts, and had received robes of honour, elephants, jewellery and royal letters in return. A contingent of his troops had occasionally fought in the imperial ranks, as was the duty of all feudatories. Late in the reign of Shah Jahan (1654), he had fortified Chitor in violation of treaty; but the presumption had been promptly punished: a Mughal army under the *wazir* Sadullah Khan had dismantled the fort and forced the refractory Maharana to offer an apology. [Waris, 90b—93a.]

But now the lord of Udaipur had to choose between rebellion and the loss of whatever is dearest to man. The Mughal annexation of Marwar turned his left flank and exposed his country to invasion

through the Aravali passes on its western side, while the eastern half of his State, being comparatively level, lay as open to a foe as before. The mountain fastness of Kamalmir, which had sheltered Pratap during the dark days of Akbar's invasion, would now cease to be an impregnable refuge to his successor. The annexation of Marwar was but the preliminary to an easy conquest of Mewar. Besides, Aurangzib's campaign of temple destruction was not likely to stop within the imperial dominions. He had demolished and wantonly desecrated the holiest Hindu shrines at Benares, Mathura and Somnath. In Rajputana itself, even before the death of Jaswant gave him any pretext for interference, he had pulled down the great temples of Khandela and Sanula and "all other temples" there, while after Jaswant's death, the Mughal occupation of his capital had been signalized by the wanton demolition of its temples and the public desecration of their idols. [M.A. 173.] On the revival of the *jaziya* tax, a demand for its enforcement throughout his State had been sent to the Maharana. [K. K. ii. 261.] If the Sisodias did not stand by the Rathors now, the two clans would be crushed piecemeal, and the whole of Rajasthan would lie helpless under the tyrant's feet. So thought Maharana Raj Singh, and so thought his clansmen, many of whom had already fraternized with the Rathor refugees in the Godwar district and

opposed the Mughals under Tahawwur Khan. [Ishwardas, 77b.] The mother of Ajit Singh was a Mewar princess, and Raj Singh could not, either as a kinsman or as a knight, reject her appeal to defend the orphan's rights.

§10. *The war in Mewar.*

Raj Singh began his preparations for war. With huge portals he closed the pass of Deobari which leads to his capital, and also repaired the fortifications of Chitor. Aurangzib with his usual promptitude struck the first blow. He left Ajmir (30th November, 1679) for Udaipur. Seven thousand picked soldiers under Hasan Ali Khan marched in advance from Pur ravaging the Rana's territory and clearing the way for the main army. The Rajputs had nothing that could make a stand against the excellent Mughal artillery served by European gunners. On the plains they were hopelessly outclassed. Hence, the Rana had prepared for the invasion by abandoning the low country and retiring with all his subjects to the hills, whither the Mughals durst not penetrate. The deserted pass of Deobari, leading to Udaipur from the east, was occupied by the Emperor on 4th January, 1680. Even the capital Udaipur, was found evacuated. The Mughals took possession of it and destroyed its great

temple, "one of the wonders of the age and a building that had cost the infidels much money,"—its twenty self-elected defenders fell fighting one by one in a hopeless resistance, after slaying many times their own number. Three temples on the Udai-sagar lake suffered the same fate.*

Hasan Ali Khan entered the hills north-west of Udaipur in search of the Rajput army; but all trace of him was lost among those rugged defiles. There was extreme anxiety about him in the imperial camp, as all communication with him had ceased for several days. The regular scouts refused to go out on reconnaissance in fear of the Rajputs. At last a young Turani lieutenant, Mir Shihab-ud-din, undertook the perilous adventure and by a combination of audacity and cleverness reached Hasan Ali's camp, and brought back news of his safety to the anxiously expectant Emperor. This achievement was the beginning of a long and successful career which ended in his becoming the highest peer of the realm and the father of the founder of the greatest Muslim State that rose on the ruins of the Mughal empire.†

* *M. A.* 182, 186. Ishwardas, 78b—79a. Tod, i ch. 13. *Storia*, ii 240. K. K. ii. 263. Aurangzib, on taking possession of Udaipur, set about "demolishing the portals of Deobari, dismantling the palaces and temples, and cutting down the garden trees" (Ishwardas, 79a.)

† *M. A.*, 186-187; Ishwardas, 80a. *Anecdotes*, §33, places this feat of scouting later, but it is wrong.

Hasan Ali was reinforced and freshly provisioned, and he inflicted a defeat on the Maharana (22nd January), capturing his camp and property and much grain on the way, and destroying 173 temples in the environs of Udaipur. Chitor had been already occupied by the Mughals, and 63 temples of the place were destroyed when Aurangzib visited it at the end of February. The power of Mewar having been seemingly crushed and its ruler being a fugitive among the hills, the Emperor left Udaipur and returned to Ajmir (on 22nd March), while a strong force under Prince Akbar held the Chitor district as a base.* The Udaipur valley was evidently abandoned by the Mughals, as too distant to be occupied with safety. Even then the imperial outposts were too far scattered to be defended easily, while the whole of the Rajput land was seething with hostility. The Mughal positions in Mewar and Marwar were isolated from each other by the wedge of the Aravali range, whose crest the Rana held in force, and from which he could make sudden descents and deal crushing blows on the east or on the west as he pleased, while the Mughals in transferring troops from Chitor to southern Marwar had to make a long and toilsome detour through the Bednor, Beawar, and Sojat districts.

* M. A. 187, 189-190.

§11. *Difficulties of the imperialists.*

The rough circle formed by the massed hills of Mewar and stretching from Udaipur westwards to Kamalmir and from the Rajsamudra lake southwards to Salumbra, resembled a vast impregnable fort with three gates, opening east, north and west, through which the garrison could sally out in full force and crush any isolated Mughal outpost or thin Mughal detachment that seemed an easy prey. The Mughals, on the other hand, could effect a concentration only by moving along a long arc of which the Rana held the short base. The Emperor's plan of campaign was virtually that of besieging this immense natural circle and breaking into it through its three gates,—Udaipur, Rajsamudra and Deosuri.

Prince Akbar had been left at Chitor in charge of all the Mughal posts east of the Aravali and south of Ajmir. But his force was too small for the effective defence of this vast region. Under his direct command were probably 12,000 men,* and

* The strength of Akbar's army is not given in *M.A.*, Ishwardas or K. K. But we learn from *Adab* No 700 that when, on 22nd Nov., after receiving reinforcements from Court, he made Tahawwur Khan force the Jhilwara Pass, the troops employed numbered 9,000 only, with possibly a thousand or two in reserve. That Akbar used to reinforce his subordinates with not more than 2,000 men from his own division is stated in *Adab*, Nos. 638, 666, 675 and 694. Akbar was

after deducting the large detachments he had to send out under his chief lieutenants, Hasan Ali Khan and Tahawwur Khan, he could never spare more than 2,000 men from his own corps to strengthen any threatened outpost. On the other hand, the Rathors alone are said to have numbered 25,000 horsemen, at the lowest computation, while the Udaipur troops must have exceeded 12,000, as they formed three independent divisions.* The Rajputs, fighting in their homeland, knew every nook of the ground and were helped by a friendly peasantry. The Mughals were strangers to that wild broken country and marched among a hostile population, though some Rajput nobles (of the Rathor and Hada clans) fought under the imperial banners.

a divisional commander like his brother Shah Alam, and the force which the latter brought to Ajmir to save the Emperor during Akbar's rebellion, was only 9 to 10 thousand strong (K K ii 266) The Rajput bard's statement that "Seventy thousand men under Tyber Khan were commanded to destroy the Rajputs," is an instance of poetic licence

The Rathor army before Akbar's defection was estimated at nearly 25,000 horsemen (K K ii 263) When the prince rebelled he was joined by 30,000 Rajputs (K K ii 265, *Storia*, ii 245), or 25,000, according to Ishwardas, (81 b) To this body the Maharana contributed only *half* his armed strength (*Adab*, No 756) The Rathor national militia is frequently computed in the Rajput annals at 'fifty thousand *talwar-i-Rathoran*,'—an indefinite expression,—more than double of the real number. The *Raj-vilas* counts the Mewar army as 25,000 strong.

* Tod, i. ch. 13, p. 397.

Moreover, while the invaders lacked a decisive superiority in mere numbers, the Rajput soldiers very early established a personal ascendancy over their enemy.

§12. *Rajput successes.*

A marked increase of Rajput activity began with the Emperor's retirement to Ajmir (in March). They made raids, cut off supply trains and stragglers, and made the Mughal outposts extremely unsafe. From Prince Akbar's letters we learn how effectually the Rajputs succeeded in creating a terror of their prowess. The command of Mughal outposts went abegging, captain after captain declining the dangerous honour and "offering excuses"; the Mughal troops refused to enter any pass, "being overcome by vain fancies"; detachments sat down only a short distance from the base and refused to advance further.* The bitter experiences of Hasan Ali Khan's troops when they were lost for a fortnight in the hills west of Udaipur and the greatest alarm and anxiety which were felt in the imperial camp on their account, must have completely unnerved the Mughal army.

In April, 1680, the Mughal garrison in

* *Adab*, Nos. 662, 666, 733, 734 (officers decline the command of outposts in fear).

Zafarnagar* was invested by Jopal Singh, and its communication with the head-quarters cut off for a time. About the middle of the next month Akbar's camp near Chitor was surprised at night and some slaughter done by the Rajputs who had entered it by a ruse. The Maharana descended from the hills and roamed the Bednor district, threatening Akbar's communications with Ajmir. Such was the terror inspired by the Rajputs that even Hasan Ali Khan refused to invade the hills, pleading the difficulty of transport. The imperialists had to wall their camp around for safety. At the end of this month (May), a terrible reverse befell the Mughal arms: Akbar was surprised by the Rana and evidently suffered a heavy loss. A few days later, the Rajputs carried off a convoy of *Banjaras* with 10,000 pack-oxen bringing grain to the prince's army from Malwa by way of Mandesor and Nimach. The enemy daily grew bolder. One of the Rana's armies under his son Bhim Singh ranged the country, striking swift and sudden blows at weak points. The Emperor's order to lay Mewar waste could not be carried out, as the Mughal captains refused to advance beyond the low country; "our army is

* *Adab*, Nos 721 and 748 I cannot trace this fort, which was situated in the land of the Hada clan, probably Kotah. Rantambhor is too far north to be the place meant, though otherwise it seems most likely.

motionless through fear," so Akbar complains. Even Bednor, north-west of Chitor, was threatened. The Mughal army in Mewar was faced with starvation, and provisions had to be sent to it from Ajmir under strong escort.*

At these signal instances of Akbar's failure, the Emperor in high wrath sent him off to Marwar and placed the command of Chitor in the hands of another son, Prince Azam (26th June).

The imperial plan henceforth was to penetrate the Mewar hills in three columns,—from the Chitor or eastern side Prince Azam would advance by way of the Deobari Pass and Udaipur, from the north Prince Muazzam by way of the lake Rajsamudra, and from the west Akbar through the Deosuri Pass. The first two failed to achieve their tasks; and we now turn to Akbar's operations in Marwar during the second half of the year 1680, of which his 127 letters in the *Adab-i-Alamgiri* give a detailed account.†

The disgraced prince left Chitor on 26th June and went to Marwar by the Barr Pass,‡ a few miles west of Beawar,—Tahawwur Khan ably leading his

* *Adab*; Tod, i. p. 400 (supplies sent from Ajmir).

† Akbar's own account of his operations is given in his letters to Shah Alam (*Adab*, No. 686) and Zeb-un-nisa (*Adab*, No. 700)

‡ The MS reads *B R H A*, *H R H* or *B R H*. Neither *Banera* nor *Barl* (28 m. north of Banera) seems to be the place meant

Van and clearing the way for him. The Rajputs occasionally molested his narch, but they were beaten off, and he even took prisoners at the village of Beawar and another place south of Mairta where the Rathors had made a stand. The town of Sojat in the Luni valley was reached on 18th July, and it continued to be his head-quarters for some months.

§13. *Guerilla warfare in Marwar.*

But in Marwar the imperial arms met with no better success than in Mewar. The Rathor bands spread over the country, appearing unexpectedly in different quarters and scoring a success wherever a Mughal outpost was weakly held, closing the trade routes, and keeping the land in perpetual turmoil. No great pitched battle was fought, but the Mughal general was distracted by the ever present alarm and the necessity of reinforcing threatened points in time; his divisional commanders were worn out by their ceaseless marches and counter-marches in the vain attempt to clear the country of the elusive Rajput bands and keep the roads open for traffic. All parts of Marwar,—Jhalor and Siwana in the south, Godwar in the east, Nagor in the extreme north, and Didwana and Sambhar in the north-east, were invaded by Ajit's partisans in turn, always by surprise, and some times oftener than once.

§14. *Prince Akbar's campaign in Rajputana.*

On entering Marwar, Akbar's instructions were to make the central position at Sojat secure, then occupy Nadol, the chief town of the Godwar district, from which new base his Van under Tahawwur Khan was to advance eastwards into Mewar by the city of Narlai, force the Deosuri Pass, and invade the Kamalmir region, where the Maharana and the defeated Rathors had taken refuge, and from which they used to make sallies. But it took many months to carry this plan out. So great was the terror inspired by the "death-loving" Rajputs that Tahawwur's troops stopped at Kharwa, on the way to Nadol, refusing to advance (early in August). When, a month later, they did reach Nadol, the same fear and inactivity were again displayed. Therefore, the Commander-in-Chief had to go to the place himself, to drive them forward. After making arrangements for the patrolling of the roads and the supply of provisions, establishing a chain of outposts from Jodhpur to Sojat and thence to Nadol, and organizing bodies of pioneers and water-carriers for the campaign in Mewar, Akbar left Sojat on 21st September, and reached Nadol at the end of the month. But Tahawwur Khan refused to enter the hills, and Akbar had to use compulsion towards his timid lieutenant. On 27th September the Khan advanced towards the mouth of the pass to

reconnoitre. The Rajputs under Bhim Singh, the second son of the Maharana, descended from the hills and gave battle, with losses on both sides.* .

Then, for more than a month and a half, we have a long spell of delay which is mysterious. As early as the end of May, the Maharana had proposed terms through Tahawwur Khan; Rathor envoys had been visiting the Khan's camp off and on since the beginning of August. Akbar had warned the Emperor not to take these overtures seriously, as they were clearly intended to delay the Mughal invasion.† Tahawwur Khan had, however, been instructed to win over to his side as many Rathor and Sisodia nobles as he could, and he was, therefore, constantly holding parley with them. How early he had yielded to Rajput seduction and decided to play the traitor, we do not know. But from September 1680 we notice a suspicious slackening of his activity. He is no longer the brave and dashing officer who, as commander of Akbar's Van in the first Jodhpur campaign and the war in eastern Mewar, had won the Emperor's praise and the title of Padishah Quli Khan. He will not advance unless a sergeant-at-arms is sent to compel him; he pleads the difficulty

* The battle has been very graphically described by Ishwardas, 77b-78b *Adab* (Nos. 670 and 700) and Tod. i p 401, briefly refer to it

† *Adab*, Nos. 662, 716, 723, 724

of the roads, the smallness of his own force, and the enemy's overwhelming numbers.

After more than six weeks had been wasted while Akbar sat down at Nadol and Tahawwur Khan at the village of Deosuri near the entrance to the pass, the prince found that his father's patience had been worn out. The Emperor sent him money and reinforcements under the Paymaster Ruhullah Khan with orders to enforce a forward movement of the division. Further delay could not be excused. So, Akbar advanced his base from Nadol to Deosuri (19th November),* and from the latter village sent Tahawwur Khan on to force the Jhilwara Pass (22nd). Three thousand musketeers crowned the ridges right and left in long files, while the Khan, at the head of six thousand picked cavalry, dashed into the narrow defile between. The Rajputs offered a stubborn resistance in defence of their stronghold; many were slain on both sides, but the Mughals advanced to Jhilwara, fighting and carrying the barricades across the path. Ammunition, provisions, and baggage were pushed up to them from the rear by Akbar, and the Khan, from his station at Jhilwara, began to ravage the neighbouring country freely. The Mughal advanced position was strengthened in flank and rear by planting outposts at Someshwar in the north and Sadri in the south of it, building a redoubt at Deosuri, and daily

'patrolling the road from Narlai to the pass. Other outposts under loyal Rajput officers radiated west, north and east, from Nadol as a centre.

The advance to Jhilwara* was made on 22nd November. The next step would have been to push on eight miles south to Kamalmir, the last refuge of the Rana. But during the next five weeks we have again the same suspicious inactivity on Tahawwur Khan's part. Akbar in his despatches to his father weakly complains of his lieutenant's procrastination and defers his own advance till the arrival of fresh reinforcements. But, in truth, the prince's treasonable plot was fully hatched during this period. On 1st January, 1681 he united with the Rajput rebels, issued a manifesto deposing his father, and crowned himself Emperor; and the next day he set out for Ajmir to wrest the Mughal crown from Aurangzib's brows.

APPENDIX VII

THE PARENTAGE OF AJIT SINGH

The official history (*M.A.* 178) asserts that the Rathor escort of Jaswant's family in Delhi, on being hard pressed by the imperial troops and losing many of their number, slew the two widows of Jaswant "who had been brought into the field in male attire," concealed his sole surviving son in the house of a milk-vendor, and then fled. "The *kotwal* Fulad Khan, learning of it, brought the infant to the Court, and he was identified as the late Rajah's son by some of his servant-girls who had been made prisoner.

The boy was brought up in the harem, by Zeb-un-nisa, and named Muhammadi Raj." All other authorities hold that the true son of Jaswant escaped to Marwar and lived to ascend the throne as Ajit Singh. Khafi Khan (ii. 259-260) writes what was most probably the truth, "The Rajputs secured two boys of the same age as the Maharajah's sons and kept them in the tents with every care along with two servant-girls dressed like the Ranis. Then they dressed the true Ranis in male attire and sent them home by forced marches at night, while a strong body of life-sacrificing soldiers was stationed round the tents of the false princes to offer resistance to the Mughals. Then the Emperor ordered the whole family to be conveyed to the fort. The Rajputs, together with the servant-girls (who, as is the wont of their race, could fight like men) sacrificed themselves. Some designing officers, in order to gain credit for superior activity and alertness, got up evidence and persisted so much in asserting the capture of the boys that the nobles and ministers [of the Court] came to believe that the Rajah's sons had really been captured. So long as the Rana of Chitor did not form a marriage connection with Ajit Singh, the suspicion of his being a counterfeit did not leave the mind of Aurangzib." *Dilkasha*, 164, says the same thing. In the numerous letters of Aurangzib, the heir of Marwar is always mentioned as *Ajit-i-jali*, 'the bogus Ajit.'

But Ajit's mother could not have been killed at Delhi, as she afterwards went to Mewar and appealed to the Maharana to befriend her orphan son. As she was an Udaipur princess, no false personation with regard to her could have escaped detection at the Udaipur Court. The Maharana must have satisfied himself with regard to the genuineness of her son Ajit, before he consented to marry him to his own niece. (Tod. ii. ch. 8, i. ch. 13.)

CHAPTER XXXVII

THE REBELLION OF PRINCE AKBAR AND THE END OF THE RAJPUT WAR, 1681-1709

§1. *History of Prince Akbar.*

Sultan Muhammad Akbar, the fourth son of Aurangzib, was only 23 years of age at this time. Having lost his mother a month after his birth, he had been brought up by his father with special tenderness. Early in youth he had received the practical education of Mughal princes by being entrusted with the viceroyalty of provinces and the command of armies in the field, generally under the tutelage of some high minister of State. In the present Rajput war he had commanded in chief, both in Marwar and Mewar. The first Mughal invasion of Marwar had swept everything before it, as the Rathors had no time to organize a national defence. But his campaign in Mewar had been of a different character. There the Maharana had dealt some heavy blows at his force, and paralysed its movements by creating a terror. For these signal proofs of slackness and incapacity, the Emperor had sharply censured Akbar, and the prince had abjectly apologized (2nd June 1680), pleading, "I am merely learning the alphabet in the school of practical

wisdom. Language can describe but a part of the shame and pain I feel at the cursed infidel's astonishing exploit. I have erred grievously through inexperience and human frailty. I beg your Majesty's pardon for these heavy faults, and promise that in future I shall not be the least remiss in caution and vigilance." (*Adab*, No. 655.) But two days later the Rajputs plundered a large caravan of grain, while the Mughal army "did not stir through fear."

This was too much for Aurangzib. He at once removed Akbar from the Chitor command (14th June) and sent him off to Marwar. The prince, smarting under the disgrace, stopped writing to the Emperor for some days, which called forth further reprimands. In Marwar, too, he failed either to crush the roving Rathor bands or to penetrate into Mewar by the Deosuri Pass as planned by the Emperor. Indeed, his six months' stay there (July-December, 1680) was unrelieved by a single decisive military success, if we except the forcing of the Jhilwara Pass which was effected by a commissioner specially sent from Court for the purpose.

§2. *Akbar's treasonable conspiracy with the Rajputs.*

From an early period in the campaign emissaries of the Rajputs had been tempting Akbar to rebel

against his father. Tahawwur Khan, the second in command of the imperial forces in Marwar, was the intermediary of these treasonable negotiations. The Maharana Raj Singh and Durgadas, the Rathor leader, told Akbar how his father's bigoted attempt to root out the Rajputs was threatening the stability of the Mughal empire, and urged him to seize the throne and restore the wise policy of his forefathers if he wished to save his heritage from destruction. In this attempt to place a truly national king on the throne of Delhi, they promised to back him with the armed strength of the two greatest Rajput clans, the Sisodias and the Rathors.*

The negotiations were protracted. First Akbar sent a confidential servant to the Maharana to communicate his secret designs orally. The Rana in return despatched one of his trusted agents to the prince's Court. Everything had been arranged for a march against Aurangzib at Ajmir, when the Maharana died, (22nd October, 1680), and during the month of mourning that followed, his successor Jai Singh naturally remained inactive. Thereafter the negotiations were resumed. Tahawwur Khan having reached the Jhilwara Pass, not far from the Rajput head-quarters at Kamalmir, the new Maharana repeated the demands of his father through the

* Akbar's letter to Shambhuji in *Khatut-i-Shivaji*.

Khan, praying to the prince, "If you wish that the honour of Hindustan should not be totally lost, we clasp the skirt of your robe and hope for deliverance and happiness at your hands." He also sent a secret agent, Rao Keshari Singh, to the prince, who ratified the agreement, promised to treat the Rajputs with honour and justice like the former emperors, and admitted the Rana's claim to certain villages as part of his State. The Rana agreed to send half his army, both foot and horse, under his son or brother to fight the prince's battles. The 2nd of January 1681 was fixed as the day when Akbar would begin his march on Ajmir to contest the imperial throne.*

§3. *Akbar marches against Aurangzib.*

Two days before this date he wrote a false letter to his father to disarm his suspicion. "The brother and son of the new Rana, under the guidance of Tahawwur Khan, have descended from the hills and come to me. The Rathor leaders also have come here to make terms through the mediation of the Khan. They urge that unless I myself conduct them to your Majesty and personally beg pardon on their behalf, they cannot compose their minds for coming over to our side. In making this demand they appeal

* *Adab*, Nos. 756, 762; and Akbar's letter to Shambhuj cited above.

to the precedent of Shah Jahan, when Crown Prince, having personally presented the then Maharana's son to the Emperor Jahangir, [and thus made a lasting peace with the Rajputs]. If this condition is not fulfilled, they decline to come. I am therefore, starting [with them] for your Presence." (*Adab*, No. 676.)

After this last attempt to dupe his father, Akbar threw off the mask. Four theologians in his pay issued a decree over their seals, declaring that Aurangzib had forfeited the throne by his violation of the Islamic Canon Law. Akbar crowned himself Emperor (1st January), and conferred high titles on his adherents,—the chief of them, Tahawwur Khan, being created Premier Noble (*Amir-ul-umara*) and a Commander of 7,000 Horse. Of the imperial officers with him, some willingly joined him; but most others were powerless to resist or to escape, and feigned adhesion to his cause. A few were thrown into prison for refusing to share the prince's treason. Shihab-ud-din Khan, who had been detached to a distance, boldly rode away from the rebel emissary, made a forced march to Aurangzib's side, and was highly rewarded for this timely service.*

For, the Emperor's situation at Ajmir was

* Akbar's rebellion: *M.A.*, 197-204; Ishwardas, 80a-83b; K. K. ii. 265-276; *Storia*, ii. 243-251; *Dilkasha*, 170 (meagre); *Basatin-i-salatin*, 439 (very brief).

critical. The two main divisions of his army which were untainted by treason, were quartered far away, —near Chitor and the Rajsamudra lake. Even the imperial body-guard was absent on a distant service. His immediate retinue consisted merely of unserviceable soldiers, who, with his personal attendants, clerks and eunuchs, formed a total of less than ten thousand, while rumour swelled the rebel army to 70,000 men, including the best blades of Rajputana mounted on the famous horses of Marwar.

Aurangzib had trusted his favourite son too long. Prince Muazzam had given him early warning of Akbar's treasonable intrigues, but his only reward had been a rebuff for raising false suspicion against a younger brother! At last the rebellious movement of Akbar became the common talk of the Emperor's camp, and he could not resist the evidence of spies, official news-writers and other well-informed persons. The scales dropped from the eyes of the doting father, and in the bitterness of disillusionment he cried out, "I am now defenceless. The young hero has got a fine opportunity. Why, then, is he delaying his attack?"

Every one expected a rapid advance of Akbar's troops, the rout of the small imperial body-guard, and a change of sovereigns. The Mughal camp at Ajmir was in the extremity of terror, but not the Emperor. Every day's delay lessened the chances of Akbar's

success, and Akbar was not the man to take time by the forelock. He had never been an active or calculating leader; he had never achieved a victory by his own efforts; and now, in the pride of youth and newly acquired sovereignty, he began to spend his days and nights in indolence and pleasure. The dash on Ajmir and the decisive conflict with his father fell into delay. He took a fortnight (2-15 January) in covering the 120 miles which separated him from his father, when every hour's delay told in Aurangzib's favour.

§4. • *Aurangzib's defensive measures.*

For, meantime, couriers had galloped off on all sides to recall the scattered Mughal detachments to the Presence. Loyal captains were straining every nerve and marching day and night to join the Emperor in time. Shihab-ud-din Khan, the father of the first Nizam, did the second notable service of his long and glorious career by reaching Ajmir (9th January) with his troops after a forced march from Sirohi, in which he covered 120 miles in two days. Next Hamid Khan hurried up with the imperial guards, raising the strength of the defence to 16,000 men. And the good news also arrived that Prince Muazzam was rapidly approaching with his division which would nearly double the imperial army.

The acute stage of the crisis was over. The

palace at Ajmir was put in a posture of defence; entrenchments were dug around the camp; the passes leading to the city were held in force; the neighbouring hills were crowned with batteries; every suspected officer was thrown into prison; reconnaissances were pushed on towards the lake of Pushkar. But the Emperor refused to shut himself up in the fort and thereby lose the initiative. On 14th January, he issued forth into the open, and encamped six miles south of Ajmir on the historic field of Deorai, where he had vanquished Dara. The enemy's Van was located at Kurki,* and the imperial army was marshalled for battle. But despair and defection raged in the camp of Akbar. As he came nearer, increasing numbers of Mughal officers began to desert him and escape to the imperial camp. The thirty thousand Rajputs, however, remained true to him.

The crisis came on the 15th of January. The Emperor advanced four miles further south and waited at Do-rahah, where the road parts, one arm going westwards to Beawar and Marwar and the other turning east towards Agra. News came in quick succession that the enemy were approaching;

* Kurki 24 m. s. w. of Ajmir, and 9 m. n. w. of Pisangan (*Ind. At*, Sh. 34 N W) Do-rahah was seemingly close to the Sardhana station on the railway running from Ajmir to Gujrat. Ishwardas says that Aurangzib encamped at "the village of Begampur, 9 kos from Ajmir" (81 b.)

but the Emperor wisely decided to play a waiting game and refused to precipitate an action; "More men were joining him every hour." In the evening, Prince Muazzam after a forced march through rain and wind and the bitter cold of midwinter, joined the Emperor and brought to him a large and very necessary accession of strength. On the other side, Akbar arrived three miles from his father's camp, halted there for the night, and fixed the next morning for the decisive battle.

§5. *Murder of Tahawwur Khan.*

But during the night Aurangzib's diplomacy, as so often before, triumphed over the heaviest odds and secured the completest victory without resort to arms. The near approach of the rebels to his camp had made the escape of the waverers and enforced adherents in the prince's ranks easy and safe. There had been large defections during the last few days; and now Aurangzib's letters completed the work. Tahawwur Khan, the right-hand man of Akbar, had married a daughter of Inayet Khan, a high officer then in the imperial camp. Aurangzib made Inayet write to Tahawwur Khan urging him to come to the Emperor, with a promise of pardon for the past, and a threat that if he declined "his women would be publicly outraged and his sons sold into slavery at the price of dogs."

The letter bewildered Tahawwur Khan. He felt that he had sinned beyond hope of pardon; but his family was held as hostages in the hands of the enemy, and Akbar's chances of success had by this time dwindled away to almost nothing. After putting on a coat of scale armour under his robe, as a precaution against treachery, he secretly left his tent without informing Akbar or Durgadas, arrived at the imperial camp a little before midnight, and demanded audience. He was ordered to be admitted after being disarmed; but he refused to take off his arms, pleading that as a high officer of State he had never been put to the indignity of being ushered into the Presence unarmed like a captive. The more they urged him to lay his sword and daggers aside the more did his suspicion of treachery grow. The dispute became loud. Some courtiers whispered to the Emperor that Tahawwur had really come there in concert with Akbar to assassinate him. At this Aurangzib in high wrath dropped his rosary, drew his sword and cried out defiantly, "Let him enter with his arms on!" The guards took the hint; one of them gave the Khan a rude shove on the breast; Tahawwur retorted by slapping the insolent fellow on the face, and then tried to run away. But a tent-rope caught his feet, he stumbled on the ground, and the crowd of royal attendants attracted to the spot by the noise rained down blows on him with

their maces. The hidden cuirass saved him for a time, but at last some one cut his throat and "silenced his uproar."*

§6. *Rajputs deceived, abandon Akbar.*

Meantime, Aurangzib had written a false letter to Akbar. In it the prince was praised for the success he had hitherto gained in carrying out his father's stratagem of luring all the Rajput fighters into a snare and bringing them within easy reach of the Emperor; and he was now instructed to crown his achievement by placing them in his Van in next morning's battle, so that they might be crushed when attacked by Aurangzib from the front and Akbar from the rear. As contrived by Aurangzib, the letter fell into Durgadas's hands,† who read it and went to Akbar's tent for an explanation. It was a

* Murder of Tahawwur Khan Manucci says that Tahawwur went to the Emperor's camp to assassinate him (*Storia*, II 247). Some of the courtiers suspected that he had come with this murderous intention in concert with Akbar (K K II 268, *MA* 201). The best account of the affair is given by Khafi Khan whom I follow and who absolves Tahawwur of blame. Ishwardas (82b) holds the same view. That Tahawwur wore cuirass under his coat is no proof that he meant treachery: it was only an act of precaution in a solitary night ride in that troubled time. It is clear to me that he wanted to desert Akbar and his reluctance to submit to the humiliation of entering the imperial Presence unarmed like a captive of war, was due to his resentment at the Emperor undervaluing the importance of the defection of Akbar's right hand man. See also Tod, II 891.

† Khafi Khan (II 269) discredits the story of such a letter having been written. Letter quoted by K. K. Ishwardas (82 a), and Manucci (II. 247). The story was current in the camp, as Khafi Khan admits.

little after midnight; the prince was asleep and his eunuchs had strict orders not to wake him. Durgadas returned in anxious uncertainty to his own tent and sent men to call Tahawwur Khan. Then the

- Rajputs discovered that the soul of the whole enterprise had stolen away to the imperial camp some hours ago. Akbar's sleep was at once taken to be a politic pretence; the intercepted letter was believed to have been verified by facts. No time was to be lost if the Rajputs were to escape from the treacherous plot they had discovered by good luck. Three hours before dawn they took horse, robbed what they could of Akbar's property, and galloped off to Marwar. Profiting by this chance, the imperial troopers whom Akbar had forced to march under his banners and the loyal captains whom he had placed under arrest, escaped towards the camp of Aurangzib. In fact, the flight of Tahawwur Khan was the ruin of Akbar's cause. He had been the connecting link between the Rajputs and Akbar; he had been the new Emperor's Commander-in-Chief and prime minister in one, and his absence dissolved the confederacy.*

§7. *Akbar's flight.*

In the morning Akbar woke to find himself deserted by all. His vast army had melted away in

* Akbar's own words in his letter to Shambhuji.

a single night, as by magic, and only his faithful old retainers, a band of 350 horse, were left with him. The dream of contesting the throne of Delhi had vanished with the night, and only the speediest flight could save him from his father's vengeance. Mounting his ladies on horses and loading what treasure he could on camels, he rode away for dear life in the track of the Rajputs.

Early on the 16th of January the news of his flight reached Aurangzib. There was rejoicing in the imperial camp at this providential escape; the band played as for a glorious victory; the courtiers offered congratulations and presents to the Emperor. The remnant of Akbar's property which had escaped plunder was seized, and his deserted family,—consisting of one wife, two sons, and three daughters,—was brought away to the Emperor's camp. Relentless punishment was meted out to his followers: many were thrown into dungeons; many others were flogged in addition; and the four luckless Canon lawyers who had signed the decree of deposition against Aurangzib were stretched at full length on planks of wood and severely whipped. The Princess Zeb-un-nisa, whose secret correspondence with Akbar was discovered, was deprived of her allowance of four lakhs of Rupees and her landed property, and confined in the Salimgarh fortress. Akbar's name was ordered to be entered in all official

records in future as Akbar the Rebel, and Akbar the Worse (*Akbar-i-abtar*).

The very day of Akbar's flight, Shihab-ud-din Khan had gone out in pursuit and killed many stragglers of the rebel force. A well-appointed army under Prince Muazzam was next sent into Marwar to hunt Akbar down, while orders were hurried off to the provincial governors, commandants of outposts, and zamindars on all sides, to watch the roads and prevent the prince's escape from Rajputana.

Akbar fled for a day and a night and a day again, without finding a refuge. But by that time the Rajputs had discovered the fraud played on them and no longer doubted the prince's sincerity. During the second night Durgadas with the Rajput army turned back and took Akbar under his protection. Rajput honour demanded that the refugee should be defended at all costs. Akbar with his protectors roamed through Marwar, never passing twenty-four hours at the same place so as to give his pursuers no chance of overtaking him. At this Muazzam changed his tactics; he divided his troops and set up a cordon of outposts in Marwar to arrest Akbar's movements. Within a week of Akbar's failure near Ajmir, we hear of his having fled to Sanchor, close to the border between Marwar and Gujrat, while the pursuers reached Jhalor, 70 miles

north of it. But the Mughal officers in Gujrat were on the alert and headed the rebel off. The unhappy prince then entered Mewar, where Maharana Jai Singh welcomed him with presents and invited him to stay. But Udaipur was no more invulnerable to Mughal invasion than Jodhpur. Then Durgadas most chivalrously undertook to conduct Akbar to the Maratha Court, the only Power in India that had successfully defied Mughal arms. With a slender escort of 500 Rathor horse, he issued from Mewar, crossed the Dungarpur range, and set his face towards the Southern Land. Every known ferry and pass was guarded by imperial pickets; but the Rathor leader with the greatest skill evaded them and misled his pursuers as to his real objective. From Dungarpur he made a dash westwards for Ahmadabad; and when it failed, he turned south-east, passed through Banswara and S. Malwa, crossed the Narmada (9th May) near the ferry of Akbarpur, and appeared within a short distance of Burhanpur on the Tapti (15th May). But here, too, his path was barred by imperial officers, and he marched due west through Khandesh and Baglana, finally reaching Shambhuji's protection in Konkan (1st June). To contemporaries the success of this small band in evading capture during such a long and perilous journey seemed incredible except on the

supposition that Khan-i-Jahan Bahadur, the viceroy of the Deccan, had connived at the prince's escape.*

§8. *End of the war with Mewar.*

Akbar's rebellion failed to change the sovereign of Delhi, but it brought unhopcd for relief to the Maharana. It disconcerted the Mughal plan of war at a time when their net was being drawn closer round his State and even his hill refuge had been proved to be not invulnerable. Akbar's defection broke the cordon, and, by diverting all the untainted imperial troops into Marwar, gave automatic relief to Mewar. It was probably at this time that the Sisodias seized the opportunity of making reprisals. One of their armies in charge of the gallant Prince Bhim Singh descended from the Aravalis and spread over Gujrat, raiding Wadnagar, Vishalnagar and some other places, while this disturbance enabled the deposed Rao of Idar to recover his capital from the Muslim usurpers with the help of a band of Rajput adventurers. Another division of the Maharana's army, led by his finance minister Dayaldas, a trader

* Akbar's movements after the failure of his rebellion: His letter to Shambhuji; *M. A.* 203-206, 211; Khafi Khan (the best account), ii. 275-277; *Basatin-i-salatin*, 439; Isinwardas, 83b; Tod, ii. 892-893. For Khan-i-Jahan's complicity, *K. K.* ii. 277; *Dilkasha*, 171. *M. A.* gives reports that Akbar passed to Sanchor, then over the hill of Dugar[pur]—by way of *Berun-garh* (? Bhairon-garh) and Rajpipli—into the Deccan.

by caste, descended on the eastern plains, ravaging Malwa, sacking Dhar, and carrying off a herd of imperial elephants, camels, horses and cattle that had been sent there to graze.*

But both these exploits were of the nature of incursions, and they could not affect the broader issues of the war. Such temporary successes were more than neutralized by the signal incapacity of the new Maharana, Jai Singh, who had inherited neither the military skill nor the organizing genius of his great father, and ruled, besides, over a house divided against itself.

The Rajput war was a drawn game so far as actual fighting was concerned, but its material consequences were disastrous to the Maharana's subjects. They retained their independence among the sterile crags of the Aravali, but their corn-fields in the plains below were ravaged by the enemy. They could stave off defeat but not starvation. The Mughals, on the other hand, might fail to penetrate into the hills of Kamalmir; their outposts might be surprised

* *Mirat-i-Ahmadi* (311) and Ishwardas (80a); the latter authority places these events after Raj Singh's death, which took place on 22nd October, 1680. *M. A.* (205) distinctly states that late in January 1681, Dayaldas intended to make a night attack on Prince Azam's army near Chitor, but it was defeated with heavy loss to the Rajputs. Tod's authority, the Rajasthan poem *Raj-vilas* (cantos 15-17), places these raids in Jan.—Feb. 1680, and greatly magnifies the success of Bhim and Dayaldas (i. 400). I attach no weight to the chronology of the bard.

and convoys cut off occasionally; but they held the low country and received supplies from all parts of the empire.

§9. *Peace with Maharana.*

So, both sides desired peace. A mutual friend was found in Shyam Singh of Bikanir, who informally proposed peace to the Maharana and offered his own services as mediator. The Maharana grasped the hand extended to him, and personally visited Prince Muhammad Azam (14 June, 1681). Through this prince as intermediary a definite treaty was now made between Mewar and the empire on the following terms :

1. The Rana ceded to the empire the *parganas* of Mandal, Pur and Bednor in lieu of the *jaziya* demanded from his kingdom.

2. The Mughals withdrew from Mewar, which was restored to Jai Singh with the title of Rana and the rank of a Commander of Five Thousand.*

The long interrupted friendly relations between suzerain and vassal were renewed. Maharana Raj Singh had died in a state of war; now, eight months after the event, peace having been made, the paternal overlord sent to the new Maharana the

* *M A*, 208, Tod, i p. 403 I cannot understand Tod, i 408 on this treaty. The Mughals were not really so utterly crushed as the bards imagine. The authentic diplomatic papers are given in *Vira-
vinod*, ii 654-662

customary robe of condolence for his father's death. Two months after the treaty the heroic Bhim Singh paid his respects to the Emperor and was taken into Mughal service with his son.*

• §10. *Long and desultory war in Marwar.*

Thus Mewar at last recovered peace and freedom. Not so Marwar. That unhappy theatre of war was turned into a wilderness during the truceless conflict which constitutes Jodhpur history for the next thirty years. "The sword and pestilence united to clear the land." •

Time was in favour of the imperialists, and economic pressure would have worn out Rathor endurance if only the Mughals could have held on long enough. But Akbar's junction with Shambhuji raised a more formidable danger to the empire, and Aurangzib had to concentrate all his forces in the Deccan and even to be present there in person. The Mughal hold on Marwar was consequently relaxed, the garrisons were depleted, and the higher commanders withdrawn. This was the salvation of the Rathors. Throughout the succeeding generation we find the Mughal hold on Marwar pulsating with the military situation in the Deccan. When a great enterprise or a heavy reverse forced the Mughals to

* M. A. 212. Bhim Singh was created a Rajah and posted at Ajmir for the war with the Rathors.

draft more troops to the South, the Rajput nationalists sallied from their dens and struck heavy blows at the thinned Mughal outposts.* When the pressure in the Deccan was relieved, reinforcements were pushed up into Rajasthan and the Mughals recovered their lost positions. The Rathor system of warfare, under Durgadas's able guidance, anticipated the Maratha method and its success by harassing and exhausting the imperialists and even by driving the helpless Mughal commanders to buy a secret forbearance by paying *chauth* to the Rathors. Thus the war went on with varying fortunes, but without cessation for 30 years, till August 1709, when Ajit Singh entered Jodhpur in triumph for the last time and his lordship of Marwar was formally and finally acknowledged by the Emperor of Delhi. [Post Ch. 44,]

The loss caused to Aurangzib by his Rajput policy cannot be measured solely by the men and money he poured on that desert soil. He had concentrated all the resources of the empire against two small States† and had failed to achieve decisive

* In 1099 A. H. the faujdar of Jodhpur died; no troops could be spared from the Deccan; the faujdari of Jodhpur was made part of the duties of the subahdar of Gujrat; Durgadas returned from the Deccan; the deputy faujdari of Jodhpur went abegging among Aurangzib's officers. (*Mirat*, 334-335).

† "For this campaign [1680], Aurangzib put in pledge the whole of his kingdom." *Storia*, ii. 240.

success. Damaging as this result was to imperial prestige, its material consequences were worse still. In the height of political unwisdom, he wantonly provoked rebellion in Rajputana, while the Afghans on the frontier were still far from being pacified. With the two leading Rajput clans openly hostile to him, his army lost its finest and most loyal recruits. Nor was the trouble confined to Marwar and Mewar. It spread by sympathy among the Hada and Gaur clans. The elements of lawlessness thus set moving overflowed fitfully into Malwa and endangered the vitally important Mughal road through Malwa to the Deccan. In the incessant wars which fill the remainder of his reign, the Bundela clan and a few Hada and Kachhwa families supplied the only Rajput soldiers he could secure for fighting his battles. This was the harvest that Jalal-ud-din Akbar's great-grandson reaped from sowing the whirlwind of religious persecution and suppression of nationalities.

APPENDIX VIII

CHRONOLOGY OF THE RAJPUT WAR

[All the dates are given in the Old Style, and when not otherwise stated are based on the *Masir-i-Alamgiri*.]

10 Dec. 1678. Jaswant dies in Peshawar district.

January 1679. Emperor appoints Mughal officers to be *faujdar*, *qiladar*, *amin* and *kotwal* of Jodhpur.

- 9 Jan. Emperor leaves Delhi for Ajmir, (arrives 19 February.)
7. Feb. Khan-i-Jahan is sent by the Emperor to take possession of Marwar.
- 26 Feb. Jaswant's agent reports the birth of two sons to him at Lahor.
- High officers reach Emperor,—*wazir* Asad Khan from the Deccan (17 Feb.), Shaista Khan from Agra (28 Feb.), Prince Akbar from Multan (10 Mar.)
- 1 March. Newly appointed Mughal *qiladar* enters fort Siwanah and searches for Jaswant's property there, without success.
- 9 March. Sayyid Abdullah sent by Emperor to go to Siwanah and attach Jaswant's property, and report on the revenue of Jodhpur, Mairta and other districts. Md. Ali Khan sent with a mason to dig under the foundations, new buildings and grounds of fort Siwanah in search of Jaswant's treasure, (*Akhbarat*, year 22, sheet 1).
- 8 March. . Mughal detachment under Darab Khan destroys the great temple of Khandela, and also those of Sanula and other neighbouring places.
- Maharana's agent brings submissive letter to Emperor. Kumar *Jai Singh, the heir of Mewar, has audience of Emperor, (April); is given conge, 19 April, with presents and *farman* for Maharana.
- 10 March. Emperor leaves Ajmir, and returns to Delhi on 2 April. Shaista Khan and Akbar sent back to their posts (10 March and 13 April respectively).
- 2 April. *Jaziya* reimposed.

- 25 May. Khan Jahan returns to Delhi after demolishing Jodhpur temples.
- 26 May. Indra Singh appointed Rajah of Jodhpur, for a tribute of 36 lakhs.
- July. Durgadas reaches Delhi with Jaswant's family and presses the request for the installation of Ajit Singh with great insistence. One of the two infants dies.
- 15 July. Emperor orders the Ranis and Ajit to be seized and placed in Nurgarh prison-fortress. Battle in the streets of Delhi and on the road to Marwar. [Tod's date 7 Sravan=3 Aug.]
- 23 July. Durgadas reaches Jodhpur with Ajit. Emperor removes Rajah Indra Singh for incompetence.
- 17 Aug. A strong force sent under Sarbuland Khan to wrest Jodhpur from the Rathors.
- 23 Aug. Emperor (at Delhi) learns of a 3 days' battle between Tahawwur Khan and Raj Singh Rathor. The latter killed, with heavy loss on both sides. (*M. A.* 179-180). Tod (ii. 889) places the battle at Pushkar, and gives the date 11 Bhadra=6 Sep.
- *3 Sept. Emperor leaves Delhi for Ajmir, where he arrives 25 Sept. Akbar marches in advance, and penetrates to Mairta.
- Oct. Mughal officers appointed to outposts in Rajputana.—Mandal, Pur, Nimbaj, Siwanah, Dhaman, Mairta.
- 30 Nov. Emperor leaves Ajmir for Mewar; is joined by Akbar from Mairta and Azam from Bengal, 16 Dec. 1679.
- 4 January 1680. Emperor halts in Deobari Pass. Rana had abandoned Udaipur. Azam advances to Udaipur; temples destroyed. Hasan Ali Khan

pursues Rana into the hills and is isolated from imperial army. Mir Shihab-ud-din brings news from his camp.

16 Jan. Akbar goes to Udaipur. Hasan Ali Khan sent (again ?) with a well-equipped force. Attacks Rana (after 21 Jan.), captures his camp and much grain, destroys 173 temples in and around Udaipur, and rejoins Emperor on 29 Jan.

24 Jan. Emperor visits Udaisagar lake (3 temples demolished).

23 Feb. Emperor (from Deobari?) goes to Chitor, 63 temples destroyed.

4 March. Akbar appointed to command of Chitor district.

6 March. Emperor leaves Udaipur, reaches Ajmir 22 March.

6 May. Hamid Khan sent against Rathors of Sojat and Jitaran. Is sent against Mairta on 9 Nov.

14 June. Azam leaves Ajmir, relieves Akbar at Chitor (26 June).

10 Aug. Report received of 66 temples having been demolished in Ambar.

Akbar's campaigns in Marwar. [Dates based on the *Adab-i-Alamgiri*, 266a—293a].

14 May 1680. Night attack on his camp. Rana appears in Bednor district.

2 June. Rana surprises Akbar (about a week earlier.) Emperor censures Akbar for slackness. His base-camp walled round. Rajputs carry off 10,000 oxen laden with grain. Mewar army under Kumar (Jai or Bhim Singh ?) roams the country, threatening Mughal outposts, prepares to besiege Bednor.

- 26 June. Akbar is replaced by Azam, and marches from Chitor to Marwar, by way of Hara (? Barr Pass), Tahawwur Khan leading his Van.
- 18 July. Akbar, from Mairta, reaches Sojat. Tahawwur Khan sent to pursue Rathors to Jhalor, Godwar and Deosuri. Akbar makes many prisoners at Beawar ; they are sold into slavery (? late in July).
- 2 Aug. Tahawwur is ordered to take post at the mouth of Deosuri Pass, and destroy Someshwar temple, but refuses to advance beyond Kharwa.
- End of Aug. Mewar army active in Godwar district and holding passes.
- 21 Sep. Akbar leaves Sojat for Nadol, which he reaches, 30 September.
- 27 Sep. Tahawwur goes to the mouth of Deosuri Pass, fights Rajputs under Bhim Singh.
- 22 Oct. Maharana Raj Singh dies ; Jai Singh succeeds.
- 16 Nov. News of Rathors having descended from the hills and made raids in Marwar in parties. Akbar sends forces against them to different districts.
- 18 Nov. Akbar advances from Nadol to Narlai, en route to Deosuri. Ruhullah Khan, sent by Emperor (M.A. 195), reinforces Akbar here.
- 22 Nov. Tahawwur Khan forces Jhilwara Pass and takes post. Akbar pushes up provisions, ammunition, and baggage from rear (Deosuri).
- 31 Dec. Tahawwur Khan returns to Akbar, with Maharana's son and brother. Akbar decides to march to Emperor. (His rebellion.)
- Akbar's rebellion and conclusion of war with Mewar.**
[Dates based on the *Masir-i-Alamgiri*.]

- 1 Jan. 1681. Akbar is joined by Rathors under Durgadas and Sisodias (? under Bhim Singh). [*Adab* No. 676.]
- 2 Jan. Date fixed for Akbar's march from Deosuri (or Narlai ?) [*Adab*, No. 762].
- 7 Jan. Emperor at Ajmir learns of Akbar's rebellion.
- 13 Jan. Emperor leaves Ajmir and stops at Deorai; enemy located at Kurki.
- 15 Jan. Emperor advances three miles to Do-rahah. Shah Alam joins him. Akbar encamps three miles off. Tahawwur Khan murdered. Flight of Akbar. Akbar crosses the Narmada (9 May); is heard of near Burhanpur (15 May); and reported as living under Shambhuji (6 Aug.)
- End of Jan. Dilawwar Khan defeats Rana's diwan Dayaldas.
- 14 June. Maharana Jai Singh interviews Prince Azam at Lake Rajsamudra, and makes peace with Emperor.
- 18 Aug. Bhim Singh enters imperial service.
- 8 Sept. Emperor leaves Ajmir for the Deccan.

APPENDIX IX

Tod's annals of the war (mostly derived from the poem *Raj-vilas*), criticised in the light of the information supplied by the Persian sources. My criticism is given within square brackets.

War in Mewar. (Tod, i. ch. 13.)

Aurangzib concentrates all the resources of the empire against the Rajputs. Calls up his sons and other leading officers. [*Crit.*—Akbar joined the Emperor at Delhi on 29th August, 1679, Md. Azam joined at Ajmir, 16 Dec. Shah Alam left the Deccan in May 1680, and reached Mewar (lake Rajsamudra) about October. Muhammad

Amin Khan, governor of Gujrat, arrived about 26 Oct. 1679.]

Aurangzib subdues the low country; Rana withdraws to the hills. Mughals capture the strongholds,—Chitor, Mandalgarh, Mandesor, Jiran, and many others (canto x. 117.) Aurangzib stops at Deobari Pass [4 Jan. 1680], sends Akbar to occupy deserted Udaipur, [16 Jan.] Kumar Jai Singh surprises Akbar at Udaipur, while Rana cuts off his retreat eastwards to Deobari. Akbar marches towards Gogunda, which the hills block. Jai Singh releases Akbar on promise of ending the war, and escorts him to Chitor *via* Jhilwara. [*Crit.*—Incredible story. The bearings are wrong. Chitor is east of Gogunda, and one has not to go there *via* Jhilwara which is west, and the way to which involves the needless crossing of hills, while the natural route eastwards *via* Udaipur and Deobari could have been easily opened to Akbar. Equally incredible is Manucci's story, as given in *Storia*, ii. 241, that the Rana encircled the Emperor, cut his supplies off, and captured Udaipuri Begam. The Emperor was methodically guarded in full force during his stay in Mewar: when he stopped at Deobari, his Van occupied Udaipur; when he himself went to Udaipur, a strong force under Hasan Ali Khan advanced westwards pursuing the Rana to Gogunda. The Rana, who was at this time a fugitive, could not have attacked the Emperor who occupied the centre, without destroying the left or western wing of the Mughal army. On the contrary he was actually defeated by this wing on 22nd January. Twenty camel loads of tents and other property captured from the Rana, "who had fled leaving his camp and property behind," were brought (on 29th January) to the Emperor by the victorious Hasan Ali Khan, who also "seized so much grain during this campaign that it led to cheapness" in the camp bazar. (*M.A.* 189.) As the Mughal line from Deobari to Udaipur was unbroken,

Aurangzib's communication with his rear could not have been cut off nor could his wife have been captured, unless she had ventured *west* of Udaipur with a slender escort, which is highly improbable. The envelopment of the Emperor is, I think, the garbled Rajput tradition of the envelopment of Hasan Ali Khan's force near Gogunda, which, however, did not end in a Mughal defeat. Akbar met with some defeats at the hands of the Rana's army, but that was later, *after* the Emperor's return to Ajmir and took place in the open country *east* of the Deobari Pass, as we learn from the *Adab*, which gives detailed and accurate dates.]

Dilir Khan enters by the Deosuri Pass to extricate Akbar ; is cut off by Vikram Solanki and Copinath Rathor. [Crit.—Both the man and place mentioned are improbable. Dilir Khan never served in Marwar nor under Akbar, whose task it was to advance from the *western* or Deosuri side. *Adab*, 649, dated 1 or 2 Sep. 1680, speaks of a plan for Dilir Khan penetrating into Mewar from the *eastern* side, which was in Azam's command. Dilir Khan was serving in the Deccan from June 1676 till after March 1680, and could not have taken any part in the Rajput war before July 1680. We find him with *Azam's* army near the Rajsamudra lake in June 1681. Tod is probably here writing about the attack made by Bhim Singh on Tahawwur Khan in the Deosuri Pass, on 27 Sep. 1680.]

In Falgun (February 1680) Rana with Rathor allies in full force defeats Aurangzib in the Deobari Pass, and drives him back to Chitor. Samaldas cuts off communication between Chitor and Ajmir. Emperor hurriedly retreats to Ajmir to save himself. Thence he sends Ruhullah Khan with 12,000 men to convoy food to his sons at Chitor, but the Khan is defeated at Pur-Mandal by the Rathors and forced back to Ajmir. [Crit.—This is

diametrically opposed to the Persian accounts which represent Aurangzib's visit to Chitor on 22 Feb., his return to Udaipur immediately after, and march from Udaipur to Ajmir, 6-22 March, 1680, as triumphant movements. Mandal was sacked by the Rajputs a year later, 15 Jan, 1681. It is clear that the Udaipur valley was evacuated by the Mughals in March, 1680: if this was the result of a disaster, the Persian accounts are absolutely silent about it. Akbar's army was, no doubt, defeated and his communication with Ajmir occasionally cut off; but that was in April-June, *after* the Emperor's return to Ajmir. I suspect the Rajput bards have made a confusion of dates and persons. Any disastrous defeat of Aurangzib or Akbar seems to me unlikely, as it would certainly have been mentioned in the *M.A.* which does not conceal other imperial reverses.]

Bhim Singh invades Gujrat, captures Idar, and raids some towns. The Rana's *diwan* Dayal Shah ravages Malwa with a flying column, joins Kumar Jai Singh and defeats Azam near Chitor, the prince fleeing to Rantambhor.

Mughals expelled from Mewar. Bhim Singh carries off 500 heads of cattle from the Mughal camp by a night attack, defeats Akbar and Tahawwur Khan at Ganora, the chief town of Godwar.

[*Crit.*—Bhim's raid is described in Ishwardas, 80*a* and *Mirat-i-Ahmadi*, 311-12, and his success in causing scarcity in the Mughal camp evidently in Eastern Mewar *before* March 1680, in Ishwardas, 79*b*. Dayal's success in Ishwardas, 80*a*. But the short official history, *M.A.*, is silent about Bhim Singh's exploits and records only the defeat of Dayaldas by Dilawwar Khan, a lieutenant of Prince Azam, end of January 1681, (p. 205). Prince Akbar writes of Dayal as strengthening the Rajput outposts near Jhilwara (*Adab*, No. 640)].

APPENDIX X.

SUMMARY OF THE NARRATIVE OF THE WAR AS GIVEN IN THE
RAJASTHANI BARDIC CHRONICLES AND TRADITIONS.

A.

(From Rao Gopal Singh's compilation.)

Jaswant Singh died at Peshawar on Paush Krishna 10, 1735 Samvat (=28 Nov. 1678.) The news reached Marwar 18 days later. Shortly afterwards the Mughal subahdar of Ajmir informed the Rathor nobles and officers at Jodhpur that imperial administration would be established in Jodhpur and Mairta. They replied that the Emperor ought to wait and see if either of the two pregnant queens of the late Maharajah would deliver a male heir. A council of regency composed of high Rathor officers was formed in the meantime.

Aurangzib prepared for invading Marwar and himself reached Ajmir on 20th February 1679. He sent Khan-i-Zaman [=Khan-i-Jahan] with 10,000 horse and Tahir Beg on to Jodhpur. On Chaitra Krishna 12 (=27 Feb.) the Khan, marching from Mairta, reached Palāsani, where he was met by messengers from Lahor bringing the news of the birth of two sons to Jaswant, on Chaitra Krishna 4 (=19 Feb. 1679.) Later, he reached Jodhpur. The Rathors peacefully allowed Mughal administration to be set up in Marwar, in order to placate the Emperor.

A deputation of Rathor nobles went to Delhi to urge the claims of Ajit Singh to the throne, but the Emperor would not listen to them, he gave Marwar to Indra Singh, 26 May, 1679.

The Rathors in Delhi fought and carried off Ajit into safety, but both the queens and many of the captains and

troops perished, some 40 men only escaping to Marwar. The news of this fight reached Jodhpur on 4th August, and the Rathors immediately embarked on war, attacking the imperial outposts. Dindai Khan, the Mughal agent in Jodhpur, fled to Nagor. Mairta and Siwanah were recovered by the Rajputs.

The advancing Rathor army, under Raj Singh of Mairta, was met by Tahawwur Khan at Pushkar. A three days' fight took place with heavy slaughter among the Mairta contingent. At the end of it Tahawwur had to retreat to Ajmir.

Indra Singh from Delhi reached Jodhpur on 31 Aug. 1679 and took possession of the city. In October, Maharana Raj Singh sent his minister Shah Dayaldas to the Rathors sheltering in the hills, with proposals for an alliance against the Mughals. The Rathors and Sisodias in concert invested Jhalor, the imperial qiladar of which, Fath Khan, was compelled to pay a ransom of Rs. 10,000.

In November 1679 Aurangzib came to Ajmir again. He sent an army to occupy Udaipur, which the Maharana had vacated. Battle at the Deobari pass.

The Emperor sent Akbar to invade Marwar. Battles were fought at various places. The Rathors had expelled the Mughal outposts at Mairta, Didwana, &c. These were now restored by the prince. Wherever the Rathors arrived they drove out the imperial forces, took plunder and pulled down the mosques. When the Muslim troops arrived they demolished the temples.

As the war was not being conducted to his satisfaction, the Emperor himself went to Mewar and transferred Indra Singh from Jodhpur to Bednor. But after a time

he sent Indra Singh back to Jodhpur to fight Durgadas. Indra was defeated at Osian, 36 miles n. w. of Jodhpur, on Jyaishta Shukla 14 (=1 June 1680) and fell back on Jodhpur.

In the month of June 1680, while Aurangzib was at Ajmir, he ordered Prince Akbar and Tahawwur Khan to attack the Maharana. The main battle was fought at Kundadhah. Then the imperialists encamped at Sojat, whence Tahawwur advanced into the Deosuri district of the Godwar province, fighting the Rathor-Sisodia forces for some days. On the 15th he was defeated at Narlai and forced to fall back on his base.

Akbar could accomplish nothing in this war. He was between two fires: the Emperor's wrath at his failure and the unconquerable strength of the enemy. In despair, he listened to the seductive proposals of the Rajputs to make him Emperor of Delhi if he recognized Ajit's right to Marwar. Ram Singh of Ratlam was the medium of this conspiracy.

Maharana Raj Singh died on 22 Oct. 1680, and the Rathor chiefs went and placed Jai Singh on his throne. The Rajputs raided the roads and invested the cities, levying ransom from all places and the traders on the roads.

While Durgadas and Sonang were halting with their forces at Jaliwara in Godwar, Akbar's agents met them and settled the terms of the pact [evidently in December.] Then Akbar crowned himself Emperor at the village of Khod [or Badul, according to another account] and advanced on Ajmir to attack Aurangzib, who came out of the city and encamped at Dumara, a village 8 m. west of it.

B.

Doings of the Sisodias.(From the *Raj-vilas*.)

At the appeal of the Rathor leaders, Maharana Raj Singh wrote to Aurangzib pleading for the rights of Jaswant's infant son. It only angered the Emperor, who set his army in motion. The Mewar feudatories and Rathor nobles waited on the Maharana, who said, "Hear, ye Samantas! Aurangzib will not understand the case without a fight."

The Rajput army under the Maharana marched out. Five detachments were sent to hold the passes against the enemy. The rainy season began and made the *ghats* impassable.

The Mughals marched on Udaipur, but were struck with terror [before the *ghats*.] Khan Bahadur was afraid to advance. The Emperor then sent Sultan Akbar with 50,000 horse, (his Van being under Husain Aghar), to enter Udaipur. This was done and Mughal *thanas* were established at many places in Mewar. The Maharana ordered his vassals to guard their own homes and issue on raids. [Canto 10.]

Vikram Solanki and Gopinath Rathor opposed the Mughal advance on Deosuri ghat, and made a heavy slaughter of the enemy. This was the first victory of the Maharana's troops and they captured much treasure. [Canto 11.]

Udaybhan, son of Rukhmangad Chauhan, raided the *thana* of Udaipur. [Canto 12.] Prince Akbar advanced. The Maharana from Nenwari sent troops against the Mughals. They defeated Husain Ali [leader of the

Mughal Van], who fell back 50 miles in one night, in the intense cold of Falgun [February], on the prince's camp. [Canto 13.]

Gang (son of Kesari Singh Rawat, a Saktawat) raided Chitor ; Bhim (a son of the Maharana) raided Gujrat and Kathiawad ; Sambaldas Rathor attacked the imperial thana at Bednor (under Ruhullah Khan) ; Dayal Shah sacked Dhar, Sarangpur &c. in Malwa ; Jai Singh (the crown prince) defeated Mir Matang [? at Chitor ?] in June 1680, and then attacked Prince Akbar, who was in fort Chitrakot, defeating and plundering him and driving him back to Ajmir. [Cantos 14-18.]

CHRONOLOGY OF AURANGZIB'S

REIGN :—First half.

All the dates in this book are in the Old Style or unreformed calendar. To convert them to the New Style add 11 days.

The figures within brackets at the end of each entry refer to volume and page of this *History*.—the 2nd ed. of Vols. I & II in one, and the 3rd ed. of Vol. III.

1658

- 5 Feb. Aurangzib starts from Aurangabad to contest the throne ; reaches Burhanpur 18 Feb. ; leaves Burhanpur 20 Mar. (i. 344.)
- 14 .. Shuja defeated at Bahadurpur by Sulaiman Shukoh. (i. 469.)
- 15 April. Aur. defeats Jaswant at Dharmat. (i. 359.)
- 23 May. *First year of his reign officially begins.*
- 29 .. Aur. defeats Dara at Samugarh. (i. 390.)
- 8 June. Shah Jahan made prisoner in Agra fort. (i. 425.)
- 25 .. Aur. imprisons Murad. (i. 433.)
- 21 July. Aurangzib's first Coronation. (i. 446.)
- 30 Sep. Aur. turns back from the pursuit of Dara, from near Multan, in order to fight Shuja. (i. 454.)

1659

- 5 Jan. Aur. defeats Shuja at Khajwa. (i. 488.)
- 9 .. Dara enters Ahmadabad, which he leaves 14 Feb. (i. 499.)
- 13 Mar. Aur. defeats Dara at Deorai. (i. 512.)
- 12 May. Aur. enters Delhi in procession. (i. 615.)
- 13 May. *Second year of reign begins.*

- 5 June. Grand Coronation of Aur. Coronation festivities extend $2\frac{1}{2}$ months, 5 June—19 Aug. (i. 614.)
- 8 June. Muhammad Sultan deserts to Shuja. (i. 588.)
- 9 „ Dara and Sipihr Shukoh captured. (i. 539.)
- June. Islamic ordinances issued. Censor appointed (iii. 81.)
- 21 July. New wall round Agra fort begun.
- 30 Aug. Dara executed. (i. 548.)
- Nov. Presents sent to Mecca (iii. 103.)
- 13 „ Aur. marches from Delhi ; reaches Garh Mukteshwar 24 Nov. ; hunts and hawks in the neighbourhood, 1 Dec. 5 Jan. (iii. 6, 15.)
- 10 Dec. Foundation laid of marble mosque in Delhi fort
- 1660**

- 7 Jan. Aur. leaves Garh Mukteshwar for Allahabad, but returns to Delhi on 13 Feb. (iii. 6.)
- 28 „ Shaista Khan starts from Aurangabad against Shivaji ; captures Chakan fort, 15 Aug.
- 8 Feb. Muhammad Sultan returns to imperial army : reaches Salimgarh as prisoner, 26 Apr. (i. 600)
- 1 May. *Third year of reign begins.*
- 6 „ Flight of Shuja from Dacca, which Mir Jumla enters on 9th. (i. 606.)
- 10 Aug. Amir Kh. sent to subdue Rao Karan of Bikanir. (iii. 26.)
- 20 Nov. Parenda fort surrendered to Mughals by Bijapur general.
- 27 Dec. Sulaiman Shukoh brought to Delhi as prisoner. (i. 563.)
- 1661**

- 16 Feb. Balkh envoy is presented. (iii. 114.)

- 23 March. Daud Khan starts for conquest of Palamau ;
reaches fort Kunda and cantons for the rains,
23 May—15 Oct. (iii. 34.)

March. Famine at Delhi and Lahor.

- 20 April. *Fourth year of reign begins.*

- 22 May. Persian envoy Budaq Beg is presented ; dis-
missed 27 July. (iii. 107.)

- c. 15 Oct. Champat Bundela dies. (iii. 30.)

- 1 Nov. Mir Jumla starts from Dacca on invasion of Kuch
Bihar and Assam. (iii. 157.)

- 19 „ Envoy of Bukhara has audience ; is dismissed
10 Feb. 1662. (iii. 114.)

- 4 Dec. Murad Bakhsh beheaded. (i. 438.)

- 19 „ Kuch Bihar city captured by Mir Jumla. (iii. 158.)

- 13 „ Daud Kh. captures Palamau fort (iii. 39.)

1662

- 17 March. Mir Jumla enters Garhgaon the capital of
Assam. (iii. 161.)

- 10 April. *Fifth year of reign begins.*

May. Sulaiman Shukoh poisoned to death. (i. 565.)

- 12 „ Aurangzib falls ill ; illness takes a turn for the
better 17 June : complete recovery 24 June.
(iii. 10.)

Nov. Imperial treasures removed from Agra to Delhi.
(iii. 7.)

- 16 „ Mir Jumla resumes the offensive after rains.
(iii. 175.)

- 8 Dec. Aurangzib starts for Kashmir. (iii. 14.)

1663

- c. 1 Jan. Assam king makes treaty with Mir Jumla ; the
Mughal army begins its retreat, 10 Jan. (iii. 177.)

- 8 Feb. Aur. reaches Lahor ; leaves it, 1 May. (iii. 14.)
 30 March. *Sixth year of reign begins.*
 31 .. Death of Mir Jumla. (iii. 179.)
 April. Shivaji's night attack on Shaista Khan.
 14 May. Aur. enters Kashmir through Pi Panjal Pass ;
 arrives at Srinagar, 28 May, leaves Kashmir.
 16 August. (iii. 14.)
 2 June. Rajah Raghunath, *naib diwan*, dies. (iii. 64.)
 7 .. Fazil Kh. created *wazir* and *diwan* ; dies 23 June.
 (iii. 65.)
 29 Sept. Aur. reaches Lahor ; leaves it 9 Nov. (iii. 14.)
 30 Dec. Jafar Khan invested as *wazir*. (iii. 65.)

1664

- 5 Jan. Shivaji loots*Surat for the first time
 18 .. Aur. enters Delhi on return from Kashmir. (iii. 14.)
 7 Mar. Shaista Kh arrives at Rajmahal as governor of
 Bengal ; reaches Dacca 13th Dec. (iii. 203.)
 18 March. *Seventh year of reign begins*
 2 July. Costly embassies sent to Central Asia. (iii. 114)

1665

- 3 March. Jai Singh reaches Puna ; opens campaign
 against Shivaji, 14 March ; captures Rudra-
 mal, 11 June , is interviewed by Shiva, 11 June
 8 March. *Eighth year of reign begins.*
 10 April. Custom duty on Hindus doubled. (iii. 275.)
 13 June. Shivaji makes Treaty of Purandar with Jai Singh.
 9 Nov. Shaista Kh. sends out expedition against Sondip
 island. (iii. 205.)
 20 .. Jai Singh opens campaign against Bijapur ;
 captures forts Faltan, Mangalbida &c. Dec. ;
 turns back from 10 miles to Bijapur city.
 5 Jan. 1666.

- 6 Dec. Tribute from Rajah of Kach Bihar received by Aurangzib. (iii. 192.)
 9 .. News received that ruler of Great Tibet acknowledges Aur.'s suzerainty. (iii. 18.)

1666

22. Jan. Shah Jahan dies. (iii. 139.)
 26 .. Shaista Khan captures Chatgaon. (iii. 210.)
 15 Feb. Aurangzib reaches Agra. (iii. 143.)
 25 February. Ninth year of reign begins.
 9 May Imperial treasure removed from Delhi to Agra fort. (iii. 7.)
 12 .. Shivaji is presented to Aurangzib at Agra.
 13 Aug. Shivaji escapes from Agra.
 22 .. Death of Shah Abbas II. Aurangzib learns of it on 12 Dec. (iii. 113.)
 25 .. Army sent to the Panjab to meet threat of Persian invasion. (iii. 112.)
 Sep. Tarbiyat Kh., Mughal envoy, returns from Persia. (iii. 112.)
 9 Oct. Aur. leaves Agra ; reaches Delhi 25 Oct. (iii. 7.)
 26 Nov. Jai Singh reaches Aurangabad on return from Bijapur war with failure.

1667

- 8 Feb. Chanda invaded by Dilir Khan ; Rajah submits.
 15 February. Tenth year of reign begins.
 24 Feb. Md. Kam Bakhsh born to Udaipuri Begam.
 23 Mar. Jai Singh recalled from the Deccan ; dies at Burhanpur about 1 July
 March. Yusufzai rising in Peshawar district. (iii. 224.)
 May. Dilir Kh. invades Deogarh ; Rajah submits.
 9 .. Custom duty on Muslims abolished. (iii. 275.)
 c. 2 Nov. Assamese capture Gauhati. (iii. 186.)

27 Dec. Rajah Ram Singh posted to Assam. (iii. 187.)

1668

4 February. *Eleventh year of reign begins.*

Feb. Music forbidden. (iii. 84.)

15 March. Abdullah Khan, ex-king of Kashghar, is presented at Delhi (iii. 116.) Dies there 20 Oct. 1675.

3 May. Ahom princess married to Muhammad Azam.

1669

3 Jan. Azam married to Jahanzeb Banu, daughter of Dara. (iii. 49.)

23 January. *Twelfth year of reign begins*

9 April. Temple destruction ordered throughout Mughal empire. (iii. 265.)

c. 10 May. Abdun Nabi, faujdar of Mathura, slain by Gokla, the Jat rebel. (iii. 294.)

August. Temple of Vishwanath at Benares demolished (iii. 282.)

Nov.-Dec. Peasant risings in Agra district. (iii. 294.)

28 Nov. Aur. leaves Delhi for Agra, enters Agra' fort. 1 Jan. 1670. (iii. 7.)

1670

13 January. *Thirteenth year of reign begins.*

Jan. Keshav Rai temple of Mathura demolished. (iii. 267, 282.)

„ Gokla Jat captured and executed. (iii. 295.)

6 May. Jafar Khan, *wazir*, dies. (iii. 67.)

18 July. Danishmand Kh. dies.

4 Aug. Bidar Bakht born to Md. Azam.

2 Oct. Shivaji loots Surat a second time.

1671

2 January. Fourteenth year of reign begins.

Hindus excluded from revenue dept. . (iii. 277.)

11 Sep. Raushanara Begam dies. (iii. 59.)

2 Nov. Aur leaves Agra for Delhi ; reaches Delhi 26 Nov. (iii. 7.)

22 December. Fifteenth year of reign begins.

1672

Afridi rising under Acmal. (iii. 228.)

March, Satnami rising. (iii. 298.)

22 April. Afghans destroy Md. Amin Kh.'s army in the Khaibar Pass. (iii. 229.)

11 December. Sixteenth year of reign begins.

16 Dec. Favour shown to captive Md. Sultan and Sipihir Shukoh. (iii. 44.)

1673

3 Oct. Son of Rajah of Kumaun interviews Emperor. (iii. 42.)

?—Khan-i-Jahan defeats Shivaji.

30 November. Seventeenth year of reign begins.

1674

21 Feb. Shujaet Khan slain in Karapa Pass. (iii. 235.)

7 April Aur. leaves Delhi for Hasan Abdal ; arrives there 26 June. (iii. 237.)

19 November. Eighteenth year of reign begins.

22 Dec. Mahabat Kh. dies.

1675

June. Disaster to Mukarram Kh. at Khapush in Bajaur country. (iii. 241.)

9 November. Nineteenth year of reign begins.

26 Nov. Qazi Abdul Wahhab dies. (iii. 75.)

Dec. Guru Tegh Bahadur beheaded. (iii. 313.)

23 Dec. Aur. starts on return from Hasan Abdal. (iii. 242.)

1676

21 Jan. Aurangzib reaches Lahor ; leaves it 24 Feb. ;
reaches Delhi 27 Mar. (iii. 242.)

13 June. Islam Khan, subahdar of Malwa, slain.

8 Oct. Asad Kh. created *wazir*. (iii. 68)

15 .. Muazzam given the title of *Shah-i-Alam* (iii. 46,
243.)

28 October *Twentieth year of reign begins*

3 Dec Muhammad Sultan dies. (iii. 44.)

1677

19 March. Amir Khan appointed governor of Afghanistan.
(iii. 243.)

Aug. Khan-i-Jahan recalled from the Deccan, leaving
Dilir Kh. in charge.

18 October. *Twenty-first year of reign begins.*

18 Nov. Puritanical simplicity introduced into Court.
(iii. 87.)

1678

18 Sep. Shah Alam appointed subahdar of Deccan
Expedition sent against Chhatra Sal Bundela.

Famine in the Pānjab and Central Asia.

7 October. *Twenty-second year of reign begins.*

10 Dec. Jaswant Singh dies at Jamrud. (iii. 325.)

1679

9 Jan. Aur. leaves Delhi ; reaches Ajmir 19 Feb.
(iii. 326.)

7 Feb. Khan-i-Jahan invades Marwar. (iii. 327.)

Feb. Gauhati recovered by the Mughals. (iii. 190.)

10 March. Aurangzib leaves Ajmir ; reaches Delhi 2 Apr.
(iii. 328.)

- 2 April. *Jaziya* reimposed on the Hindus. (iii. 271.)
 26 May. Indra Singh made Raja of Jodhpur. (iii. 328.)
 15 July. Aur. orders Jaswant's son Ajit to be imprisoned
 at Delhi. (iii. 332.)
 23 .. Ajit conveyed to Jodhpur by Durgadas. (iii. 334.)
 3 Sep. Aur. leaves Delhi; reaches Ajmir 25 Sep.
 (iii. 335.)
 26 September *Twenty-third year of reign begins.*
 October. Marwar annexed to Mughal empire. (iii. 336.)
 30 Nov Aurangzib leaves Ajmir for Udaipur. (iii. 339.)
 16 Dec. Md. Azam interviews Aurangzib after forced
 march from Bengal.

1680

- 4 Jan Aurangzib reaches Deobari Pass (iii. 339.)
 23 .. Aurangzib visits Udaipur. (iii. 339.)
 22 Feb Aurangzib visits Chitor. (iii. 341.)
 6 Mar. Aurangzib leaves Udaipur; reaches Ajmir 22
 Mar. (iii. 341.)
 5 April. Death of Shivaji.
 June. Temples of Amber (Jaipur) destroyed. (iii. 357.)
 26 June Akbar relieved by Azam from command of
 Chitor district. (iii. 346.)
 15 September *Twenty-fourth year of reign begins.*
 22 Oct. Maharana Raj Singh dies. (iii. 355.)
 22 Nov Akbar forces Jhilwara Pass (iii. 350.)

1681

- 1 Jan. Akbar crowns himself and starts against Aur. (iii.
 357.)
 16 .. Akbar flees from his camp. (iii. 365.)
 — Ahoms reconquer Gauhati (iii. 191.)
 14 June. Maharana Jai Singh makes Treaty of Rajsamudra
 with Mughal Government. (iii. 370.)

26 July. Azam married to Bijapuri princess.

31 July. Azam created *Shah-i-Alījah* and sent to the Deccan.

14 September. *Twenty-fifth year of reign begins.*

6 .. Jahanara dies. (iii. 58.)

8 .. Aurangzib starts from Ajmir for the Deccan;
reaches Burhanpur 13 Nov. (iv. 252.)

1682

28 Feb. Aurangzib leaves Burhanpur for Aurangabad,
where he arrives, 22 March.

24 August. *Twenty-sixth year of reign begins.*

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